opinion; perhaps I may not see it exactly in the same light as the honourable gentleman*, yet I do not perceive any material practical difference between us. The general principal and outline of our national defence appears to me good, regarding as it does the regulars, army of reserve, militia, and volunteers. Were they less defensible in principle than they are, I should consider them as existing establishments, in the present moment, more agreeable to confirm and improve, than abolish and substitute by new.

Thus I declare my opinion on this subject, without at this time entering into a more particular defence of it. With respect to the power of the crown to call on every subject under its dominion in case of absolute need, this, I take, under some form or other, to be incident to the very establishment of civil society, and, in fact, whenever occasion required, has been exercised. The principle is, however, limited by its necessity, which scarcely can arise but when the state of things would authorise the crown of itself to proclaim martial law; and if the constitution should survive that urgent state of things, the counsellors of His Majesty would, doubtless, be as amenable to constitutional responsibility for that, as any other act of their administration. As such is the undoubted right and prerogative of the crown, I should think, with a view to possible emergencies, that legislative provision should, in the present juncture, a little anticipate the justifiable necessity to which I have referred, at least so far as to put every man in the maritime counties, likely to be the seat of the enemy's attempt, under the immediate power of the crown, in case of actual or imminent danger of invasion. In those counties most likely to be the seat of war, such as Kent, Essex, Sussex, Suffolk, Devonshire, Cornwall, and the vicinity of Newcastle, I also think a greater proportion of volunteers should be allowed than in others, at least so far as the convenience and voluntary offers of individuals will allow. But I shall not stop here. I must say, that our naval means are insufficient for our defence ; and that there is a great deficiency of the means for keeping up * Mr. Fox.

our navy.

Into these points I shall enter minutely, upon some future occasion. At present I shall only say, in vindication of myself from all the obloquy thrown upon me by officers, brought from distant stations to support the present system, that, as to the specific force which I recommended, I did not recommend barges, and lighters, and such sort of trash as they reproached me with advising. I recommended good stout gun-brigs, and I have had the pleasure of seeing great activity of late to increase that very species of force.

Another objection has been made to my system. I recommended fortifications, and I have on this account been reproached with an attempt to lessen the spirit of the country, and to involve a great and unnecessary expense. What I recommended was, not a general system of fortification, but that, where there were great districts possessing great local bulwarks, there a judicious mixture of art and nature, which, at a small expense in money, might spare many thousands of men, would be the best and wisest policy. I know many places in which a few thousand pounds expended, would give more security than as many thousand men could afford. This is obvious to all military men, and the system is beginning to be acted upon; but at the same time it must be admitted, that it was as obvious last summer as it is now. I do not wish, by these observations, to interfere with the department to which this system may seem to belong. I believe, however, that it does not rest with the department of the commander-inchief, or any other, but with the cabinet. I have discharged my duty by delivering this my sincere and undisguised opinion. I hope it is not hastily or inconsiderately entertained; but sure I am that I should consider it treason to the best interests of my country, if, such as it is, I did not openly declare it.

The motion was negatived;

Ayes........... 204

Noes........... 256

April 25. 1804.

Mr. Secretary Yorke having moved the order of the day for the House to go into a Committee on the Bill for the Suspension of the Army of Reserve Act,

Mr. PITT rose, and addressed the House as follows:

In rising, Sir, to oppose the motion for your leaving the chair, it is not my wish to occupy the attention of the House longer than appears to me absolutely necessary; and therefore I have no desire to enlarge on topics connected with the general subject, which have, in the course of late debates, undergone the most ample discussion. Before I proceed to the description of the plan of which I have given notice to the House on a former day, it is my wish to say a few words on the nature and complexion of the bill which it is the object of the right honourable gentleman's motion to bring under our consideration in a committee. As far as I am able to understand it, the only effect of its adoption would be to relinquish all chance of the benefit of that augmentation of our disposable force, which, in the unanimous opinion of all persons in this House, ought to be the principal object of attention with His Majesty's government. It would be to relinquish all chance of the continuance of future benefit, arising from a measure which, though in many points of view impeded and retarded, has had the effect of procuring, within the space of twelve months, a more considerable augmentation of our regular force, than could pere haps have been obtained in any other way, at the time and under the circumstances in which the measure was carried into activity. It appears to me that all these chances of benefit are given up, without substituting in their room any system by which the great object of the augmentation of the regular army is to be obtained.

If I understood the statement of the right honourable secretary of state below me, there were three measures, by the adoption of which His Majesty's ministers flattered themselves that they would

be able to augment the regular disposable force of the country. The first of these measures was, the acceptance of the voluntary offers of a certain proportion of the Irish militia to extend their services to this country. The second measure had in view the augmentation of the militia of Ireland. The last of the measures, directed to the great object in view, was the formation of a number of new regiments, to be raised independent of that competition which is at this moment admitted to be most fatal to the speedy recruiting of the regular army. On these different measures proposed for the augmentation of our disposable force, it is not now my intention to enlarge; but I must be permitted to observe, that in none of them does there seem to be any thing which is at all calculated to be effectual in producing the completion of this object which, without exception, is admitted to be of the last consequence in the present circumstances of the empire. It is true that a certain proportion of the Irish militia have volunteered their services to this country. In this offer it is doubtful whether there is less of policy than of national advantage. Before the House can admit the policy of receiving such offers, it becomes necessary to look a little to the degree in which the interchange of the services of the militia of both countries is to be conducted, and I may add, whether, in extraordinary circumstances, this interchange ought to be encouraged. It cannot, in reason, be denied, that such an interchange must depend on circumstances of special emergency; and what I maintain is, that the acceptance of the voluntary offers of the militia of Ireland, at this time, is not only productive of all the evils arising from an undefined interchange of services, but can be attended with none of the advantages arising from such a measure, originating from well-considered views of national interest. On the subject of the augmentation of the militia of Ireland, my opinions are not by any means different. It will not be disputed by His Majesty's ministers, that the offers of extended services by a certain proportion of the militia of Ireland, depends for acceptance, in a great measure, on this subsequent measure. It is allowed on all hands, that Ireland cannot lose such a proportion

of the means of its defence, without receiving something like an adequate return. We must understand, that the augmentation proposed is meant to form the return to which I have referred. But will any gentleman in this House for a moment affirm, that a mere resolution for the augmentation of the Irish militia will at all compensate for the loss of a considerable proportion of troops, allowed on all hands to be adequate to the defence of Ireland, combined with the regular military force? In fact, Sir, if ministers act consistently, the offers of the Irish militia cannot be accepted, unless some return be made to Ireland. By the system of augmenting the militia, this return cannot be expected for a considerable period, and therefore the one measure is not only inconsistent with the other, but utterly inefficient for any object of obtaining a greater disposable force.

No man will go beyond me in maintaining that the militia are a constitutional, a respectable, and a most useful force, when kept within proper limits, and applied to the specific object of their formation. It must, however, be with every man a question of peculiar jealousy, to find the militia come in competition with the regular army under any circumstances, but more peculiarly under the circumstances in which the proposed measures of ministers necessarily placed that competition. They admit that there is a necessity for the augmentation of the disposable force of the country. They fix on Ireland as that part of the empire where that disposable force is to be more readily procured; and at the time they are holding this language, they are determined that the militia of Ireland shall be, to a considerable degree, increased. It must, Sir, appear singular, that when the deficiency of the quota of the army of reserve to be furnished by Ireland is materially deficient, it should be proposed to augment the miTitia;-a species of force confessedly limited to services less applicable to our present circumstances. If new levies are to be made, why are these deficiencies in the army of reserve, or why are not the new levies to have the precedency? The mischief of competition is allowed. The professed object of ministers is to have a disposable force; yet, with these admissions, the militia