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8 precarious.

Confined by various commitments, the authorities

in Washington have restricted arms sales to Taipei.

The

consequence has been an increasing imbalance in military

potential between the ROC and the PRC in the Taiwan Strait.

Should any Congressional initiative, under whatever pretext,

further impair Taipei's access to arms purchase in the United

States, the consequences might be incalculable.

Conclusions

Any suggestion that sanctions be imposed on the Republic

of China on Taiwan as a consequence of the tragedy that befell

Henry Liu in October 1984 is, at the very best, premature.

No probative evidence has been forthcoming that the government

Moreover,

of the ROC was in any way involved in the murder.

the authorities in Taipei have been more than forthcoming in

assisting U.S. investigation of the homicide, allowing

American officials to conduct their investigations in Taiwan

in the pursuit of evidence.

Whatever the case, however, the imposition of sanctions

on the ROC that might affect the ability of the ROC military

command to maintain its self-defense capabilities would

seriously impair U.S. interests in the region.

The U.S.

Congress is urged to be very circumspect in imposing sanctions

that might undermine the viability of the ROC.

That

impairment would threaten the human rights of 19 million

Chinese who would then find themselves exposed to military and political threat emanating from the People's Republic of

China. Any threat to the future of the ROC would constitute

i a threat to U.S. interests, which are served by the continued

success of the open market economy of Taiwan. The economic success of the ROC offers Asian nations an alternative to the

hierarchical command economy model explicit and implicit in

the extant system on the mainland of China.

The U.S. has

every interest in seeing the acceptance of an open-market,

rather than a command, economy in East Asia.

Any threat to the survival of the ROC would be a threat

to the security interests of the United States.

The Taiwan

Relations Act specifically identifies the ROC as a security

asset and its position on the critical waterways to Japan

and the Republic of Korea makes its importance evident.

It is common knowledge that the ROC is one of the major

economic partners of the U.s, in the Pacific Basin.

The ROC

is not only a major source of commodity imports into the

United States, Taiwan is also a major agricultural commodities

market for U.S. products.

None of this should be threatened for anything less than

compelling reasons. Systematic human rights violations--a

persistent and certifiable pattern of such violations as

evidence of government policy--might well constitute just such

a reason. All the evidence indicates, however, that the

authorities in Taipei have made concerted efforts, over the

[blocks in formation]

At best, any action by the United States government as

a consequence of the unfortunate Liu case, in terms of

sanctions against the authorities in Taipei would be premature.

Whatever its failures in the past, the government of the

Republic of China on Taiwan has been sensitive to U.S. concerns

with respect to fundamental, civil and political human rights.

As we have seen, in the judgment of the U.S. Department of

States, the "outlook for continued improvement in human rights

[on Taiwan] appears favorable."

Any actions on the part of

the government of the United States which would obstruct that

improvement, by increasing the measure of threat under which

the government in Taipei must operate, would be counterproductive.

Any imposition of sanctions would contribute to the measure

of threat--and should be abjured.

They would do nothing to

increase the availability of human rights on Taiwan, and could

very well threaten very fundamental U.S. and Chinese interests.

Notes to the Henry Liu Murder Case

1. See the discussion in A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia

Chang, The Republic of China and U.S. Policy: A Study in Human Rights (Washington, D.C. : Ethics and Public Policy, 1983).

2. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1980), p. 526.

3. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983

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(Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1984), p. 756.

4. See the testimony of A. James Gregor, before this

subcommittee in Martial Law on Taiwan and United States Foreign

Policy Interests (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 7-46.

5. See the comprehensive discussion in Raymond D. Gastil (editor), Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil

Liberties 1983-1984 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984).

6. In this regard, see the discussion in Hungdah Chiu, Chinese Law and Justice: Trends Over Three Decades (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 1982) and Socialist

Legalism: Reform and continuity in Post-Mao People's Republic

of China (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law);

Tao-tai Hsia, "Legal Development in the People's Republic of

China, 1949-1981," in Hungdah Chiu and Shao-chuan Leng (eds.),

China: Seventy Years After the 1911 Hsin-hai Revolution

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(Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1984).

7. For a discussion of the importance of the Roc to

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American interests, see A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia

Chang, The Iron Triangle: A U.S. Security Policy for North

en

ceat

east Asia (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984).

8. Martin L. Lasater, Taiwan: Facing Mounting Threats (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1984), and A. James Gregor, "U.S. Interests in Northeast Asia and the Security of

mes

Taiwan," Strategic Review, Winter 1985.

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