1. Detention or temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary
to give effect to the exclusion or expulsion of Chinese aliens is valid.
Wong Wing v. United States, 228.
2. The United States can forbid aliens from coming within their borders,
and expel them from their territory, and can devolve the power and
duty of identifying and arresting such persons upon executive or sub-
ordinate officials; but when Congress sees fit to further promote such
a policy by subjecting the persons of such aliens to infamous punish-
ment at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, such legislation,
to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of
the accused. Ib.
A contract made with an alien in a foreign country to come to this coun-
try as a chemist on a sugar plantation in Louisiana, in pursuance
of which contract such alien does come to this country and is em-
ployed on a sugar plantation in Louisiana, and his expenses paid by
the defendant, is not such a contract to perform labor or service as is
prohibited in the act of Congress passed February 26, 1885. United
States v. Laws, 258.
R. obtained a judgment against B. on the law side of the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia. Shortly after he assigned the judgment
to S. W., who subsequently became bankrupt, and as such surrendered
all his property, including said judgment. G. was duly made his
assignee. S. W. died and G. W. was made his executrix. The death
of S. W. being suggested on the record, a writ of scire facias was
issued to revive the judgment, and on return of nihil a second writ
was issued on which a like return was made. When these proceed-
ings came to the knowledge of B. he filed a bill to set them aside.
A demurrer being sustained on the ground that the assignee was not
a party the assignee was summoned in; and, upon his death, his suc-
cessor was made a party on his own motion. After issues were made
by the pleadings, the suit proceeded to a final decree in the Supreme
Court of the District, from which an appeal was taken to the Court of
Appeals. The latter court reversed the judgment of the court below.
On appeal to this court it is Held, (1) That the proceedings to revive
the judgment were regular; (2) That as the assignee was a party
to the proceedings, with his official rights protected, the judgment
debtor could not set up that it was not competent for G. W. to orig-
inate the proceedings; (3) That no substantial reason was shown
why B. should be relieved from the judginent. Brown v. Wygant and
Leeds, 618.
The report of the commissioners appointed October 21, 1895, 159 U. S. 275,
to run the disputed boundary line between Indiana and Kentucky, is
confirmed. Indiana v. Kentucky, 520.
CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.
Singer Manufacturing Company v. June Manufacturing Company, 163 U. S.
169, followed. Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Bent, 205.
See COURT ANnd Jury, 5;
REMOVAL Of Causes.
CHINESE ALIENS.
See ALIENS.
1. A statute of a State, requiring a telegraph company to pay a tax upon
its property within the State, valued at such a proportion of the
whole value of its capital stock as the length of its lines within the
State bears to the length of all its lines everywhere, deducting a sum
equal to the value of its real estate and machinery subject to local
taxation within the State, is constitutional and valid, notwithstand-
ing that nothing is in terms directed to be deducted from the valua-
tion, either for the value of its franchises from the United States, or
for the value of its real estate and machinery situated and taxed in
other States; unless there is something more showing that the system
of taxation adopted is oppressive and unconstitutional. Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart, 1.
2. The statute of Indiana of March 6, 1893, c. 171, which directs the
state board of tax commissioners to take as the basis of valuation
of the property within the State of every telegraph company, incor-
porated in Indiana or in any other State, the proportion of the value
of its whole capital stock which the length of its lines within the
State bears to the whole length of all its lines, but, as construed by
the Supreme Court of the State, makes it the duty of the tax com-
missioners to make such deductions, on account of a greater propor-
tional value of the company's property outside the State, or for any
other reason, so as to assess its property within the State at its true
cash value; and, so construed, is constitutional. Ib.
3. A person upon whose oath a criminal information for a libel is filed,
and who is found by the jury, as part of their verdict acquitting the
defendant, to be the prosecuting witness, and to have instituted the
prosecution without probable cause and with malicious motives, and
is thereupon adjudged by the court to pay the costs, and to be com-
mitted until payment thereof, in accordance with the General Stat-
utes of Kansas of 1889, c. 82, § 326, and who does not appear to have
been denied at the trial the opportunity of offering arguments and
evidence upon the motives and the cause of the prosecution, is not
deprived of liberty or property without due process of law, or denied
the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States. Lowe v. Kansas, 81.
4. A state statute which authorizes the redemption of property sold upon
foreclosure of a mortgage, where no right of redemption previously
existed, or which extends the period of redemption beyond the time
formerly allowed, cannot constitutionally apply to a sale under a
mortgage executed before its passage. Barnitz v. Beverly, 118.
5. The constitutional prohibition upon the passage of state laws impair-
ing the obligation of contracts has reference only to the laws, that is,
to the constitutional provisions or to the legislative enactments, of
a State, and not to judicial decisions or the acts of state tribunals
or officers under statutes in force at the time of the making of the'
contract, the obligation of which is alleged to have been impaired.
Hanford v. Davies, 273.
6. The act of Congress of September 20, 1850, c. 61, granted a right of
way, and sections of the public lands, to the State of Illinois, and to
States south of the Ohio River, to aid in the construction of a railroad
connecting the waters of the Great Lakes with those of the Gulf of
Mexico, and over which the mails of the United States should be car-
ried. The State of Illinois accepted the act, and incorporated the
Illinois Central Railroad Company, for the purpose of constructing
& railroad with a southern terminus described as "a point at the city
of Cairo." The company accordingly constructed and maintained its
railroad to a station in Cairo, very near the junction of the Ohio and
Mississippi Rivers; but afterwards, in accordance with statutes of the
United States and of the State of Illinois, connected its railroad with
a railroad bridge built across the Ohio River opposite a part of Cairo
farther from the mouth of that river; and put on a fast mail train
carrying interstate passengers and the United States mails from
Chicago to New Orleans, which ran through the city of Cairo, but
did not go to the station in that city, and could not have done so
without leaving the through route at a point three and a half miles
from the station and coming back to the same point; but the company
made adequate accommodation by other trains for interstate passen-
gers to and from Cairo. Cairo was a county seat. Held, that a statute
of Illinois, requiring railroad companies to stop their trains at county
seats long enough to receive and let off passengers with safety, and
construed by the Supreme Court of the State to require the fast mail
train of this company to be run to and stopped at the station in Cairo,
was, to that extent, an unconstitutional hindrance and obstruction of
interstate commerce, and of the passage of the mails of the United
States. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 142.
7. The legislation of the State of Georgia, contained in §§ 4578 and 4310
of the Code of 1882, forbidding the running of freight trains on any
railroad in the State on Sunday, and providing for the trial and pun-
ishment, on conviction, of the superintendent of a railroad company
violating that provision, although it affects interstate commerce in a
limited degree, is not, for that reason, a needless intrusion upon the
domain of Federal jurisdiction, nor strictly a regulation of interstate
commerce, but is an ordinary police regulation, designed to secure the
well-being, and to promote the general welfare of the people within
the State, and is not invalid by force alone of the Constitution of the
United States; but is to be respected in the courts of the Union until
superseded and displaced by some act of Congress, passed in execution
of the power granted to it by the Constitution. Hennington v. Georgia,
8. There is nothing in the legislation in question in this case that suggests
that it was enacted with the purpose to regulate interstate commerce,
or with any other purpose than to prescribe a rule of civil duty for all
who, on the Sabbath day, are within the territorial jurisdiction of the
State. Ib.
9. The appropriations of money by the act of March 2, 1895, c. 189, 28
Stat. 910, 933, to be paid to certain manufacturers and producers of
sugar who had complied with the provisions of the act of October 1,
1890, c. 1244, 26 Stat. 567, were within the power of Congress to make,
and were constitutional and valid. United States v. Realty Company,
427.
10. It is within the constitutional power of Congress to determine whether
claims upon the public treasury are founded upon moral and honorable
obligations, and upon principles of right and justice; and having
decided such questions in the affirmative, and having appropriated
public money for the payment of such claims, its decision can rarely,
if ever, be the subject of review by the Judicial branch of the Govern-
ment. Ib.
11. The statute of Louisiana, acts of 1890, No. 111, requiring railway
companies carrying passengers in their coaches in that State, to pro-
|