Opinion of the Court, per DANFORTH, J. obligation to support the plaintiff, contract to perform it faithfully. she was bound under that (Cowley v. People, 83 N. Y. 464.) A promise to pay a debt on the termination of a life may be performed within a year, and, therefore, need not be in writing. (Kent v. Kent, 62 N. Y. 560.) DANFORTH, J. The complaint is two-fold: First: That the defendant's testator, the father of the plaintiff, although not the husband of her mother, being applied to by Margaret Voris, Francis A. Knapp, Hester A. Knapp and Louisa A Story to provide for the plaintiff, promised them that he would pay for her maintenance, support and education, by making due and sufficient provision for her by his last will, in consideration that they would support her during the term of his natural life; avers that these persons were relatives of the plaintiff's mother, and that upon this promise they maintained, cared for, educated and supported the plaintiff up to June 25, 1879, when the testator died. Second: A promise by the testator to the plaintiff, and other persons acting in her behalf, that he would support and maintain her so long as she should live. The testator made no provision for the plaintiff by will, or otherwise. These promises were denied by the defendants, and the referee, to whom the issues were referred, found against the plaintiff, because in his opinion no legal claim had been established, lamenting at the same time "that the simplicity and ingenuousness of the plaintiff and her witnesses "the persons above referred to "had been practiced upon." On appeal to the General Term that court held that the plaintiff might recover upon the first cause of action, but as to the second, that no case was made out; reversed the judgment which had followed the report of the referee and ordered a new trial. From that order the defendants appealed to this court, assenting that if the order should be affirmed, judgment absolute should be rendered against them. (Code, § 191.) We think the referee and General Term came to a correct conclusion in regard to the plaintiff's right under the second Opinion of the Court, per DANFORTH, J. division of her complaint, and shall confine our discussion to the case made under its first branch. The plaintiff was born June 27, 1852, her mother having been seduced by the testator under promise of marriage. The mother was hardly more than a child herself, and had no means of her own. She was living with, and wholly dependent upon, her own mother, who was then a widow. At its birth, the testator received the child into his arms, and in the presence of witnesses acknowledged his paternity. She remained at her grandmother's nine or ten years, and during that period was visited often by the testator, who at all times manifested great affection for her, and frequently told both the mother and grandmother "that he wished" them "to take good care of the child and bring her up right, and he would see that it was all right." As these assurances were given after as well as before he had married another woman, it is difficult to believe that they related to any other than pecuniary satisfaction for the services he invoked. The grandmother at all events provided the child with board, care and clothing, paid all necessary expenses and sent her to school, paying the bills. In 1863 or 1864, when asked by the plaintiff's mother, "do you remember about your promise to do for this child?" he said, "yes, and I will do well by her; if she outlives me I will remember her in my will." Again in 1870, he inquired of her mother how she (his daughter) was; how she was getting along with her music; if she was going to school; what music teacher she had; and being informed, he told her mother "to give her all the lessons she would take;" the mother replied "that would cost something," and he said, "you go on and have her take them; never mind about that I will see that you are well paid." In 1876 his attention was again called to his promise to provide for the plaintiff, and asked "if he had forgotten it," he said, "I have not, I shall remember her in my will if she outlives me." She lived about two years, just after 1870, with her mother, and then with Mrs. Story and other relatives until 1879. During this time Mrs. Story boarded her and paid for her music Opinion of the Court, per DANFORTH, J. lessons, and clothes, and other expenses. To Mrs. Knapp, her aunt, who during a long period cared for the plaintiff, testator said in substance, as he had before said to her mother and her grandmother, among other things, "I want you to give her a good musical education," and she speaking of the cost, he said, "Don't worry about that, you will get it all back." Being asked in what way, he said, "I intend to do well by her in my will, them that do well by her will be well paid." He wanted to know who was taking care of her and Mrs. Knapp replied, "We are all doing for her." This occurred in 1860. Afterwards in 1875 or 1876, manifesting the same interest in his child and the same intentions in regard to her, he inquired of Mrs. Knapp, in the presence of Mrs. Story, concerning her and her progress in music, expressed satisfaction at her success, and his wish that she should receive a good education in that science. As to the expense he repeated, "You will get that all back. I have enough of this world's goods. I am only living for a name." When they asked "if he could not do something for her now," he said, "not now, but as I said before, I will do well by her; I will remember her in my will," and with other conversation added in conclusion, "Well, take good care of her, be well paid." * * * you will all The plaintiff was informed by her relatives of these promises of the testator, and with that knowledge, and in reliance upon them, assured the different persons who were taking care of and providing for her, and among other times, after she was twenty-one years of age, that whatever they did for her, she would when able repay. It is needless to recall more of the testimony. It is in no respect contradicted, and has been accepted as credible by the learned referee and General Term. The plaintiff from her birth to the commencement of this action has been cared for, maintained and educated by those relatives, each at different periods and at large expense. Its amount has been found and stated by the learned referee. He says: "From the time of the birth of the plaintiff to the time she went to live with her cousin (Mrs. Story) Opinion of the Court, per Danforth, J. the plaintiff's grandmother and aunt have paid, laid out, and expended for her in various necessary ways, and for her education and maintenance, services and moneys, amounting in all to $17,069.43, and the plaintiff's cousin, with whom she has lived from 1874 to the commencement of the suit, has also paid out considerable sums of money for her support and maintenance, amounting in all to $3,799." Notwithstanding all this, the learned referee felt constrained to dismiss the complaint. He thought the testator had practiced dissimulation, but so successfully that he was bound only by his own conscience, and that no action lay against him though he did not perform his promises. We cannot agree to this. In our opinion there is in the record, as above quoted, evidence of an agreement made upon valuable consideration, and, therefore, also binding in law upon him and consequently upon his estate. It is true that by the common law the child that is born before marriage is so far nullius filius that he cannot inherit; but he may acquire rights. Nor is his putative father under any legal liability at common law to support him (Moncrief v. Ely, 19 Wend. 405), yet it is said he may take him out of the parish (Sherman's Case, 1 Ventris, 210) and maintain him, or by will leave any of his property to him, or in his life-time make other provision for his support. So if he acknowledges or adopts the child as his own, and at his request it is cared for by others, he becomes liable in favor of the party providing for it (Moncrief v. Ely, supra; Birdsall v. Edgerton, 25 Wend. 619), and remains so until he renounces the child or otherwise notifies the persons who have it, that he will no longer be bound to them. From these or like circumstances a promise to make compensation may be implied, and of course such a promise may also be expressed by him. In either case the natural obligation arising out of the relation of the putative father to his child will uphold a contract upon which an action may be sustained (Hesketh v. Gowing, 5 Esp. 131; Nichole v. Allen, 3 C. & P. 36; In re Plaskett's estate, 30 L. J. Eq. 606; Moncrief v. Ely, supra; Birdsall v. Opinion of the Court, per DANFORTH, J. Edgerton, supra; Hook v. Pratt, 78 N. Y. 371; 34 Am. Rep. 539.) Duncan v. Pope (47 Ga. 445), cited by the appellant, goes no further than to hold that in the absence of a contract for its support a bastard cannot maintain an action against his putative father, or his estate. On the other hand it holds that if he voluntarily makes an agreement for it, not only may the father be bound but his representatives, while Nine v. Starr (8 Oreg. 49), also cited by him, decides only that when the mother alone is bound to maintain the child she cannot maintain an action upon the father's agreement to pay her for doing so. But even in such a case, if any provision for the child beyond such legal maintenance be included in the consideration, it is sufficient, and the promise valid. (Smith v. Roche, 6 C. B. [N. S.] 223; Follit v. Koetzow, 2 E. & E. 730.) In Moncrief v. Ely (supra), it is held that at common law an action will lie against him for the support of his child upon an express promise, or if he had adopted the child as his own, upon an implied promise in favor of the party maintaining it; but the plaintiff in that case failed to recover, because there was no evidence of a promise express or implied. This case was followed in Birdsall v. Edgerton (supra). Indeed it has never yet been held that there was any thing illegal in an undertaking by a putative father to support his bastard, or to pay a sum of money in consideration of such support being furnished by another, though that other person was the mother of the child. Upon principle and authority such a promise must be regarded as valid. But notwithstanding this, the learned counsel for the appellant argues that the promises made by the testator to Mrs. Voris, Mrs. Knapp and Mrs. Story were without consideration -mere naked promises, and not enforceable. The learned referee finds that the testator did not expressly promise to pay the plaintiff's relatives, nor any one else, for the expenses incident "to her maintenance and support, and whatever was said by him was contingent on the plaintiff's outliving him, and was limited to such provision as he might make for her by his |