engine and brakeman on said cars, without warning or in any manner apprising the said Robert Mailhos of the fact that said engineer was incompetent, unskillful, and reckless, which facts were not known to the said Robert Mailhos, who at said time was an inexperienced youth, and of immature judgment." The measure of damages, as shown by plaintiffs' petition, was the value of the deceased's services to plaintiffs, as follows: "Plaintiff further represents that he is about sixty-eight years of age, and his wife, the mother of said Robert Mailhos, is about fifty-eight years of age; that neither of them possesses any means of support, and are both unable to perform manual labor, and are unable to secure other kind of employment, or to earn a livelihood by any means; that he and his wife were, previous to the death of their son, entirely dependent upon him for support and maintenance; that their said son had, previous to his death, contributed all his earnings to the support of his said father and mother, up to the time of his death, and had promised to do so, and would have continued to do so, during the remainder of their lives; that he had been working for the defendants several years previous to his death, and that he had been earning $1.15 per day; that he was an industrious, sober, moral, and intelligent boy, and very careful and attentive in his business, and had every reasonable expectation of being promoted to the position of engineer, or other lucrative position, whereby he would have earned $150 per month, to contribute to plaintiff and his mother for their support and maintenance during the remainder of their lives, and plaintiff and his said wife have a reasonable expectation of living twenty years longer." The defendants' answer contained (1) a general demurrer, (2) a general denial, and (3) a special answer, which, in substance, alleged that the cars which deceased was in the act of coupling were loaded as other cars were usually loaded on defendants' tram road, with which cars, and the method of loading, the deceased was well acquainted, and that he assumed the risks ordinarily incident to the employment, and was well aware of the dangers that were attendant upon and incident to the same; that he was guilty of negligence in standing in an erect attitude while attempting to make the coupling; that it was necessary for him to stoop below the logs in order to make the coupling, and his failure to do so was the direct and proximate cause of his injuries. The plaintiffs' right to recover was made to depend upon the loss of services of the minor, as actual damages, as will appear more fully from the following part of the court's charge to the jury, as follows: "You have the right to consider the age, health, habits, and what he was earning, the probability of increased earnings, and what would fairly compensate them in their expectancy. They do not recover for loss of the company, or grief for loss, of son. Do not understand that to be the case, but it is based on the grounds that he was their servant, and that they were entitled to the servant's wages, and the loss to them is to be considered in such way as will compensate the parents for the loss of same." The jury on June 8, 1899, rendered a verdict for $1,500 in favor of the plaintiffs, upon which judgment was entered. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and defendants were granted 60 days in which to file a bill of exceptions, which bill was filed July 31, 1899, and thereafter this writ was sued out. J. D. Martin and J. N. Votaw, for plaintiff in error. Before PARDEE, MCCORMICK, and SHELBY, Circuit Judges. PARDEE, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above). We find printed in the transcript four propositions labeled, "Charge Asked by Defendants," and indorsed, "Refused. D. E. Bryant, Judge." They are abstract propositions of law, unaccompanied by any statement of fact showing their pertinency to the case on trial; and, while we may presume that they were requests made and ruled on before the jury retired, there is nothing to show that there was any exception taken at the time to the rulings thus made. We also find printed in the transcript a document entitled, "Charge of the Judge to Jury," verified by the affidavit of one J. R. O'Hara as “a true and correct copy of the charge delivered by the Hon. David E. Bryant to the jury on the trial of the case of Dominique Mailhos v. Olive Sternenberg & Co., tried in the United States circuit court on the 7th and 8th days of June, 1899"; but the same is not set forth in any bill of exceptions, and it does not have the indorsement or any other approval of the judge, nor is there any objection or exception conected with the same. None of the matters referred to above, although contained in the transcript, form any part of the proper record in the case. Blake v. U. S., 33 U. S. App. 376, 18 C. C. A. 117, 71 Fed. 286; Clune v. U. S., 159 U. S. 590, 16 Sup. Ct. 125, 40 L. Ed. 269. There is one document, denominated "Bill of Exceptions," in the record, filed many days after the trial, and commencing: "Be it remembered, that the defendants in the above styled and numbered case come now, and except to the judgment of the court rendered in said case upon the verdict of the jury, and the judgment of the court overruling defendants' motion for new trial, for the following reasons." Then appear some 16 alleged reasons, with more or less argument, and the bill concludes as follows: "This bill is allowed and approved, with the following explanations and qualifications: As to the grounds of plaintiff's cause of action as construed by me, it embraces the grounds set forth by defendants, and in addition thereto a charge of general bad repair and unsafe condition of defendants' roadbed. As to the exceptions to failure of the court to give certain special instructions asked, I think the general, charge, and the charge number six asked by defendants and given by the court, taken together, presented to the jury the law as applied to the facts, without needless reiteration. "Filed July 31, 1899. D. E. Bryant, Judge." This alleged bill is a combination motion for a new trial and an assignment of errors, and it is defective and insufficient to authorize this court to review any of the alleged errors suggested. The bill does not show any ruling of the court during the trial of the case, except, perhaps, as to the charges actually given and refused; and it is not shown that any ruling of the court was excepted to before the jury retired, or, as for that matter, excepted to at any time prior to the verdict. None of the charges given, nor any of the special charges requested and said to have been refused, are accompanied with such a statement of the evidence as would show whether the charges given or refused were applicable to the case before the jury. See Railway Co. v. Twombley, 100 U. S. 78, 25 L. Ed. 550; Worthington v. Mason, 101 U. S. 149, 25 L. Ed. 848; U. S. v. Carey, 110 U. S. 51, 3 Sup. Ct. 424, 28 L. Ed. 67; Insurance Co. v. Raddin, 120 U. S. 183, 7 Sup. Ct. 500, 30 L. Ed. 644; Express Co. v. Malin, 132 U. S. 531, 10 Sup. Ct. 166, 33 L. Ed. 450; Newman v. Iron Co., 25 C. C. A. 382, 80 Fed. 228; Cotton Oil Co. v. Ashburn, 26 C. C. A. 436, 81 Fed. 331. In short, we find only one assignment of error calling for any attention, and that is not well taken. It is the seventh, and to the effect that the court erred in failing to give a peremptory instruction to find for the defendant. This assignment, as based on the uncontradicted evidence in the case, cannot be considered, for the entire evidence in the case is not certified, and in the absence of the evi dence we are bound to presume that there was sufficient evidence before the jury to support the verdict. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs in error, however, contend that as the death of the minor, Robert Mailhos, was instantaneous, the parents of said Robert Mailhos cannot recover, under the pleadings in this case, for the loss of his services during minority, either at common law or under the statutes of Texas, and cite Railway Co. v. Beall, 91 Tex. 310, 42 S. W. 1054, 41 L. R. A. 807. In that suit the parents were suing to recover damages for the unlawful killing, resulting in the instantaneous death, of a minor son; and two questions were certified by the court of civil appeals, Third supreme judicial district of the state of Texas, to the supreme court of the state. One was as to the right of the parents to recover under the common law, and the other was as to whether the contributory negligence of the deceased could be attributed to the parents, when they had not consented to the employment of their minor son. The court held that the action could not be maintained at common law, and that "since the father's right to recover depends upon the statute, which imputes to him the deceased son's contributory negligence, the second question certified must be answered in the affirmative." The Texas statute (Rev. St. 1895) is as follows: "Art. 3017. An action for actual damages on account of injuries causing the death of any person may be brought in the following cases: (1) When the death of any person is caused by the negligence or carelessness of the proprietor, owner, charterer, hirer of any railroad, steamboat, stage coach or other vehicles for the conveyance of goods or passengers, or by the unfitness, negligence or carelessness of their receiver or receivers or other person or persons in charge or control of any railroad, their servants or agents; and the liability of receivers shall extend to cases in which the death may be caused by reason of the bad or unsafe condition of the railroad or machinery or other reason or cause by which an action may be brought for damages on account of injuries, the same as if said railroad were being operated by the railroad company. (2) When the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence. unskillfulness or default of another." This action seems to be fully authorized by the above statute, and we know of no decision, controlling or otherwise, to the contrary. Diligence of counsel has failed to find any such decision, and we know, as a matter of fact, that such actions have been maintained frequently, and without this particular objection, in both the United States and state courts in Texas. Railway Co. v. Compton, 75 Tex. 667, 13 S. W. 667, is a case where the mother sued the railway company for damages for negligently causing the death of her minor son; and the supreme court of Texas, among other things, said: "The appellee, being the sole surviving parent of Alexander Compton, was entitled to his services during minority, and hence at common law could have recovered their value during that period, in the event the appellant was found liable for the injury. But it does not follow that this right abridges in any manner her claim for the compensation given by the statute (Rev. St. art. 2899 et seq.). It happens in this particular case that the plaintiff, being the sole surviving parent of the deceased, is entitled to recover, if at all, damages not only for the loss of services during her son's nonage, but also for the loss of any prospective pecuniary benefits which she may have received from him after he attained his majority. She has sued for the whole in the statutory action, as we think she had the right to do, and her right to recover in such action cannot be restricted to the period of her son's minority." There is no question in the present case as to the right of the parents to recover exemplary damages for the death of a minor child, and therefore Winnt v. Railway Co., 74 Tex. 32, 11 S. W. 907, 5 L. R. A. 172, is not applicable. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. In re FRONASCONE. In re SALASIN. In re MAYROVICA. In re POLLACK. (Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. January 18, 1900.) ALIENS-ADMISSION TO CITIZENSHIP-PROOF REQUIRED. Under Rev. St. § 2167, which permits an alien who has resided within the United States for 3 years next preceding his arriving at the age of 21 years to be admitted as a citizen without having made the declaration of intention required by section 2165 to be made by adult immigrants at least 2 years prior to their admission, but which requires that such applicant shall make such declaration at the time of his admission, "and shall further declare on oath, and prove to the satisfaction of the court, that for two years next preceding it has been his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the United States," substantial evidence of the exist ence of such intention for the required time, in addition to the oath of the applicant, is required; and vague, oral statements of a single witness should not be accepted as a sufficient substitute for the documentary evidence required by section 2165. These were applications by aliens to be admitted as citizens of the United States. DALLAS, Circuit Judge. Section 2167 of the Revised Statutes provides that "any alien, being under the age of twenty-one years, who has resided within the United States three years next preceding his arriving at that age, and who has continued to reside therein to the time he may make application to be admitted as a citizen thereof, may be admitted a citizen of the United States, without having made the declaration required in the first condition of section 2165"; that is to say, without having declared on oath, before one of the courts designated in that section, "two years, at least, prior to his admission, that it is bona-fide his intention to become a citizen of the United States," etc.; "but such alien shall make the declaration required therein, at the time of his admission; and shall further declare, on oath, and prove to the satisfaction of the court, that, for two years next preceding, it has been his bona. fide intention to become a citizen of the United States." For more than 20 years preceding the passage of the statute from which section 2167 of the Revised Statutes is derived, the law had imposed upon any alien, as a condition precedent to the acquisition of citizenship, the requirement that, two years, at least, prior to his admission, his intention to become a citizen should have been declared under oath, before a court of record; and this preliminary proceeding was evidently regarded by congress, and therefore must be viewed by the courts, as of substantial importance. Section 2167 does not dispense with it in the class of cases to which that section relates; for, even as to them, it provides that the same declaration must be made at the time of admission, and it must be made under oath (U. S. v. Walsh [C. C.] 22 Fed. 646); and the act of February 1, 1876, which sanctions the making of the declaration required by section 2165 before the clerk, as well as before the court itself, plainly exhibits the continuing legislative design that it shall be solemnly made, and become matter of record. But section 2167 also requires that every such applicant thereunder "shall further declare on oath, and prove to the satisfaction of the court, that for two years next preceding, it has been his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the United States"; in other words, that he shall establish the existence of the requisite intention, as in the case of other aliens, for at least two years prior to his admission to citizenship, but may do this by any relevant and competent evidence which shall "prove to the satisfaction of the court" the truth of his own deposition. Under section 2165 the essential fact of declaration is always decisively shown by production of the record, or by due certification thereof; and the solicitude of congress to preclude the too-ready acceptance of less conclusive testimony under section 2167 is evinced by its provision that the oath of the applicant himself, though required, must be supplemented by proof which the court shall deem satisfactory. Not only the manifest spirit, but the express terms, of this section, call for the exercise of scrupulous care in this particular; and experience has convinced me that the vague oral statement of a single witness, which is commonly offered under section 2167, in substitution for the documentary evidence required by section 2165, cannot safely be relied upon where the applicant, though having arrived in this country more than 3 years before attaining the age of 21 years, has continued to reside here for several years after he might have applied to be made a citizen, without having taken any practical step to carry out his asserted intention. It is not necessary to refer with particularity to each of the cases mentioned at the head of this opinion. The observations which have been made are applicable to all of them, and therefore the prayer of the petition is in each instance denied. MAUPIN v. TEXAS & P. RY. CO. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. January 9, 1900.) No. 831. MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE OF FELLOW SERVANTS. If the negligence of a master contributed to an injury to his servant, it is no defense to an action against him therefor that fellow servants were also guilty of negligence which contributed thereto. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas. S. P. Jones, for plaintiff in error. T. J. Freeman and F. H. Prendergast, for defendant in error. Before PARDEE, McCORMICK, and SHELBY, Circuit Judges. 99 F.-4 |