tered into on behalf of said minor or his or her guardian. Whenever any minor shall become an inmate of any orphan asylum or home, under any order of court, or in any other lawful manner, the duly authorized officers of such asylum or home, shall have the same power and right to secure a home for and bind over any such child, by proper indenture, as the parent. or legal guardian would have.

6786. Humane society police agents Appointment of Powers. § 8. Any duly organized or incorporated humane society, having for one of its objects the protection of children from cruelty, may offer any agents or officers employed by them to the proper authorities of any city for the purpose of being commissioned to act as police officers through the limits of said city, for the purpose of arresting all offenders against this act, or of any of the provisions thereof; whereupon such police authorities shall, if such persons are proper and discreet persons, commission them to act as such police officers, with all the rights and powers pertaining thereto, but no such city shall be liable in any way for the salary or wages of such officers, or for any expense whatever in relation thereto, except for the detention of prisoners. All persons thus qualified under this section shall be deemed to be constables and authorized officers within the meaning of section six of this act; and the keepers of jails, lockups or station houses, in any of said counties, are required to receive all persons arrested by such policemen or constables.

6787. Custody to humane society, when - Guardian, when. 9. Whenever any person having the care, custody or control of any minor child, shall be convicted of an assault, or of an assault and battery upon such child, or of any violation of the provisions of this act, it shall be lawful for the justice of the peace, mayor, police judge, or court before whom such conviction has taken place, or where the parents or proper guardian of any child can not be found, it shall be lawful for any such justice, mayor, police judge or court to commit such child to the care and custody of any duly authorized or incorporated humane society, having for one of its objects the protection of children from cruelty, and such society shall thereupon have all the rights of a guardian of the person of such child; but such society may at any time apply to the proper court of the proper county for the appointment of a guardian of the person, or the commitment of any such child to an asylum or home for children as provided in the seventh section of this act.

6788. Deserted child - Adoption. § 10. Whenever it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the circuit court of any county, or the judge thereof, that any minor child has been deserted by its parents or surviving parent, and that it has no legal guardian, it shall be lawful for any person desirous of adopting the said child to adopt the same, in the manner now provided by law in the case of death of the parents.

6789. Guardians of poor have custody, when. § 11. Whenever the parents or proper guardian of any infant unable to support itself, have been convicted of any of the offenses enumerated in this act, or are dead or can not be found, and there is no other person legally responsible for the maintenance and support of such child willing to assume such support, or to be found within the county, the circuit court of the county in which such child may be found, or the judge thereof, may commit such child to the care and custody of the guardians of the poor of the said county; but

nothing herein contained shall exempt any person from the duty of maintaining and supporting such child as now imposed by law.

6790. Repealing clause. § 12. All laws and parts of laws coming in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.

AN ACT defining the crime of riotous conspiracy and providing penalties for violation thereof. [Approved February 28, 1889; S., 1889, p. 50.

6791. Unlawful act under disguise. SEC., 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, That if three or more persons shall unite or combine together for the purpose of doing any unlawful act in the night time, or for the purpose of doing any unlawful act while wearing white caps, masks, or being otherwise disguised, shall be deemed guilty of a riotous conspiracy, and upon conviction thereof shall be imprisoned in the state prison not more than ten years nor less than two years, and fined in any sum not exceeding two thousand dollars.

6792. Emergency. § 2. There being no law now in force adequately defining the offense herein defined, an emergency exists for the immediate taking effect of this act; it shall, therefore, be in force from and after its passage and publication in the Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, News and Journal.

AN ACT to amend section two hundred and forty-three (243) of an act entitled "An act concerning public offenses and their punishment," approved April 14, 1881, and being section 2155 of the Revised Statutes of 1881, state of Indiana, and declaring an emergency. [Approved and in force, March 5, 1891; S., 1891, p. 111.

6793. [2155] Public building-Ingress and egress-Out swinging doors. SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, That said section two hundred and forty-three (243) of an act entitled "An act concerning public offenses and their punishment," approved April 14th, 1881, and being section 2155 of the Revised Statutes of 1881, state of Indiana, be and the same is hereby amended so as to read as follows, to wit: Section 243. Whoever, being the owner, manager, lessee, trustee or person having the charge of any theater, opera house, museum, college, seminary, church, school house or other public building, refuses or neglects to cause all the doors thereof constructed for the purpose of ingress or egress, whether inner or outer doors, to be so hung that the same shall swing outwardly, shall be fined in any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars nor less than ten dollars, to which may be added imprisonment in the county jail for any period not exceeding six months: Provided, that this section shall not apply to the outer doors of one story churches and school houses.

6794. Emergency. § 2. Whereas, an emergency exists for the immediate taking effect of this act, therefore the same shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

AN ACT repealing sections 216 and 217 of an act entitled "An act concerning public offenses and their punishment," approved April 14, 1881, the same being sections 2126 and 2127, Revised Statutes of 1881. [Approved and in force March 9, 1889; S., 1889, p. 339

6795. [2126-7] Preventing work - Impeding railroad travel-Repeal. SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, That sections 216 and 217 of an act entitled "An act concerning public offenses and their punishment" and repealing all laws in conflict thereof, approved April 14, 1881, being sections 2126 and 2127 of the Revised Statutes of 1881, be and the same are, hereby repealed.

6796. Emergency. § 2. An emergency exists for the immediate taking effect of this act; and, it shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

SEC.

ARTICLE to — AGAINST HONEST DEALING.

6797. G. A. R. badge - Wrongful use of.

AN ACT to prevent any person from unlawfully wearing the badge of the Grand Army of the Republic Union Veterans, Sons of Veterans or Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the state of Indiana. [Approved February 26, 1891; in force June 10, 1891: S., 1891, p. 34.

6797.* G. A. R. badge—wrongful use of. SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, That any person who shall wilfully wear the badges or buttonaire of the Grand Army of the Republic, Union Veterans, Union Sons of Veterans or Military Order of the Loyal Legion or shall use or wear the same or print, cause to be printed, or use any card containing a printed cut or similitude of such badge to obtain aid, assistance or notoriety thereby within this state, unless he be entitled to use or wear the same under the seals and regulations of the Grand Army of the Republic, Union Veterans, Union Sons of Veterans, or Military Order of the Loyal Legion, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in any sum not exceeding twenty dollars.

*See, also, chap. 34, art. 1.

1904. Murder in first degree. In order that there may be such premeditated malice as will make murder in the first degree, the thought of taking life must have been consciously conceived in the mind. Where a homicide has been preceded by a concurrence of will with an intention to kill, and these are followed by deliberate thought or premeditation although they follow as instantaneously as successive thoughts can follow each other, the perpetrator may be guilty of murder in the first degree. It is, however, of the very essence of the crime, that there should have been time and opportunity for deliberation or premeditation after the mind has consciously formed the design to take life; so, it follows, as a necessary corollary, that there must have been the mental capacity to think deliberately upon and determine rationally in respect to the nature and consequences of the act which follows. Therefore, while the rule is of universal application that voluntary intoxication is no excuse for crime and does not, in any degree, mitigate or palliate an offense actually committed; but, rather, to the contrary, where there is reason to believe that one has conceived the design to commit a crime, and while harboring the unlawful purpose, voluntarily becomes intoxicated, in order to blunt his moral sensibilities and nerve himself up to the execution of his preconceived design, the offense is thereby greatly aggravated. Nevertheless when the essence of a crime depends on the intent with which the act was done, or where an essential ingredient of the crime consists in the doing of an unlawful act, with a deliberate and premeditated purpose, the mental condition of the accused, whether that condition be occasioned by voluntary intoxication or otherwise, is an important factor to be considered. Mere intoxication, however, in the absence of such mental incapacity resulting therefrom, as renders one who takes the life of another incapable of thinking deliberately and meditating rationally on the purpose to take human life, and which leaves him with full power to know the quality of his act, and to abstain from doing it, can not, of itself, be regarded as sufficient to reduce a homicide from murder in the first to murder in the second degree. There must be the absence of that self determining power which, in a sane mind, renders it conscious of the real nature of its own purpose and capable of resisting wrong impulses. Where the self governing power is wanting, whether it is caused by insanity, gross intoxication, or other controlling influences, it can not be said truthfully that the mind is fully conscious of its own purposes and deliberates or premeditates, in the sense of the act describing murder in the first degree; Aszman v. State, 123-351.

1908. Manslaughter. Nothing in this section defining the crime of manslaughter is to be found to indicate that the words "unlawful act are to receive an interpretation other and different from that given them at common law, from which the statutory definition is adopted. To constitute manslaughter, the act causing death must be of such a character as to show a wanton or reckless disregard of the rights and safety of others, not necessarily, however, an act denounced by the statute as a specific crime. So, where a railroad engineer, while engaged in operating the locomotive under his charge, carelessly and negligently runs the same upon and into a passenger car standing upon a railroad track, thereby causing the destruction of the car and the death of a passenger who was within it. he is guilty of the offense of involuntary manslaughter within this section; State v. Dorsey, 118-167.

1909. Assault and battery with intent etc. On an indictment for assault and battery with intent to commit manslaughter, the failure to specify the degree or kind of manslaughter which the accused intended to commit, does not vitiate the verdict. A failure more specifically to describe the offense could not prejudice the material rights of the defendant for, whether the manslaughter be voluntary or involuntary, the punishment is the same, and it is now well settled that no judgment, either in a criminal or civil case, will be reversed for an error which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the appellant; Brown v. State, 111-442.

Prosecution for assault with intent to kill and murder. Affidavit that one F. on etc., at etc. "did then and there unlawfully and feloniously attempt to commit a violent injury upon the person of" R. G., he, the said F., “then and there having the present ability to commit said injury, by then and there feloniously, purposely and with premeditated malice, holding in his hands two large stones with intent then and thereby, him the said " R. G., "feloniously, purposely and with premeditated malice to kill and murder." This affidavit sufficiently charges an assault; it charges the attempt to commit a violent injury upon G., and that he had the present ability to commit the injury. This is all the statute requires to constitute an assault. It was unnecessary to aver that defendant had weapons in his hands, but such allegation does not render the affidavit defective; Freel v. State, 125-166.

1915. Kidnapping. As defined by one branch of the statute the offense is complete if the person is feloniously carried away from his residence, unless the act is done pursuant to some state or federal law. An arrest or an imprisonment not made pursuant to such laws constitutes the offense under the other branches of the statute, if either is made with the intention of carrying the person from his residence; State v. Sutton, 116-529.

This section, defining kidnapping, is composed of two subdivisions or branches. (1) To constitute a crime under the first subdivision there must be a carrying or decoying of the person, against whom the wrong is committed, away from his place of residence, forcibly or fraudulently. (2) Under the second subdivision, to constitute the crime, it is not necessary that the person against whom the wrong is committed be compelled, or induced, to leave his place of residence. The definition given to the crime in the first subdivision necessarily involves an intentional carrying or decoying away from the place of residence. Wherefore an information need not aver tautologically the words in the section "with the intention of having such person carried away from his place of residence." Under the second subdivision, however, the crime intended to be embraced in the statute would be incompletely defined without the use of said words; Boes v. State, 125–206.

An indictment for kidnapping, under this section, must, in addition to alleging the unlawful and felonious character of the acts with which the defendant is charged, negative the exceptions in the statute, and allege that the acts were not done in pursuance of the laws of this state or of the United States." An averment in an indictment that the defendant carried away etc. a certain person, named, from her residence in a township and county, named, in this state, to and in to the state of Illinois, the defendant "not then and there having first established a claim upon her," the person named "according to the laws of the state of Indiana or the laws of the United States," is not sufficient, as not being the equivalent to an averment in negation of the statutory exception above stated; State v. Kimmerling, 124-383.

1917. Rape. When an indictment charges a rape upon a female under the age of twelve years it is not necessary to aver that the child was ravished forcibly and against her will. In such case the law conclusively presumes that she is incapable of giving her consent and, by this section, declares the mere act of sexual intercourse a crime. This being so it follows that the abuse of her person with a view to the accomplishment of that act constitutes an assault and battery with the intent to commit rape, if sexual intercourse does not take place, for if she is incapable of consenting to the act of sexual intercourse she is equally incapable of consenting to all familiarity with her person that necessarily precedes the consummation of the act; Murphy v. State, 120-116.

Under section 1806 the slightest penetration of the genital organ of the male in to that of the female is sufficient, the other elements of the crime being present, to establish guilt. Penetration, like any other element of crime, may be established by circumstantial evidence; Taylor v. State, 111-280.

1925. Libel. It is not necessary that the words used in a published libel shall be slanderous, to sustain an action for libel. Any words will be presumed defamatory which expose the party complaining to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, which tend to injure him in his profession or trade, or cause him to be shunned or avoided by his neighbors. So, every thing, printed or written, which reflects on the character of another and is published without lawful justification or excuse, is a libel, whatever the intention may have been. The words need not, necessarily, impute disgraceful conduct to the plaintiff; it is sufficient if they render him contemptible or ridiculous. Any written words are defamatory which impute to a person that he has been guilty of any