Davenport Nat. Bank v. Board of Equalization, City of Davenport, Iowa. upon other tax payers of the community. After the Validating Act was passed, the plaintiff applied to the assessors for the cancellation of the assessment for the years 1876, 1877 and 1878, or a reduction from the amount assessed. The assessors refused to cancel the assessments, but they allowed a reduction from them to the amount of $2,071.66, which was paid to him. It follows from the views expressed that the judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed, and it is so ordered. DAVENPORT NAT. BANK V. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, CITY OF DAVENPORT, IOWA, AND OTHERS.* The Iowa statute which taxes savings banks on the amount of their paid-up capital, and does not tax the shares of those banks held by individuals, the same rate being assessed upon the capital of the savings banks as upon the shares of the National banks, and the tax upon the former not being shown to be less than that upon the latter, is not invalid. N error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa. IN A. J. Hirschl and W. T. Dittoe, for plaintiff in error. E. E. Cook, L. M. Fisher and C. A. Ficke, for defendants in error. MILLER, J. This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa. The question presented grows out of the allegation on the part of the bank, which is a National bank located in Iowa, that the shares of its stock are taxed at a rate which is in excess of the taxes levied upon other moneyed capital of the State. The foundation of this allegation is that the statute of the State on this subject taxes savings banks, one of which is in the same town with the plaintiff, on the amount of its paid-up capital, * Affirming 64 Iowa, 140. Davenport Nat. Bank v. Board of Equalization, City of Davenport, Iowa. and does not tax the shares of those banks held by the individual shareholders. The case, passing through the proper stages in the State tribunals, was decided by the Supreme Court against the plaintiff. The proposition of counsel seems to be that the capital of savings banks can be taxed by the State in no other way than by an assessment upon the shares of that capital held by individuals, because, under the act of Congress, the capital of the National banks can only be taxed in that way. It is strongly urged that in no other mode than by taxing the stockholders of each and all the banks can a perfect equality of taxation be obtained. The argument is not conclusive if the proposition were sound; for the act of Congress does not require a perfect equality of taxation between State and National banks, but only that the shares of the Na tional banks shall not be taxed at a higher rate than other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals. That this does not mean entire equality is evident from the fact that if the capital of the National banks were taxed at a much lower rate than other moneyed capital in the State, the banks would have no right to complain, and the law in that respect would not violate the provisions of the act of Congress for the protection of National banks. It has never been held by this court that the States should abandon systems of taxation of their own banks, or of money in the hands of their other corporations, which they may think the most wise and efficient modes of taxing their own corporate organizations, in order to make that taxation conform to the system of taxing the National banks upon the shares of their stock in the hands of their All that has ever been held to be necessary is that the system of State taxation of its own citizens, of its own banks, and of its own corporations, shall not work a discrimination unfavorable to the holders of the shares of the National banks. Nor does the act of Congress require any thing more than this; neither its language nor its purpose can be construed to go any further. Within these limits the manner of assessing and collecting all taxes by the States is uncontrolled by the act of Congress. owners. In the case before us the same rate per cent is assessed upon the capital of the savings banks as upon the shares of the National banks. It does not satisfactorily appear from any thing found in Davenport Nat. Bank v. Board of Equalization, City of Davenport, Iowa. this record that this tax upon the moneyed capital of the savings banks is not as great as that upon the shares of stock in the National banks. It is not necessary, nor a probable inference from any thing in this system of taxation, that it should be so, and it is not shown by any actual facts in the record that it is so. If then neither the necessary, usual or probable effect of the system of assessment discriminates in favor of the savings banks against the National banks upon the face of the statute, nor any evidence is given of the intention of the Legislature to make such a discrimination, nor any proof that it works an actual and material discrimination, it is not a case for this court to hold the statute unconstitutional. The whole subject has been recently considered by this court in the case of Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826; ante 243. In that opinion it was held that while the deposits in the savings banks of New York constituted moneyed capital in the hands of individuals, yet it was clear that they were not within the meaning of the act of Congress in such a sense as to require that because they were exempted from taxation the shares of stock in National banks must also be exempted. The reason given for this is that the institutions generally established under that name are intended for the deposits of the small savings and accumulations of the industrious and thrifty; that to promote their growth and progress is the obvious interest and manifest policy of the State; and as was said in Hepburn v. School Directors, 23 Wall. 480; 1 Nat. Bank Cas. 113, it could not have been the intention of Congress to exempt bank shares from taxation because some moneyed capital was exempt. It is unnecessary to inquire whether the savings banks of Iowa are based upon principles similar to those of New York, which were the subject of the opinion in Bank v. New York, for while in that case the savings banks were exempt from taxation, the Iowa statute imposes a tax upon them equal to that imposed upon the shares of the National banks. The whole subject is so fully reviewed and reconsidered in that opinion, delivered less than a year ago, that it would be but a useless repetition to go further into the question. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is affirmed. Lessassier v. Kennedy. LESSASSIER V. KENNEDY. (123 U. S. 521.) Jurisdiction-transfer of stock — liability of assignor. On the sale of shares in a National bank, the name of the assignee not having been inserted in the blank left for that purpose in the transfer-book of the bank, and the assignors having been compelled, in a suit brought by a receiver, to contribute as owners of such shares toward the liabilities of the bank, the assignors brought this suit against their assignee to recover the money so paid. Held, that the action was not within the jurisdiction of a Federal court. IN N error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. On motion to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction. Action to recover money which plaintiffs had been compelled to contribute toward the liabilities of a bank on account of certain shares which they had previously sold to defendant. The judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court was in the defendant's favor. H. C. Miller and Enoch Totten, for plaintiffs in error. W. Hallett Phillips and J. McConnell, for defendant in error. WAITE, C. J. At the hearing of this cause a motion was made to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction, on the ground that no Federal question was involved in the decision below. This motion will be first considered. The facts as disclosed by the record are as follows: On the 24th of February, 1873, Lessassier & Binder sold to Samuel H. Kennedy at New Orleans, through his broker, E. C. Feinour, forty shares of the capital stock of the Crescent. City National Bank, and in accordance with the prevailing custom at that place upon such sales, signed a transfer of the shares sold upon the transfer-book of the bank, leaving the name of the transferee blank. On the 15th of March, Kennedy sold the same stock to Thomas A. Adams, a responsible person, but at the request of the purchaser, the transfer on the books of the bank was made to Lessassier v. Kennedy. Morris Dyer, who was irresponsible, by writing his name in the blank left for the name of the transferee in the assignment which had been signed by Lessassier & Binder. The bank was known to be embarrassed March 14th, and on the 17th of that month it closed its doors and soon afterward a receiver was appointed, under the National Banking Act, by the Comptroller of the Currency. On the 1st of August, 1874, the receiver, by direction of the Comptroller, brought a suit against the shareholders to enforce their individual liability for the debts of the bank, under section 5151, Revised Statutes. To this suit Kennedy was made a party, as the holder of the shares which had been sold to him as above. He appeared and filed an answer, setting up his sale to Adams as a defense. Upon the hearing a final decree was rendered June 2, 1876, dismissing the bill as to him. A suit was then brought by the receiver against Lessassier & Binder, alleging that they were the owners of the stock at the time of the failure of the bank. They notified Kennedy that this suit had been begun, and that if their defense failed they should fall back on him and hold him for whatever amount they might be compelled to pay "on stock which, from February 24, 1873, they had ceased to own and had transferred to him." In the answer of Lessassier & Binder they set up the sale to Kennedy as a defense to the action. At the final hearing a judgment was rendered against them on the pleadings and proofs, May 16, 1879, for $2,800, and interest at five per cent per annum from July 23, 1874. This judgment they paid, and then brought the present suit against Kennedy, to recover from him the amount of their payment. In the petition it was alleged that upon the sale of the stock to Kennedy, and the signing of the transfer on the books of the bank, it became his duty to insert his name in the blank left for that purpose, and that they had been compelled to pay the judgment in favor of the receiver "owing to the conduct of the said Kennedy in not causing his name to be inserted in the transfer-book aforesaid as transferee of said stock, and preserving in said transfer-book of said bank, contrary to his obligation and duty, the said transfer in blank, with your petitioners' name signed thereto, from the time of said sale to him until said bank failed and owing to the other acts of the said * * * Kennedy in the premises VOL. III-37. * * * |