charter and regulations, an institution established for scientific and not for charitable purposes, its object being to enable persons interested in geographical research to obtain information as to recent discoveries. There is, however, no school attached to it, nor is tuition any part of its scheme. It is a voluntary association in the nature of a club, supported by voluntary contributions, and may cease to exist by reason of the death of all its members. There is, therefore, nothing tending to a perpetuity in its constitution, neither is there any educational trust affecting it; and a gift to this society cannot be considered a gift to a "general public use," as charity has been defined to be— 1 Jarman on Wills, 192, 3rd ed., nor for "the advancement of education and learning" within Whicker v. Hume, 7 H.L. Cas. 124; s. c. 28 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 396. This society is, therefore, entitled to be paid its legacy as well out of the mixed as out of the pure personalty.—They also referred to Weld's History of the Royal Society, by Thompson v. Shakespear, 1 De Gex, Carne v. Long, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 75; s. c. 29 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 503. The Attorney General v. the Haberdashers' Company, 1 Myl. & K. 420; s. c. 2 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 33. Morice v. the Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399; s. c. 10 Ibid. 522. Mr. Bagshawe, for the Royal Society. The legacy to this society is payable out of the mixed as well as the pure personalty, and the act of 9 Geo. 2. c. 36. does not apply. This society is not a charitable institution; it has no endowment, being merely allowed the use of rooms rent-free; and it is, like the Royal Geographical Society, supported by the voluntary subscriptions of its own members. He also contended that these societies were entitled to have the whole personal estate of the testator (in which the proceeds of the real estate in Madeira should be included) applied in payment of their legacies in priority to the residuary legatees, and cited 2 Jarman on Wills, 573, 3rd ed. Bench v. Biles, 4 Mad. 187. Mr. Greene and Mr. Alfred Bailey, for the Marylebone School for Girls and the Albert Orphan Asylum, contended that these were charitable institutions properly so called, and were therefore entitled to be paid out of the pure personalty in priority to the Royal Society and Royal Geographical Society, which were not charitable institutions. They maintained that this was not a case of marshalling, and referred to The Philanthropic Society v. Kemp, 4 Sturge v. Dimsdale, 6 Beav. 642. Robinson v. Geldard, 3 Mac. & G. 735. Mr. Davey, for the Royal Humane Society, argued that it was not a charitable institution, but that if it was the proceeds of the real estate in Madeira, not being subject to the law of Mortmain, must be considered as pure personalty, and be applied pari passu with the pure personalty in payment of the charitable legacies. [STUART, V.C. said he was clearly of opinion that the Royal Humane Society was a charity, and that the proceeds of the real estate in Madeira were applicable in payment of the charitable bequests.] Mr. Bacon, in reply. The proceeds of the Madeira estate are not primarily liable to the payment of the charitable legacies, but they savour of the realty, and must be applied rateably in payment also of the debts, funeral expenses and costs— Tempest v. Tempest, 7 De Gex M. & STUART, V.C.-The questions that have been argued in this case are some of them of very great difficulty. The first question is, whether or not the legacies to the Royal Society and the Royal Geographical Society are legacies to institutions which can within the contemplation of this Court be considered charitable, and I am of opinion that they are. It seems to me that the case of Whicker v. Hume, and the other cases relied upon, have very little application to the present case, and that very little can be derived either from the propositions of law cited or from the judgment in Whicker v. Hume to assist the decision in the present case. But Sir John Leach, Sir William Grant and Lord Eldon have used expressions that I think entirely govern the present case. Sir John Leach, in the case of The Attorney General v. Heelis (1), with his usual precision, said, “I am of opinion that funds supplied from the gift of the Crown, or from the gift of the legislature, or from private gifts, for any legal public or general purpose, are charitable funds to be administered by Courts of equity." Now, the Royal Geographical Society seems to me to be a body of persons having an individual character who have their funds supplied from private gifts for a "legal public or general purpose." I conceive that the Royal Society and the Royal Geographical Society essentially, from their constitution, are composed of individuals associated for a purpose public and general, and assist that purpose by the contribution of their own private funds, and when any other individual gives to the fund of that society, it seems to me that he gives for a public and general purpose within the definition of Sir John Leach. I need not stop to read the observations of Sir William Grant and Lord Eldon in the case of Morice v. the Bishop of Durham, which are entirely, but less precisely, within the language of Sir John Leach. Therefore my opinion is, that the gifts made to the Royal Geographical Society and the Royal Society by the testator must be considered as gifts which, in the contemplation of the law, are for a charitable purpose. When the testator therefore said that "all the said charitable legacies are to be paid out of my pure personal estate," he gave a direction relating to the next question, which seems to be one of very considerable difficulty and importance. I conceive that his direction to pay these legacies out of his pure personal estate was given for a purpose, and that the testator, by the language he has used, has, just as clearly as the testatrix in Robinson v. Geldard, manifested an intention to benefit those charitable legatees by this direction. If not, the direction was nugatory, because it said no more than what would have been done by the law, whether it was said or not, because nothing beyond the pure personal estate could be applicable to pay those legacies. Therefore my opinion is, that the pure personal estate is first of all applicable to pay those legatees in priority to all other legatees. In But I go further; I think that the language manifests an intention to pay those legacies in priority to anything else out of the pure personal estate. Robinson v. Geldard the language was very nearly the same; and I understand that Lord Truro by his decision in that case, which reversed the decision of Lord Langdale, made a decree which exempted the legacies to charitable purposes from bearing their proportion of any demand in respect of costs of the suit or for debts of the testator. In the case of Tempest v. Tempest it was different, and Lord Cranworth, who reversed the decree of Wood, V.C., takes care to say that he rests his decision on the ground that the testator had not expressed any intention to release pure personalty from its legal liability. Now, I think this direction was given with the express purpose of exempting the pure personal estate from its ordinary liability, and that it was intended to give a preference to the charitable legacies. The words in that case were a mere direction that the charitable bequest should be paid in precedence to the other pecuniary legacies. The testatrix had defined the extent of precedence, and defining it to that extent there was, in the opinion of Lord Cranworth (very justly formed, if I may venture to say so) nothing to authorize the Court in that case to exempt the pure personal estate from its ordinary contribution to the costs of the suit, the funeral expenses and the debts. But in this case there is an undefined priority given, in my opinion, to the charity legacies. I find it not confined to giving priority merely to the pecuniary legacies. I think the testator intended that the pure personal estate, out of which is alone the charity legacies should be paid should be primarily applied to the purpose of their payment, and until that purpose satisfied it should be applied for no other testamentary purposes. The other question as to the real estate in Madeira I have already disposed of. I entertain no doubt whatever in a case where a testator dies entitled to landed property in a foreign country that, in the contemplation of this Court that land is not real assets, and not within the peculiarity of the law of England in the distribution of assets, which favours so much the rights of heirs and devisees as against creditors. I think it must go like the pure personal estate to pay these charity legacies as the purpose to which it is primarily applicable. But then it may be said, if it is personal estate it cannot be considered as pure personal estate, and the utmost that the charity legatees can say is, that they will take their proportions with other legatees. But my opinion is that these proceeds are more in the character of pure personal estate than impure personal estate, because I am not prepared to hold that land in a foreign country which has no character of real estate can be considered as impure personal estate, for this reason: we consider impure personal estate is that (leasehold property for instance) which partakes in some degree of the character of real estate; but, if I am right in my view of the property at Madeira considered as assets upon the distinction between real and personal assets, I can find nothing in it to connect it with the character of real assets, to make me say that it is impure personal estate, or other than personal estate to be administered like the rest. Therefore, that is primarily applicable to pay the charity legacies. After the charity legacies, if there is enough to satisfy them, of course what remains must be applied in the ordinary course of administration, for the testator has said nothing else. As to the costs of the suit which was instituted after the testator's death, to set aside the fraudulent settlement which he had made of his property, I have already indicated my opinion that the property recovered in that suit, whether real or personal, whether pure or impure personalty, being recovered in that suit, must bear the NEW SERIES, 38.-CHANC. costs which were involved in its recovery; and that there should be an apportionment of the costs of the suit between the property of the different creditors, whatever that may be, so that if there were pure personal estate and impure personal estate recovered in that suit, there should be an apportionment, which should include the pure personal estate in the costs of that suit. His Honour added that that suit having been necessary before the property subject to the settlement could be made assets, the expense of making it assets must be borne rateably by the property which was now found to be assets, otherwise the whole costs of that suit would come out of the pure personal estate and might defeat the charitable legatees. Those legatees must submit to bear that portion of the costs of that suit to which the pure personalty applied. His Honour also stated that he included the Royal Humane Society among the charitable legatees, and that as such legatees had swept away the whole pure personal estate, and kept it free of the general costs of the present suit, his Honour could give them no costs thereof, and that each of them, whether parties to this suit or not, must bear their own costs. Will-Power to Appoint Rents to Wife for Life-Trust for the Benefit of Husband. A testator gave real and leasehold property to H. M. E. for life, and empowered him to appoint the rents thereof after his death to his wife for life. The testator bequeathed his residuary personalty upon "the like trusts for the benefit of H. M. E. and his issue as were thereinbefore declared concerning the real and leasehold estates":—Held, that H. M. E. took a power to appoint the income of the residuary personalty to his wife for life. K? A will authorized investments in “shares of any established railway in full operation." Held, that investments in shares in railways within the United Kingdom, established by act of parliament, were authorized. SPECIAL CASE.—Edmund Bushell, by his will, dated the 21st of September, 1853, devised and bequeathed all his real and leasehold estates unto his trustees, their heirs, executors and administrators, upon trust (but as to a portion of the estates, after the expiration of certain life interests) to pay the rents and profits of such estates unto, or permit the same to be received by, the testator's nephew, Henry Martyn Edwards, during his life; and after his death, upon trust for the children or other issue of Henry Martyn Edwards, as the latter should appoint, and in default of appointment, upon trust for the children equally, who being sons should attain twenty-one or die under that age leaving surviving issue, or who being daughters should attain that age or be previously married. The will then contained a hotchpot clause in the usual form, and then proceeded as follows: "And I empower my said nephew, by deed or will, to appoint that all or any part of the rents and annual income of the aforesaid trust premises shall immediately from and after his decease be paid to any wife who may survive him, for her life or any less period." The will then contained, among other provisions, a declaration that if Henry Martyn Edwards should be living at the expiration of eighteen years from the date of the will (which event did not happen), the trusts therein before declared concerning the testator's real and leasehold estates should cease, and Henry Martyn Edwards should become absolutely entitled to such estates. The testator then bequeathed his residuary personal estate to his trustees, upon trust to get in such parts thereof as should not consist of money, or securities for, or investments of money, and to stand possessed of his personal estate and the investments thereof, upon trust, as to one moiety thereof, to pay a mortgage debt and a bond debt respectively owing by Henry Martyn Edwards, and as to the residue of such moiety to stand possessed thereof upon trusts, which were declared in the following words, viz., "upon the like trusts for the benefit of my said nephew, Henry Martyn Edwards, and his issue as are hereinbefore declared with respect to my real and leasehold estates, and with the like provision for the determination of the trust at the expiration of the said period of eighteen years from the date hereof, and for the absolute assignment and transfer of the same moiety to the said Henry Martyn Edwards if he should be then living." The will then, among other things, empowered the trustees to invest the moneys arising from the testator's personal estate, which should not be wanted for any of the purposes of his will, in or upon any of the parliamentary stocks or public funds of Great Britain, or at interest upon government or real or leasehold securities in England or Wales, or on the bond or bonds of any corporate body authorized by parliament to raise money on bond, or in the purchase of shares in any established railway in full operation. The testator died on the 23rd of October, 1856. Henry Martyn Edwards died on the 19th of November, 1866, leaving a will dated the 7th of September, 1863, whereby, in exercise of the powers given to him by the will of Edmund Bushell, he appointed that the rents and annual income of the real and leasehold estates, subject to the trusts of the same will, and also the interest, dividends and annual income of the securities representing so much of the personal estate bequeathed by the same will, as was thereby made subject to trusts for the benefit of himself and his children and other issue and his wife, should be paid to his wife, the plaintiff, Helen Edwards, during her life. It appeared that the moiety of the residuary personal estate of the testator, Edmund Bushell, bequeathed upon trusts in favour of Henry Martyn Edwards and his children was in part represented by 100 half shares in the Ulster Railway Company, and 50 shares in the Northern Counties Railway Company, both of which railways are situate in Ireland. The questions were: First, whether under the will of Edmund Bushell, Henry Martyn Edwards had power to appoint by will to the plaintiff a life or any other and what interest in the moiety of the residuary personal estate of the testator, Edmund Bushell, by his will bequeathed upon trust for Henry Martyn Edwards and his children. Secondly, whether under the same will investments of the testator Edmund Bushell's personal estate upon the shares of established railway companies were authorized. G. protested against what had taken place, but did not repudiate the transaction to S. On the contrary, he retained possession of the transfer which had been handed to him, and deposited it with the secretary of the company as a security for the amount which was placed to his debit in the manner above mentioned. He, however, refused, when requested by S, to register the transfer. A suit for specific performance of the contract for purchase was accordingly instituted by S. Mr. Kay and Mr. Martineau, for the against G. and W.:-Held, that G. was not, plaintiffs, cited In re Palmer, 3 Hurls. & N. 26. Mr. Druce and Mr. Ferrers, for the defendants. GIFFARD, V.C.-It is clear that a power of this kind is for the benefit of the legatee. The answer to the first question must be in the affirmative. The Vice Chancellor directed the second question to be amended by confining it to shares of railways in the United Kingdom established by act of parliament, and said that the answer to the question, as amended, would be in the affirmative. Solicitors--Messrs. Cunliffe & Beaumont, agents for Messrs. Keightley & Banning, Liverpool, for plaintiffs; Messrs. Maynard, Son & Co., agents for Messrs. Johns & Johns, Belfast, for defendant. } LORDS JUSTICES. SHEPHERD v. GILLESPIE. A broker on the Stock Exchange, by order of S, sold for the account some shares in a company to another broker, who bought them on the instructions of W. On the settling-day W. instructed his broker that G. was the real purchaser, and directed him to have the shares transferred to G. A transfer to G. was accordingly obtained from S. In fact, the instructions so given to his broker by W. were without G's authority; but G. was afterwards informed of the use which had been made of his name, and he was also told that his account with the company, of which both he and W. were directors, had been debited with the price of the shares. under the circumstances, at liberty to deny that he was the purchaser; and as the company was being wound up, he was ordered to indemnify S. against the calls which were being made upon the shares. This was an appeal from the decree of Stuart, V.C., reported 37 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 335. The facts are fully set out in the former report. The following is a summary of such facts. The plaintiff, a registered owner of 250 shares in the JointStock Discount Company (Limited), sold them to a broker on the Stock Exchange in the ordinary manner, the name of the broker's principal being, as is usual, undisclosed. On the settling-day, the broker informed the plaintiff that his principal was the defendant J. F. Wilkinson, but that J. F. Wilkinson had requested that the shares should not be transferred to him, but to the defendant Gillespie. The deeds of transfer were accordingly made out in Gillespie's name, and were executed by the plaintiff and delivered to the broker, who paid the plaintiff the agreed price of the shares, viz., 1,750l. for 200 of them, and 4377. 10s. for the remaining 50. The transfers were delivered to Gillespie, who retained them. The evidence was conflicting as to the true relative position of Wilkinson and Gillespie; but the plaintiff contended they were both liable to indemnify him from the calls and responsibilities attaching to the ownership of the shares. And, inasmuch as neither had taken any steps to procure a registration of the transfers, and thereby the shares were left standing in the plaintiff's name, the present suit was instituted to compel performance of the contract of purchase, and for indemnity. The Vice Chancellor having decided that |