In United States v. Tanner,1 the court instructed the jury that the writer of the letter had a right to control the use of it, it being his property; and that, if they shall be satisfied the letter was written with the view that the defendant should read it, as well as the person to whom it was directed, the defendant is not guilty of a crime in taking the letter out of the post-office, and opening it. Although the letter was directed to Blum, if Myers before writing it requested the defendant, or authorized him, to take the letter out of the office and read it, he had a right to do so, and the defendant is guilty of no violation of the postoffice law. Parties may correspond under assumed names, without any violation of law. The jury found the defendant not guilty. In United States v. Whitaker, the charge of the court was as follows: This is an indictment against the defendant, who acted as assistant post-master at --post-office, for stealing a letter from the mail containing ninety-three dollars. The letter was proved to have been mailed at Withamsville, the money being counted and handed to the defendant to be enclosed in a letter and directed to Stephen Clark, Cincinnati, but was never received, as proved by Mr. Clark, nor did it appear to have been received by the account of mails received at the Cincinnati post-office. The defendant sometime after the deposit of the money, called one or more witnesses to notice the fact that he enclosed the money in the letter, sealed it, but no one swears to the fact that it was mailed, but such were their impressions, as at the time of enclosing the money he was putting up the mail. A proposition was made to the defendant, if he would pay, or secure the payment of the money to Mr. Clark, the matter would not be prosecuted, which the defendant refused. The persons who usually open the mail in the Cincinnati office were examined, but all the persons through whose hands the letters passed were not examined. In the defence it was shown that the letters directed to Cincinnati, on the same route, west of the defendant's office had miscarried, and also, the letters directed to the Cincinnati office on other routes had never been received. It was proposed to prove that the assistant post-master at Mount Washington, the next office to the Witham office, on the same route to Cincinnati, was suspected, and that at one time he had been charged with passing counterfeit money. But the court overruled the testimony, on the ground that the person had not been examined as a witness, and that his general character could not be assailed. Some ten or twelve witnesses were then called, who proved the good character of the defendant. In the cross-examination of one or two of the witnesses to the good character of the defendant, they were asked whether the defendant had not, at one time, been charged with passing counterfeit money. This was not objected to by the defendant, and was explained by showing of whom he had received the bank-note, as good, on which the charge was founded. This circumstance, it was proved, had not in the least affected the fair character of the defendant in his neighborhood. The court remarked to the jury that the exemplary character of the defendant as proved, should have weight in their deliberations. That before the letter reached Cincinnati, it passed through the office at Mount Washington, and one or two other offices before it reached Cincinnati, and at that office it passed through the hands of clerks, and there were others who had access to it. The defendant admitted the letter and the money were deposited in the office, to be 16 McLean, 128 (1854). 2 6 McLean, 342 (1855). defendant boarded with witness. On the night of the 10th of January, Coyle staid at his house, and registered his name Adams. He had been once before at the house of witness. Heard him say that he was acquainted with Poage in Virginia. They lodged in the same room the night of the 10th, and the next day they went to the country together in a buggy. On the 12th they returned at about ten o'clock. Mr. Beal states that on the 10th of January, he met Mr. Poage early in the morning, who helped witness make a fire, and remained until about 12 o'clock. After some time Poage and the boy came together to the house, at between one and two o'clock. The boy showed a note, and said he had traded a galvanized watch for it, and that if he did not collect the note he would not lose much. The witness identifies the note. When he saw it, it was not indorsed, and he observed to the boy, without the indorsement of Calvert he could not collect the note. The boy soon went out to get the note indorsed, and when he returned, he said that he had met the man, who indorsed it. Mr. Brown, says he first saw defendant at Cabell County, Virginia, and found him fifteen miles beyond Guyandotte. The defendant said that he had known Coyle at Staunton, but had not seen him for some time before he met him at Cincinnati. He said Coyle was in the printing office. Here the evidence of the prosecution closed. Mr. Moore, a citizen of Virginia, was acquainted with the defendant, near Staunton, Virginia. He was then engaged as engineer on a railroad, and was a man of good character and respectably connected. Mr. Harrill, from the same neighborhood, spoke of the excellent character of the defendant, and that he was employed as an engineer on a railroad. Messrs, Walker, Wilson, and Marcus all testified to the good character of the defendant in Virginia, where he was engaged in most respectable employments. Some of the above witnesses had been members of the Virginia Legislature, and all of them had the appearance of gentlemen, and were intelligent. The court observed to the jury, there can be no doubt, from the evidence, that the letter which contained the bank bill and the promissory note of Nesbat was stolen, and from the fact that Coyle had possession of the note and collected it, under false pretenses, he would be presumed to be the guilty person, if now on his trial. The only evidence against the defendant is, that he was associated with Coyle when he collected the note, and received a pair of gloves in the way of change. The association with Coyle before they rode out to Nesbat's and afterwards, lodging in the same room on the night of the 10th of January, was enough to excite suspicion against him. But his good character, being sustained by most respectable witnesses in Virginia, where the defendant was reared and respectably employed, should exonerate him from mere suspicion, founded on such circumstances. Good character can seldom fail to protect an individual from suspicion. A man of intelligence and reputable standing in society, is not likely to indulge in crime, or to do anything which shall forfeit his good name. If the defendant had participated with Coyle in stealing the letter he would without doubt have suggested to him that the note must be indorsed to enable him to collect it. If he was acquainted with Coyle in Virginia, their intimacy may be accounted for without presuming any participation of the defendant in the crime charged. And you can not find the defendant guilty, unless you shall find he participated in stealing the letter. The case is left with you, gentlemen, not doubting that after deliberately weighing the testimony, you will come to a just conclusion. Verdict, not guilty. T In United States v. Tanner,1 the court instructed the jury that the writer of the letter had a right to control the use of it, it being his property; and that, if they shall be satisfied the letter was written with the view that the defendant should read it, as well as the person to whom it was directed, the defendant is not guilty of a crime in taking the letter out of the post-office, and opening it. Although the letter was directed to Blum, if Myers before writing it requested the defendant, or authorized him, to take the letter out of the office and read it, he had a right to do so, and the defendant is guilty of no violation of the postoffice law. Parties may correspond under assumed names, without any violation of law. The jury found the defendant not guilty. In United States v. Whitaker,2 the charge of the court was as follows:This is an indictment against the defendant, who acted as assistant post-master at post-office, for stealing a letter from the mail containing ninety-three dollars. The letter was proved to have been mailed at Withamsville, the money being counted and handed to the defendant to be enclosed in a letter and directed to Stephen Clark, Cincinnati, but was never received, as proved by Mr. Clark, nor did it appear to have been received by the account of mails received at the Cincinnati post-office. The defendant sometime after the deposit of the money, called one or more witnesses to notice the fact that he enclosed the money in the letter, sealed it, but no one swears to the fact that it was mailed, but such were their impressions, as at the time of enclosing the money he was putting up the mail. A proposition was made to the defendant, If he would pay, or secure the payment of the money to Mr. Clark, the matter would not be prosecuted, which the defendant refused. The persons who usually open the mail in the Cincinnati office were examined, but all the persons through whose hands the letters passed were not examined. In the defence it was shown that the letters directed to Cincinnati, on the same route, west of the defendant's office had miscarried, and also, the letters directed to the Cincinnati office on other routes had never been received. It was proposed to prove that the assistant post-master at Mount Washington, the next office to the Witham office, on the same route to Cincinnati, was suspected, and that at one time he had been charged with passing counterfeit money. But the court overruled the testimony, on the ground that the person had not been examined as a witness, and that his general character could not be assailed. Some ten or twelve witnesses were then called, who proved the good character of the defendant. In the cross-examination of one or two of the witnesses to the good character of the defendant, they were asked whether the defendant had not, at one time, been charged with passing counterfeit money. This was not objected to by the defendant, and was explained by showing of whom he had received the bank-note, as good, on which the charge was founded. This circumstance, it was proved, had not in the least affected the fair character of the defendant in his neighborhood. The court remarked to the jury that the exemplary character of the defendant as proved, should have weight in their deliberations. That before the letter reached Cincinnati, it passed through the office at Mount Washington, and one or two other offices before it reached Cincinnati, and at that office it passed through the hands of clerks, and there were others who had access to it. The defendant admitted the letter and the money were deposited in the office, to be 16 McLean, 128 (1854). 26 McLean, 342 (1855). forwarded in the mail. Upon the whole, the court remarked, unless you come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, you will acquit him. The jury found the defendant not guilty. § 83e. Post-Office Laws- Prying into Correspondence — Agent Opening Principal's Letter. -The statute punishing any person who "shall take any letter or packet * * * out of a post-office, or shall open any letter or packet which shall have been in a post-office, or in custody of a mail carrier, before it shall be delivered to the person to whom it is directed, with a design to obstruct the correspondence, to pry into another's business or secrets; or shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy any such mail, letter or packet," does not punish the agent to receive the letter from the office fully authorized by the party to whom it was directed, who embezzles such letter before delivering it to his principal. In United States v. Sander,2 WILLSON, J., charged the jury as follows: "This is an issue upon a plea of not guilty to an indictment founded upon the last clause of the twenty-second section of the act entitled 'An act to reduce into one the several acts establishing and regulating the Post-Office Department,' of the 3d of March, 1825. By this clause of the statute it is provided, if any person shall take any letter or packet not containing any article of value or evidence thereof out of a post-office, or shall open any letter or packet which shall have been in a post-office or in custody of a mail carrier before it shall be delivered to the person to whom it is directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, to pry into another's business or secrets, or shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy any such mail, letter, or packet, such offender, upon conviction,' etc. "The indictment contains two counts. The first charges that the defendant, on the 5th day of May, 1855, at Vermilion, etc., did open a letter which had been put into the mail at Coldwater, in the State of Michigan, to be conveyed by post and directed to Phoebe Sturdevant, Vermilion, Ohio, with a design to obstruct the correspondence and to pry into another's secrets. The second count charges that the 'defendant, at Vermilion, in the district aforesaid, on the 5th day of May, 1855, did secrete and embezzle a certain letter which had before been in the post-office at Vermilion, in said district, before it had been delivered to the person to whom it was addressed and directed, and which letter was then and there directed to Phoebe Sturdevant, at said Vermilion, and which said letter had, before that time, been put into the mail of the United States at Coldwater, in the State of Michigan, and was intended to be conveyed by post to Vermilion aforesaid, and which said letter had before that been conveyed by mail, and was deposited in said post-office at Vermilion, and had not, before the same was so secreted and embezzled by said defendant, been delivered to said Phoebe Sturdevant.' "At the commencement of the trial of the cause the defendant's counsel made a motion to quash the second count of the indictment for duplicity. The court overruled the motion, with an intimation to counsel, however, that if the court, on reflection, should deem the ruling wrong, they would direct the jury to exclude the testimony, as impertinent to the second count of the indictment. We are satisfied that the second count is not defective for duplicity. When a statute makes two or more distinct acts, connected with the same transaction, indictable, each one of which may be considered as representing a stage in the 1 Act of March 3, 1825. 2 6 McLean, 598 (1855). same offense, it has been repeatedly held that they may be coupled in one count. Thus, setting up a gaming table, and inducing others to bet upon it, may constitute distinct offenses; for either, unconnected with the other, an indictment will lie. Yet, when both are perpetrated by the same person at the same time, they constitute but one offense, for which one count is sufficient, and for which but one penalty can be inflicted. "In describing an offense under this statute no technical words are necessary. In the case of United States v. Mills,1 the court say: "The general rule is that in indictments for misdemeanors created by statute, it is sufficient to charge the offense in the words of the statute. There is not that technical nicety required as to form which seems to have been adopted and sanctioned by long practice in cases of felony.' In the case of Mills the indictment was substantially, in form, like the second count of this; both charge the secreting and embezzling in one count, and both are founded on the same section of the post-office law. The same ruling has been adopted by this court in the case of United States v. Lancaster.2 "But a more serious and grave question is raised by defendant's counsel in requesting the court to charge the jury that if they should find the letter in question had been delivered by the postmaster at Vermilion to the defendant, who was at the time a fully authorized agent of Phoebe Sturdevant, to receive it, that any embezzlement by him thereafter, and before delivery to her, does not constitute an offense under the statute.' It is claimed by counsel that a delivery to an authorized agent is a delivery to the principal, and that when this is done, the functions of the post-office department and the powers of the Federal government are at an end in the premises. “We believe this position of counsel to be well taken. It is a familiar principle of law that an act done by an authorized agent, within the scope of his authority, is an act of the principal: 'Qui facit per alium facit per se.' Hence it is that the delivery of goods by a third person to an agent, and his acceptance of them for his principal, is, in contemplation of law, a delivery to and acceptance by the principal. So, payment made by a third person to the agent in the course of his employment is payment to the principal, and whether actually paid to the principal or not by the agent, it is conclusive on him. "A letter, packet, or other thing valuable, having been committed to the post-office department for carriage and delivery, if once parted with by the post-master to a person authorized to receive it, from that moment ceases alike to be under the control of the department and the power and authority of the general government. The sanction, by the Federal courts, of the contrary doctrine would be dangerous in its tendency and subversive of reserved State authority. No power is given to Congress to legislate upon the subject, except what is incident to and necessary to carry out the grant contained in the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution. The grant is simply that Congress shall have power to establish post-offices and post-roads;' and while we would not adopt the limited and narrow construction given to this grant by President Monroe, in his special message to Congress of 4th May, 1822, yet we would not extend implied powers further than what is necessary to carry out, with safety to the public, the legitimate operations of the post-office establishment. When the functions of the department are exhausted by the proper 17 Pet. 142. 2 2 McLean, 431. |