Ms. JACKSON LEE. Explain the safety factor that you are speaking of. Mr. DELFAY. The tests indicated that just the very act of mixing the taggant with the smokeless powder would affect its performance. Either it would not perform sufficiently, as I mentioned earlier, to expel the projectile out of the barrel which obviously creates a very unsafe situation the next time the gun is fired. And also increases sensitivity or decreases the stability of the powder when it is mixed with the taggant by the manufacturer. Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is the response or at least your analysis on safety an internal process or it has been an outside entity that analyzed this? Mr. DELFAY. Basically everything I have said is based on the study of the Office of Technology Assessment done in the late 1970's or early 1980. Ms. JACKSON LEE. In light of where we are today in looking at legislation prospectively or presently since we will be looking at this as closely and currently as tomorrow, would you not think that more current studies might be appropriate for concerns that are being expressed today? Mr. DELFAY. Exactly. We support the provision of this legislation that calls for a further study on the use of detection and identification taggants. Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would there be any balance of cost/benefit analysis that would encourage you to have support even in light of the increased costs when you would find that there would be a greater ability of saving lives and that would be balanced against what the individual would have to pay for the utilization of this ammunition? Mr. DELFAY. Certainly there could be. Cost is not the key consideration right now. Safety is the key consideration. The very real likelihood that with the objective of trying to detect who might have been involved or behind an explosion or bombing incident, we injure innocent people who might be involved in the production of explosives or sportsmen and law enforcement officers using them for hand loading or sports application. Ms. JACKSON LEE. You are then comfortable with possibly findings that might show that the ability to save lives are so great that the cost increments would be worthy of expending? You would be willing to review that kind of data and accept it? Mr. DELFAY. Yes. Ms. JACKSON LEE. Any of you that might be able to answer and some of my colleagues might be able to answer, I just wanted to explore, and I think I heard Mr. Hay somewhat comment on this. And this is, of course, going back to the basic raw materials that were used in the tragedy of Oklahoma City. And those of us who have followed it and still in the midst of receiving data know that a huge truck or a fairly decent sized truck was filled up with a certain basic garden resource. What guidance can we get or what-and I would appreciate anyone who wants to offer to answer this-with the ability of citizens to use a variety of nonthreatening elements that can ultimately then be threatening, as we look to legislation? Mr. HAY. Well, I interpret your question to be whether it is possible to make explosives out of commonly available ingredients and what can we do about it? And my answer is, yes, it is and for the second part of that, I don't know. Ms. JACKSON LEE. Good answer. Mr. HAY. There are so many possibilities for making explosives out of chemicals. As a youngster, I used to make my favorite explosive out of Clorox. This is not something you would do all the time, but if you had to do it, you could do it. And if you are trying to figure out all of the possible ingredients that could be used to make an explosive and eliminate them from the market or alter them in some form, it is actually mind-boggling. Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, could I get unanimous consent for an additional minute to pursue that, please? Mr. HYDE [presiding]. You above all people can get unanimous consent for one additional minute. Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, very much. I will conclude with this. Mr. Hay, you are interested in Clorox and we have seen fertilizer components and I was thinking about corn and whatever else might come about. Difficult as it is, we are all facing the magnitude of the tragedy. It is certainly one that we hope we will not face. again. We faced a situation that did not have the same components that the Twin Towers in New York. Would it be feasible to monitor the buying of large quantities by nonwholesalers or nonprofessionals? Is that an option that could be reviewed? Would there be sufficient data, sufficient insight ability to review those kinds of purchases? I imagine as a young boy buying Clorox you didn't need to get an oil drum full or whatever else one might imagine. Mr. HAY. I think it would be. Certainly, limiting the acquisition of materials in very large quantity, you would think would deter the production of very large bombs. It doesn't deter, of course, the production of smaller bombs if you can buy the material still in smaller quantity or a very patient person could go to 100 different stores and buy 10 pounds in each store, perhaps, and accumulate the thousand pounds again. I would say it is a logistic problem. I don't think that I am well-qualified to talk about how much patience these terrorists might have in the pursuit of their goals. Ms. JACKSON LEE. There again, that may yield itself as well to a cost/benefit analysis and may be worthy of further analysis on how you monitor those kinds of purchases. I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Delfay, I noticed that your organization does support the study. Do you have any alternative recommendations to putting taggants into various types of explosive materials? Mr. DELFAY. Additional recommendations for detecting or preventing or helping to solve bombing incidents? Mr. GOODLATTE. That is correct. Mr. DELFAY. As I reviewed the legislation before us, I think there are several provisions in there. Mandatory sentencing and others, but none that might relate to the manufacture of smokeless powder or black powder. Mr. GOODLATTE. The sentencing comes in after you have apprehended the person. Obviously the taggants are directed at attempting to assist in narrowing the field of investigation in order to detect who committed a particular crime. You don't have any recommendations along those lines? Mr. DELFAY. None that I could think of that would relate to the production of smokeless powder, even in the detection or identification later on; no. Mr. GOODLATTE. How about you, Mr. Ronay? Mr. RONAY. I cannot think of an assistance to identification of the explosive product that could be included safely in the product without serious study and bringing in people who would be expert in that area. I can say from my law enforcement experience that explosives carry a Federal code now. It has been required for many years. And as long as they are in their original container or wrapper, they are easily identifiable with the manufacturer. Forensic instrumentation and chemists can identify products that are unconsumed, that is out of the wrapper but in bulk. The unique formulations are identifiable. So, there are mechanisms in place already to assist law enforcement, even with residues which are not complete, as well as unconsumed products. After the detonation, forensic laboratories are capable of identifying the type of product and in many cases even the specific product. Mr. GOODLATTE. Is that based upon the wrapper and so on that you are talking about or is that based upon the chemical content? Mr. RONAY. Chemical analysis. Mr. GOODLATTE. Different explosive manufacturers are utilizing different compounds? Mr. RONAY. Yes, they do and even though they may be both making a dynamite or an emulsion, their formulations are different. Even from the same manufacturer, the formulation varies to some degree. And a good forensic laboratory can tell the difference and establish a fingerprint from an unconsumed amount of that explosive and tell you that it matches even a particular batch. They are very, very qualified to do that. In a postblast situation it is harder because you have less to work with. But what I am getting at is that there are a lot of tools there for law enforcement already. And adding something to the explosives, aside from the considerations of that in itself, doesn't offer a whole lot more for law enforcement or the forensic laboratory. Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you very much. Mr. Hay, you mentioned-and I think it is widely noted that there are a number of different chemical compounds that are explosive in nature, everything from gasoline we put in the tank of our car to the Clorox you mentioned and a number of other things. Is there anything unique about ammonium nitrate in terms of its explosive character or capability that we should be aware of? Mr. HAY. No, sir, the most unique thing about ammonium nitrate is the extremely low cost. And this is what makes it attractive as the commercial blasting agent; the other thing which goes along with the low cost is its wide availability because of its use as a fertilizer as well as an explosive ingredient. In those two respects it is unique but if you take ammonium nitrate off the market entirely there are still various ways to make other explosives or even in fact to make ammonium nitrate. If you have nitric acid and ammonia, you can make ammonium nitrate yourself. If you have nitric acid you can make nitrates out of an inconceivably large list of substances, all of which would have some explosive properties. Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Seitz' testimony seems to point to the enormous size of an explosive that you can create with ammonium nitrate from a very low cost and you pointed out that inexpensive cost. What are we talking about in terms of a differential between the costs of making a bomb the size of the one utilized in Oklahoma City from ammonium nitrate compared to some of the other materials you have mentioned? Is it just a slight difference or is it several times? Mr. HAY. It is a large difference. When we buy ammonium nitrate, the cost is rather more than 8 cents a pound, but it is not much more than 10 cents a pound. And most laboratories-it depends on where you buy. If you buy your reagent grade chemicals from your local scientific chemical supply house, you are going to pay several dollars a pound. Whether these materials can be obtained in lower purity from some chemical supplier, I don't know if you can buy nitric acid in bulk cheaper than you can buy it in a laboratory supply house, but I suppose that you can. But we might be talking about a factor of 10 or more in increased price. Mr. HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HYDE. The Chair wants to thank this panel for a very informative presentation on a subject that is complicated and difficult. And I think that we all agree on the need for a study and effective, intensely focused study on taggants as well as additives, we would all be better off and we need to update what studies exist and collate them. So we thank you very much and the committee will stand in recess until 1:30, when the sixth and last panel will be present to testify. [Recess.] Mr. HYDE. The committee will come to order. The Chair apologizes for the delay. We are some minutes late, but we had some votes on the floor and some conferences about the votes and votes to follow. And, so, the best laid plans of mice and the Judiciary Committee often don't work out the way we had hoped. We have panel six, a very distinguished panel which will be the last panel for these hearings concerning counterterrorism legislation. First, Mr. Khalil Jahshan is the executive director of the National Association of Arab Americans whose membership is com prised of both Muslim and non-Muslim Americans. Mr. Jahshan served as chairman of the Council of Presidents of National Association of Arab Americans, an umbrella organization representing a majority of the 3 million Americans of Arab ancestry. Next we have Dr. Azizah al-Hibri, an advisory board member of the American Muslim Council, a nonprofit sociopolitical organization dedicated to serving the interests of the Muslim community with over 10,000 members. Dr. al-Hibri is an associate professor of law at the University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law, is a member of the Virginia State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Ruth Lansner is the chair of the National Legal Affairs Committee of the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League. John H. Shenefield is the chairman of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Law and National Security. He is a partner at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, and chairman of their antitrust and trade regulation section. Formerly he served as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division and Associate Attorney General with specific responsibility over Intelligence and Intelligence Oversight. And so, would you gentlemen please take your places. I am sorry, Dr. al-Hibri is a female, for which I apologize for referring to her as a gentleman. We will go from my right to left and will be your left to right. So, first, Khalil Jahshan, we are pleased to hear from you. Would you put the little switch on and put it toward you? STATEMENT OF KHALIL E. JAHSHAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, Mr. JAHSHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to present testimony before this distinguished panel today on the subject of counterterrorism legislation on behalf of the National Association of Arab Americans. As Arab-Americans, we welcome efforts in Congress to strengthen the counterterrorism capabilities of law enforcement agencies in the United States. Like all Americans, we want to ensure that acts of terrorism can be prevented and, when such acts do occur, that the perpetrators, regardless of their identity, can be apprehended and severely punished. Strong and effective legislation, however, must ensure an equitable balance between the Nation's legitimate and very pressing security needs and the constitutionally protected freedoms and individual rights on which our democracy is based. Immediately after the tragic bombing in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, NAAA was among the first American organizations together with other Arab and Muslim organizations to condemn that barbarous act and express horror and disgust at the wanton destruction of human life that resulted from that tragic event. At the same time, Arab-Americans were concerned with the tendency of certain media outlets and so-called "experts on terrorism" to speculate prematurely at the identity of the perpetrators of the Oklahoma City bombing, thus giving way to endless speculation that the perpetrators were of Arab or Muslim or Middle Eastern |