Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

5. JOHN WITHERSPOON, OF NEW JERSEY.-THE

NECESSITY OF CONFEDERATION

(In Congress, at Philadelphia, July 30, 1776.)

ON June 7, 1776, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia introduced the following resolutions in the Continental Congress:

"Resolved, That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown; and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and of right ought to be, totally dissolved.

[ocr errors]

"That a plan of Confederation be prepared and transmitted to the respective colonies for their consideration and approbation."

The first of these resolutions resulted (July 4, 1776) in the Declaration of Independence; the second led to the formulation and ultimate adoption of the Articles of Confederation.

The "plan of confederation" here ordered to be prepared was first reported July 12, 1776. It was adopted by Congress and recommended to the States for "immediate and dispassionate consideration" on November 15, 1777; but

JOHN WITHERSPOON, D.D. Born near Edinburgh, Scotland, 1722; graduated from Edinburgh University, 1739; became president of New Jersey College, 1768; member of the New Jersey Constitutional Convention, 1776; member of the Continental Congress, 1776-82; died, 1795.

it was not finally acceded to by Maryland, the last of the thirteen States, until 1781, on March 1st of which year it formally went into effect. The government created was one of strictly limited powers, each State retaining “its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." There was no provision for a separate executive, so the administration was left to Congress, its committees, and the officers appointed by it. The Congress was a legislature of a single house, consisting of delegates appointed by and responsible to the State Legislatures. Each State delegation possessed one vote. On important matters the votes of nine States were necessary. To amend the Articles themselves, confirmation by the legislature of every State was required. A common treasury was established out of which all charges of war and other expenses were to be defrayed; but to fill the treasury Congress could only make requisitions on the States, which alone assessed and collected taxes. On the other hand, Congress was given the sole and exclusive right of determining on war and peace, of sending and receiving ambassadors, and of entering into treaties and alliances with foreign powers.

In the discussions which preceded the final adoption of the Articles, serious differences of opinion were revealed over the question of representation and taxation (which involved the question of the status of slaves), over the control of the Indians, and especially over the ownership of the Western lands. The long delay in ratifying the Articles was due to Maryland's resolute demand that those States which claimed territory extending to the Mississippi or the Pacific (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, the Carolinas, and New York) should first surrender to the

United States these Western lands. In Congress itself opposition on this question had arisen. In the midst of the first discussions of the Articles (July 25, 1776) James Wilson of Pennsylvania had characterized these claims as "extravagant" and "made upon mistakes"; Pennsylvania, he continued, "has no right to interfere in these claims, but she has a right to say that she will not confederate unless these claims are cut off." (Notes of the debates, in John Adams, Works, II, p. 493.)

It was the imminent danger, revealed by these discussions, of the failure of all plans for permanent union, which called forth the following speech (July 30, 1776) from Dr. John Witherspoon, President of the New Jersey College (now Princeton University) and a delegate in Congress from that State. To those who had objected that America was not yet "ripe" for independence, Witherspoon had replied, "We are not only ripe but rotting.” His learning and ability made him a leading figure alike in the religion, education, and politics of the time. A special value attaches to this and the few other speeches contained in the four volumes of Witherspoon's Works, for they are almost the only speeches which have come down to us from the Continental Congress.

T

[JOHN WITHERSPOON, in Congress, at Philadelphia, July 30, 1776.]

HE ABSOLUTE necessity of union to the vigor and success of those measures on which we are already entered, is felt and confessed by every one of us without exception; so far indeed that those who have expressed their fears or suspicions of the existing confederacy proving abortive, have yet agreed in saying that there must and shall be a confederacy for the purposes of and till the finishing of this war. So far is well; and so far it is pleasing to hear them express their sentiments. But I entreat

gentlemen calmly to consider how far the giving up all hopes of a lasting confederacy among these States, for their future security and improvement, will have an effect upon the stability and efficacy of even the temporary confederacy, which all acknowledge to be necessary? I am fully persuaded that when it comes to be generally known that the delegates of the provinces consider a lasting union as impracticable, it will greatly derange the minds of the people and weaken their hands in defense of their country, which they have now undertaken with so much alacrity and spirit. I confess it would to me greatly diminish the glory and importance of the struggle, whether considered as for the rights of mankind in general, or for the prosperity and happiness of this continent in future times.

It would quite depreciate the object of hope, as well as place it at a greater distance. For what would it signify to risk our possessions and shed our blood to set ourselves free from the encroachments and oppression of Great Britain, with a certainty, as soon as peace was settled with them, of a more lasting war, a more unnatural, more bloody, and much more hopeless war among the colonies themselves? Some of us consider ourselves as acting for posterity at present, having little expectation of living to see all things fully settled, and the good consequences of liberty taking effect. But how much more uncertain the hope of seeing the internal contests of the colonies settled upon a lasting and equitable footing.

One of the greatest dangers I have always considered the colonies as exposed to at present is treachery among themselves, augmented by bribery and corruption from our enemies. But what force would be added to the arguments of seducers, if they could say with truth that it was of no consequence whether we succeeded against Great Britain or not, for we must in the end be subjected, the greatest part of us, to the power of one or more of the strongest or largest of the American States? And here I would apply the argument which we have so often used against Great

Britain—that in all history we see that the slaves of freemen, and the subject states of republics, have been of all others the most grievously oppressed. I do not think the records of time can produce an instance of slaves treated with so much barbarity as the Helotes by the Lacedæmonians, who were the most illustrious champions for liberty in all Greece; or of provinces more plundered and spoiled than the states conquered by the Romans, for one hundred years before Cæsar's dictatorship. The reason is plain: there are many great men in free states. There were many consular gentlemen in that great republic, who all considered themselves as greater than kings, and must have kingly fortunes, which they had no other way of acquiring but by governments of provinces, which lasted generally but one year and seldom more than two.

In what I have already said, or may say, or any cases I may state, I hope every gentleman will do me the justice to believe that I have not the most distant view to particular persons or societies, and mean only to reason from the usual course of things, and the prejudices inseparable from men as such. And can we help saying that there will be a much greater degree, not only of the corruption of particular persons, but the defection of particular provinces from the present confederacy, if they consider our success itself as only a prelude to contests of a more dreadful nature, and indeed much more properly a civil war, than that which now often obtains the name? Must not small colonies in particular be in danger of saying, We must secure ourselves? If the colonies are independent States, separate and disunited, after this war, we may be sure of coming off by the worse. We [the small States] are in no condition to contend with several of them. Our trade in general, and our trade with them, must be upon such terms as they shall be pleased to prescribe. What will be the consequence of this? Will they not be ready to prefer putting themselves under the protection of Great Britain, France, or Holland, rather than submit to the tyranny of

« AnteriorContinuar »