The State of Florida vs. William H. Gleason. That the said court had illegally granted leave to file the said information upon the said motion; that the said court had no jurisdiction over such proceedings as aforesaid against this petitioner as Lieutenant-Governor; that if it had jurisdiction it would be an improper use of the power of the said court to allow the proceedings aforesaid to proceed and be prosecuted against the said petitioner. Your petitioner states that this honorable court held that the said information was legally instituted; and that the motives and purposes aforesaid of the prosecution against your petitioner could not be inquired into; and thereby held that the same did not constitute any sufficient defense against the said information; and that the said court had jurisdiction over the said information. Your petitioner further represents that the said information admits that this petitioner has been elected to the office of Lieutenant-Governor by the people of the said State; and insists that he was not three years a citizen of the State when he was elected by the said people. Your petitioner further shows to this court that the said question of ineligibility stated in the said information, for want of three years' residence, was decided by the people in their sovereign capacity in the said election; and for that reason, which this honorable court should take judicial notice of, the said court should not have granted the said rule, nor allowed the said proceedings to be prosecuted. That the said court should have taken judicial notice of the fact that this court cannot, in the exercise of any constitutional power, call upon this petitioner to show his authority to act as Lieutenant-Governor, inasmuch as the said information admits that he was elected by the people of the said State, by which he is vested with his authority as Lieutenant-Governor. Your petitioner further respectfully represents that there is no person in the State of Florida claiming the office of this petitioner nor contesting his election; and that this said informa The State of Florida vs. William H. Gleason. tion is not prosecuted in the name and by the authority of the people of the said State, nor do they require, ask for, or demand the said prosecution. Your petitioner further represents that he has been wronged and injured in the premises, and subjected to great expense in defending the said prosecution instituted against him contrary to the constitutional and legal rights and privileges of this petitioner. And your petitioner respectfully informs this honorable court that he does hereby remove the case made by the said information against this petitioner to the United States Circuit Court in and for the Northern District of Florida, to be held at Tallahassee, in said State, in the exercise of his right under and in pursuance of the third section of an act of Congress of the United States, entitled "An Act to Protect All Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and Furnish the Means of their Vindication;" and the fifth section of an act of Congress entitled "An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases," approved March 3d, 1863, and the third, fourth, and fifth sections of an act of Congress entitled "An Act to Amend An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases," approved March 3d, 1863, and approved May 11th, A. D. 1866; and under all and every the sections and provisions of the said acts of Congress of the United States, and all other laws applicable thereto. W. H. GLEASON. Before me, Sherman Conant, United States Commissioner, in and for the Northern District of Florida, personally came William H. Gleason, the subscriber to the foregoing petition, who being by me first duly sworn, made oath that the statements contained in the said petition were true, so far as the same are stated of his own knowledge, and that those matters stated on information and belief are true according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief. SHERMAN CONANT, United States Commissioner. The State of Florida vs. William H. Gleason. RANDALL, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court upon the foregoing petition: After consideration of the matter of this petition we cannot see that this act of Congress has anything to do with this case. Upon its face it has nothing more to do with the subject than an act of Congress making appropriations for the expenses of the government, or the construction of a light-house. It enables persons who, by the rules of practice of courts, acts of the Legislature, or fundamental constitutional provisions, are denied equal rights, such as to inherit property, to give evidence, to make contracts, and other rights enumerated, to carry their cases to a tribunal where they will have equal right to be heard, to give evidence, &c. As in this State there are no denials of this kind by any tribunal, but all have equal rights under the Constitution, there is no more necessity to construe this act in this case than any other act of Congress. The respondent is not such person as is denied any right; all courts are open to him, and he has full and equal benefit of all law. The construction of the act as contended for, is such that it vests defendant with a discretion whenever he thinks a court, after a full hearing, has decided a question of law wrong, before final judgment, to stop its proceedings. With such a construction no case can be decided finally by the State courts, and all questions, whether arising under an act of Congress or the Constitution of the United States, or under a purely local statute, and State Constitutions, become the subject matter of review in the United States courts. Are we to admit this construction and stay proceedings when we are trying a matter of constitutional construction, and which can in no manner be affected by an act of Congress, this State being a recognized member of the Union? To do so would be to destroy all necessity for and power of State courts, and destroy all harmony between the courts of the The State of Florida vs. William H. Gleason. United States and the State courts. It would result in a revolution in the judicial system. This petition affirms that respondent has been "denied jus tice" by this court. The fact is, that the court has in this case subjected itself to just and well-deserved censure by those who know something of judicial proceedings, for the privileges ex tended, which the strict rules of law prohibited. This record is but a repetition of enlargements of rules, and the answers to some of them consist of matter already determined, and which for that reason should have been stricken out, and in any other case it would have been done. What is complained of here as a denial of justice is its simple administration, which is never a denial, except with that class to whom its administration is the greatest wrong. By the strict law of the case, as has been shown, respondent had no right to be heard until the summons in this case issued. The rule to show cause, and all of these proceedings up to this time, have been ex gratia. The rules of law would have justified the court in striking out all of the answers to the first rule and making it absolute, as the Attorney-General was entitled to it upon the simple filing of his information. Lord Mansfield, in the case of Rex. vs. Wilkes, (2 Eng. Com. L. R., 2,) where he was threatened with assassination, and made the subject of libellous attacks in the press, saw proper to refer to these matters, and while we think that we cannot very properly criticise other assaults which the respondent may make, it is yet within our proper and legitimate province to subject his acts in these proceedings to judicial criticism when such assaults, however futile and absurd, are made here. The person entitled to the benefit of the act referred to in this petition, commonly known as the "civil rights bill," are enumerated in said act, and are as follows: "All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power * * are declared to be citizens of the United States, and such citi The State of Florida vs. William H. Gleason. have the same right to make and enforce contracts; to sue, be parties, and give evidence; to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings, for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject te like punishment, pains, and penalties and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding." The third section, in pursuance of which, and other acts in Congress referred to, the respondent assumes to remove this cause to the Circuit Court of the United States, provides that the Circuit Courts shall have cognizance of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied, or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first section. of this act; and if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has been or shall be commenced in any State court, against any such person, for any cause whatsoever, such defendant shall have the right to remove such cause for trial to the proper Circuit Court of the United States, in the manner prescribed by an act relating to habeas corpus, &c., approved March 3, 1863, and all acts amendatory thereof. * * Now who are the persons mentioned in the "civil rights bill?" They are "citizens of the United States," and none other. The petitioner does not allege that he is a person of that description-and here we might stop; but the petitioner does not state in his petition which of the "rights" to which citizens are entitled under the act, has been denied him by this court, by or under "any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom of this State," or otherwise. He does not point out one, and his able counsel did not deign to state before the court any right or privilege secured to him under said act of Congress which he had not had the full benefit of. Indeed the respondent has not, up to this time, demanded anything whatever, except that the suit be dismissed upon grounds |