1 2 which is in fact a contempt; 1 and the conviction will be void if the finding is wanting. A different rule applies in the courts of general jurisdiction. In tribunals of all sorts and grades the party accused of contempt is entitled to a hearing. Bodies having quasi judicial and legislative powers, like boards of supervisors and city councils, cannot punish for contempts.1 1 Bachelder v. Moore, 42 Cal. 412; Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 616. 2 Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335. 8 Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364. CHAPTER XVI. PROTECTION TO CONTRACTS AND PROPERTY. SECTION I.-LAWS IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CON TRACTS. The Constitution. Among the powers forbidden to the States by the Constitution is the power to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. The prohibition passed almost without comment at the time, and in the careful and very full discussions of the Federalist it is barely alluded to twice; first, as a provision to prevent aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens would be injured by such laws; 2 and, second, as being a "constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights" against laws which are "contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation." Apparently nothing was in view at the time except to prevent the repudiation of debts and private obligations, and the disgrace, disorders, and calamities that might be expected to follow. In the construction of this provision, however, it has become one of the most important, as well as one of the most comprehensive, in the Constitution; and it has been the subject of more frequent and more extended judicial discussion 8 than any other. Only brief reference can be made here to the principles which the decisions have settled. 1 Const., Art. I. § 10. 2 Federalist, No. 7, instancing the then recent laws of Rhode Island in their results on the neighboring States. 8 Federalist, No. 44. What are Contracts? - Contracts are either executory or executed. An executory contract is one whereby a party takes upon himself the obligation to do or abstain from doing some particular thing. An executed contract is one whereby an obligation assumed is performed, and the transaction perfected; as a deed of conveyance perfects a sale of lands. The Constitution makes no distinction between these two classes of contracts, and the latter as much as the former is within its protection. It is, therefore, not within the power of legislation, after a conveyance has been made, to annul it on any pretence; since this would not merely impair the obligation of the contract, but would destroy it entirely.1 Obligation of the Contract. The obligation of a contract consists in its binding force on the party making it, which the law at the time recognizes, and for which it gives a remedy. It involves, therefore, first, the promise or assurance of the party, and, second, the sanction of the law, whereby the promise or assurance becomes an effectual contract.2 No promise or assurance can, therefore, constitute a contract, unless the law lends its sanction; and this in some cases it withholds. For example, if there is no consideration for an executory contract, this in law is a mere nude pact, and invalid; and so is any promise which is illegal, either in its consideration, or in the purpose to be accomplished by it." What Contracts intended. The contracts intended by the Constitution are all those over which the State can have authority, and which, but for this provision, might be reached by state law. The contracts of the State itself 1 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 133. 2 Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 259, 302, 318. 8 Meacham v. Dow, 32 Vt. 721; Piatt v. People, 29 Ill. 54; Marshall v. Railroad Co., 16 How. 314. are therefore included, as much as those of individuals; and a State is thus precluded from recalling its own grants, as had frequently been done on various pretexts in England. Neither can a State modify, except by mutual consent, any provision of a pre-existing contract into which it may have entered.' For example, if a State, being the owner of the capital stock of a bank, provides by law that its bills shall be received in payment for all debts owing to the State, the provision is a promise to those who shall receive the bills, that they shall be thus accepted for state dues; and this promise the State cannot recall, to the prejudice of any who previously had become holders of the bills. So if a State, or one of its municipalities, contracts a debt and issues obligations therefor, and these obligations come into the hands of foreign holders who are not subject to state taxation, a subsequent statute imposing a tax upon them, and directing that the amount thereof shall be deducted in making payment, is void as to the foreign holders, because withholding something to which they are entitled, and to that extent impairing the obligation of the contracts.* Statutes. A statute, public or private, is not a contract. It is an expression in due form of the will of the State, as to what shall be the law on the subject covered by it; and the State would be deprived of its sovereignty, and crippled in the exercise of its essential functions, if it were 1 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Van Horne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304; Huidekoper v. Douglas, 3 Cranch, 1. The principle stated would of course not preclude a State from invoking judicial proceedings to set aside one of its grants on any grounds that would be sufficient if it were a grant by an individual. 2 New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164. 8 Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190; Furman v. Nichols, 8 Wall. 44; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. Rep. 454. 4 Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. Rep. 432. And see State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300. not at liberty to change its laws at discretion. But there are exceptions to this general rule: for a State may give to its contracts such form as it may choose to express its assent in; and this is sometimes the form of a statute. The grants of land by a State are frequently made by statute, and so are grants of special privileges. Bounties are sometimes offered in this way; and when the terms of the offer are accepted, a contract exists; but a bounty law may be repealed at any time as to anything that may accrue thereafter.1 Offices. A public office is a public trust: the appointment or election to it is a delegation of the trust to the person appointed or elected for the time being. But it is not a contract, and neither the office nor its emoluments can be claimed as matter of right, as against subsequent legislation abolishing the one or reducing the other.2 Nevertheless, if in either of these particulars the state constitution has made provisions, it is not competent by law to change them, for the manifest reason that the constitution in that case limits the legislative power in that regard. For example, the President's term of office is four years, and his compensation can neither be increased nor diminished during his term; and in both these particulars the power of Congress over his office is excluded. Statutory Privileges. The grant of a statutory privilege is not a contract, but it resembles a license, and is always revocable, except that the party cannot be deprived of benefits already enjoyed under it. Under this head come exemptions from military and jury duty, exemptions of property from taxation or from sale on execution,* and 1 Welch v. Cook, 97 U. S. Rep. 541. 8 2 Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Head v. University, 19 Wall. 526. 8 Const., Art. II. 4 Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; East Saginaw |