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the steamer, and in the decree were awarded separate sums, which were each less than $5000-but together amounted to more than that sun. Held, that the owners of the steamer could not appeal, as the causes of action were distinct and in favor of distinct parties: In re B. and O. Railroad Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.

Escape of Prisoner Pending Appeal.—Where a person who has been convicted upon a criminal charge has sued out writ of error, and pending the writ makes his escape from the custody of the law, it is within the discretion of the court whether it will proceed to the hearing of the cause while the escaped prisoner is still at large: McGowan v. People, 104 Ill.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

Allowance of Expenditures on Contest of the Will.-Moneys expended by an executor in defending a suit to contest the validity of a will, in behalf of the personal interests of the devisees named in the will, in which suit the will is set aside, are not proper credits to be allowed against the estate. For such expenditures the executor must look to such devisees: Shaw v. Moderwell, 104 Ill.

Settlement of Account-Correction of Mistakes in former Account.— Upon every settlement of an account by an executor or administrator, all his former accounts may be so far opened as to correct any mistake or error therein, except as to matters in dispute between two parties which had been previously heard and determined by the court, which shall not again be brought in question without leave of the court. This includes the power to correct all errors or mistakes of the court, as well as of the executor or administrator, found in former settlements, whether as to items embraced in or omitted from such former accounts: Watts v. Watts, 38 or 39 Ohio St.

FIXTURES.

Machinery-Mortgage-A mortgage of land does not cover machines. resting upon the floor of a building on the land, by means of iron legs, fastened to the floor by screws only for the purpose of steadying them when in use, and, which although of great weight, connected with shafting, and adapted for use and necessary in the business carried on in the building, can be moved without injury to the building and used elsewhere: Hubbell v. East Cam. Savings Bank, 132 Mass.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

Memorandum in Writing-Failure to Deliver-Place of Signature.— The note or memorandum in writing of a contract of sale, required by the seventeenth section of the Statute of Frauds to be made and signed by the party to be charged, need not be delivered to the other partydelivery is not essential to its validity: Drury v. Young, 58 Md.

The place of the signature in the memorandum of sale, required by the seventeenth section of the Statute of Frauds, is immaterial; and the name may as well be printed as written. The name in the print is a sufficient signing if it be recognised and appropriated as his, by the party: Id.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Power to Purchase Lands-Lien of Vendor reserved in the Deed— Unpaid Purchase-money-Interest.—Where a married woman, with the consent of her husband, buys land and gives her promissory notes for part of the purchase-money, and a lien is reserved in the deed of conveyance for the payment of the notes, such lien may be enforced against the land, though the notes be void as against the woman personally: Bedford v. Burton, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.

In such case the grantee is not entitled, by reason of her coverture, to have the sale set aside and the purchase-money already paid refunded, though consenting to account for rents and profits, nor will she, or her husband, be allowed for permanent improvements erected by them. Id.

In such case, also, in a state where, by contract, interest above the ordinary legal rate may be stipulated for, such interest may be recovered under the vendor's lien if agreed to be given in the notes for purchasemoney: Id.

Curtesy in Wife's Separate Estate.-A conveyance to the sole and separate use of a married woman does not debar her husband from curtesy in land of which she died in the actual possession, or the rents, issues and profits of which she received through her trustee, unless it appears from the deed that such result was intended by the grantor. A covenant on the part of the trustee to convey the property at her death as she may appoint, and in default of appointment then to her heirs, held, not to indicate such intent: Tremmel v. Kleiboldt, 75 Mo.

Contract for Necessaries—Ratification by Husband.-A promise by a husband to pay for necessaries which have been furnished to his wife upon his credit, if they are such as he is bound to supply her with, although accompanied by a direction to sell no more goods to her on his credit, amounts to a ratification of her contract, upon which an action may be maintained, even if she had no previous authority to purchase them: Conrad v, Abbott, 132 Mass.

INSURANCE. See Corporation.

Fire-When immediate cause of Loss.-A steamboat, on which were goods insured against "immediate loss by fire," came into collision with another steamboat. A fire caused by the collision at once broke out, and the vessel subsequently sank, with the goods insured, before they were touched by the fire. Held, that if the damage to the goods could have been avoided but for the intervention of the fire, the fire was the immediate cause of the loss, and an action on the policy of insurance could be maintained: N. Y. & Boston Des. Exp. Co. v. Traders' & Mech. Ins. Co., 132 Mass.

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Mutual Company-Knowledge of By-Laws-Usage of CompanyApplication of Dividends -When a party takes out a policy in a mutual insurance company, and the contract is complete, he at once becomes a

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member, and is bound by the rules and provisions of the charter and by-laws of the company, and he is presumed to have knowledge of them all: Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Miller Lodge, 58 Md.

While the charter and by-laws are explicit in requiring payment of the interest on the deposit note, at or before a fixed and definite time, the contract of insurance has reference to the time thus expressly designated, and the member is bound to take notice of it at his peril: ld. Although there may be a habit or usage of the company to give notice to the members, of the amount of the annual interest, and the time of payment: yet if no obligation to give such notice is created by the charter or by-laws of the company, there is nothing in such habit or usage that could impose such a duty upon the company, with the consequence of making the notice a condition precedent to the right of the company to receive the interest on the premium note, according to the contract of insurance: Id.

And even if a dividend of profits were declared in favor of the policy holder, unless expressly made applicable to the payment of the annual interest on his premium note, the insurance company would neither be bound nor justified, in the absence of the assent or request of the insured, in so applying the dividend: Id.

JOINDER OF PARTIES. See Equity.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Eviction-What amounts to.-If wrongful acts of a lessor upon the demised premises are such as to permanently deprive the lessee of the beneficial enjoyment of them, and the lessee, in consequence thereof, abandons the premises, it is an eviction; and the intent to evict is conclusively presumed: Skalir v. Shurte, 132 Mass.

Assignee for Creditor-Liability for Rent.-An assignee, who, in the conduct of the business of his trust, continues in possession of premises let to his assignor does not thereby subject himself to a personal liability for the rent. To create such liability there must be a special agreement. And when the assignee is sued personally, the fact that he may have assets as assignee will not authorize recovery: White v. Thomas, 75 Mo.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. See Corporation.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Duty of Master-Negligence-Railroad.-As between employees of a railroad company, whose duty it is to repair its track, while trains are using the same, and the company and its representatives, who are engaged in running trains over the same where the trackmen are so employed, it is the duty of the latter, as far as is practicable, to adopt such precautions as will guard its employees on the track from dangers incident to their employment: Dick v. I. C. & L. Railroad, 38 or 39 Ohio St.

Agreement between Connecting Roads-Injury to Employee of one by Servant of other.-Whatever effect an agreement between the several companies owning connecting lines of railroad, may have upon the parties thereto, it cannot have any upon strangers to it, nor alter or change the relations of either of them towards third parties, nor have the effect of making those who were employed and paid wages by either of the

contracting parties, the co-employees of the agents and workmen of the other parties, or make the others liable either severally or jointly for any loss or damage caused by the neglect of any one of them, even were the agreeement silent in this respect: Philadelphia, Wil. and Balt. Railroad Co. v. The State of Maryland, 58 Md.

Where injury to the employee of one of said companies occurs on the road of another of said companies, and is caused by the imperfect condition of said road, the principle that every employee assumes the risk of the negligence of his co-employee, is not applicable to him: Id.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.

Coupons-Transfer after Maturity.-Where interest coupons payable to bearer on a day named, are transferred after maturity, the holder takes no better title than the transferror had, and if they were obtained by him by fraud or theft, no title passes against the lawful owner; and he can maintain trover against the holder for their conversion: McKim v. King, 58 Md.

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Sale of Interest of one Partner to another-Liability of Firm Assets. -Where the members of a firm, acting in good faith, dissolve the partnership, and one member sells his interest in the partnership property to the other, the latter will not be deprived of the right to hold such property exempt from the payment of a debt thereafter asserted against him, on the ground that such debt was a partnership debt due at the time of the dissolution; nor will the fact that the partners knew the firm to be insolvent, at the time of such dissolution make any difference. Gaylord v Imhoff, 26 Ohio St. 317, distinguished: Mortley v. Flanagan, 38 or 39 Ohio St.

Death-Right of Surviving Partner. The executor or administrator of a surviving partner, who dies with partnership assets in his possession and while he is engaged in settling the partnership business, is entitled to the possession of such assets, and is charged with the duty of completing such settlement unless relieved from that duty by contract, or by an order of a competent court: Dayton v. Bartlett, 38 or 39 Ohio St. He is not, as a matter of law, precluded from receiving compensation out of the partnership funds for his services in the performance of this daty: Id.

PATENT.

Prior Invention.-A device which might be made to accomplish the purpose of the patented invention, but which was not designed for that purpose, and which no person looking at or using it, would understand to have been intended to be used in the same way as the patented invention, and which was not shown to have been really used and operated in that way, held not to amount to a "prior invention:" Clough v. Manuf. Co., S. C. U. S., Oct Term 1882.

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RAILROAD.

Negligence by Employees of Sleeping Car Co.-Liability of Railroad. -A passenger, by train of a railroad company, travelling in the coach of a sleeping car company, may properly assumé, in the absence of notice to the contrary, that the whole train is under one management, and in such case, where he sustains injury by the negligence of one in the employ of the sleeping car company, he may maintain an action against the railroad company. What the effect of such notice would be is not determined C. C. C. & I. Railroad v. Walrath, 38 or 39 Ohio St. On proof of injury sustained by a passenger on a railroad train, by the fall of a berth in a sleeping car, and that the passenger was without fault, a presumption arises, in the absence of other proof, that the railroad company is liable: I.

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REMOVAL OF CAUSES. See United States Government.

Corporation of a Foreign State-When Jurisdiction of the State Court censes- -Practice.-The rule by which the individual members of a corporation created by a state of the Union, are conclusively presumed to be citizens of that State, for purposes of suit by or against the corporation, extends to corporations created by foreign states: Steamship Co. v. Tugman, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.

In a suit in which the jurisdiction of a U. S. Circuit Court depends upon the character of the parties, it is sufficient if their citizenship is shown, affirmatively, by the record; it need not be set out in the petition for removal: Id.

Upon the filing of the petition and bond required by the statute-the suit being removable-the jurisdiction of the state court absolutely ceases; and a failure to file the transcript within the time prescribed by the statute does not have the effect of restoring the jurisdiction of the state court: Id.

A petition and bond for removal having been filed in the state court, that court ruled that the suit was not removable, and the party seeking the removal consented to a reference and contested the suit in the courts of the state up to final judgment: Held, that the jurisdiction of the state court was not thereby restored, and that the consent to the order of reference was to be deemed as only an expression of preference for that one of the several modes of trial authorized by the laws of the state: Id.

SALE.

Delivery of Possession-Lease. The delivery of a bill of parcels of a chattel to the purchaser, who thereupon gives to the seller a lease of the chattel, if there is no other delivery or change of possession, is not sufficient to pass the title as against a subsequent purchaser in good faith from the original seller: Harlow v. Hall, 132 Mass.

SLANDER.

Words known to hearer to be False-Slanderous words are actionable, although spoken, when no one else is present, to a person who knows them to be false, and who does not repeat them until after action brought: Marble v. Chapin, 132 Mass.

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