furniture left in my charge for the past two years by a man who has failed to pay the storage charges or rent agreed upon when leaving them in my care. Shall I advertise them for sale subject to the storage charges, and, after doing so and waiting for a few days to hear from him, and not doing so, dispose of them without danger of being sued for their value? REPLY.-Under the statutes of this State a "warehouse company, warehouseman, or other person lawfully engaged in the business of storing goods, wares, and merchandise for hire," has a lien upon goods deposited with him, for his storage charges, and, if these are not paid, he may sell the goods at public auction after advertisement and notice to the owner. But one who is not engaged in taking goods on storage for hire, as a regular part of his business, is not entitled to sell any goods which may be deposited with him. He must look solely to the owner of the goods for payment. Whenever he wishes to be rid of them, he may deliver them to a warehouseman, who will have a lien upon them and power to sell them to pay storage charges. War Revenue Act. TAXATION OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES. There seems to be a difference of opinion here as to whether chattel mortgages for less than $1,500 require a stamp. Can you settle the matter for us? REPLY.-The War Revenue Act makes no discrimination between chattel mortgages and mortgages of real estate, but taxes them all alike under a paragraph in schedule A, as follows: "Mortgage or pledge of lands, estate, or property, real or personal, where the same shall be made as a security for the payment of any definite and certain sum of money, lent at the time, or previously due and owing, or forborne to be paid, being payable; also any conveyance of any lands, estate, or property whatsoever, in trust to be sold or otherwise converted into money, which shall be intended only as security, either by express stipulation or otherwise; on any of the foregoing exceeding one thousand dollars, and not exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars, twenty-five cents," etc. THE TAX ON WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS. We have occasion to store more or less merchandise in different storehouses and ask for a receipt for the same. We notice that some of the storage houses, when issuing the same, charge for the stamp. Please advise us whether this is legal. We understand that it is illegal to accept a check unless a canceled stamp is attached to the same. Why should not the same rule apply to storehouse receipts? REPLY.-The War Revenue Act expressly requires that warehouse receipts shall bear a stamp of twenty-five cents each. It also provides a penalty for any person or persons who "shall make, sign, or issue, or cause to be made, signed, or issued, any instrument, document, or paper of any kind or description whatsoever, without the same being duly stamped for denoting the tax hereby imposed thereon, or without having thereon an adhesive stamp to denote said tax." If a warehouseman issues an unstamped receipt, he lays himself liable to this penalty. But the law does not undertake to determine who shall pay for the stamp. A warehouseman is not bound, as a carrier is, to serve all who apply to him, and if he refuses to take goods unless the person storing them will pay for the stamp, or if he pays for it himself and increases his storage charges to cover the cost, the customer would seem to have no remedy. TAXATION OF DEEDS TO CEMETERY LOTS. Please inform me whether or not stamps are re-. quired upon deeds for cemetery lots where the consideration exceeds $100. REPLY.-If any person should buy a lot in a cemetery taking an absolute deed to it, as in the case of an ordinary purchase of real estate, the War Revenue Act would apply to that transaction as to any other sale of real estate, and the deed would be taxable if the consideration exceeded $100. In most cases, however, the so-called purchaser of a cemetery lot does not take an absolute title to the land, but buys merely the privilege of using it as a burial place, the title remaining meanwhile in the company owning the cemetery. Such a transaction as that is not taxable. THE TAX ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE. In construing a recent decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a few days ago, we said: "He does not pass upon the exact question raised by our correspondent, namely, whether a bill which upon its face is payable otherwise than at sight or on demand, but which by the acceptance is made payable immediately, shall be taxed at two cents per hundred dollars or only at two cents for each bill, without regard to the amount for which it is drawn. Until a ruling has been made covering this point the wiser plan would seem to be to stamp such bills upon the ad valorem basis." The Commissioner has now made a ruling upon this very important point, which we are enabled to print through the kindness of the correspondent to whom our former reply was made. It is as follows: WASHINGTON, April 20, 1899. C. H. TREAT, Esq., Collector Second District, New York, N. Y.: SIR. This office is in receipt of a letter under date of April 14th, 1899, from who subunit the following question for a ruling: "Shall a bill, which upon its face is payable otherwise than at sight or on demand, but which by acceptance is made payable immediately, be taxed at 2. per $100, or only at 2c. for each bill, without regard to the amount for which it is drawn?" You will please advise the above-named firm that a domestic draft drawn otherwise than at sight or on demand must have affixed thereon, and canceled at the time it is i-sued by the drawer, stamps at the rate of 2c. per $100 or fraction thereof of face value, regardless of whether or not it is by acceptance payable immediately. A foreign draft drawn otherwise than at sight or on demand must before being paid or accepted in this country be stamped at the rate of 2c. per $100 or traction thereof of the face value, irrespective of the fact that by acceptance it becomes payao.e immediately. Respectfully, Signed, G. W. WILSON, Comm:ssioner. TAX ON TRANSFER OF INSURANCE POLICY. The question of revenue stamps on insurance policies is a perplexing one, and I write to ask you to settle it. I give this example: Mary Jones has a policy written for three years for $2,500; premium, $25.50; expiring June 25th, 1900. The revenue tax on this is 13 cents. Mary Jones transfers her policy to John Smith, July 25th, 1899. Should the charge for revenue on the transfer be 13 cents, the original charge, or for the eleven months which the policy has to run, the premium for eleven months being $7.79, and the revenue tax 4 cents? tract, or charter, by letter or otherwise, a stamp duty shall be required and paid at the same rate as that imposed on the original instrument." In the early days of the law, the Internal Revenue Department interpreted and enforced this section as if it had provided for payment, upon transfer, of the same amount as in the first instance, and not simply at the same rate. Wiser counsels prevailed later, however, and the Department finally announced the conclusion, which is unquestionably correct, that "assignments of insurance policies are subject to taxation in proportion to the unearned premium of the policy. This unearned premium is the basis of taxation, and computation is made on this account." In the case our correspondent puts, the tax accruing upon the transfer is 4 cents, and not 13 cents, as upon the original transaction. VALIDITY OF A TYPE-WRITTEN WILL. Wills. Please say if a will which is signed by the testator, and also by two persons as witnesses, is valid if it is a type-written will. REPLY.-A type-written will, if it is properly signed and witnessed, and conforms in other respects to all legal requirements, is valid. So is a will written with a pencil, or a will which is printed, engraved, or lithographed. The courts have long agreed in holding that a statute which requires a document to be in writing is satisfied by a printed document, the words "in writing" being construed to mean simply "not verbal." The fact that a will is in the handwriting of the testator will furnish evidence of its authenticity, but it being admitted that a will is signed and witnessed as the statute directs, the fact that it is a type-written document will not invalidate it. THE DATE FROM WHICH A WILL SPEAKS. A dies, leaving a will regularly drawn up. One of the heirs, a son (by A's second wife) and unmarried, whom we will designate as B, was very sick at the time of A's death. A's will is not yet probated. B died a few days ago, leaving a will dated about three years ago, which bequeaths the bulk of his estate to the children of his sister. A married twice; the second wife and children of both wives are living. Inasmuch as B died before A's will was probated, does B's will cover the property left him by A? The children of A's first wife contend that B's will covered only his own personal property; that his share in A's will should revert to the heirs of A, share and share alike. B made it known that he thought it necessary to make a new will, but his early death precluded his doing it. lished, that settles the title to the property disposed of by the will, but not the date at which the title devolves. The latter date is always the day of the testator's death. MEANING OF THE WORD "HEIRS." A testator gives and devises to his children, B, C, D, E, and F, respectively, and "to their heirs and assigns forever," certain property. He also gives and devises certain other property to a trus tee, as he says, "to hold in trust for the exclusive use and benefit of my son, G, during his natural life, and from and after his death I give and devise the property held in trust to my heirs that said son, G, share and share alike." The following shall be living at the time of the decease of my are descendants of the testator at the time of the death of G: Four children, one grandchild of deceased parents, and one great-grandchi d also of deceased parents and grandparents. How is the estate to be divided? REPLY.-The word "heirs" in a will in this State, when used in connection with the disposition of real property, means those relatives who would be entitled to succeed to the real property of an intestate. When applied to the succes sion of personal property, the word means the same as "next of kin," those relatives, that is. who would succeed to the personal property of one dying intestate. Where the surving relatives are such as our correspondent describes, the property left in trust is to be disposed of in the same manner, whether it is real estate or personal property. The heirs in either case, in tuis instance, are the four children, the grandchild, ard the great-grandchild; and they are to take, as the will provides, "share and share alike." LAPSING OF LEGACIES. A makes a will leaving all of his property, res and personal, to his son B. B dies, leaving a widow and several children. After the death of RA dies, not having changed his will meanwhile. What disposition does the law make of his prop erty in such a case? REPLY. If A makes a will leaving part of his property to B, and then dies, the property so left to B becomes his at the death of A, though the probate of the will may be delayed for a longer or shorter time. A will speaks from the death of the testator, and not from the date of its probate. If Bafterward dies leaving a will which purports to dispose of all his property, or specifically of that left to him by A, the will is valid for this REPLY.-The common-law rule was that a legasy purpose. The property left to B by A became the was extinguished by the death of the legater property of B upon the death of A, notwith- during the lifetime of the testator. This is now standing any delay in the probate. When a wil law in this State except that it is modified by is admitted to probate and its validity estab-statute as follows: "Whenever any estate, real or personal, shall be devised or bequeathed to a child or other descendant of the testator, and such a legatee or devisee shall die during the lifetime of the testator, leaving a child or other descendant who shall survive such testator, such devise or legacy shall not lapse, but the property so devised or bequeathed shall vest in the surviving child or other descendant of the legatee or devisee, as if the devisee or legatee had survived the testator, and had died intestate." Applied to the case put by our correspondent, this statute vests the property of A, at his death, in the children of B. TONNAGE OF MERCHANT MARINES. Miscellaneous. The net tonnage of the steam and sailing vessels of over 100 tons each of the leading maritime countries of the world, as recorded in Lloyd's Register for 1897-98, is as follows: United Kingdom, 12,587,904 tons; the United States, 2,448,677; Germany, 2,113,981; Norway, 1,643,217; France, 1,179,515; the British Colonies, 1,077,408 tons. These are all of the countries having more than a million tons. WEALTH OF VARIOUS NATIONS. Mulhall, a competent authority, basing his conclusions upon the most recent and reliable official reports, estimates the wealth of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, in 1895, as follows, the figures in each case representing millions of pounds sterling: United Kingdom, 11,806; France, 9,690; the United States, 16,350. The wealth of the United Kingdom is distributed among the constituent countries thus, the figures being in millions of pounds sterling: England. 10.062; Scotland, 1,094; Ireland, 650. BEGINNINGS OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES. Mr. Swank, in his history of iron manufacture, gives 1728 as the earliest date at which he can be certain that steel was manufactured in this country. As to an attempt to manufacture it in the previous century, he says: "Bishop states that the first suggestion of the manufacture of steel in the colonies was made in 1655, when John Tucker, of Southold, on Long Island, informed the general court of New Haven 'of his abilitie and intendment to make steele there or in some other plantation in the jurisdiction, if he may have some things granted he therein propounds.' In October, 1655, and in May, 1656, special | privileges were granted to the petitioner, but we are not told whether he ever made any steel or not." As to its manufacture in 1728, he says: "Connecticut was among the first of the colonies to make steel. In 1728 Samuel Higley, of Simsbury, in Hartford County, and Joseph Dewey, of Hebron, in Hartford County, represented to the legislature that the first-named had, with great pains and cost, found out and obtained a curious art, by which to convert, change, or transmute common iron into good steel, sufficient for any use, and was the very first that had ever performed such an operation in America.' The certificates of several smiths who had made a trial of the steel and pronounced it good were produced. He and Joseph Dewey were granted the exclusive right for ten years of practicing the business or trade of steelmaking.'" THE SINGLE-TAX THEORY. Please give a brief summary of the principle and method of application of the "Single-Tax theory. REPLY.-Henry George's definition of the single tax is this: "A term which has come into use since 1887 to denote the proposal, theory, or movement which aims at the collection of all public revenues from one single source, what in political economy is termed 'rent,' the value of land itself, irrespective of the value of any improvement in or on it; or, to adopt another form of statement, a proposal or movement which aims at the appropriation of economic rent, the unearned increment of land values,' to public uses by means of taxation." All other taxes are to be abolished, and a tax is to be levied on the value of land (not including improvements) which shall be just equal to the amount which the landowner is now enabled to collect as rent of the bare land, without improvements. UNAUTHORIZEd Opening of a LETTER. A letter addressed to John Smith, Esq., care of W. J. & Co., 10- Street, New York City, is received at the address given and opened by W. J. & Co., they claiming that they had a perfect right to open any letter addressed in their care. Is not this a direct violation of the postal laws? Was it not the duty of W. J. & Co., if they received the letter, to hold it unopened for the party to whom it was addressed, and was not their only choice in the matter that of refusing to receive the letter and having it returned either to the Dead-Letter Office or to the sender? REPLY.-If a letter is addressed to John Smith, care of W. J. & Co., it is proper that it should be delivered to W. J. & Co. When it is once so delivered, the postal authorities have nothing further to do with it, and W. J. & Co. cannot deal with it in such a way as to offend against the postal laws. But if they open such a letter, without permission, they may be guilty of a punishable offense under the laws of the State in which the act is done. It is provided in this State, for example, by section 642 of the Penal Code, that "a person who wilfully and without authority opens or reads, or causes to be opened or read, a sealed letter, telegram, or private paper, *** is guilty of a misdemeanor." Merely to have a letter sent in care of a person does not confer authority upon that person to open it. LIMITED LIABILITY OF VESSEL-OWNERS. Are we liable for the whole of an unpaid bill against a small vessel or which we own only oneeighth? We have no connection with the vessel as agent or consignee, or in any other capacity than as part owner, as noted above. REPLY.-Ordinarily any member of a partner ship may be held liable for the whole of a debt owing by his firm. But it has been provided by an Act of Congress that "the individual liability of a shipowner shall be limited to the proportion of any or all debts and liabilities that his individual share of the vessel bears to the whole; and the aggregate liabilities of all the owners of a vessel on account of the same shall not exceed the value of such vessel and freight pend.ng." Under this law our correspondents are exempt from liability for more than their proportionate share of the debt, unless they personally made the contract or adopted it as their own after it was made. RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO ADVERTISE. If a firm fails and makes a compromise with its creditors, and Mr. A buys goods of the firm, can A use said firm's name for advertising the goods he bought without permission from said firm? REPLY.-If A buys goods from a firm, which he undertakes to sell again, he is not entitled to advertise in any manner likely to give the impression that the sale is being made by the firm, or in its interest. But the origin or the source of supply of the goods he is selling he is not bound to conceal. It is a fact that he has obtained his goods from a certain firm. It is a fact, the general knowledge of which is not likely to damage the firm, and it is a fact that A has a right to divulge if he chooses. RIGHT OF ONE TO ADVERTISE AS TO" ANOTHER. SUCCESSOR A and B dissolve partnership. They own a building and some other property. They have a cash store and a credit store in the same building. The cash store is run under a different name from the credit, although they really belong to one firm. A and B dissolve; A transfers his entire interest in the cash and credit store to B for a certain sum. Bin turn sells the cash store to A, who runs it still as a cash store, while B retains his credit store. B sold the cash store to A just as though a stranger had bought it. B does business as B, successor to A & B." Now, the point is, has A the right to do the same, as A&B"? My opinion is that he has not the right, as he sold his interest in the cash store to B, who, in turn, resells it to him, just the same as if a stranger had bought it. successor REPLY.-Any one who buys out the business of another, whether the purchaser is a former partner or an entire stranger, is entitled to advertise himself as successor to the seller. The purchaser of A's business, who takes the business as it stood and continues it, is, in fact, A's successor, and that is a fact which he is not bound to conceal. The partners A and B may own two separate businesses, as in the present case, and may sell one business to one person and the other to a different person. In that case the purchaser of each business, whether he is one of the partners or a stranger, may advertise himself as successor to A & B in that particular business, because he is such successor, and in buying the business he has bought the right to call himself such. In the case our correspondent puts, however, it does not appear that both A and B will wish to hold themselves out as "successor to A & B." Our correspondent says that the two concerns were run under different names. If one was run under the name of A & B and the other under another name, then the purchaser of each has a right simply to describe himself as "successor to " the firm name under which the business he has bought was formerly run. DEFINITION OF GOOD-WILL Kindly tell me the literal meaning of the term good-will," so generally used in business circles. Is there ever more than one construction put upon it, and, if so, what may that be? is REPLY.-We believe the term "good-will ' always used in practically the same sense. Story acquired by an establishment beyond the mere defines it as "the advantage or benefit which is employed therein, in consequence of the general value of the capital stock, funds, or property public patronage and encouragement which it receives from constant or habitual customers on account of its local position or common celebrity or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from any other accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices." Lord Eldon has defined it more briefly as being "nothing more than the probability that the old customers will resort to the old place." In short, it is the chance of being able to keep the business which has already been established. VALUATION OF GOOD-WILL. A, B, and C are in partnership, each sharing alike. B dies, which of course dissolves the concern. The assets of the concern consist largely in good-will. The point in question is, how is the value of this to be arrived at, assuming that the heirs of B do not wish to continue their interest? Could the value of it be computed, taking the past profits as a basis, or is there any fixed rule or precedent by which the said heirs of B could be guided so that the matter could be settled equitably? What redress would the heirs of B have in case the surviving partners did not agree with them? REPLY.-There is no fixed rule by which to determine the value of a good-will in all cases. One source of the difficulty in attempting to establish any fixed rule to apply in all cases lies in the fact that good-will includes such different and widely varying elements of value in different instances. Sometimes it includes a right to use an old and well-known name; sometimes it carries with it a practical monopoly of an important branch of trade; and sometimes it includes nothing more than a right to continue the business at the old stand. In the case our correspondent puts, the right to continue business under the old name probably continues in the survivors without any obligation on their part to pay anything for the privilege to the estate of the deceased. This is the case with most of the partnerships transacting business under the laws of this State. In any case, it is necessary, in the first place, to ascertain accurately what is included, in the particular case, under the term good-will. Then the most satisfactory method of arriving at its value in most cases is by offering it for sale after due advertisement. If, for any reason, this plan is not advisable in any given case, the best way to arrive at the value of good-will, as in the case of real estate or any other property, is to have it appraised by experts. They should be informed as to the net earnings of the business during the last few years, and their own knowledge of the trade will enable them to estimate more accurately than any one else could do it what proportion of these earnings represents the ordinary profits of the business, and what portion is to be set down to the credit of that special advantage now to be valued as good-will. If the matter cannot otherwise be amicably adjusted, either party to the contro versy may ask the assistance of a court in appointing appraisers and seeing that their work is fairly and properly done. INDEX. In Two Parts: Foreign Countries and United States. FOREIGN COUNTRIES. Abyssinia: coinage, 340 railroads, 127 FOREIGN COUNTRIES. For UNITED STATES, see pages 618-624. Aden: area, population, ruler, 141 Adrar: area, population, ruler, 143 Africa, 79-84. See also separate countries of Con- commerce with principal countries, 119, 120, 139 debts, public, 138 imports and exports, total, and per capita, 139 sugar, 4:0 wheat, 444 Algeria: agriculture, 84 area, 84, 142 -commerce, foreign, 84, 119, 120 - expenditures, fiscal, 84 imports and exports, 84, 119, 120 population, and occupation of, 84, 142 post-office, 132 railroads, 127 revenue, fiscal, 84 - shipping, 84 - telegraphs, 133 wheat crop, 444 wine, 131 See also AFRICA; FRANCE Alsace-Lorraine : beer product. 18 railroads, 127 America. See specific countries Angola: railroads, 127 - telegraphs, 133 Anguilla. See WEST INDIES (BRITISH), 104, 105 Argentine Republic Continued area, 106, 144 banking, 107, 108 coinage, 340 coins, gold and silver, 134; value of, 342 debt, public, 106, 138 duties, import, collected, 131 - expenditures, fiscal, 106, 140 fiscal affairs, 106, 140 - president, 144 railroads, 127 revenue, fiscal, 106, 140 - weights, 257 - wheat, 444 wine, 131 - wool, 416 |