Such, at least, was, and is my opinion. The Government, however, took a different view of the subject. Many thought it unconstitutional. Some looked upon it as a project to relieve the planters. Others thought it nothing short of a South-Sea speculation. I considered it, then and now, just as Constitutional as to give bonds for gunpowder, or to buy other munitions of war. It was not with a view to relieve the planters, though its incidental accommodation to them would not have been objectionable, but with the view of wielding effectually the element of the greatest power we could command, that I wished this course adopted. This resource, then,-this element of power, we still havethough not to the same extent. There is enough, however, to effect wonderful results, if properly used, as it can be. We may have lost a year or two, but we are far short of seven years' war yet. With our ports open many of the present evils and hardships of the war would be relieved. We would no longer have to give fifty dollars for a bushel of Liverpool salt, or ten dollars for the roughest sort of shoes. With ports open and this in hand, we should be much better able to make it a Peloponnesian struggle, if our enemy choose so to make it. This view, and one other idea, I presented to the people at Sparta, upon the subject of cotton, which I will repeat here.

Many to be met with suppose that by abandoning the growth of cotton and burning what we have, we can force our recognition abroad. This, I told the people there, and tell you, is, in my judgment, a radical and fundamental error. England will never be controlled by such a policy. Our cotton should be treasured up, not sold-more precious is it than gold-for it is more powerful, as a sinew of war, than gold is. Like gold, and everything else of value, it should be destroyed, if need be, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, but with no view to a foreign policy; nor should the production of cotton be abandoned, with such a view. You could not please Lord Palmerston better than to let him know that there would not be grown a pound of cotton in the Southern Confederacy for twenty years. The power of cotton is well known to and felt by British statesmen. They know it is King in its proper sphere, and hence they want the scepter of this King for their

own use.

The great error of those who suppose that King cotton would compel the English ministry to recognize our Government and raise the blockade, and who will look for the same result from the total abandonment of its culture, consists in mistaking the nature of the kingdom of this potentate. His power is commercial and financial-not political. It has been one of the leading objects of Lord Palmerston, ever since he has been in office, to stimulate the production of cotton in his own dominions or those of his Sovereign-so as not to be dependent upon us for a supply. This he cannot do to any extent, while his inexperienced producers have to compete with us. Cotton can be raised in their East

India possessions, and those on the western coast of Africa, at eighteen or twenty cents a pound; but it cannot be raised there profitably, to any extent, in competition with us at eight or ten cents. If assured, however, of no competition from this quarter, they could, or it is believed would, after a while, get to producing it as cheaply as we can.

Improvements in agriculture are slower in their progress than in any other department of life. No one can safely or wisely say how cheaply cotton may or may not be grown in those countries, with a few years' absolute control of the market, nor that the quality of the article may not be as good. No one can tell what may be effected by improvements in agriculture and the introduction of new varieties suitable to climate and soil. More money can be made here by growing cotton now at eight cents a pound, than could be made at eighteen cents forty years ago. The quality is also greatly superior to the old black seed. More persons can now pick three hundred pounds a day than could pick one hundred when I can first recollect; and one hand and horse or mule can cultivate twice as much land. It is a great mistake, I think, to suppose cotton cannot be grown as cheaply, and with as good a staple-fine a fibre-in other countries, as it can in this-not in all places where it is now grown, but in some.

There is nothing within the bounds of human knowledge on which reliance can be placed with such certainty as to results, as upon the laws of nature. It is on these laws governing the races of men that our Institutions are based. And there is nothing better ascertained in the floral kingdom, than that on the same geological formation, within the same lines of temperature and climatic conditions, (either from altitude or latitude,) the same species and varieties of plants will grow, each producing its like under similar culture to as great perfection in one hemisphere as the other, and upon one continent as another. We have one advantage in the production of cotton which they have not in the British Provinces. This has no reference to climate, soil or varieties. It is our system of labor. On our advantage in this particular, and to this extent, (which is no inconsiderable item,) we may rely in looking at the prospect of competition in the future, with these countries, should they, by a continuation of our blockade, or our necessary abandonment of the culture for a time, have the market of the world to themselves.

We should not, therefore, think of abandoning the production of cotton, with any idea of thereby advancing our interests-politicallyabroad. This would be but playing into the hands of those Powers who are trying to break it down. We have had to curtail it, and shall have to curtail it while the war lasts-especially while the blockade continues. Duty and patriotism, as well as necessity, require this. The first great object of all now, should be to sustain our Cause; to feed, as well as clothe men in the field. To do this besides raising sufficient provisions for home consumption, will necessarily require larger grain crops. To

have an abundance for home consumption, and for the army, should be the object of every one. This is dictated by the highest considerations of home policy, and not from any view of advancing our interests abroad. On the contrary, after sufficient provisions are made for home consumption and to supply the army, the more cotton that can be grown the better.

II.

LETTER OF THE AUTHOR ON MARTIAL LAW, AND RESOLUTIONS ON THE SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS INTRODUCED BY HON. LINTON STEPHENS IN THE GEORGIA LEGISLATURE AND PASSED BY THAT BODY, IN MARCH, 1864, WHICH WERE APPPROVED IN A PUBLIC SPEECH, BY THE AUTHOR ; AND WHICH WITH THE LETTER PRESENT HIS VIEWS UPON THOSE MATTERS REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT, PAGE 574.

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, September 8th, 1862.

HON. JAMES M. CALHOUN, Atlanta, Ga.:

DEAR SIR :-Your letter of the 28th ult., to Hon. B. H. Hill, was submitted to me by him a few days ago, for my views as to the proper answer to be made to your several inquiries touching your powers and duties in the office of Civil Governor of Atlanta, to which you have been appointed by General Bragg. I took the letter with the promise to write to you fully upon the whole subject. This, therefore, is the object of my now writing to you. I regret the delay that has occurred in the fulfilment of my promise. It has been occasioned by the press of other engagements, and I now find my time too short to write as fully as I could wish. The subject is one of great importance, and this, as well as matters of a kindred sort, have given me deep concern for some time past.

I am not at all surprised at your being at a loss to know what your powers and duties are in your new position, and your inability to find anything in any written code of laws to enlighten you upon them. The truth is your office is unknown to the law. General Bragg had no more authority for appointing you Civil Governor of Atlanta, than I had; and I had, or have, no more authority than any street-walker in your city. Under his appointment, therefore, you can rightfully exercise no more power than if the appointment had been made by a street-walker.

We live under a Constitution. That Constitution was made for War as well as Peace. Under that Constitution we have civil laws and military laws; laws for the civil authorities and laws for the military. The first are to be found in the Statutes at Large, and the latter in the Rules and Articles of War. But in this country there is no such thing as

Martial Law, and cannot be until the Constitution is set aside—if such an evil day shall ever come upon us. All the law-making power in the Confederate States Government is vested in Congress. But Congress cannot declare Martial Law, which in its proper sense is nothing but an abrogation of all laws. If Congress cannot do it, much less can any officer of the Government, either civil on military, do it rightfully, from the highest to the lowest. Congress may, in certain cases specified, suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus, but this by no means interferes with the administration of justice, so far as to deprive any party arrested of his right to a speedy and public trial by a jury, after indictment, etc. It does not lessen or weaken the right of such party to redress for an illegal arrest. It does not authorize arrests except upon oath or affirmation upon probable cause. It only secures the party beyond misadventure to appear in person to answer the charge, and prevents a release in consequence of insufficiency of proof, or other like grounds, in any preliminary inquiry as to the formality or legality of his arrest. It does not infringe or impair his other Constitutional rights. These Congress cannot impair by law. The Constitutional guarantees are above and beyond the reach or power of Congress, and much more, if it could be, above and beyond the power of any officer of the Government. Your appointment, therefore, in my opinion, is simply a nullity. You, by virtue of it, possess no rightful authority; and can exercise none. The order creating you Civil Governor of Atlanta, was a most palpable usurpation. I speak of the act only in a legal and Constitutional sense-not of the motives that prompted it. But a wise people, jealous of their rights, would do well to remember, as Delolme so well expressed it, that "such acts, so laudable when we only consider the motive of them, make a breach at which tyranny will one day enter," if quietly submitted to too long. Now, then, my opinion is, if any one be brought before you for punishment for selling liquor to a soldier, or any other allegation, where there is no law against it, no law passed by the proper law-making power, either State or Confederate, and where, as a matter of course, you have no legal or rightful authority to punish, either by fine, or corporeally, etc., you should simply make this response to the one who brings him or her, as the case may be, that you have no jurisdiction of the matter complained of.

A British Queen (Anne) was once urged by the Emperor of Russia to punish one of her officers for what His Majesty considered an act of indignity to his ambassador to her Court, though the officer had violated no positive law. The Queen's memorable reply was that "she could inflict no punishment upon any, the meanest of her subjects, unless warranted by the law of the land."

This is an example you might well imitate. For, I take it for granted that no one will pretend that any General in command of our armies, could confer upon you or anybody greater power that the ruling Sov

ereign of England possessed in like cases under similar circumstances. The case referred to in England gave rise to a change of the law. After that an act was passed exempting foreign ministers from arrest. So with us. If the proper discipline and good order of the army require that the sale of liquor to a soldier by a person not connected with the army should be prohibited, (which I do not mean to question in the slightest degree,) let the prohibition be declared by law, passed by Congress, with pains and penalties for a violation of it, with the mode and manner of trying the offence plainly set forth. Until this is done, no one has any authority to punish in such cases; and any one who undertakes to do it is a trespasser and a violator of the law. Soldiers in the service, as well as the officers, are subject to the Rules and Articles of War, and if they commit any offence known to the Military Code therein prescribed, they are liable to be tried and punished according to the law made for their government. If these Rules and Articles of War, or in other words, if the Military Code for the government of the army is defective in any respect, it ought to be amended by Congress. There alone the power is vested. Neither Generals nor the Provost-Marshals have any power to make, alter or modify laws, either military or civil; nor can they declare what shall be crimes, either military or civil, or establish any tribunal to punish what they may so declare. All these matters belong to Congress; and I assure you, in my opinion, nothing is more essential to the maintenance and preservation of Constitutional Liberty than that the Military be ever kept subordinate to the Civil. Authorities. You thus have my views hastily, but pointedly given. Yours most respectfully,

ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS.

RESOLUTIONS ON WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

The General Assembly of the State of Georgia do resolve :

1st. That under the Constitution of the Confederate States, there is no power to suspend the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, but in a manner and to an extent, regulated and limited by the express, emphatic, and unqualified Constitutional prohibitions, that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," and that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the places to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." And this conclusion results from the two following reasons: First, because the power to suspend the Writ, is derived not from express delegation, but only from implication, which must always yield to express, conflicting, and restricting words. Second, because this power being found nowhere in the Constitution, but in words which are copied from the original Constitution of the United