vide equal, but separate, accommodations for the white and colored
races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for each passenger
train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to
secure separate accommodations; and providing that no persons shall
be permitted to occupy seats in coaches other than the ones assigned
to them, on account of the race they belong to; and requiring the
officers of the passenger trains to assign each passenger to the coach or
compartment assigned for the race to which he or she belongs; and
imposing fines or imprisonment upon passengers insisting on going
into a coach or compartment other than the one set aside for the race
to which he or she belongs; and conferring upon officers of the trains
power to refuse to carry on the train passengers refusing to occupy
the coach or compartment assigned to them, and exempting the rail-
way company from liability for such refusal, are not in conflict with
the provisions either of the Thirteenth Amendment or of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Plessy
v. Ferguson, 587.
See ALIENS;
INDIANS, 2, 3, 4, 5.
an alien, sold to B. in New Orleans thirteen bonds of the State of
Louisiana, delivered them to him, and received from him payment for
them in full. Both parties contemplated the purchase and delivery
of valid and lawful obligations of the State, and both regarded the
bonds so delivered as such valid and lawful obligations. It turned
out that the bonds were absolutely void, having never been lawfully
put into circulation. B. thereupon sued A. in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, to recover the
purchase money paid for them. Held, (1) That as the sale was a
Louisiana contract, the rights and obligations of the parties must be
determined by the laws of that State; (2) That by the civil law,
which prevails in Louisiana, warranty, whilst not of the essence, is
yet of the nature of the contract of sale, and is implied in every such
contract, unless there be a stipulation to the contrary; (3) That by
the rule of the common law, both in England and in the United
States the doctrine is universally recognized that where commercial
paper is sold without indorsement or without express assumption of
liability on the paper itself, the contract of sale and the obligations
which arise from it, as between vendor and vendee, are governed by
the common law, relating to the sale of goods and chattels; and that
the undoubted rule is that in such a sale the obligation of the vendor
is not restricted to the mere question of forgery vel non, but depends
upon whether he has delivered that which he contracted to sell, this
rule being designated, in England, as a condition of the principal
contract, as to the essence and substance of the thing agreed to be
sold, and in this country being generally termed an implied warranty
of identity of the thing sold; (4) That whilst the civil law enforces
in the contract of sale generally the broadest obligation of warranty, it
has so narrowed it, when dealing with credits and incorporeal rights,
as to confine it to the title of the seller and to the existence of the
credit sold, and, e converso, the common law, which restricts warranty
within a narrow compass, virtually imposes the same duty by broaden-
ing the warranty as regards personal property so as to impose the
obligation on the vendor to deliver the thing sold as a condition of
the principal contract or by implication of warranty as to the identity
of the thing sold; and thus, by these processes of reasoning the two
great systems, whilst apparently divergent in principle, practically
work substantially to the same salutary conclusions; (5) That B. is
entitled to recover the sum so paid by him, with interest from the
time of judicial demand. Meyer v. Richards, 385.
See ALIEN IMMIGRANT;
LIFE INSURANCE;
RAILROAD, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
1. When, in an action by a railroad employé against the company to
recover damages for injuries suffered while on duty, the inference to
be drawn from the facts is not so plain as to make it a legal conclu-
sion that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, the ques-
tion whether he was or was not so guilty must be left to the jury.
Northern Pacific Railroad v. Egeland, 93.
2. The defendant in error, plaintiff below, was a common laborer in the
employ of the plaintiff in error. When returning from his work on
a train, the conductor ordered him and others to jump off at a station
when the train was moving about four miles an hour. The platform
was about a foot lower than the car step. His fellow-laborers jumped
and were landed safely. He jumped and was seriously injured. He
sued to recover damages for those injuries. Held, that the court
below rightly left it to the jury to determine whether he was guilty
of contributory negligence. Ib.
CORPORATION.
See RAILROAD, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17.
1. It is no error to refuse to give an instruction when all its propositions
are embraced in the charge to the jury. Rio Grande Western Railway
Co. v. Leake, 280.
2. It is no error in an action like this to refuse an instruction which
singles out particular circumstances, and omits all reference to
others of importance. Ib.
3. This case was fairly submitted to the jury with no error of law to the
prejudice of the defendant. Ib.
4. This case was one peculiarly for the jury, under appropriate instruc-
tions from the court as to the principles of law by which they were
to be guided in reaching a conclusion as to the liability of the rail-
road company for the death of its employé; aud the positions taken
to the contrary have no merit. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Gentry,
5. The ruling in Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148, that "the judge
presiding at a trial, civil or criminal, in any court of the United
States, may express his opinion to the jury upon the questions of fact
which he submits to their determination" applied to statements by
the court below in its charge in this case. Wiborg v. United States,
632.
See CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; NEGLIGENCE.
1. Rulings of the court below refusing writs of subpano duces tecum held
to work no injury to defendant. Murray v. Louisiana, 101.
2. The state court, on the trial of the plaintiff in error for murder, per-
mitted to be read in evidence the evidence of a witness taken in the
presence of the accused at a preliminary hearing, read to and signed
by the witness, the prosecuting officer alleging that the witness was
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and his attendance could not be
procured. The bill of exceptions to its allowance was not presented
to the trial judge for signature until two weeks after sentence, after
refusal of a new trial, and after appeal. The record does not disclose
the nature or effect of the testimony so admitted. Held, that there is
nothing in this record which would authorize this court to convict the
Supreme Court of Louisiana of error in that behalf. Ib.
3. A person indicted for robbing a mail-carrier of a registered mail pack-
age, and of putting the carrier in jeopardy of his life in effecting it, is
entitled under Rev. Stat. § 819 to ten peremptory challenges. Harri-
son v. United States, 140.
4. The defendant's name need not be correctly spelled in an indictment,
if substantially the same sound is preserved. Faust v. United States,
452.
5. On the trial under an indictment against an assistant postmaster for
embezzling money-order funds of the United States, it being proved
that he was the son and assistant of the principal postmaster, and
as such had the sole management and possession of the money-order
business and money-order funds during the entire term, a certified
transcript from the office of the Auditor of the Treasury at Wash-
ington, showing the account of the postmaster, is admissible in evi-.
dence. Ib.
6. It was no error on such trial to refuse to admit evidence tending to
show that another person than the defendant, at a time anterior to
the time of the commission of the offence charged, had committed
another and different offence than the one herein charged, and that
said other person had been indicted and convicted thereof. Ib.
7. It was within the discretion of the court below to permit a witness who
had been examined and cross-examined to be recalled in order to
make some change in the statements made by him on cross-examina-
tion. Ib.
8. The objection that the charge as a whole was misleading is without
merit. Ib.
9. The sixth assignment is based on the refusal of the court to charge the
jury that the embezzlement must be proved to have taken place with-
out the consent of the defendant's principal or employer. It was
claimed that as the indictment failed to charge that the defendant
embezzled any money without the consent of his principal or em-
ployer, and as the postmaster employed the defendant, the defendant's
responsibility was to the postmaster, and not to the government. Held,
that it had no merit. Ib.
10. The remaining assignments are without merit. Th.
11. A general verdict of acquittal, in a court having jurisdiction of the
cause and of the defendant, upon the issue of not guilty to an indict-
ment undertaking to charge murder, and not objected to before ver-
dict as insufficient in that respect, is a bar to a subsequent indictment
against him for the same killing. United States v. Ball, 662.
12. A verdict in a case submitted to the jury on Saturday may be received
and the jury discharged on Sunday. Ib.
13. A defendant in a criminal case, who procures a verdict and judgment
against him to be set aside by the court, may be tried anew upon the
same or another indictment for the same offence of which he was con-
victed. Ib.
14. Whether defendants jointly indicted shall be tried together or sepa-
rately rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Ib.
15. After a witness in support of a prosecution has testified, on cross-
examination, that he had, at his own expense, employed another
attorney to assist the attorney for the government, the question "How
much do you pay him?" may be excluded as immaterial. Th.
16. Upon a trial for murder by shooting, in different parts of the body,
with a gun loaded with buckshot, and after the introduction of con-
flicting evidence upon the question whether a gun found in the de-
fendant's possession would scatter buckshot, it is within the discretion
of the court to decline to permit the gun to be taken out and shot off,
in the presence of the deputy marshal, in order to test how it threw
such shot.
17. An indictment for murder, which alleges that A, at a certain time
and place, by shooting with a loaded gun, inflicted upon the body of B
"a mortal wound, of which mortal wound the said B did languish, and
languishing did then and there instantly die," unequivocally alleges
that B died of the mortal wound inflicted by A, and that B died at
the time and place at which the mortal wound was inflicted. 1lb.
18. The court is not bound, as a matter of law, to set aside a verdict of
guilty in a capital case, because no special oath was administered to
the officer in charge of the jury, if he was a deputy marshal who had
previously taken the oath of office, and no objection to his taking
charge of the jury without a new oath was made at any stage of the
trial, and the jury were duly cautioned by the court not to separate
or to allow any other person to talk with them about the case, and
there is nothing tending to show that the jury were exposed to any
influence that might interfere with the impartial performance of their
duties or prejudice the defendant. Ib.
The right to a drawback on bituminous coal, imported into the United
States and consumed as fuel on a steam vessel engaged in the coasting
trade of the United States, which existed before the passage of the
tariff act of October 1, 1890, c. 1244, 26 Stat. 507, was taken away by
the passage of that bill. United States v. Allen, 499.
1. This complaint being, in effect, a bill to quiet title as against an adverse
claim, and the plaintiff having thus voluntarily invoked the equity
jurisdiction of the court, he is in no position to urge, on appeal, that
his complaint should have been dismissed because of adequacy of
remedy at law, and such an objection comes too late in the appel-
late tribunal. Perego v. Dodge, 160.
2. Where a case is one of equitable jurisdiction only, the trial court is not
bound to submit issues of fact to a jury; and, if it does so, is at lib-
erty to disregard the verdict and findings of the jury. Ib.
3. By reason of his selection of this form of action, and his proceeding to
a hearing and decree without objection, the contention of the appel-
lant in respect of his deprivation of trial by jury comes too late. Ib.
4. The act of March 3, 1881, c. 140, 21 Stat. 505, was not intended to re-
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