CHAPTER II.

Moral character and speculative belief-Man consists of a double nature, half angel and half beast-Natural process downward— Tendency to be less and less spiritual in the affections and the understanding-Views of moral excellence, how acquired—Standard of comparison-Moral attributes of the Deity-Danger of misconceiving them-Proneness to error from the corruption of human nature-From the limited faculties of the mind-A case supposed-Diffidence of our capacity to judge correctly of mora qualities, the truest wisdom.

It was stated in the outset, that the great danger of our losing the chief and only durable good arose principally from a too great trust in our own judgment of spiritual things, without duly considering the influence of our corrupt nature upon the perceptions and decisions of the mind. The operation of moral character upon speculative belief, though difficult to detect in particular cases, is yet in some measure understood and admitted by all. Both our sensibility to moral qualities and our perception of them may change and decay from neglect, or be choked and overrun by the growth of other and opposing principles. "Man, as he consists of a double nature, flesh and spirit,' so is he placed in a middle rank, betwixt an angel, which is a spirit,

and a beast, which is flesh; partaking of the qualities and performing the acts of both. He is angelical in his understanding, in his sensual affections bestial; and to which of these he most inclineth and conformeth himself, that part wins more of the other, and gives a denomination to him: so as he, that was before half angel and half beast, if he be drowned in sensuality, hath lost the angel, and is become a beast; if he be wholly taken up with heavenly meditations, he hath quit the beast, and is improved angelical. It is hard to hold an equal temper; either he must degenerate into a beast, or be advanced to an angel. Mere reason sufficiently apprehends the difference of the condition." it is so evident that it will not here be reasoned, that the process in every man is naturally downward, to the gratification of his inferior nature, and to the love and pursuit of sensible things. As the consequence of this, it is equally evident that he does not see either the objects of sense or those of faith in their true character. He is in the case of the blind man, who, when asked if he saw aught, was sure he saw something, which yet was not a proper sight, for he saw " men as trees.' He sees wealth, beauty, and honour; but it is not a proper sight, because he sees not all about them; he sees them not as a snare, 'Bishop Hall's 'Select Thoughts,' No. Ixii.

It will not, perhaps, be doubted,

and does not sanely estimate their use to him. He sees the pleasures and enticements of sense; yet it is a question whether he sees them or no, because he sees them only as harmless and desirable: there is no reason in the sight. He sees all temporal goods; but we can hardly say whether he has a sight of them or no, because he sees them not as they are; he sees them 'as trees walking;' he does not see the reason and beauty of them; he does not see them as beams and proofs of that perfection of them, which is reserved as 'glory to be revealed.' But, becoming less and less spiritual in his affections and understanding, the derangement in his sight of spiritual objects must be still greater. What was lovely and tasteful in moral excellence gradually disappears, and the very virtues comprised in it are for the most part mean and spiritless in his view: still, he reasons about them, and fully confides in his own decisions. He never doubts the soundness of his views, but there is an inconsistency between them and his feelings and conduct, which does not appear with regard to any other subject. If we can find the cause of this, all difficulty will vanish, and we shall be able to account for much, in the practice of men, which seems not to be compatible with any just appreciation of their own welfare, or of the character of God; much, which is precisely as we should

suppose it would be, if the light that is in them were indeed darkness.

We would not be understood to deny that men may have views of moral excellence much purer than their practice; but it is certain that their moral character does more or less modify their views, and, in this way, involve them in most dangerous errors. This truth may be discerned in the very process by which we arrive at a judgment of moral qualities. Our nearest approaches to the discovery of the excellence of any object are made by comparing it with other objects, which are more or less excellent. In such a comparison, its advantage, or disadvantage, is the more visible, for the brightness or obscurity of those with which it is contrasted. Who, for instance, can discover a single colour on a fabric in which all colours are intermingled? Who can have any proper ideas of degrees in benevolent actions, unless he has had, or witnessed in others, an exercise of malevolence? Who can declare one countenance more beautiful than another, if he has not in his mind some standard of comeliness, with which to compare it? It is thus evident that we must form our judgment of the distinctive excellence of objects, by the process of comparison.

Let us, now, consider the probable effects of this process upon our notions of the moral attributes

of God. These attributes must be designated by words, commonly used and understood. Is he holy, just, and good? If these terms are not understood in their application to the character of men, we shall understand them as little, when they are applied to God. Our notions of what is just or good in man will enter into all our reasonings, and form the basis of our thoughts concerning what is just or good in God. The same is true of all his moral attributes. They exist in him without defects; in man, with the blemishes of imperfection and guilt, and as dim shadows and uncertain semblances of the divine reality. But the dimness and the uncertainty are all his own: nothing can be laid to the charge of God; he made man in his own image; the fountains of his being were all pure and his sight was perfect, till he corrupted them and chose his darkness, and now that abundant light is come, and a new way opened for his recovery of this blessedness, he is held fully responsible for the errors of his judgment. But while he remains in his darkness, and has not the relish of his blessedness, what errors may he not commit, associated as he is with beings of universal and acknowledged imperfection-himself naturally as imperfect, as the greatest profligate he beholds. We will suppose him called to contemplate the moral perfections of God, and that they are designated,