to take action, after approval by the National Committee, against persons or groups believed guilty of unauthorized price increases. The committees are composed of five members, with the prefect of the Province as president. The director of agricultural services represents the Ministry of Agriculture. Provincial Committees for Price Supervision.-The decree of October 26, 1939, provides for the establishment in each Province, under the guidance of the Provincial Committee for Price Control, of one or more price-supervision committees (according to the size and population of the Province) to watch over wholesale and retail prices and report any infractions of the decree of September 9, prohibiting price increases. The members of the committee, who serve without remuneration, are appointed by the prefect of the Province from among Government pensioners.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

France entered the present war with almost no Government control over agriculture; yet it was not, as in 1914, wholly unprepared. Plans for the economic mobilization of the Nation in the eventuality of war were drawn as early as July 1938; the power to govern by decree and thus avoid delay in applying necessary measures was given to the Cabinet in March 1939; and in April 1939 the foundations were laid to assure the provisioning of the Nation in time of war. This early legislation enabled the Government to act swiftly upon the outbreak of hostilities, and in less than 2 weeks the framework of France's wartime agricultural economy had been erected.

For the present, however, regulation, advice, and assistance are the order of the day. Farmers are advised, but not compelled, to produce more and spend less. The Government encourages private enterprise to produce all it can without attempting any rigid control over it. The machinery to use the most complete regulation and control over agricultural production, consumption, and trade is ready, however, and could be set in motion almost over night. Several months prior to the outbreak of hostilities the mayors of all French communities had received instructions to print food-ration cards modeled after those of 1918 and have them ready for distribution at a moment's notice. Such control may include the establishment of a Ministry of Food, the fixing of all prices, the management of agricultural production, and the rationing of foodstuffs.

So far, foodstuffs have been ample, although measures are being taken to assure the supply of stocks. If the war continues well into 1940, the mobilization of a large portion of the country's farmers, coupled with the evacuation of some northern sections near the front, may affect this year's crop production. The increase in working hours and the employment of more women and children in the fields will only partly fill the wide gap left by millions of mobilized farmers.

The French possessions which in recent years have supplied France with large quantities of foodstuffs, are being encouraged to send still greater shipments. On the French North-African possessions will fall a large part of the burden. They will be required to increase their exports of cereals, wines, tobacco, fruits and vegetables, sugar, and meat products. From French West Africa will be demanded increasing quantities of oils, oilseeds, rubber, and coffee, while Indo-Chins will continue to send large shipments of rice.

Despite the probable increase in imports of agricultural products from its possessions, France will continue to depend on countries outside the French Empire for all cotton requirements and a large portion of the rubber, coffee, and wool consumed. Substantial quantities of frozen meats and tobacco may also have to be imported from these countries.

Exports of American farm products to France will be adversely affected by the war in Europe. Present United States laws requiring French importers to pay cash for all products purchased here and to carry them from American shoes in non-American bottoms will lead the French to buy in the United States only the agricultural necessities they cannot obtain under more favorable conditions. Because they need to conserve their foreign exchange to purchase armaments in this country, they will seek their main agricultural imports from their possessions and from countries accepting francs or sterling in payment. Another reason for the probable decrease in French imports of certain American agricultural products is the new tendency in France to restrict as much as possible the consumption of what is termed in wartime "luxury" products. This restriction will adversely affect American exports of fresh fruits and tobacco, the two most important items, after cotton, in the agricultural trade with France.

The Anglo-French economic and financial agreements will also limit the sale of American farm products to France. As a result of these agreements, France will be able to purchase from the countries of the British Empire, and pay in francs, many agricultural products that otherwise would have been imported from the United States and paid for in dollars. Moreover, those farm products that cannot be obtained advantageously elsewhere by France and the United Kingdom will be ordered from the United States cooperatively via London, thus avoiding any price competition. In the 1914-1918 conflict similar economic and financial agreements between the Allies were entered upon only at the end of the third year of the war.

The bulk of the agricultural imports, and particularly of foodstuffs, from the possessions is unloaded in French Mediterraenan seaports. So far during the present war, submarine warefare has not affected shipping lanes in that sea. The continuation of the present unhampered shipping between France and its possessions, i. e., the key to the French food problem during this war, will depend to a great extent on the attitude of Italy. If Italy remains neutral or joins the Franco-British alliance, France and the British fighting forces on French soil will be assured of an adequate flow of foodstuffs for the duration of hostilities. If, on the other hand, Italy chooses to enter the conflict on the side of Germany, Italian submarines and air forces may interfere with French-North African shipping, thus seriously affecting French food supplies.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Senator Pepper of Florida. STATEMENT OF HON. CLAUDE PEPPER, UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Senator PEPPER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I appear before the committee to address myself primarily to the principle of the Trade Agreements Act under which agreements have heretofore been entered into which have permitted the import of fresh vegetables into this country with reduced tariff during certain periods of the year, giving to the producers of vegetables in south Florida particularly a very hurtful form and volume of competition.

The first trade agreement entered into by the Government with a foreign country pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act was the trade agreement between United States and Cuba which permitted the vegetable producers of Cuba during the months of December, January, and February to send their products into this country at a reduction of 50 percent in the tariff which then existed in the tariff law of this country.

I realize that it was entirely possible, in fact I think probable, that the Executive branch of the Government at that time labored under some misapprehension as to what the facts were. I mean to say that I assume that the Executive department of our Government would not have entered into a trade agreement with a foreign country which would have permitted or encouraged that country to send any commodity into this country without substantial tariff barrier in serious competition with what we grow of that commodity in this country. I mean to say that I have never understood it to have been the intention of the Trade Agreements law to open the doors of the United States to the entry of agriculture and horticultural commodities at a time and to the extent that will make possible a detrimental competitive effect upon the producers of those commodities in the United States, particularly where there was not a shortage in the production of that commodity in this country. And yet I

propose to show the committee that that is just exactly what has been the actual effect of the trade agreement entered into between the United States and Cuba with respect to the vegetable industry in my State at least.

For example, I have before me a report from the United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics entitled "The Florida winter vegetable industry and the trade agreement with Cuba," dated Washington, D. C., August, 1937, and that pamphlet has noted in the upper left hand corner "F.S. 70," and on page 23 in table 11 there is disclosed a summary of monthly carload shipments and imports, November to June 1931-32 to 1936-37.

Looking at that table, I observe that in the season 1931-32, the month of December, Florida production and shipment of tomatoes amounted to 310 cars; in January, 559 cars; in February, 909 cars. For the year, the Florida shipments were 6,284 cars.

In the year 1932-33, for December the cars shipped from Florida were 308; January, 608; February, 1,059; total for the year, 6201. In 1933-34, December Florida shipments were 398 cars; January, 768 cars; February, 1,114 cars; total for the year 7,705.

Now the trade agreement between Cuba and the United States went into effect before the season of 1934-35.

In December of the year 1934-35, the Florida shipments were 314 cars; in January, 9 cars; February, 16 cars; total for the year 7,171 cars. The season 1935-36, December Florida shipments, 354 cars; January, 249 cars; February, 341 cars. For the year, 6,046 cars. Senator CONNALLY. May I ask you, Senator, for the preceding year there you say there were only 9 cars in January?

Senator PEPPER. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. What was the cause of that?

Senator PEPPER. Senator, let me get these figures in the record and then I will make some comment on them.

For the year 1936-37, Florida carload shipments were 233 for December; 555 in January; 1,117 in February; and for the whole year 5,623.

For Cuba, for the year 1931-32, December, 221; January, 354; February, 338; and for the year, 1,413 cars.

1932-33, Cuba; 91 cars in December; 427 in January; 354 in February; 1,150 for the year.

1933-34, Cuba; 126 cars in December; 395 in January; 405 in February; 1,446 for the year.

The season 1934-35, for Cuba: December, 527; January, 611; February, 412; and for the year 2, 082 cars.

For the season 1935-36, Cuba: December, 559 cars; January, 691 cars; February, 489 cars; and for the year, 2,124.

The season 1936-37, Cuba: December, 561 cars; January, 616 cars; February, 479 cars; and for the year, 2,141.

Summarizing by years, Cuban shipments and Florida shipments in carload lots in the pre-trade-agreement year of 1931-32, Florida sent in 6,284 cars to the market, speaking still of the tomatoes; Cuba sent in only 1,413 cars.

For the pre-trade-agreement year 1932-33, Florida's contribution was 6,201 cars; and Cuba, 1,150.

For the pre-trade-agreement year of 1933-34, the Florida shipments to the market were 7,705 cars; and Cuba, 1,446 cars.

For the first trade-agreement year, Florida was 7,171 cars and Cuba was 2,082 cars.

For the next trade-agreement year, Florida was 6,046 cars, less than either 1931-32 or 1932-33, whereas Cuba was 2,124 cars-more than in any previous year.

And in the trade-agreement year 1936-37, Florida had fallen to 5,623 cars, and Cuba was 2,141 cars.

So, generally speaking, you see a constant trend of increase in the quantity of Cuban imports and a constant tendency toward a decline in quantity of Florida put into the market during the same year.

Then you find that during the same months where there is competition you have a similar trend.

I would like to put into the record some further figures on the subject month by month, which cover the year 1939, which have been furnished me by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done. (The same are as follows:)