- The President shall nom

Appointments and Removals. inate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not in the Constitution otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.1

The power to appoint includes the power to remove; 2 but this, it seems, equally requires the advice and consent of the Senate, or may by law be made to do so. But the consent of the Senate to an appointment in the place of an incumbent is sufficient for the purpose.*

The President has power to fill all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. But he cannot by removals make vacancies in

1 Const., Art. II. § 2, cl. 3. As to who are inferior officers, see United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385; United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. Rep. 760; United States v. Jermaine, 99 U. S. Rep. 503; United States v. Tinklepaugh, 3 Blatch. 425; Collins v. United States, 99 U. S. Rep. 503.

2 Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230.

8 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, Rev. Stat. of U. S. (1878), § 1767 et seq. See United States v. Avery, Deady, 204.

4 Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230; Bowerbank v. Morris, Wall. C. C. 118.

5 Const., Art. II. § 2, cl. 3. A newly created office, which has never been filled, is not a case of vacancy within the meaning of this provision. McCrary, Am. Law of Elections, § 237. The President has no authority to anticipate a vacancy, and make an appointment in advance to fill it. Ibid., § 257. The decision of the executive that a vacancy exists is not conclusive. Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Monr. (Ky.) 648.

order that he may fill them. The President commissions all the officers of the United States.1

Messages. - The President from time to time shall give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; 2 he may on extraordinary occasions convene both Houses, or either of them, and, in case of disagreement between them in respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper. 8

Veto Power. - Every bill passed by the two houses shall, before it shall become a law, be presented to the President; if he approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the house in which it originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered; if approved by two thirds of that house, it shall become a law. In the reconsideration the yeas and nays must be entered at large on the journals of the houses respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days Sundays excepted-after it shall have been presented to him, it will become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return. All orders, resolutions, and votes to

1 Const., Art. II. § 3. As to the time when a commission takes effect, see Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Bowerbank v. Morris, Wall. C. C. 118; United States v. Le Baron, 19 How. 73.

2 Const., Art. II. § 3. In practice, since Mr. Jefferson's time, this information is conveyed by written message, transmitted by the President's private secretary.

8 See People v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9, as to the circumstances which amount to such a disagreement as will justify his interference. 4 Const., Art. I. § 7, cl. 2.

which the assent of both houses may be necessary, except on a question of adjournment, must take the course of bills.1

Compensation. The salary of the President is fixed by law, and can neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive during that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.2 According to the legislative precedent of 1873 an increase made after a President has been re-elected, but before the second term has begun, may apply to his salary during the second term.

Appropriations. The provision that no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law, applies with peculiar force to the President, and is a proper security against the executive assuming unconstitutional powers. The further provision that periodical statements of receipts and expenditures shall be published, is intended as a means of holding all departments of the government, and particularly the legislature, under a due sense of responsibility to the people. The duty to see to this publication is properly executive.

General Powers. -The President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," and, the foreign intercourse of the country being committed to his charge, "he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers";" and this implies that, for reasons satisfactory to himself, he may refuse to receive those who are sent, or, after having received, may dismiss them, or request their recall, or refuse longer to hold relations with them.

1 Const., Art. I. § 7, cl. 3. 2 Const., Art. II. § 1, cl. 6. dollars until 1873, when it was 8 Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 7. 4 Const., Art. II. § 3.

The salary was twenty-five thousand increased to fifty thousand.

Executive Independence. - The judiciary cannot control the President in the performance of his executive duties, by mandamus,1 injunction, or otherwise.

2

1 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 347; The Secretary ». McGarrahan, 9 Wall. 298, 311.

2 Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475; Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 57.

CHAPTER VI.

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

Extent. The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases, in law and equity, arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States, between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.1

The power thus defined is commensurate with the ordinary legislative and executive powers of the general government, and the powers which concern treaties; but it is also still broader, and in some cases is made to embrace controversies from regard exclusively to the parties suing or sued, irrespective of the nature of the questions in dispute. The cases in which this authority has been given are cases in which the influence of state interests and jealousies upon the administration of state laws might possibly be unfavorable to impartial justice, and which for that reason it was deemed wise to remove to the federal jurisdiction.

1 Const., Art. III. § 2.