of a violent change. The immense increase of population, the still greater increase of wealth; the introduction of foreign races in large numbers as citizens, not brought up under the laws and customs which were adapted to a more limited, and, practically, a more homogeneous race; the character of the political constitution consequent, perhaps, on these circumstances; the absence of any theatre for the ambitious and refined intellects of the country, which deteriorated public spirit, and lowered public morality; and, above all, the increasing influence of the United States upon the political fortunes of Europe,-these were all circumstances which indicated the more than possibility that the mere colonial character of these communities might suddenly be violently subverted, and those imperial characteristics appear which seem to be the destiny of man. I cannot conceal from myself the conviction that whoever in this House may be young enough to live to witness the ultimate consequences of this civil war will see, whenever the waters have subsided, a different America from that which was known to our fathers, and even from that of which this generation has had so much. experience. It will be an America of armies, of diplomacy, of rival States and manoeuvring Cabinets, of frequent turbulence, and, probably, of frequent wars. With these views I have myself, during the last session, exerted whatever influence I might possess in endeavouring to dissuade my friends from embarrassing Her Majesty's Government in that position of politic and dignified reserve which they appeared to me to have taken up on this question. It did appear to me, looking at these transactions across the Atlantic, not as events of a mere casual character, but as being such as might probably influence-as the great French revolution influenced, and is still influencing-European affairs-that there was on our part due to the existing authorities in America a large measure of deference in the difficulties which they had to encounter. At the same time it was natural to feel, what I would not attempt to disguise, the greatest respect for those Southern States, who, representing a vast population of men, were struggling for some of the greatest objects of existence-independence and power. It appeared to me that the course which Her Majesty's Government had apparently resolved upon was one which, on the whole, was honourable to this country, and would prove beneficial to all classes of the community. I was therefore surprised, and, individually speaking, somewhat mortified, when I found that in the course of the autumn Her Majesty's Government commissioned one or two of their members to repair to the chief seats of industry in the country to announce, as I understood it, an entire change in the policy which they had throughout supported and sanctioned. It was not an accident; the declaration was made formally, and it was made avowedly with the sanction of the Government. If that declaration meant any thing, it meant that the Southern

States would be recognized; because, if it be true that they have created armies, navies, and a people, we are bound by every principle of policy and of public law to recognize their political existence. There appeared to me to be a great inconsistency in that declaration. I thought that a course of conduct was then recommended by the Government which nothing had occurred in the interval to justify. It is most inconvenient that, upon a subject of such importance, and upon which the Government appeared from the first to have taken up a correct and dignified position, the Government should have exhibited such contradictory conduct, and such conflicting opinions, and that during the autumn they should have felt it their duty to communicate this vacillation of purpose, and this inconsistency of judgment to the whole nation. At the commencement almost of the struggle we were told by one minister, who, above all, ought to be best informed on these topics, what, in the opinion of the Government, were the motives of this civil war. We were told that on the part of the North there was a desire to establish dominion, and on the part of the South to achieve independence. It may have been discreet, perhaps, on the part of the Government to make that public declaration of their opinion; but what are we to say of the subsequent definitions of this contest which have also been supplied by the Government? It is only a fortnight since one of the Cabinet ministers told us that the whole cause of this war was the existence of slavery, and he vigorously denounced that pestilent institution. What agreement is there, then, between the President of the Board of Trade and the Foreign Minister, who ought to be the greatest authority on matters of this character ? What are we to say when one day we find an eminent member of the Cabinet recommending the recognition of Southern independence, and the next day another equally important colleague telling us that none of the conditions on which independence should be recognized, exist in the South? These varying opinions are so prevalent among the members of the Government that only a day or two ago one of them, not yet admitted to the Cabinet, but whose lips are steeped in the gravity of the Privy Council, told us that in the opinion of the Government the Lord of Hosts was on the side of the Southern States.' I think it very much to be regretted that the Government did not adhere to that reserve which distinguished them last session upon this great subject, and that it is much to be deprecated that, unless a change has taken place in their policy, there should not have been more silence during the recess as to their individual opinions."

Another topic, upon which Mr. Disraeli entered somewhat more fully than it had been dealt with elsewhere, was that of the operations of our military force in China. He desired to have some information as to what was going on in that quarter, and as to the employment of British troops between the Emperor of China

and his rebellious subjects. He wanted to know whether this was a policy which the House approved of. If we were to support the Emperor against the Taepings, we might be involved in another Chinese war, and with such a policy there could be no reduction of the expenditure. The House had been promised special papers relating to the affairs of Denmark, Italy, and Greece. On the latter subject especially he thought much information might be required from Ministers, especially in regard to the policy pursued by Earl Russell towards Turkey. Against the proposed surrender of the Ionian Islands to Greece Mr. Disraeli argued with great vehemence, contending that the view of those who regarded the right of this country over those islands as being merely a protectorate, was entirely fallacious.

"This," he said, "is very dangerous ground to take; and I most earnestly recommend the House to pause before they accept representations of this kind. The treaties of 1815 entrusted the Ionian Isles to England about in the same manner that they entrusted Paris to the French people. Both parties possessed what was entrusted to them. We possessed the Ionian Isles before the treaties of 1815, and it becomes us to consider how we possessed them. We possessed them by conquest; and the question immediately arises why were they conquered? You do not conquer places out of mere wantonness or for amusement. The Ionian Isles were conquered, because the great men, to whom was entrusted the duty of guarding British interests and maintaining British power in those waters, represented most earnestly to the English Government that they could not accomplish their behests as long as these insular harbours were in possession of our powerful rival and enemy. It is, or it should be, well known, that the occupation of the Ionian Isles by the French was part of the secret negotiations of Tilsit, and it was only in consequence of an arrangement with Russia, before war was declared between that power and England, that French troops were landed from Russian ships on these islands, where the injurious influence exercised by them during the war upon British shipping and British interests was so great, that no less a man than Lord Collingwood impressed upon the British Government that it was absolutely necessary that these harbours should be in our possession. And they were in our possession. Corfu was not seized in a military sense; but six of these islands, including Cephalonia, which was described by Sir C. Napier-no mean authority on this subject-as possessing the most considerable harbour in the Mediterranean, had been conquered, and had been five years in the possession of England at the time of the peace. And why was not Corfu in our possession? Why, Corfu was a thorn in our side. We had not succeeded in taking Corfu, but we had strictly blockaded it, and when Napoleon suddenly fell, the French surrendered it to England by a military convention. It was in every sense a military surrender; and, therefore, when the Congress of Vienna

had to deliberate upon the settlement of Europe, we were in military possession of these islands, which we had in fact conquered and occupied, because in the possession of our enemy we had found them most injurious to our power and our interests."

Mr. Disraeli proceeded to contend that the gift of these islands to Greece would have a mischievous influence upon that power, whom it would stimulate to seek a further extension of territory, and to make aggressions upon the Turkish power, and thus disturb the peace of the world. In this respect it would be a strong instance of that policy which the present Government had on recent occasions most strongly reprobated. As to the conditions by which it was said the proposed cession was to be limited, Mr. Disraeli denied that any adequate security could be obtained for the observance of those conditions. He hoped that Her Majesty's Government were not about to adopt the wild notions which had of late been promulgated, which were hostile to the very principle of the British Empire. Mr. Disraeli plainly stated his own views as to the motives by which statesmen should be guided in regard to the acquisition and the retention of territory. "Professors and rhetoricians find a system for every contingency and a principle for every chance; but you are not going, I hope, to leave the destinies of the British Empire to prigs and pedants. The statesmen who construct, and the warriors who achieve, are only influenced by the instinct of power, and animated by the love of country. Those are the feelings and those the methods which form empires. There may be grave questions as to the best mode of obtaining wealth--some may be in favour of protection of domestic and colonial interests, some of unrestricted competition, or some of what I am quite surprised have now become so modish-commercial treaties and reciprocal arrangements for the advantage of commercial exchange-propositions which used to be scouted in this House; but there can be no question either in or out of this House that the best mode of preserving wealth is power. A country, and especially a maritime country, must get possession of the strong places of the world if it wishes to contribute to its power. I cannot say that I have yet heard any argument that appears to justify the course Her Majesty's Government have hitherto pursued, or the expectations they have held out to the Greek Islands." He concluded by expressing a hope that as the arrangement in question appeared to be not yet matured, circumstances might arise which would prevent it from being carried into effect.

The same argument against the cession of the Ionian Islands was urged with much earnestness by Mr. Seymour Fitzgerald, and by some other speakers in this debate. But they received an effective answer from members on the other side, and especially from Lord Palmerston, who clearly distinguished the case in question from the alleged historical parallels cited by his opponents"Mr. Disraeli had said that the Ionian Islands were, by the treaty of 1815, placed under the British Crown in the same way as Paris

was placed under France. The right hon. gentleman is not a man who speaks in this House without knowing what he is saying. He knows the value of words and the nature of things; but I was astonished at his making an assertion of that kind. Compare it to Piedmont and to the Prussian Rhenish provinces! Why he himself stated that which negatived that general assertion. The Ionian Islands were, as he said, six of them, occupied militarily by a British force at the time of the termination of the war, and Corfu surrendered at the downfall of Napoleon. But their fate was determined, like the fate of many of the countries of Europe, by the treaties concluded in 1815; and to those treaties, and especially to the treaty in regard to the Ionian Islands, Great Britain was a party. Well, what did that treaty do? Did that treaty say that the Ionian Islands were to be what the right hon. gentleman stated--a British territory, and to belong to the British Crown as one of its possessions? Quite the contrary. It stated that the Septinsular Republic was to be a separate and independent State, but, as a separate and independent State, was to be placed under the protection of the British Crown. But it is no part of the dominions of the British Crown. The Queen is not Sovereign of the Ionian Islands. Our treaties do not include or bind the Ionian Islands. When a treaty of commerce is made, there must be a separate act on the part of the Ionian Islands to give them the benefit of that treaty. They have a separate Legislature of their own; we do not make laws for them. They are to all intents and purposes, literally and legally, a separate State, forming no part of the British territory or dominions, but under the protection of England, by virtue of the treaty concluded between England and the other great Powers of Europe. Therefore, all the argument of the right hon. gentleman, founded on the supposition that Corfu and the other Ionian Islands were to England what Paris is to France, is, if he will allow me to repeat his own words, a 'perfect absurdity,' and has no bearing whatever on the question which the House may have to consider with reference to these islands. It is not now the time to discuss the policy of making that cession under the circumstances contemplated by the paragraph in the Queen's Speech. My own opinion is that it would be a wise measure. I think it would be a generous measure. think it is due to that Ionian State, which was placed under our protection for its own benefit and not for our advantage. We were bound to do the best for it. I believe we have done the best for it hitherto by maintaining the protectorate; but I think, if Greece is established under an enlightened Sovereign, who will develope her internal prosperity and maintain her external peace, that it will be for the benefit of those islands to be united with their fellow-countrymen. I think, too, that it is an example which may not be lost upon other countries. There are other questions pending in the world, in Europe especially, with regard to which an example of generous disinterestedness on the part of Great

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