attestation of William Roupell's signature by Mr. Edwin Whitaker, a brother of Mr. Whitaker, the attorney of William Roupell, and he being examined, stated that he saw William Roupell sign the deed, and that it was then signed by Truman and Dove, and that the attestation clause of the execution by R. P. Roupell was at that time filled up. This was relied upon as a contradiction of Truman and William Roupell, and Mr. Covington was called to show that when Truman and Dove were first applied to on the subject they did not say that they had not seen the old man execute the deed. Further, they made the time of execution to have been summer, whereas it was in the spring, and William Roupell, it would be seen, stated it was the end of February, whereas a memorandum of deposit of the deed with Whitaker was produced, dated the 11th of February, 1856, so that the deed must have been completed before then.

Such was the substance of the evidence on this the vital part of the case. The deed having been completed was first deposited with Mr. Whitaker, to whom William Roupell owed money, and he also owed 12,000l. to the bank on his guarantee, and a mortgage to Whitaker was prepared, but not executed. An advance was obtained from a Mr. Longman, who, however, finding that the father was not to be a concurring party on a conveyance to himself, declined to have any thing to do with the transaction. This was in July, 1856, and, notwithstanding this, no application was made to the testator to ascertain if he really had executed the deed, and subsequently a mortgage of the estate to Whitaker was prepared in his office, but it was not executed. On the 12th of September, 1856, the old man died, having, just before (on August 30th), confirmed the will of 1850. It was proved that the old man received the rents, and dealt with the property as owner down to the time of his death, but, on the other hand, the tenants stated he told them that they would have his son William for their landlord, and that he had given him the estate. After his death, William Roupell proved the will of 1856, giving all the estates to his mother, and received the rents as for her. According to his own account, he carried the will of 1850 about with him, having determined to destroy it, because it gave the Warley estate to his brother Richard. And the case for the plaintiff was that he forged the will of September 2nd, 1856, after his father's death, in order to get rid of that former will, and prevent the discovery of his fraud as to the deed of gift. The mortgage to Whitaker, it will be remembered, was prepared, but not executed. It was in July, 1857, that the mortgage of this estate to the defendants was executed for 12,000l., which was employed in liquidating the debt to the bank, for which Whitaker was guarantee. The mortgage recited the forged leases, which had been shown to them, to enhance the value of the estate. So long as they were out of possession, receiving the interest, the fraud as to the leases was not discovered. When, however, in 1862, William Roupell became embarrassed, and could no longer keep up the interest, they threatened to take possession, on which, of course, the fraud would be discovered. He, thereupon, had certain communications with Whitaker, the nature of which did not appear, as he was not examined about them, and Whitaker was not called. The case for the defendants was that he threatened to declare the deed forged if they exposed the fraud as to the leases. In the result he absconded in March, 1862, and returned in August, 1862, when he appeared as a witness at the trial at Guildford on behalf of his brother in the action to recover the Kingston estate. On that occasion he swore to the forgery of the deed of conveyance of that estate, and also of the will of the 2nd of September, 1856. On that occasion he was crossexamined with a view to shake his testimony, and to show that he had set up

this story only to recruit the fortunes of his family, and with that view it was elicited from him that the value of the various other properties of his father at the time of his death was:— s:-Roupell-street estate, 50,000l.; Kingston, 15,0007.; Warley, Essex, 12,000l.; Thundersley, 10,0007.; Havering-atte-Bower, 75007.; leadworks, 1500l.; premises in Shoe-lane, 20007.; premises in Bear-lane, 20007.; premises in Lant-street, Southwark, 35007.; hop-warehouses, Borough, 25007.; Wandsworth-road estates, 80007.; Southwell, 4500l.; Hampshire estates, 45007.; and that he had raised 135,0007. on Roupell-park estate, and about 30,000l. on Roupell-street estate, and about 12,000l. on the Warley estate in Essex, so that the total charge on all the estates came to about 184,000l.; and it was suggested that the object of his testimony as to the forgery of the securities was simply to get back all this property for his family; and this was also suggested on the part of the defendants in the present trial. On the other hand, it was suggested by the counsel for the plaintiff that the great object of his forgery of the will of September, 1856, was to cover his frauds in regard to this particular estate, because the will of 1850 gave it, as he said, to his brother, and the codicil of the 30th of August, 1856, confirmed it. That codicil, according to a "draught" copy of it, ran thus :

"This is a codicil to the last will of me, Richard Palmer Roupell, which will bears date on the 1st day of October, 1850. Whereas, by my said will, I appointed my wife Sarah, my son William Roupell, R. Stevens, and P. Hughes executors and trustees of my will; and P. Hughes has departed this life, and I have since the execution of my said will made some alterations on the side thereof, stating such fact, and appointing J. Surridge and William Clarke to be executors and trustees thereof, along with my said wife and son, and Richard Stevens; and whereas I did not re-execute my said will, except by showing such alterations to the said W. Clarke, who then subscribed his name thereto; now, I do hereby appoint the said J. Surridge and W. Clarke to be executors of my said will (then follows some legacies to them), and in every other respect I confirm my said will. In witness,— J. S. G. C. R.

"August 30th, 1856."

"(Witnesses)

The initials were those of Mr. Sharpe and Mr. Ring, the proctors who prepared it. They, however, having burnt the draught of the will of 1850 when that of 1856 was proved, could not speak to its contents; and of this there was no evidence but that of William Roupell, who stated that, after carrying the will of 1850 about with him for six years, he burnt it in March, 1862. Two of the executors above mentioned, Clarke and Surridge, were called as witnesses, and one of the most remarkable features in the case was that they actually declared their belief in the genuineness of the signatures said to be forged. Mr. Surridge, being called for the plaintiff, and shown the will, said it was genuine, and he was not asked as to the deed. And Mr. Clarke was called for the defendants, and declared both the will of 1856 and the deed of 1856 to be "decidedly genuine." The third executor, the eminent law publisher, Mr. Richard Stevens, though present in court, was not called by either side. Nor were the two tenants of the estate in question, nor the two attesting witnesses of the deed asked as to the genuineness of the signature they appeared to have attested, but only swore that they had not seen it signed by the donor. Of the other tenants who were called, the most were called by the defendants, and declared the deed genuine. And the greater part of the evidence of the plaintiff (except that of the experts) was

directed to show the forgery of the will of 1856. Such is a summary of the evidence in this most extraordinary case, which in any view of it presented circumstances so contradictory that they afforded ground for arguments on each side most difficult to answer; and offered to the jury a question perhaps as hard to determine as any that ever came before a court of justice.

Mr. Serjeant Shee, Mr. Lush, Q.C., Mr. J. Brown, and Mr. Thesiger appeared for the plaintiff; Mr. Bovill, Q.C., Mr. Hawkins, Q.C., and Mr. Garth were for the defendants.

On the eighth day of the trial, the evidence of the witnesses having been concluded, Mr. Baron Channell summed up the case to the jury. He congratulated them on the close of what was, perhaps, in all its circumstances, a case without a parallel. The great question in the cause was whether the deed of gift under which the defendants claimed was valid, but that would depend a great deal on all the circumstances of the case and the position of the parties. The real parties to the action were Richard Roupell and the mortgagees, and Richard Roupell claimed as heir-at-law of his father. In order to sustain that claim he must show that his father died seised of the estate. He could not recover both as heir and devisee. If the deed was valid, then his father did not die seised of the estate. In that case he could claim as devisee under the will of 1850. And then, again, if the will of September, 1856, was valid, then his mother, and not he, was entitled. The defendants claimed chiefly on the broad ground that the deed of gift was valid, and they also set it up as showing that the father did not die seised of the estate. They derived title under that deed by a mortgage executed by William Roupell after his father's death. They did not claim under either of the wills, but if there was a valid will which gave the title to any one else than the plaintiff, of course he could not recover. The case must depend a great deal, but not entirely, on the evidence of William Roupell, which must, no doubt, be taken in connexion with the other evidence in the case as tending to confirm or contradict it. Every one in court yesterday was perceptibly impressed with the eloquence of the learned serjeant, especially when he urged that William Roupell might possibly have been penitent. The jury, however, must deal with the case, if not upon a sterner view of it, at all events upon the evidence and according to the rules of law, as they might bear upon their determination. And it was impossible for them to conceal from themselves that he came before them as a witness, in any view, steeped in guilt and crime. According to his own account he had forged his father's will, and forged the leases and the deed, and obtained the money of the mortgagees, and then destroyed a will giving the estate to his brother. That was the view to be taken according to his own account. On the other hand, if that account was false, he was seeking to commit a flagrant fraud by means of deliberate perjury, and to deprive the mortgagees of the security on which he had obtained their money. In point of law, however, he was a competent witness. Not long ago he would not have been competent, as having been convicted of forgery. The law, however, was so far altered that his evidence was admissible; but it was for the jury, under all these circumstances, to judge whether he was the witness of truth. It had been deemed unwise to exclude the evidence of persons convicted of infamous crimes, but it was for the jury to exercise their discretion as to whether the witness was worthy of credit. Many objections had been taken to the reception of other evidence in the case, of which he had taken a note; but if any exception were taken to his direction in point of law, he should expect a written note of it to be handed up to him before he concluded his charge. With regard to the heir

ship of the plaintiff, it did not appear now to be disputed; and the rest of the case, as he said, depended greatly on the credit to be given to the evidence of William Roupell, to which therefore he should particularly call the attention of the jury. (The learned Baron then read and commented upon it at considerable length.) It was not unimportant to observe that the mother and sister resided at Aspen House, where the father never was except on Sunday and Monday, and where William Roupell slept; so that he had his mother and sister very much under his influence. It was also material to observe that he stated that his difficulties began when his father refused to increase his allowance, and that he owed large sums of money in January, 1856, and had no means of payment. It appeared, however, that his father at that time had placed confidence in him, and gave him opportunities of dealing with property to a large amount. At that time he stated that the negotiations for the enfranchisement of the copyhold part of Bolens farm were going on, and that he took away all the deeds of the Warley estate. The receipt given by the father for the deeds only mentioned the property at Bolens," and that the father had seen the receipt was clear, for it was altered in his handwriting as to the word " Havering" written for "Warley." He said he took two of the deeds to the law stationer's-that is, the counterpart leases executed by the tenants, and got them copied, and then altered the copies and got them re-copied, and then took them to Whitaker, his attorney, for the purpose of preparing new leases. He said he directed Whitaker to engross the leases from the draughts thus prepared from the copies of the counterparts. These draughts were produced, and the false leases were dated October, 1856, and at increased rents. He explained his object to be to raise money on the estate, and with that view to enhance the value, by means of these false leases. There was one fact in the case on which both parties agreed-viz., that these new counterpart leases were forged. It was contended for the defendants that the deed of gift was valid, but admitted that the leases were forged. Indeed, they were recited in their mortgage, so that it could not be disputed, and the tenants denied having executed these new counterparts. Different inferences were drawn from the fact, but the fact was admitted. William Roupell said he directed Whitaker to prepare the deed of gift. It was a singular thing that Mr. Whitaker, whose office was in London, did not appear to have had any interview with old Roupell. But it was said that he asked for an authority, and William Roupell said he handed him the letter of which so much had been said, and as to which Sarah Roupell was examined. (The learned Baron here read and commented upon the letter of the 8th of January, 1856.) The letter appeared to refer only to one of the farms, and that might not be unimportant; for there was evidence that at that time the copyhold part of Bolens had been transferred to William; and it was stated that the old man had spoken of his intention to give him the farms, so that it was not improbable that she might have supposed the letter to refer to that farm. However incautious her conduct might have been in writing the letter, there was not, in his opinion, any ground for serious reflection on that young woman, the sister. She had certainly been called late in the case, and, indeed, after the plaintiff's case was closed, and in consequence of a suggestion of his own. But there were obvious reasons for reluctance to call her, and his suggestion arose in a great degree from his observing that neither party was likely to call Whitaker as a witness. There was no reason to suppose that she was privy to any thing improper. It was upon the authority of this letter, it was said, that Whitaker prepared the deed of gift-a most imprudent course. It was stated by

William Roupell that he directed Whitaker to raise as much money for him as he could upon the deed. Before it was engrossed it was, he said, handed to him, and he signed his father's name as donor and his own as donee. He said he did it at the end of February or beginning of March, and that he got it attested by Truman and Dove, under the idea that it was a lease signed by himself. He said he put blotting-paper over the attestation. A good deal had been said as to the appearance of the signatures, as showing that the "h" of John Truman's name went up into the "e" of old Roupell's name above it, and that the name "R. P. Roupell" must have been written first. But if the blotting-paper had been so placed as to leave the word "Roupell" uncovered, that would be accounted for and would not be so important. That they signed the deed as attesting witnesses was clear, and the evidence was quite consistent with this supposition, that the name of old Roupell was already signed to the deed, and that only the initial letters "R. P." were covered or concealed. The evidence of William Roupell was that he directed Mr. Whitaker to raise as much money as he could upon the deed, and that on the 6th of February, 1856, he got 60001. from Whitaker, who was called to produce the deeds, but not called to be examined as a witness. Observations had been made on one side and the other to show that the other side should have called him as a witness. He should not himself make any observations upon that point further than that it was competent in point of law for a party to call a person to produce deeds without examining him as a witness. It was said that the case for the plaintiff had been opened as if the names of the attesting witnesses were forged, whereas it turned out that they were really signed. In a certain sense their signatures or attestations were forgeries; for if a man were induced to put his name to one instrument, supposing it to be another, it was a fraud, if not a forgery, and would invalidate an instrument so executed by the maker or grantor under such a mistake as to its identity. In this case, however, the attesting witnesses really signed as such, and said they supposed the instrument to be a lease by William Roupell, and so of the counterpart leases. Then on the 11th of February, 1856, there was a deposit of the deed with Whitaker, and on the 11th of March with Mr. Longman. At that time, as William Roupell stated, he owed Whitaker several thousand pounds, besides the new advance; and he also owed the London and Westminster Bank 12,000l. Mr. Longman advanced 60007. The enfranchisement of the copyhold was in July, 1856. Mr. Longman would not continue the transaction, and called in the 60007. he had advanced. There was a mortgage to Whitaker prepared, dated July, 1857, which was never executed. Mr. Edwin Whitaker was called, and stated that it was prepared in the office. William Roupell stated that the negotiations with Whitaker were pending at the time of his father's death, and that in July, 1857, he executed a mortgage to the defendants for 12,000l., with which the sum guaranteed by Whitaker was paid off, and Whitaker signed the receipt for the money indorsed on the deed, the money being paid into the account at the London and Westminster Bank. There was an entry in the pass-book—“ July 29, 12,000l.;” and it appeared that the money passed through Whitaker's hands, the money being received by him and paid into William Roupell's account by Whitaker, and then, on the same date, the whole amount was drawn out. William Roupell stated that on the 28th of March, 1862, he gave Whitaker the genuine documents, the real counterpart leases he had taken from his father's box. Up to that time he said Whitaker did not know they were not genuine. He gave Whitaker the first intimation on the 18th of March, 1862. He said he saw that at that time