agreeably to statute law, from the mere use of it by the public for any period less than twenty years: Id.

Proof, that part of an entire highway, the laying out of which was defective, has been used by the public for the term of twenty years, is evidence of a legal highway, as to the part so used, although no distinct act of acceptance by the town be shown: Id.

Where the record of a laying out of a highway is defective in failing to show a particular statute requisite, but enough is shown to render it probable that all the requisites had been complied with, and at the same time the record is so ancient as to afford a presumption, that by the death of the actors it could not be amended, there a jury on such evidence, aided by the fact that the highway had been opened by the town and used for many years, though less than twenty, would be justified in finding the highway to have been legally laid out: Id.

So long as a highway once established is kept open and fenced out, and the public never excluded, but it has always been used as a publie highway by the landowners for access to their farms, and for other farming purposes, the right of the public will not be deemed to be lost by abandonment: Id.

Where a road is established by use alone, it is not necessarily limited to the travelled track, and the ditches on each side, but a jury would be at liberty to find that the easement extended over the whole space marked by fences which had been maintained more than twenty years, and which gave about the usual width of a highway: Id.

HOMESTEAD. See Bankruptcy.

A widow is not entitled to a homestead and personal exemption out of the property of the intestate in addition to her dower and provision for her year's support: Rust, Johnson & Co. et al. v. Billingslea et al., 42 or 43 Ga.

The crop made upon a rented place is subject to the lien of the landlord for his rent, and if the same has been set apart as an exemption for the benefit of the family of the tenant, is nevertheless subject to levy and sale for the payment of the rent, the claim for rent being in the nature of the purchase-money: Harral v. Feagin, 42 or 43 Ga.

INFANT. See Debtor and Creditor.

INTEREST.

In the Absence of any Agreement to pay, not collectable after Payment of Debt-When there is no agreement to pay interest, interest when allowable, is allowed, not as part of the contract, but as an incident, and by way of damages for the default, to make the creditor good for the loss he has sustained by reason of the breach or default: The Southern Central Railroad Company v. The Town of Moravia, 61 Barb.

In that class of cases, it has always been held, that after the principal of the debt had been paid, and received in full, no action could be maintained to recover interest: Id.

The defendant subscribed to the capital stock of a railroad company, the amount of the subscription to be paid "in such instalments, and at such times, as the board of directors might lawfully direct." Several calls were made, by the directors, amounting in the aggregate to the precise sum subscribed, which were all paid by the defendant, but not

at the times designated in the calls, and receipts given. Nothing was said about interest, and no claim made for it, until after the whole principal had been paid: Held, That an action would not lie to recover interest on the several amounts specified in the calls, for the time they remained unpaid after the day designated for payment, by the call: Id.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. See Homestead.

A tenant for a year under a contract of rent stands in the shoes of his landlord, and in general is not a purchaser entitled to notice of equities against his landlord in favor of third persons: Clark v. Herring & Mock, 42 or 43 Ga.

A tenant cannot attorn to one who claims adversely to his landlord, even to prevent an illegal eviction by the sheriff: Donkle v. Kohn, 42 or 43 Ga.

When a party sublets to another under a contract that the sublessee is to pay the rent due, this is not such a claim for rent by the landlord as may be enforced against the sublessee by levy of a distraint warrant: Smith v. Turnley et al., 42 or 43 Ga.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Administrators.

Effect of a Partial Payment.-A partial payment made upon a promissory note, by the administratrix of one of the makers, a portion of which payment is from assets of the estate, if made before the Statute of Limitations has run against the note, saves the obligation from the operation of the statute, up to that time. And this, although the payment was made without the consent of the other administrator: Heath et al., Adm'rs, v. Grenell, Adm'r., 61 Barb.

An administratrix making a payment upon a note after the Statute of Limitations has run against it, not out of the assets of the estate, but out of her own funds, will not be deemed as acting in her capacity of administratrix, even though she directs the payment to be made upon that specific debt. Nor can such a payment be construed into a promise, or as indicating an intention to revive or continue the demand against the estate: Id.

Any payment upon such a note, made by the administratrix with her own money, cannot bind the estate, or affect it in any way, any more than if it had been the act of a stranger: Id.

Where an administratrix directed her agent to pay a certain sum on her intestate's debts, out of money of her own, giving no specific direction to pay a particular demand, or any part of it, and the agent, in the exercise of his own discretion, in distributing the fund, made a partial payment upon that demand: Held, That the general direction to the agent could not be construed into a promise or intention to continue that particular demand, and not being made from the assets of the estate, the payment could have no bearing against the estate: Id.

MORTGAGES.

Individual property is not embraced by a mortgage executed by partners on their partnership property except it is specifically set forth and described Reid v. Goodwin, 42 or 43 Ga.

NEW TRIAL.

How far granted-Amendment after Verdict.-The rule now adopted by this court is, that when a general verdict depends upon the finding of several disputed facts or questions, some of which were not and could not have been affected by any error in the ruling of the court, and others of which were or may have been thus injuriously affected, the verdict will not be wholly set aside, and the case thrown open again to a new trial on all points; but such findings of facts as have been had upon the merits, and to which no valid objection can be made, shall remain undisturbed, and the verdict shall be set aside, and a new trial granted only on those points necessary to correct some error or mistake: Janvrin v. Fogg, 49 or 50 N. H.

And when the court can see that the only question of fact in the case has been submitted to and settled by the jury, under some mistaken ruling of law, in precisely the same manner and upon the same evidence, that it must have been submitted and settled, had the rulings upon the law been correct, the verdict will not be set aside : Id.

Amendments to be passed upon by the court, and which could not affect the finding of the jury, may be made after verdict, and judgment then rendered upon the verdict: Id.

And if amendments may be made in the cause itself after verdict, they may also be made in the testimony relating to the competency of records or other papers used as evidence in the cause, when they are not of a character to affect the finding of the jury, and are addressed to the court alone: Id.

Where a mortgage of personal property was introduced in evidence, which proved not to be sufficiently stamped so as to make it competent, Held, that this evidence of competency, being addressed only to the court, and being such that it could not have been affected, the verdict of the jury may be supplied by properly stamping the mortgage after verdict. And where that was the only ground of objection to the evidence, judgment will then be rendered upon the verdict: Id.

NUISANCE.

Private Action for-Highway-Mill-dam.-An individual sustaining an injury from a public nuisance, differing in kind from that sustained by the community in general, may maintain an action therefor: Venard v. Cross, 7 Kansas.

Proof of service of the notices provided by section 4 of the Road Act of 1864 was not required to be filed, recorded, or preserved, and a failure of the record to show such proof of service does not avoid the record: ld.

The right of flowing lands obtained by proceedings under the MillDam Act does not include the right to overflow or obstruct a highway: ld.

Chapter 66 of the General Statutes, commonly known as the "MillDam Act," is constitutional and valid: Id.

PARDON.

Under the Constitution of Georgia the Governor may exercise the pardoning power before conviction as well as after conviction. WARNER J., dissenting: Dominick v. Bowdoin, 42 or 43 Ga.

Where one was in custody under a bench-warrant founded upon an indictment by the grand jury, and sued out a writ of habeas corpus before a judge of the Superior Court, and as a ground of discharge, offered a pardon from the Governor for the offence charged against him, and the judge refused to receive and consider the pardon: Held, That this was manifest error by the court. It is the duty of all courts sitting for the purpose of habeas corpus or otherwise to receive, without further evidence of its verity, the pardon of the governor under the great seal of the state: Id.

Pardons obtained by fraud are void, and upon suggestion of fraud upon the trial of habeas corpus it was the duty of the judge presiding to have heard the evidence and passed upon its merits, as to the facts in the particular case, and it was error in the court to hold that this question could only be inquired of by the jury: Id.

Pardons before conviction are based upon the confession of the imputed guilt of the accused, and before such pardon takes effect it must be accepted by the accused, and when the plea of pardon by sureties fails to set up its acceptance by their principal, evidenced by his application for the pardon, and delivery to him, or his acceptance of it when done, the pardon granted without the application of the principal, and not evinced by his acceptance of it, is of no effect: Bullock, Governor, v. Hancock et al., 42 or 43 Ga.

PARTNERSHIP.

Whatever may be the interest of the parties, and whether they be, in fact, partners under the bargain or not, they will be liable as such, if they so act as to hold themselves out to the world as such: Sankey & Shorter v. Hall, Moses & Co., 42 or 43 Ga.

The sayings of one of the partners, not expressly, or by implication, brought to the knowledge of the other, are no evidence against that other in an issue of partnership or no partnership: Id.

PAYMENT.

When may be recovered back.—When a party pays an illegal demand with a full knowledge of all the facts which render such demand illegal, without an immediate and urgent necessity therefor, or unless to release his person or property from detention, or to prevent an immediate seizure of the same, such payment must be deemed to be voluntary, and cannot be recovered back; and the fact that the party at the time of making the payment files a written protest, does not make the payment involuntary: Commissioners v. Walker, 8 Kans.

REVIEW.

Amendment. When there is a written contract between the parties, it is for the court to give construction to that contract, if it becomes necessary, but it is for the jury to find whether the acts done which constitute the basis of the present action, were done under that contract or some other which was not written: Colebrook v. Merrill, 49 or 50 N. H.

In actions of review the statute has placed the whole subject of amending the pleadings and of admitting new pleadings, entirely within the discretion of the court: Id.

In the trial of an action upon review the court may, in its discretion, reject or disallow a demurrer to the original declaration : Id.

What is Pleadable in Action of.-Upon review, no matter or thing which has arisen since the judgment in the original cause, can be pleaded in bar of the further maintenance of the suit: Zollar v. Janvrin, 49 or 50 N. H.

A review is a new trial of the issues before tried between the parties, unless the court grant leave to amend the pleadings: Id.

An action of review is a chose in action, which, in virtue of an adjudication of bankruptcy, vests in the assignee; who is, alone, empowered to prosecute or defend it, in his own name: Id.

SLANDER.

Words spoken in heat-Mitigation of Damages. Where slanderous words, which are per se actionable, are spoken in a moment of heat and passion, induced by some improper conduct immediately preceding on the part of the plaintiff, the said circumstances under which the words were spoken are not a complete defence to the action for slander, but should be considered by the jury only in mitigation of damages: Miles v. Harrington, 8 Kans.

In an action of slander for words spoken which are per se actionable, where the petition does not allege any special damages, the jury may give a verdict for such general damages as the plaintiff may have sustained; and all damages, which are the necessary and natural result of the words spoken, are general damages: Id.

And in such an action damage is presumed without any proof of actual damage, and if no special damage is pleaded, no general damage proved, nor exemplary damage allowed by the jury, still the jury should allow nominal damages for the plaintiff: Id.

And in such a case, whether exemplary damages should be allowed, is a question for the jury, under all the circumstances: the law would permit such damages: Id.

Opinion of Witness as to meaning of Words used.-Where, in an action for slander, the plaintiff proved the speaking by defendant of other defamatory words for the purpose of showing malice, the defendant will not be allowed to ask the witness how he understood those words: Shaw and Wife v. Shaw, 49 or 50 N. H.

Such inquiry will be allowed in reference to the words charged in the declaration only, when they are ambiguous, and with caution: Id.

STAMPS. See New Trial.

TAXES.

An action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant on a promissory note. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's suit, on the ground that he had not filed an affidavit that the taxes had been paid on the debt, as required by the Act of 1870. The plaintiff was a non-resident of this state: Held, That inasmuch as the plaintiff was a non-resident of the state there was no tax, due by him on the debt, which he was bound to pay: Mc Donald & Co. v. Feagan, Sheriff, 42 or 43 Ga.

USURY. See Bills and Notes.