brought, as they might have been, to act in concert in that election.

I have now gone through with what Mr. Buchanan was pleased to say in his book on the Missouri Compromise, the Compromise of 1850, and the legislation of 1854. I cannot quit the subject, however, without one other remark, upon another statement by him, in the extract which I read; and to express my very great surprise, that it should have been made by him. I allude to what he says about the Constitutionality of the old Missouri Restriction, and his assertion that, if "this question had been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, to be in violation of the Constitution, in a case arising before them, in the regular course of judicial proceedings, the decision would have passed off in comparative silence, and produced no dangerous excitement among the people."

Now, it is well known that the Supreme Court did decide this question in the very way and manner spoken of by him, and that they did decide it to be in violation of the Constitution, and, therefore, void from the beginning; yet, nothing that Congress had ever done so much excited the Restrictionists, as this regular and solemn adjudication did.* By resolves and denunciations in every form and shape, this entire class of agitators expressed their fixed determination never to be bound by it, and resorted to all the epithets of abuse they could command to cast odium upon the learned Judges who made it; especially did they exhaust their vocabulary of defamation in their attempts to blacken the name of Chief Justice Taney, who delivered the judgment of the Court. This eminent jurist, who thus became the marked object of their vituperations, was no less distinguished for his public than his private virtues. In all the qualities

*19 Howard's Reports, p. 393.

which characterize a good citizen, as well as an able statesman, he had no superior in the country. By his legal and judicial acquirements, he had added new lustre to that Bench to which Marshall, whom he succeeded, had already given so much distinction and renown, not only in this, but in foreign countries.

Enough, however, on this subject.

The facts adduced show that there was no "breach of Compact" or of "faith," and that there was no " aggression" on the part of the South in the legislation of 1854. Whatever excitement followed that legislation was gotten up by the Restrictionists, who would be bound by no Compact in the premises, not even by the Constitution itself, which they were sworn to support. These are the enduring facts of history.

So after all these three last long talks, in which we have gone over extensive new grounds, we come back to the point at which we had arrived before, in relation to the open, palpable, and avowed violation of the Constitution by the Centralists and Restrictionists in the matter of the rendition of fugitives from service. We have seen, conclusively, that in that matter the wrong, the aggression, the acknowledged "breach of faith," was on the side of the non-slaveholding States alluded to, and that in no instance pointed out by Judge Bynum, as an excuse or palliation, was there any aggression or breach of faith by the Southern States. They were ever true to their Constitutional obligations, and resorted to a withdrawal from the Union only when it became the thorough conviction of their leading men, that it was the object of the Centralists, by using this question, to accomplish their purpose Of effecting a Consolidated Empire instead of continuing the Federal Republic. We have seen that by public law*

* Ante, vol. i, pp. 405 to 522.

seen.

they had a perfect right to withdraw. In denial of this right to withdraw, the war was inaugurated, as we have The cry, on the part of those controlling the Federal Government at the time, of saving the Union, was but a pretext to cover their design of overthrowing the Principles of the Constitution. It remains, then, for us now to proceed, if you have nothing further to say against these facts, to consider the conduct of the war thus inaugurated; and, after that, to take some notice of the results of this conflict of principles, so brought into physical play on both sides. We will, however, if agreeable to you, take another rest before entering upon these subjects.

MAJOR HEISTER. I have no objection to the rest, but I have a question to put to you before you enter upon these other subjects to which you allude.

COLLOQUY XVIII.

THE DISCUSSION TAKES ANOTHER NEW TURN—MAJOR HEISTER ASKS A QUESTION WHICH PUTS MR. STEPHENS IN A NEW ATTITUDE OF DEFENCE— REASONS GIVEN WHY HE DID NOT FAVOR SECESSION AS A KEDRESS OF WRONGS CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. LINCOLN CALLED FOR AND PRODUCED CHARLESTON AND BALTIMORE CONVENTIONS—THE NEW PLANK IN THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM-MILLEDGEVILLE UNION SPEECH-THE UNION PLATFORM IN SECESSION CONVENTION—SPEECH IN THAT CONVENTION— IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT DOCTRINE CONSIDERED.

MR. STEPHENS. Well, Major Heister, what is your question? Are you inclined to join issue with me on any of the points discussed in our last three Colloquies?

MAJOR HEISTER. No. My question does not relate to any of these points. I must admit, as I do, that I was entirely mistaken in relation to the principle established by the Compromise of 1850, as well as the nature and character of the legislation of 1854. I think that you have shown, that Mr. Buchanan's statement in regard to the latter was erroneous. But the question I wish to put to you is this: why you opposed Secession, with the sentiments you have expressed, and in the face of the facts you have adduced? It seems to me, if I had been in Georgia, entertaining the sentiments you did, and in view of the facts as you have related them, I should have gone with the Secessionists.

MR. STEPHENS. Ah! that is your line is it? In military language, you are about to make a flank movement, are you? You are about to bring some of the experience of your army training to fields of controversy of a different

character? Your question entirely reverses the order of our proceedings, and will require for the present, at least, a change of front.

Judge Bynum put me on my defence for yielding obedience to the Ordinance of Secession of my State after it was passed, and you now put me on a like defence for not supporting and advocating it in the first instance. My answer to him has been fully given; and the reasons which induced me to oppose its passage, I intended to give when I came to speak of that Ordinance itself: but as you have propounded the question you have, I may as well give them now as hereafter. They were perfectly satisfactory to me at the time, and are still so; though I very much question if they will, in the judgment of mankind, be considered as complete a vindication and justification of my opposition to that measure, as those given in answer to Judge Bynum will be deemed a justification of my course after its adoption. Especially in view of subsequent events. It must, however, be recollected that when one line of policy is adopted instead of another, either in civil or military affairs, or even in the ordinary business of life, it is impossible ever afterwards to form any very satisfactory conclusion as to what would or might have been the results of that other line which was rejected.

In illustration of what I mean, let me say that if the views of Nicias instead of those of Alcibiades had prevailed at Athens, when war against Syracuse was resolved upon, no one can now, with any assurance, venture to assert what would have been the difference in the results upon the well-being of that Commonwealth. So in this instance. What would or might have been the result of the line of policy I advocated, can never be positively known. It can only be