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of the strong opinion, he might say the indignation, of England at the occurrences in Poland.

Mr. WALTER said, however strong the sentiments of the House and the country might be in the case of Poland, there should be no misunderstanding upon so important a question as the present. The motion proposed to submit to Her Majesty that the facts "demand the interposition of England in vindication of her own public faith and solemn engagements." If this language meant any thing, it meant war, and ought to mean war; the Government would be bound to give effect to the declaration, and not by merely sending a Queen's messenger.

Mr. DENMAN desired to steer between the two courses suggested by Mr. Hennessey and Mr. Milnes. He would strengthen the hands of the Government, and not tie them by saying that under no possible circumstances should England go to war with Russia. He was disposed to move an amendment substituting a resolution for an address, omitting the words after "demand," and inserting "the serious and immediate consideration of Her Majesty's Government."

Mr. FITZGERALD observed that this question had assumed a different complexion from that of former years; that the present position of the Polish people rendered it an urgent one, and that the solution of it rested with Her Majesty's Government. He dissented from Mr. Denman's proposed amendment, contending that the public law of Europe had been violated by Russia, and it was a feeble conclusion to leave such a matter to "the serious and immediate consideration of the Government." He supported the address.

Mr. STANSFIELD, attributing the insurrection of the Poles to the conscription, described this measure as a wholesale deportation of the very élite of the people of Poland; a barefaced device for sweeping into one huge net whatever was patriotic, free-spirited, and progressive in the country, and consigning the youth of Poland to a doom which every Polish mother would say was worse than death. He explained the secret motives and object of the Russian Government in the conscription, which, he observed, was a political act, not wanton and unconsidered, but in pursuance of a predetermined and deliberate policy. After stigmatizing the conduct of Prussia, he urged that some action on the part of the Government and the House was imperative; and he believed that a protest, indorsed by the unanimous opinion of the country, would not be made in vain.

Mr. H. SEYMOUR considered that this country was, in a certain degree, responsible for the condition of Poland. But the Treaty of Vienna was framed under difficult circumstances; the Czar then obtained a larger portion of Poland by false pretences. A protest by this country, backed by France and Austria, must have more effect than in 1815, in influencing the councils of both Russia and Prussia.

Mr. MAGUIRE argued that England was directly a party to a treaty of which there had been an acknowledged infraction, whereby the rights of the Poles had been violated, and that interference on the part of this country was justified by precedent, and called for by the voice of humanity.

Mr. WALPOLE said he had never listened to a debate in which there was more unanimity. Then came the real question, how the matter was to be practically dealt with, and what was the practical conclusion? Before a motion was adopted that might lead, step by step, into war, the House should carefully consider its effect. The most practical conclusion, in his opinion, was not to destroy the unanimity of the House, which would go out to the world, by any thing that would seem to approach a conflict of opinion. Was the Government, then, prepared to echo the sentiments expressed in that House; and, if so, was the House prepared to leave to them the responsibility of enforcing them?

Lord PALMERSTON said he did not stand there to unsay any thing he had formerly said. In the matter of Poland, he repeated that the Treaty of Vienna had been systematically violated. It was impossible not to feel the deepest sympathy for the Polish nation. He believed that the present Emperor of Russia did mean to improve the condition of his Polish subjects; but no doubt the late act of the conscription was entirely discordant with such a disposition, and accounted for the outbreak. It was a most barbarous act, a cruel political piece of tyranny under the pretence of a military measure. He could not but con

ceive that to a sovereign gifted with the feelings of the Emperor of Russia military success would be a great and signal calamity. If the insurrection was put down, he would have a country in which the plains would be bathed in blood, and the towns be smoking ruins. A sovereign with his enlightened views would be disposed to grant an amnesty, and give the Poles the institutions promised to them. He hoped Mr. Hennessey would be satisfied with the unanimous expression of opinion in the House, and would not press his motion, the objections to which were very great. It assumed that by the Treaty of Vienna we were under an obligation to interfere. We had a right to interfere, but were not under an obligation to do so. In the interests of a cause which the House and the country had at heart, the course best adapted to accomplish the purpose in view was to leave it, as proposed by Mr. Walpole, to the responsibility of the Government to advise the Crown in the matter.

Mr. DISRAELI, after explaining and justifying the policy of Lord Castlereagh in relation to Poland, observed that it was not pretended that the obligations of the Treaty of Vienna forced England to act; but there were moral obligations, of which we might avail ourselves. He agreed that the great object of the present motion was to elicit an expression of the opinion of the House.

The motion for an address was withdrawn.

The deplorable contest still continued, and a feature which attracted much attention was the ungracious part assumed by the Prussian Government in the contest, in affording succour and supplies to the Russian force, and in giving up to the enemy the unfortunate Poles who took refuge in the Prussian territory. The Earl of Carnarvon gave utterance to the sentiments of the English public on this course of proceedings by a speech which he delivered in the House of Lords on the 12th of June, in which he asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for further information respecting the nature and provisions of the recent Convention concluded between the Governments of Russia and Prussia beyond that already laid before Parliament. He prefaced his question by a severe censure on the conduct of the Prussian Government in regard to Poland, which was far more dangerous to the peace of Europe than the insurrection itself. In accordance with that Convention, Prussia had assisted the Russians when defeated and furnished them with food and arms, but had delivered up the Poles who crossed her frontier to the Russians. It was difficult to understand how this Convention originated, Russia implying that it originated with Prussia, while Prussia asserted the contrary. The reasons why this Convention had not been communicated were also exceedingly contradictory, Prussia attributing the cause to Russia, and vice versa. No less difference was observable between the courses of Austria, Great Britain, and France in regard to this document; Austria refusing to have any thing to do with it, France considering it as a grave question of European policy, while England stated to Prussia that it was her duty to observe neutrality; but in acceding to this Convention she had departed from neutrality. He proceeded to lay before the House a summary of the negotiations which had been carried on at Berlin, and remarked in severe terms on the conduct of M. Von Bismark, who read to Sir Andrew Buchanan a paper, purporting to be a copy of the Convention, but which he (M. Von Bismark) subsequently denied to be such. Again, M. Von Bismark read a copy as it had been signed at St. Petersburg; but shortly afterwards doubts were thrown on its authenticity by a despatch of Lord Napier, which mentioned a secret article that M. Von Bismark had not even alluded to. He wished to know whether there was a secret article, what was the necessity of secrecy, and why so much official mystification had been employed in regard to this Convention. He proceeded to consider whether the Convention was signed by Prussia from fear of insurrection in Prussian Poland, from sympathy with Russia, or from domestic pressure, and concluded that it arose from fear of any thing like constitutional life arising on her frontier. The policy of Prussia was dangerous, as tending to isolate her in Europe, and fraught with mischief to Europe at large.

Earl RUSSELL could not at present add any information to that already before Parliament. As to the originating parties of the

Convention, there was a kind of contradiction, a sort of mystery about it. In regard to the most objectionable part of the Convention, that Russian troops might pursue Polish insurgents and attack them on Prussian territory, M. Von Bismark had declared it a dead letter. It was a bad policy on the part of Prussia to throw herself so strongly on the Russian side, and one which at one time seemed likely to involve disagreeable negotiations with France and England.

Lord BROUGHAM expressed his disapproval of the policy of the Prussian Government, both in regard to Poland and her own subjects.

In the mean time Her Majesty's Government were not inactive in taking the course which the opinion of the country and the voice of Parliament had prescribed to them. On the 17th of June Earl Russell, acting in concert with the Governments of France and Austria, had sent to St. Petersburg the recommendations of the British Government respecting the measures proper to be adopted by Russia in her future policy towards Poland. The diplomatic correspondence which thereupon took place will be found in another part of this volume. The propositions of Great Britain, as briefly stated to the House of Commons by Lord Palmerston, were these:-First, that there should be a general and complete amnesty; second, a national representation for Poland, on the principle of the engagement made by Alexander I. in 1815; third, that Poles alone should be appointed to public offices, and a Polish administration; fourth, full liberty of conscience; fifth, that the Polish language should be used in all public transactions; sixth, that there should be a regular system of recruiting. In addition to these propositions, Her Majesty's Government had recommended that there should be a cessation of hostilities.

Pending the receipt of the answers from Russia to these propositions, it was considered prudent by the House of Commons to refrain from further discussion on the question; and accordingly, on the 22nd of June, it was voted to postpone a motion, of which Mr. Pope Hennessey had given notice, for an address to the Crown, expressing the regret of the House at learning that the Emperor had set up a claim to the sovereignty of Poland, which was in violation of the Treaty of Vienna, and praying Her Majesty to adopt measures in concert with other Powers which might preserve the legitimate rights of Poland, and tend to produce a durable peace. The Government, indeed, through Lord Palmerston, disclaimed any desire to restrain the discussion, and did not allege that it would be injurious to the public interests. The House, however, by a majority of 55, resolved as above, that the matter should not be then debated.

As, however, the Session drew near its end, while the calamitous struggle still went on without any sign of mitigation, and the press teemed with fresh accounts of atrocious severities, the desire

for an expression of the opinion of the country on these transactions could no longer be withheld, and debates of a very interesting nature took place a short time before the prorogation in both Houses.

In the Upper House the subject was opened by Earl GREY, who, in moving that an humble address be presented to Her Majesty for papers with regard to Poland, said he could not look at the present state of affairs in that country without apprehending the most serious consequences. He admitted that a war with Russia for Polish rights was neither desired by the Government nor by the country; but he could not read the papers which had been published without an alarm that Her Majesty's Government, without intending it, might find themselves involved in a war. Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government ought to act on a well-considered line of policy, which might be easily understood by the country and by Europe. What the policy was the Government intended to pursue he could not discover in the papers before them. What grounds, for example, were there for concluding that the last two communications made to the Russian Government would meet with a satisfactory result? He reviewed most searchingly the six propositions made to Russia, and regarded them as impracticable, both on account of the feelings of the Russian nation and of the Polish insurgents. Interference, if not backed by force, was not likely to bring about good, and the party interfering was regarded very much in the light of one interfering between husband and wife. It was most essential, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government should explain their views, and the results which they expected from their policy. At the present moment our diplomatic intervention only fostered false hopes, and perpetuated the horrors of that war we were desirous to suppress. Could it be hoped, from our experience of Russia, that any practical advantage would arise from these diplomatic negotiations? He warned the Government not to arouse the feelings of this country until they passed beyond control. Sympathizing with the Poles, he saw no reasons why we should set up as their champions. The present one was not a case for armed interference, and he hoped that Government, having recognized this, would not have recourse to interference of any other kind.

Earl RUSSELL thanked Lord Grey for the tone and temper in which he had brought forward his motion, commented on the difference of feeling which existed in regard to armed intervention in Poland, and expressed his opinion that it would be, in the present indeterminate nature of what really was Poland, unjust to Russia, and calamitous to Europe. The gist of Lord Grey's speech was "do nothing;" but several examples from recent history showed that war and human passions had not only not been prevented, but often provoked by doing nothing. The policy of doing nothing was one of selfishness and separation. Her Majesty's Government had entered into negotiations with France,

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