perilled without danger to the existing dynasty. Yet, in the mean time, the Tsar, relying on his million of troops, is weakening his centre to carry out the most desultory projects. He has a very large army-an army of not less than 70,000 men in Poland; he has hitherto been concentrating troops in the Principalities, the actual centre of war; he is stripping Odessa and the Crimea to reinforce Prince Woronzow in the Caucasus, and yet, at the same time, he is advancing in forced marches on Khiva, Bokhara, Samarkand, and the Balkh, to stir up disorder in Persia and Affghanistan, and threaten British India from the west. Nor is he without one claw of his grasping eagle fixed on the frontiers of the land of the yellow people. This is far from strengthening his position. The Anglo-Indian army, reinforced as it is now by the warlike Sikhs, is fully competent to encounter the hosts of Russia, wearied out, if not decimated, by a long march through the desert and the wilderness. Indeed, it is quite out of question that the Russians could ever do anything while engaged in war elsewhere on the frontier of India. They would hold out the threat which would suffice for their Machiavellian policy, and to which the natural susceptibilities of the British lend themselves far too readily. The Affghans, whatever might be their feelings towards the Anglo-Indians, would, as Mussulmans, side to a man [with Turkey; they have already intimated as much to the Shah of Persia, who was supposed for a moment to waver as to what party he would embrace. If, then, we are now by force of circumstances the ally of the Islam, so Affghanistan and Bokhara are now our allies, and not those of Russia.

This is all very trite, and must have passed through the minds of all intelligent persons; but is it all right and just? There can be no doubt that all and every sacrifice ought to be made for the sake of peace-not the kind of sacrifice demanded by the so-called peace societies-men without character or patriotism, who would disarm the nation-leave our colonies and shipping without protection-hug the good terminus to their breasts like many a recreant Roman at the decline of the Empire, and expose their altars, their hearths, and their homes to the desecration of any foreign invader, be he French or Russian; but sacrifices of a natural resentment, of a ready will and the power to avenge, of an ally's first interests, almost of our national honour, so, at all events, many of the ultra-warlike-the extreme of the other party-would have it. Still, any ministry, we do avow, is justified in making almost any sacrifice, except that of positive defeat, humiliation, and subjugation, to preserve that union of states, that long existing state of things, and that peace of the world which we have seen to be threatened and involved by the conflagration of war. The dearest interests of religion demand such sacrifices, and therefore on such a principle the Aberdeen policy-reviled as it has been-is the only just and true one.

But an equally important question presents itself. Supposing the policy of peace to be a just and a good one, what of our active measures, supposing such policy no longer tenable? To prevent the aggrandisement of Russia, we go to war for Muhammadan interests as opposed to Christian-there is no mincing the matter, it is an infidel warfare. In Turkey in Europe alone, according to Boué, the best authority, there are upwards of 13,000,000 Christians of different denominations to 1,700,000

Mussulmans, of whom only 700,000-we speak in round numbers-are of the dominant, or ruling Turkish or Osmanli race.

Next, do we the better secure European peace by combating in the cause of the Turks? Yes, it will be answered, by preventing the aggrandisement of the Russians we preserve the status quo. Not at all, we cannot prevent the ultimate aggrandisement of Russia without either backing the Turks in subduing her, or helping them in their onward career of success ourselves and our martial allies. Yet by doing so we at once entail the explosion of all those political catastrophes which we have before marshalled forth in due array. Suppose, on the contrary, Russia conquered the Turks, the fleets of Great Britain and France, and the peaceful interference of Austria and Prussia, as dictated by their own interests, could arrange for the future government of Turkey, as was formerly done for Greece, on terms that would be satisfactory to all parties, and yet would not endanger the peace of the world. If we have made two sacrifices already—the looking on during the occupation of the Principalities and the commencement of hostilities in Europe and Asia-we may make a third, and wait till the concentration of forces on the part of the Tsar has entailed a first dismemberment of the Muhammadan hosts to enable us to make something like permanent arrangements in the cause of humanity and civilisation at large.

When the Turks made war in Montenegro (says a well-informed Austrian officer in the Allgemeine Zeitung), it seemed impossible that they could ever collect a well-appointed army of 100,000 men, and much less could it be supposed that such an army would, within the short period of six months, be assembled in Bulgaria. It seemed as if the Turkish Empire was in the last stage of its existence. Popular enthusiasm has for the moment triumphed over the weakness of the body politic. It is the last gleam of the candle in the socket. But the result of this last gleam is, that about 200,000 Osmanlis are in arms; that the fortresses on the Danube and the Balkan are actually in a state of defence, and that the war fleet, well armed and manned, is now stationed in the Upper Bosphorus.

The Osmanlis have crossed the Danube, and driven the Russians, demoralised by sickness, discontent, and surprise, before them, it may now be added. Disease is decimating the Russian ranks. Cholera, typhus, dysentery, malaria, and a new and formidable malady, something between plague and carbuncle, ravage the Muscovite hosts. If 12,000 men are in hospital, what debility and demoralisation there must be in the army generally! Under other circumstances, and supposing General Osten Sacken's corps d'armée to get up in time, the Danube might still be passed, columns be pushed forward, and an important point occupied on the Black Sea, before the French and English could act. Considering the strategetic position of the Russian forces, all military men felt that Turkey would be compelled by that disposition to operate against the front of the Russian advances, and partly against the furthest part of their right flank. But few anticipated even the partial success that has been attendant upon so bold and courageous a movement.

Some portions of the press have been honest enough to avow all along that they only looked with favour on the material aid given by Great Britain and France to Turkey as a means for securing the nationality of Hungary, Poland, and Lombardy. The Examiner has spoken of the

certainty, which no sane man has ever doubted, "that war upon the Danube is synonymous with insurrection in Hungary." It is impossible to deny the probability of such a result, and fate seems in favour of the oppressed nationalities, by every onward move that is made. Kossuth very naturally traced the backwardness of Great Britain to let the Turks move in self-defence, or to move themselves in aid of their cause, to apprehension of such popular risings. Justly so, we may entertain every good feeling towards Hungarian, or Polish, or Italian nationality; but could Kossuth himself aver for a moment that it would be statesmanlike, or even humane, to fan the flames of insurrection? Were the executive government of the day to be guided by the resolutions adopted at some of the public meetings that have been held to discuss the Eastern question, they would "take measures to drive the Russians out of the Principalities, and to prevent their ever invading them again!" Such a spirited resolution was much admired in sundry quarters, and is a good sample of the capacity of such meetings to deal with such questions. By all means let us do all these things, and a great many more, if we can. Let us redress the wrongs of all mankind, past, present, and future. Why not drive the Russians out of Poland-the Austrians out of Cracow, and Milan, and Venice-the Prussians out of Posen-the French out of Rome and Algiers-the Americans out of Texas, Mexico, California, and the Oregon? Great Britain and France, and Austria and Prussia altogether, could not, from the national antagonism of opposing faiths, and the numerical inferiority of Turks over Christians in their own territory, secure Turkey from future Russian aggressions, at least not without the dismemberment of that colossal empire, no more than they could from the inevitable downfal that awaits Turkey within her own self.

War will only hurry that inevitable result-the Kismet, or doom of Turkey, as Mr. Macfarlane has it; and the press, even that portion which has been most in favour of measures tending to preserve general peace, has been overshadowed by the dark side of the results of the present war.

"Though," says the Times, "the united forces of Europe may successfully defend Turkish territory from Russian aggression, it does not follow that, in the event of extremities, the Ottoman Empire will be preserved for the Ottomans. One of the surest results, indeed, of a general war and a redistribution of Europe, would be the disappearance of the Turks from its territories. At present the Divan may certainly appear to be staking little on the issue of a Danubian campaign, but, if this campaign should acquire the dimensions of a continental conflagration, the Turkish question will soon perish in the flames."

The French press have given utterance to similar sentiments. Witness the Assemblée Nationale, which says:

If peace be necessary for the whole of Europe, it is more particularly so for the Ottoman Empire, which can alone be checked in its downward course by peace. To speak truly, the preservation of Turkey is completely artificial, and its independence is an empty word. If, up to the present time, the powers have succeeded in keeping alive this tottering empire, it has only been by skilful management and reciprocal concessions. It is useless to insist on a fact which is so evident, and to call to mind the history of the last thirty years. But, let war break out, and everything will change. With war, wise and

moderate combinations are no longer possible; with war, each one resumes his pretensions, his views, and his particular cupidity, and seeks to satisfy them in the chance of events. In such a conflict what would become of the Ottoman Empire? It would be no one's business to prevent its ruin, and the formidable question of partition, so long postponed, would weigh on every one's head. It would be impossible any longer to elude it, and, on the other hand, no one could proceed to solve the question without precipitating himself into an unknown path full of danger to every one.

Dr. Aiton, Faber, Cumming, and others, have argued the downfal of Muhammadanism upon religious grounds: and what a blessing it would be! In half a century after the overthrow of Islamism we should have open roads, if not railways, to Calcutta, perchance to Pekin, and the seeds would be sown for the revival of the great nations of antiquity.

We, as our readers well know, have contented ourselves with urging the claims of the existing Christian races, Romani or Wallachian, Servian, Greek, Bulgarian, Syrian, Armenian, and Chaldean, placed in unison or separate Principalities, under the safeguard and protection of the more civilised states. Others would partition out the Sultan's empire among the belligerent states of Europe, according to an arbitrary plan of their own. Of this we have a remarkable example in a pamphlet now before us,* written by one who is evidently perfectly intimate with the internal condition of the Turkish Empire, and au fait to the real state of things in the very heart of that vast seat of petty tyranny and of base corruption and degeneracy, but who allows his sense of what is necessary to the welfare of the country to carry him into a theoretical partitioning off of regions—a grand result, in which Providence may be called in to play a part as well as man.

Our author starts by saying:

Now, setting aside for a moment this said barrier theory, we would ask the following questions :-Since we have thought fit practically to stand by Turkey, has that country taken, or attempted, any such step towards improvement as might at all invite or even warrant the continuance of our favours? Have the changes there, of which we have heard such boast, tended in the least degree to exalt the character of the Turkish executive, the very power we seem so bent on maintaining? Has the condition of those of its subjects, who "profess and call themselves Christians," become so ameliorated, and so happy, as to induce us to waste our money and shed our blood in the support of their oppressors? On these points great ignorance generally prevails amongst us here at home. But facts are stubborn things, and of these we will proceed to quote more than one.

He then proceeds to give some revolting instances of tyranny and extortion on the part of Turkish officials which have come under his own cognisance, which it would be well for some of the out-and-out friends of the Turks to peruse carefully.

That the nephews of the Sultan are even now regularly destroyed in their infancy-let the trumpeters of Turkish civilisation say what they will-is well known; and the sad tragedy in the house of the late sister of the present

*The Partition of Turkey, an indispensable feature of the Present Political Crisis; or, a Series of Ideas, the result of experience gained by one who has been long resident in the East; and reduced to their present form by a Graduate of the University of Cambridge. Chapman and Hall.

monarch, who was even a second time robbed of her offspring, has been pathetically described in the Illustrated London News of the 24th of September last.

Wherever the Ottoman power has been established, ruin and desolation have speedily appeared as the sole fruits of conquest. "Where the Sultan's horse has trod there grows no grass," is a Turkish proverb, which only too well expresses the fatal truth. From the banks of the Danube to the shores of the Propontis the traveller may behold whole provinces, which, in the hands of civilised beings, would yield an abundant harvest, lying uncultivated, and void of inhabitants. Many a city of the dead dots the desert around him; but as to the abodes of the living, they are "few indeed, and far between."

That this is not a coloured picture, we would appeal to any one personally acquainted with the Turkish dominions. We could give a hundred instances from our own personal knowledge, of towns and territories once flourishing and prosperous, which are now mere villages, or not inhabited at all, and around which all is wilderness and tenantless. We could quote similar instances, with the painful thoughts inevitably suggested by them, from Layard's last work. In Assyria, Mesopotamia, and Babylonia, there is indeed little doubt, from the pages of historians, that from the time of Nebuchadnezzar, through Persian, Macedonian, Roman, and Saracenic rule, there never was such desolation as exists in the present day under the Osmanlis.

It may, we think, be safely said, that the Turks are a people to whom history at large presents no parallel. Surrounded by nations who have, from century to century, made rapid strides in civilisation, they have themselves remained sunk in all their ancient ignorance and fanaticism; while each ruler, great or small, is alternately the agent and victim of injustice and oppression. The Sultan extorts money from the pashas, who in turn oppress the beys; these again pounce upon the effendis; and so on, through every class of both the civil and the military departments.

And further on he writes of the same irreclaimable race:

In short, what has he, in the name of common sense, whereof to boast? He has simply the good fortune to be in the unlawful possession of a country that is one of the fairest in the world, the "bone of contention" amongst his neighbours, which he is permitted for a while to gnaw, while they are disputing as to who shall in the end be its real owner. The Turks appear conscious of their own instability, and they often wonder at their being allowed, as they are, to beard powers that could ride roughshod across their territory, and blot out their very existence with but little more than the stroke of the pen. Not a whit the less, however, do they avail themselves of their suffered position; and, as the moments of impunity present themselves, repeated are the acts of insult and HUMILIATION to which their protectors, in the persons of the European representatives, are subjected. With a hypocritical excuse, based on some point of his so-called faith, the very poorest Turk will not rise on the entrance of the most distinguished European. And herein, comparing great things with small, we see a true picture of the superstition and mean arrogance which, as a nation, we seem so pertinaciously inclined to maintain; a perfect incubus, crushing the liberties and energies of a Christian population of twelve millions.

Then, again, as to the misconceptions existing in English minds upon Turkish affairs; it arises from a fact, the very relation of which would hardly be credited by those accustomed to anything in the way of honesty :