the act of 1897, where they have been assessed, rather than "vegetables in their natural state," under paragraph 257, or "vegetable substances, crude or manufactured," under paragraph 617. Decision affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. LAMB.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. January 16, 1900.)

CUSTOMS DUTIES-CANVAS.

No. 2,726.

Canvas woven with double warp and single filling, each of single jute yarn, is a plain woven fabric, dutiable under Act 1897, par. 341, rather than a manufacture of vegetable fiber, not otherwise provided for, under paragraph 347.

Stephen G. Clarke, for importers.

H. P. Disbecker, Asst. U. S. Atty.

WHEELER, District Judge. This is canvas woven with double warp and single filling, each of single jute yarn. The weaving appears to be plain, notwithstanding the double warp. Consequently, it appears to be a plain woven fabric of paragraph 341 of the act of 1897, as it has been assessed, rather than a manufacture of vegetable fiber, not otherwise provided for, under paragraph 347. Decision affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. RICHARD.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. January 16, 1900.)

No. 2,867.

CUSTOMS DUTIES-BLEACHED GRASSES.

Natural grass, sun bleached, used for emblems, is not a manufactured article, and is put on the free list, under Act 1897, par. 566, as textile grasses "not manufactured in any manner, and not specially provided for." Comstock & Brown, for importers.

H. C. Platt, Asst. U. S. Atty.

WHEELER, District Judge. Paragraph 566 of the act of 1897 puts on the free list "Istle or Tampico fiber, jute, jute butts, manila, sisal grass, sunn, and all other textile grasses or fibrous vegetable substances not manufactured in any manner, and not specially provided for." This importation is of natural grass, sun bleached, used for emblems. It has been classified as free under this paragraph, instead of under paragraph 251, which puts a duty on natural flowers of all kinds, preserved or fresh, suitable for decorative purposes. In Frazee v. Moffitt, 20 Blatchf. 267, 18 Fed. 584, Judge, afterwards Mr. Justice, Blatchford held that hay containing sugar converted by the heat of the sun from starch in the grass by being dried was not a manufactured article. So this grass, bleached by mere exposure to the sun, is not a manufactured article. It is not made into any new thing. Decision affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. SILBERSTEIN.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. January 16, 1900.)

CUSTOMS DUTIES-POCKETKNIVES.

No. 2,903.

Pocketknives, with all but the scales for the sides of the handles, are dutiable under Act 1897, par. 153, as pocketknives, or parts thereof, partly or wholly manufactured.

Comstock & Brown, for importer.
H. P. Disbecker, Asst. U. S. Atty.

WHEELER, District Judge. These are pocketknives, all but the scales for the sides of the handles. They are nothing but pocketknives now, and will be pocketknives when completed. They therefore appear to be specifically provided for as pocketknives, or parts thereof, partly or wholly manufactured, as they have been assessed under paragraph 153 of the act of 1897, and not to be dutiable otherwise. Decision affirmed.

ALTMAN CO. v. UNITED STATES.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. January 18, 1900.)

CUSTOMS DUTIES-CORSETS.

No. 2,913.

Corsets of which cotton is the component material of chief value, trimmed at the top with lace, are not articles made in any part of lace, though they are so trimmed, and are dutiable under Act 1897, par. 314, as wearing apparel of "every description of which cotton is the component material of chief value."

Appeal by the Altman Company from decisions of the general appraisers which confirm the action of the collector in assessing duty on importations in question.

Curie & Smith, for importers.

D. Frank Lloyd, Asst. U. S. Atty.

WHEELER, District Judge. These are corsets, of which cotton is the component material of chief value, trimmed at the top with lace. Paragraph 339 of the act of 1897 provides for a duty on "handkerchiefs, napkins, wearing apparel, and other articles made wholly or in part of lace." They have been assessed as articles made in part of lace, against a claim that they are within "wearing apparel of every description of which cotton is the component material of chief value," provided for in paragraph 314. The lace is not brought into their structure, and they do not appear to be articles made in any part of lace, although they are to some extent trimmed with lace. Decision reversed.

VOLKMAN v. UNITED STATES.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. January 18, 1900.)

CUSTOMS DUTIES-CHOCOLATE.

No. 2,916.

The dutiable value of chocolate packed in tin boxes should be arrived at by adding the number of pounds of both the chocolate and the tin coverings, under Act 1897, par. 281, providing for a duty on the chocolate, and that "the weight and value of all coverings, other than plain wooden, shall be included in the dutiable weight and value" thereof.

Curie & Smith, for importers.

Chas. D. Baker, Asst. U. S. Atty.

WHEELER, District Judge. Paragraph 281 of the act of 1897 provides for a duty on chocolate valued at not over 15 cents a pound of 2 cents a pound; valued above 15 and not above 24 cents a pound, of 2 cents a pound and 10 per cent. ad valorem; valued above 24 and not 35 cents a pound, 5 cents a pound and 10 per cent. ad valorem; and valued above 35 cents a pound, 50 per cent. ad valorem. And, further, that "the weight and value of all coverings, other than plain wooden, shall be included in the dutiable weight and value of the foregoing merchandise." The dutiable value per pound of this importation has been arrived at by adding the value of the tin boxes to that of the chocolate, and dividing the sum by the number of pounds of the chocolate alone, against a protest that the division should be by the number of pounds of both the chocolate and the tin coverings. The method adopted included the value and excluded the weight of the coverings from the computation. This brought the dutiable value above 24 cents per pound, and, with the weight of the coverings included, it would have been below, and the duty 2 cents per pound less. The requirement is express that the weight, as well as the value, of the coverings "shall be included," and it was not. Decision reversed.

HILLS BROS. CO. v. UNITED STATES.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. January 5, 1900.)

No. 80.

CUSTOMS DUTIES-CLASSIFICATION-DRIED CURRANTS.

"Dried currants," so called, from the Levantine, which are known to the trade by some 30 different names, indicating the islands or localities where grown, and which, although in fact raisins, made from a small grape, constitute the only currants known commercially or imported, are, except those grown on the island of Zante, entitled to free entry, under paragraph 489 of the free list of the tariff act of 1894, as "fruits, * dried, not specially provided for," and are not dutiable under paragraph 217, which covers "plums, prunes, figs, raisins and other dried grapes, including Zante currants."

*

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

This is an appeal from a decision of the circuit court, Southern district of New York, which affirmed a decision of the board of general appraisers, affirming a decision of the collector of the port of New York touching an importation of dried currants.

A. P. Ketchum, for appellant.

Henry C. Platt, for the United States.

Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and SHIPMAN, Circuit Judges.

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The importation was under the tariff act of 1894, the relevant paragraphs being:

"Par. 217. Plums, prunes, figs, raisins and other dried grapes, including Zante currants, one and one-half cents per pound."

"Par. 489 [of the free list]. Fruits, green, ripe or dried, not specially provided for in this act."

It has been stipulated, and apparently has never been disputed, that the currants in question were not the growth of the island of Zante. The question here presented first arose upon an importation of Austin, Nichols & Co. into the port of New York, and the board held that such currants were not within paragraph 217. In this decision the treasury department for some time acquiesced. Subsequently, a similar question arising in California, the board, upon the evidence in the Austin-Nichols Case and upon further proofs, reaffirmed its former decision. Appeal was taken to the circuit court, Northern district of California, additional testimony was taken in that court, and the decision of the board was reversed. In re Wise (C. C.) 73 Fed. 183. In the case at bar still further testimony was taken, but the board, referring to the Wise decision, held as follows: "In deference to a superior tribunal, we follow the said judicial ruling, and affirm the decision of the collector." This decision does not present a finding of fact by the board upon conflicting testimony of such a character that the reviewing court should hesitate to express a different conclusion, if, upon the whole record, such court were satisfied that the weight of testimony did not support such enforced finding. The cir cuit court, as a matter of comity, followed the decision in the Northern district of California, without discussing the merits of the case. In the record now before this court we have-First, all the testimony which was before the California court, both that returned by the board and that taken in the court; and, second, some additional testimony which has been taken in the case at bar. The record is most voluminous, and a great deal of the testimony wholly immaterial and unnecessary to the decision. It will not be necessary to go at length into any discussion of the testimony. In the California case the inquiry seems to have been more particularly directed to the scientific and historical side of the case. Of the 23 witnesses examined in court (leaving out the importer and his two witnesses, Falkinham and Elliot), only four were sufficiently qualified to speak as experts touching the commercial meaning of the phrase "Zante currants"; the other dealers were shown to have no experience in trade and commerce at wholesale with imported dried currants. And of the four it appeared that the experience of nearly all was most limited.

The trade witnesses called here on behalf of the importers, however, had acquired their knowledge of trade terms by long years of dealing in this very commodity-dried currants-in large quantities in the markets of this country. If it were necessary to determine the commercial meaning of the words in controversy, the record before this court would seem to present an exposition of commercial dealings at and prior to the passage of the act of 1894 much more complete and satisfactory than that upon which the court in California undertook to pass. But it will not be necessary to inquire whether there is any commercial meaning of the term "Zante currants" which will include currants not in fact of Zante. The language which congress has employed, when read in the light of the facts in proof, is most clear and unambiguous.

Referring to the history and scientific classification of the dried imported currant of commerce, the court in California says it is "a kind of raisin made from a small, seedless grape, grown not only on the island of Zante, but also, and to a much greater extent, on the mainland of Greece and other neighboring localities. It derives the name of 'currants' from the fact that in times past it was shipped from the city of Corinth, Greece. In German it is called 'Korinthen'; in French, 'raisin de Corinthe'; in Spanish, 'pasas de Corintho.' It is a raisin grape, as distinguished from a shrub currant, with which its name may be confounded, but from which it is entirely distinct,the former belonging to the grapevine family, or vitis vinifera, of plants; the latter to the shrub, or ribes. On the vine it is a small-sized grape. When picked and dried, it is a dried grape, or kind of raisin." And the court quotes the testimony of Prof. Hilgard, of the state university (California), as follows: "[It is] a raisin made from a small grape which grows in the Ionian Isles, and also in the archipelago there; also on the mainland of Asia Minor. [And the witness subsequently added, "on the mainland of Greece."] They are dried and prepared in various ways, and shipped to the whole world. It is the only region that, so far, has produced this grape to perfection."

☆

The conclusions of the California court, that these dried fruits "are a kind of raisins," and "are grapes dried," are abundantly supported by the record. Scientifically and botanically they are "raisins or other dried grapes," but popularly and commercially they are not known or classified as such. The testimony of the qualified experts, -not the botanists, but the trade experts,-who testified in California and before the board of appraisers, is overwhelming to the effect that in trade and commerce in this country, at and prior to 1894 (and, indeed, at all times), these dried currants have never been known or classed as raisins or as dried grapes, which are different and well-known articles of commerce. Now, it is manifest that congress fully understood this situation, and legislated upon the understanding that these so-called "currants" would not become dutiable as a part of the family of raisins or dried grapes unless they were specifically referred to, and therefore congress used the phrase, "raisins and other dried grapes, including Zante currants." If the contention of the government were sound, the words, "including Zante currants," would