On competitive imports, we imported $74,727,000, which was 69.8 percent of our imports, leaving us with respect to the trade-agreement countries on competitive agriculture, to the goodly $275,364,000 with those countries. When you work into the picture the situation with regard to non-trade-agreement countries, that favorable balance is reduced to $138,604,000, or 56.7 percent of our total imports. That was also surprising to us. We had expected from that the results of these two tables would be reversed. Senator KING. Then these tables indicate considerable advantage to the United States in our dealings in agricultural commodities? Mr. HOLMAN. At this point, let me explain that all the data I have read to you refers simply to all types of concessions. With respect to our concessions, it is the bound on the free list, the bound duty, the bound internal tax, and the duty cuts. I now come to what I consider to be the most important of these tables and the one that really tells the story. The next table is not numbered, gentlemen. It is called duty reductions we received and gave on all products in terms of 1938 trade. I will number it table 3-A. We are no longer on general concessions, but we are on duties where this story is told. The reason I say that is this, that the concessions of binding character simply maintain the status quo either of 1930 or of the point at which the internal taxes were levied, but let us see what happened on cuts in duties. On our exports, and I think we can eliminate the first two columns to save time Senator VANDENBERG (interposing). These are all types of exports? Mr. HOLMAN. Yes, sir. Senator VANDENBERG. Agricultural and industrial? Mr. HOLMAN. The consolidation; yes. On all exports, our duty reductions to the trade-agreement countries amounted to $232,036,000 in our trade, or 14.4 percent of our trade with them. Senator VANDENBERG. That is what we got? Mr. HOLMAN. That is what we got. On the duty reductions on imports from trade-agreement countries, we have concessions on $169,573,000, or 21 percent of our imports from them, leaving us up to that point with a favorable balance of $62,463,000 with those particular countries. Then that balance is increased by $4,874,000 if you add in the trade-agreement colonies. But what about the non-trade-agreement countries? We imported from them $137,757,000 worth of products that took the concessions that we gave, that is the duty reductions, leaving us with a total minus of $70,420,000 on the 1938 trade. And if you add in Cuba, which was the bilateral, you would still have a minus balance of $32,126,000 on duties alone. Senator VANDENBERG. That table still raises the same old point. I suppose the rebuttal is that you have not been able to assess the generalization benefits we got, if any. Mr. HOLMAN. I would like to see somebody come before the committee and prove that we got any. When they give us the data, we will examine the data to determine whether it is correct. Table 4 is the duty reductions we gave and received on agricultural products. Our total exports of agricultural products, in column 1 to the left, to the trade-agreement countries amounted to $499,813,000, and our imports were $107,067,000. The duty reductions on our exports amounted to $62,587,000, or 12.5 percent of our exports to them. The duty reductions on our imports from them amounted to $47,202,000, or 44.1 percent of our total imports of agricultural products from them, still leaving us with a favorable trade balance to this country of $15,385,000, to which you add $99,000 for trade from the colonies. But our imports from the nonagreement countries amounted to $57,753,000, or 21.2 percent imports from them, leaving us with a minus balance on agricultural trade on dutiable commodities of $42,269,000. Cuba does not particularly change that picture. Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Holman, these tables would seem to clearly prove that it is due to the generalization of the benefits that we get our loss, is that correct? Mr. HOLMAN. That is my present conclusion on the subject from the study. We only completed it at 3 o'clock this morning, Senator, but we thought that there was something of real value in these tables. Senator VANDENBERG. I think they are tremendously valuable. Mr. HOLMAN. Now, table 5 is the duty reductions we gave and received on industrial products in terms of the 1938 trade. You will note that we exported $1,108,339,000 to the trade-agreement countries. We imported during that same period $700,328,000. On our concessions, that is, our duty concessions, or duty reductions, we exported $172,485,000, which is 15.6 percent of our total exports in that class. We imported $138,829,000 on duty cuts, or 19.8 percent of our total imports, leaving us at that point with a plus balance of $33,656,000. When you take into consideration the importation from the nontrade-agreement countries amounting to $286,234,000, it leaves us with a minus balance on industrial dutiable articles of $39,039,000. The next table I would simply like to file. It is a summary of changes in balance of trade with trade-agreement and non-trade-agreement countries, which will save my going over some material which I presented more in detail. The next table is table 8, which I have not had a chance to examine. It is entitled "Value of United States agricultural exports and competitive agricultural imports, 2 years before and 2 years after the trade agreements." Gentlemen, here is what we did. We took here only the tradeagreement countries where the trade agreements had been in effect for 2 years, and then we took our total trade with those countries to get the balance of trade for 2 years before, and then we compared that with 2 years afterward. Column 1 shows the date, the year in which the trade agreement was made. This is all in terms of millions of dollars, and I will simply read you the bottom totals. On our agricultural exports we shipped them in the 2 years before, 154.5 millions of dollars worth of articles; in the 2 years afterward, 239 millions, leaving a plus balance of trade of 84.5 millions of dollars, or 54.5 percent plus to the net; that is, there was an increase. Senator JOHNSON. That is, 2 years previous to the agreement with each separate nation? Mr. HOLMAN. Yes sir; that is the composite of the nations. Senator JOHNSON. The table following the country there, Switzerland, for instance, you began with Switzerland in 1936, and with Belgium at the top of the page, 1935. Mr. HOLMAN. That is the time the trade agreement took effect, but it only took the 2-year period, you see. Senator JOHNSON. But you did not take the same 2-year period for each nation? Mr. HOLMAN. They were the trade-agreement countries. Senator JOHNSON. Individually? Mr. HOLMAN. Yes, sir. Senator JOHNSON. The 2-year period for Belgium was different from the 2-year period for Switzerland? Mr. HOLMAN. That is correct. We had to do that in order to get a 2-year period. Senator JOHNSON. That is the way I understood it. Mr. HOLMAN. This is simply 2 years before and 2 years after with respect to the particular country involved, but the total is averaged. The CHAIRMAN. The Belgian agreement was made in 1937, was it not? Mr. HOLMAN. 1935. The CHAIRMAN. You have 1935 here, and I was just trying to follow you on that 2-year period proposition. Was it 1935 we made the Belgian agreement? Mr. HOLMAN. That is my understanding. The CHAIRMAN. Then I do not understand exactly the question that Senator Johnson asked you and the explanation of it. Senator JOHNSON. It varies with each country. Mr. HOLMAN. The point involved is how to get at the comparisons of the years. If the Belgium agreement was made in 1935, we would take the years 1933 and 1934 and compare it with 1936 and 1937. The CHAIRMAN. In the case of Cuba, for instance, the trade agreement was made in 1934, was it not? Mr. HOLMAN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. You would take 2 years before that, 1932 and 1933, and compare it with 1934 and 1935? Mr. HOLMAN. No; 1935 and 1936. You see the year in which the trade agreement is made is not calculated, according to my understanding of the table. Senator LA FOLLETTE. You took the 2 years before the year when it was made and the 2 years afterwards? Mr. HOLMAN. That is correct. Senator LA FOLLETTE. You subtract 2 from the year the trade agreement was made, and you add 2 to the other? Mr. HOLMAN. This is the average of the 2 years. On agricultural competitive imports, the average was 190,500,000 before roughly speaking-and 331,000,000 afterwards, a gain of 140,500,000, or a gain in percentage of 73.8 percent. Senator GUFFEY. What are the competitive imports from Cuba? Mr. HOLMAN. This is the total. Senator GUFFEY. What are they? Senator VANDENBERG. Do you mean in items? Senator GUFFEY. Yes; what is included? Tobacco or sugar, or what? Mr. HOLMAN. It would include sugar, and it would include tobacco. I do not have the schedule of the items we used, but I will be glad to furnish them to the committee. Senator GUFFEY. I would like to see that. (Information requested follows:) Agricultural exports and imports with Cuba for the 2-year period following the year the trade agreement was signed (1934) Figures taken from Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States published by United States Department of Commerce. Mr. HOLMAN. In this case, we used the figures compiled from the United States Department of Commerce Yearbook and the work sheets of the United States Department of Agriculture. The classification of agricultural exports and competitive agricultural exports is the same as endorsed by the United States Department of Agriculture. The CHAIRMAN. As I understand you, then, in speaking of the competitive imports of 190,500,000 in 2 years before the agreement, on the average, for the 2 years afterwards it had increased to 331,000,000, or 140,500,000 increase in imports; is that right? Mr. HOLMAN. In imports. In other words, our imports increased 73.8 percent. Senator VANDENBERG, This table does not take into account the generalization? Mr. HOLMAN. No, sir. Senator GUFFEY. And that 140,000,000 on agricultural imports, for Cuba, is what I would like to get the details of. Mr. HOLMAN. We will be glad to furnish that. Now the last two columns, the excess of agricultural exports over agricultural competitive imports, in the 2 years before, it was $36,000,000, and in the 2 years afterwards it was $92,000,000. Senator KING. That would show an increase of our agricultural exports? Mr. HOLMAN. Yes; and now table 9 is a similar study. If you will consider the last 2 columns, you will see that the excess of exports over imports in the first 2 years was $151,000,000, and in the 2-year period afterwards it was $349,500,000. It must be apparent, particularly from the thesis that I am advocating here, that the real measure of these trade agreements is to be found in the duty reduction, first, that only a relatively small percentage of our total trade with these countries and with the world has been covered by the duty reductions. The CHAIRMAN. And you say you used about 20 experts that you had employed to compile these figures? Mr. HOLMAN. About 16 statisticians were used. The CHAIRMAN. They were experts? Mr. HOLMAN. Well, they have had good training. The CHAIRMAN. They had had the experience, you mean? Mr. HOLMAN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. And you think that they were thoroughly qualified to get up this statement? Mr. HOLMAN. I thought they were, and we had methods of checking for accuracy. The CHAIRMAN. Did you employ them? Mr. HOLMAN. Yes. All of them worked under my personal supervision. Senator JOHNSON. Who made the selection of these particular nations? You have 13 nations. Mr. HOLMAN. Which ones are you referring to? Senator JOHNSON. For instance, table 8. How did you happen to pick those particular 13 nations and not take all of the 22 nations? Mr. HOLMAN. Because those were the only nations on which we could get the 2-year period before and the 2 years after for comparison. You see, the trade agreements are relatively new. They began in 1934, and I think the first one of any importance was Canada, which took effect on the 1st of January 1936. Then there was Belgium, 1935, and so on; and so that, in order to get anything like a comparison, 2 years before and 2 years after, we found that the number of nations naturally became more limited out of the 22. Even on Great Britain, as I explained to the committee previously, these estimates on trade with Great Britain are, so far, largely estimates based upon our trade in 1938, but most of the economists agree that the 1939 trade was approximately the same as the 1938. There may be some differences. I call your attention again to the fact that on duty reductions in table 3-A, on our exports, only 14.4 percent of our exports to the trade-agreement countries was affected, and 21 percent of our imports from those countries. With respect to our total imports from the world, only 16.7 percent; consequently this very greatly exploited program is not by any means as great as we have all thought it was. Certainly trade agreements affecting less than 15 percent of the total trade with the country cannot be any great measure of our trade with them, and I assume, of course, of the concessions where things are bound, are eliminated from this picture. The point then comes as to why has our trade with these countries and the rest of the world increased? There are many reasons. all have our own ideas about that. We In that connection, I might say that the world depression started in the foreign countries before we in America felt it, and just as it |