Opinion of the Court, per MILLER, J. of sale given to the executors, and even if such power existed, the invalidity of the devise would not be cured thereby. (2 Story's Eq. Jur. 4793; 6 Abb. Dig. 175; White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144, 161; 5 Cow. 221; 93 U. S. 589.) As to real estate in this State an implied power of sale, or even an express power of sale given to executors, to be exercised at any time in their discretion, does not cure the invalidity of a limitation repugnant to the statutory prohibition against suspending the absolute power of alienation. (11 Hun, 147, 151; 72 N. Y. 603.) This will cannot be so construed as to work a conversion into personalty of the New York real estate. (White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144, 161; Fowler v. Depau, 26 Barb. 224; Harris v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 242; Neely v. Grantham, 58 Penn. St. 433, 437, 442; 1 Jarm. on Wills [5th ed., by Bigelow], *584; In re Will of Fox, 52 N. Y. 530, 537; Savage v. Burnham, 17 id. 561; 3 P. Wms. 20, note; Wright v. Trustees, etc., *202, *208, *222; Smith v. Claxton, 4 Mad. Ch. 484; O'Hara on Construction of Wills [Wigram on Wills], chap. 12, p. 156; Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N. Y. 394, 402; Power v. Cassidy, 79 id. 602, 613; Lent v. Howard, S9 id. 169; Bramhill v. Ferris, 14 id. 41; Meakings v. Cromwell, 5 id. 136; Dodge v. Pond, 23 id. 69; Bogart v. Hastell, 4 Hill, 492; Gourley v. Campbell, 66 N. Y. 169, 172; Ackeroyd v. Smithson, 1 Bro. C. C. 503; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1166.) No interest or title vested in the testator's grandchildren upon his death. (Elwin v. Elwin, 8 Ves. 547; 1 Jarm. on Wills [5th ed., Bigelow], *605; Loder v. Hatfield, 71 N. Y. 92, 98; Colton v. Fox, 67 id. 348-353; Warner v. Durant, 76 id. 136; Smith v. Edwards, 88 id. 92, 104-108.) MILLER, J. This action is brought to obtain a construction of certain provisions of the last will and testament of Ezekiel J. M. Hale who died at his residence in the State of Massachusetts, June 4, 1881, and whose said last will and testament was executed in that State. At the time of his death the testator was the owner of valuable real estate situated in the city of New York. The larger part of his estate was, however, in Opinion of the Court, per MILLER, J. the State of Massachusetts where his will was proved and where the executors resided. The will was valid under the laws of the State of Massachusetts. The testator gave various legacies and devises, and provided in different clauses of his will for life annuities to twelve different persons, and for certain other annuities payable in most instances quarterly, "until the final division of the rest and residue of my estate as hereinafter provided," then follows this provision: "Article 22d. As to the residue and remainder of all my estate, both real and personal, not herein otherwise disposed of, it is my will that the same be and remain in the care and control of my said executrix and executors and trustees and their successors, well and safely invested, until the decease of the last survivor of the life annuitants named in my foregoing will, and that then the said residue and remainder, with all the accumulated interest thereof, shall be divided equally among my grandchildren per stirpes, to hold to such grandchildren so distributed and to their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns forever." The questions arising upon this appeal relate to the validity of the above twenty-second article of the testator's will so far as it affects the testator's real estate in this State. The appellants' counsel claims that the testator, by implication, in this twenty-second clause of his will, directs his executors to sell his lands wherever situated, and to convert them into money for the purpose of investment and distribution, and that thereby a case of equitable conversion is presented from the moment of the testator's death. The correctness of this position must depend on the construction to be placed upon the language of the clause in question and the intention of the testator to be derived from the various provisions of the will. The will on its face contains no direction for the conversion of the real estate into personalty, and if such a construction can be placed upon the clause cited it must arise from implication only. There is no doubt of the correctness of the rule claimed by the appellants' counsel, that equitable conversion may take place by implication as well as by express words. It is conceded that same. Opinion of the Court, per MILLER, J. there must be a positive direction to convert, but it is insisted that such positive direction may be implied. Perhaps this position may be correct if the provisions of the will are of such a character as to leave no question in regard to the intention of the testator, but in order to uphold a conversion of real estate into personalty there should be such an implication of the testator's design as to leave no question in regard to the While conceding the correctness of the rule laid down in the authorities cited by the appellants' counsel, it is by no means clear that the implication arising from the clause in the will referred to is so strong as to warrant the inference claimed to be derived from the language employed and the general purpose which the testator had in view. The question then arises whether the language of the will creates, on its face and in view of the circumstances surrounding the testator, a sufficient implication to authorize the conclusion that his intention was to convert all his real estate into personalty and to distribute the same as provided in the clause of the will cited. The learned counsel for the appellants lays considerable stress upon some of the words employed by the testator in the twenty-second clause of his will, and insists that if properly interpreted they contain unmistakable evidence of his intention to convert his real estate into personalty. It is no doubt true, as is claimed, that the words, " it is my will," comprehend a plain and positive direction, and a command to carry into effect the purpose of the testator, and courts of equity cannot be too vigilant and astute in enforcing this imperative mandate in accordance with the directions given. The direction as to the residue and remainder of the testator's estate, both real and personal, that it shall be and remain in the care and control of his executors well and safely invested, involves the inquiry whether the testator intended thereby to direct a sale and distribution of his real estate and an investment of the avails arising therefrom in personal securities. The language employed vests the executors with a power over the estate which shall be in their hands at any time. It does not direct any change in the character of the property or prescribe the nature Opinion of the Court, per MILLER, J. of the investments to be made, or the manner in which this part of their duty shall be performed. The power conferred while it is direct is of a general character and would seem to be such as is usually given to executors and trustees for the proper exercise of their functions. The language employed may have all due effect in applying it to the management of the entire estate, both real and personal, without changing the real estate into personalty, and it would require a very liberal interpretation to hold that it authorized a sale of the real property, without containing any authority to that effect, and a conversion of the avails thereof and an investment of the same into personalty. The use of the words "to be and remain * * * well and safely invested," in connection with those employed, must, we think, be regarded as referring to the condition of the testator's estate, which consisted of both real and personal property. He had invested a large amount in real estate, and the language of the will last cited may have full force and effect by applying it to his estate as it existed at the time of his death. It would be a strained construction to hold that any direct or implied authority was given to sell and dispose of real estate and convert the same into money; that the testator intended to leave directions as to what should be done with the money to be realized upon a sale, and that it should only be invested in such personal securities as were sanctioned by courts of equity in the investment of personal property belonging to estates. The claim of the learned counsel for the appellants, that under the language referred to there could be only an investment in government securities or in bonds and mortgages, can have no foundation, for the testator himself had made the investment in real estate and given no directions in his will or conferred any authority to dispose of the same and reinvest the proceeds. The testator by his selection of real estate has determined the character of the investment, and the question is not presented what it should have been if the real estate had been converted into personalty. If any specific meaning is to be given to the words, "to be and remain. * safely invested," they would seem to indicate an intention of the tes * * Opinion of the Court, per MILLER, J. tator that the real estate should continue in the hands of the executors as he left it at the time of his death and until the death of the last life annuitant. In the absence of any direction for the sale or disposition of either the real or personal estate these words may well be regarded as relieving the execu tors from the responsibility of converting any portion of the personal property into different or other investments than those made by the testator himself. We are referred to several cases in regard to the effect of the use of the word "invested" upon the doctrine of an implied equitable conversion, but none of them, we think, sustain the rule that such an implication can be upheld where the language employed, of itself, does not show a plain and clear intention to that effect and where the terms employed are not more specific, clear and palpable than the language cited from the testator's will. 66 In Mower v. Orr (7 Hare, 473), which is specially relied upon, the will provided for a division of the testator's estate into different parts and a disposition of the same in shares, two shares thereof to be invested in government funds, in the name of his executors, for the use of the children of his daughter who is named, the interest to be appropriated among them, and the principal to be divided between them at the age of twenty-one years. In that case the vice-chancellor said he was of opinion that the testator must be understood as directing the conversion of his copyhold estate into personalty. The division of the entire property into a number of shares, and the direction contained in the will as to the investment and disposition of some of such shares, precluded the supposition that the testator intended the copyhold should remain unsold." It will be noticed that here was a distinct direction that a portion of the estate should be invested for the benefit of the persons named and that the interest should be appropriated for their education and the principal to be divided among them at the time specified. These requirements could not be carried out without a sale of the copyhold estate, and hence it might well be implied that such was the intention of the testator. In the case at bar there is no direction as to the |