life as against the remainderman, but for the benefit of the estate generally." I must follow the principle of these cases, and must take my law from them, if they are inconsistent (as I do not think they are) with Johnson v. Moore and Ibbotson v. Elam, cited against them; and the consequence is, in adjusting the rights of the tenant for life and those in remainder, it must be on the principle of ascertaining the value of the property at the death of the testator, and giving the tenant for life 51. per cent. interest from that date. In this case strictly 41. per cent. only would have been allowed; but 51. per cent. has been given in chambers, and has not been objected to, and will therefore stand. Declare, that the widow is not entitled to receive for her own benefit the proportion of profit arisen since the death of the testator to his estate from the sale, freight or earnings of the ships, or from the sale of or the dividends on the shares; and declare, that the moneys arising from the sale of the ships and shares, and the sums accruing from the freight, earnings and dividends of the same respectively formed part of the capital of the testator's estate. 'a new method of manufacturing pearls or beads,' communicated to the said C. E. Brooman from abroad." The bill contained no further or other allegation of the novelty of the invention. The plaintiffs were the assignees of Brooman and their licensees. Mr. Amphlett, Mr. Theodore Aston and Mr. Dundas Gardiner, in answer to an objection raised by the defendant's counsel, that the bill contained no averment of the novelty of the invention, argued that such an averment was unnecessary. The letters patent in themselves in terms stated that the invention was a new one. [The VICE CHANCELLOR said that, even assuming those terms to be true, they did not shew that the invention had not been before communicated to a hundred persons in this country. He did not recollect ever having seen a bill in a case like this, which did not contain an averment of the novelty of the invention.] Mr. Tripp, for the defendant, argued that without such an averment the pleadings were defective. The letters patent did not in themselves decide the novelty of the invention. Under the old practice, the question of novelty was frequently determined upon an issue sent to a Court of common law, and such an issue could have been directed only upon the statements in the pleadings Walburn v. Ingilby, 1 Myl. & K. 61. JAMES, V.C. (without calling for a reply) said, the plaintiffs had given evidence of the novelty of the invention, which satisfied him that it was an entirely new invention introduced from France, and never before seen or known in this country. It was also an invention of great commercial success, and the extent to which it had been used by the plaintiffs was proof of its great public utility. Mr. Tripp had relied upon the insufficiency of the pleadings, and had urged that the absence of any averment of the novelty of the invention was fatal to the plaintiffs' bill. But the objection that the invention was not a novel one was an objection which the defendant ought to raise by his answer, in which it was open to him positively to deny the novelty of the invention. He had doubted at first whether the averment of the novelty of the invention 4 G was not necessary to support a bill for the infringement of a patent; but on looking at a short form of a declaration at law for damages for the infringement of a patent, he found that it did not contain any allegation of the novelty of the invention, and accordingly he thought the bill sufficient without it; but, even if he had thought otherwise, he would not have allowed the defendant to have taken advantage of a mere technical objection of that sort, but should have directed the hearing to stand over until the defect had been remedied. He was, however, of opinion that the bill was sufficient, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a perpetual injunction. B. induced R. to advance to him a sum of money, representing to him that it was to be advanced for the benefit of two persons, both of whom he stated to be men of good means, and parties to a bill of exchange held by him; and B gave to R. a memorandum that he held the bill upon trust as to half of the proceeds for R. The bill of exchange being dishonoured at maturity, he filed a bill against B. to recover the money he had advanced. Upon demurrer by B. stating the above facts, and alleging all the representations to be false,-Held, that the allegations of fraud gave jurisdiction to a Court of equity notwithstanding the concurrent jurisdiction at law. Demurrer. The allegations in the bill were as follows: The defendant George Bolton having been for some time intimate with the plaintiff, James Ramshire, in the latter part of 1868 induced him to advance a sum of 2371. 10s., by discounting a bill of exchange, to which two persons named Lawley and Ripley were principal parties, although it did not appear clearly which The of the two drew upon the other. defendant assured the plaintiff of the solvency of both of these parties, and particularly that Lawley had recently had a large sum left to him by the will of a person named in a newspaper produced by the defendant to the plaintiff. On the faith of these representations the plaintiff advanced the sum of 2377. 10s., and received from the defendant a memorandum to the following effect: "I acknowledge to hold in my possession an acceptance of F. Lawley, one-half of which belongs to Mr. James Ramshire (the plaintiff) and the other half to myself. (Signed) "George Bolton." The bill of exchange was dishonoured at maturity, and the bill prayed for a declaration that the defendant was personally liable to repay the money so advanced, and for an order accordingly. The bill charged that "the defendant was in fact well aware before and at the time of the plaintiff's paying to him the said sum of 237. 108. that the bill would not be met, and that the said Lawley and Ripley were at the time without available means to meet the bill of exchange," and that “at the time the defendant induced the plaintiff to advance the money on the representation that it was intended to be advanced to Ripley and Lawley, the defendant never intended so to advance it to them, and in fact never did so." The bill then went on to charge that the defendant was specially cognizant of heavy liabilities of both Ripley and Lawley, and that his representations that they were men of property were untrue; that the whole transaction was a scheme of the defendant to enable Ripley and Lawley to pay off debts due from them to the defendant; that the whole or a considerable part of the sum advanced was retained by the defendant for his own use; and that the bill of exchange, if there really was any such bill, was held by the defendant without any consideration, and was to his knowledge worthless and void, and not enforceable against the drawer or acceptor thereof. The defendant demurred for want of equity. Mr. Glasse and Mr. Cotterell, for the demurrer. This is a mere money demand, for which the remedy is at law. MALINS, V.C. [after stating the circumstances as admitted by the demurrer, and concluding therefrom that there was a sufficient allegation of fraud] said: The bill alleges a case which unquestionably entitles the plaintiff to recover this money from the defendant. I was for some time of opinion that the case should go to a jury; and no doubt the distinction is very fine as to what cases can be settled in this court and what in a court of law. If a man says when he borrows money that he can pay it at a future time, when he knows he cannot, that cannot be settled in this court; but if he says "the money will be secured by such and such a good security," knowing the man giving the security to be insolvent and the security void, that is a fraud which entitles a party to maintain a suit in this court. In Pasley v. Freeman (1) A. induced B. to advance money to C, knowing that C. ought not to be trusted, and the Court of Queen's Bench held that on that statement B. was entitled to recover the money. But is he entitled to recover in a court of equity? In Colt v. Woollaston the Master of the Rolls says, "It is no objection that the parties have their remedy at law, and may bring an action for moneys had and received for the plaintiff's own use; for in cases of fraud the Court of equity has a concurrent jurisdiction with the common law, matter of fraud being the great subject of relief here." In Burrowes v. Lock (2), which was a case of misrepresentation, an objection was taken that the remedy was at law, but Sir W. Grant, following Lord Eldon in Evans v. Bicknell (3), held that cases of misrepresentation were more fit for equity than for law, and at least that there was a concurrent jurisdiction. Can anything be more (1) 3 Term Rep. 51. (2) 10 Ves. 470. (3) 6 Ibid. 173. gross than the misrepresentation stated here? The plaintiff is told that two persons are solvent and that there was a consideration for the transaction, when the defendant who made the statement knew that they were not solvent and that there was no consideration. If these statements be proved to be true, it is clear that the defendant must have a decree against him, and that this is a case which is cognizable in this court. Cridland v. Lord de Mauley (4) is precisely to the same point. Blair v. Bromley seems to go on another ground. St. Aubyn v. Smart (5) is entirely on allfours with this case, and was confirmed on appeal. Slim v. Croucher (6) was a case of innocent mistake, in which the plaintiff filed a bill on the ground of misrepresentation, and Stuart, V.C. made a decree in his favour, which was confirmed on appeal. That was precisely the same as this case, except that that was an innocent misrepresentation, while here there is a wilful and gross mis-statement; that is to say, the defendant has obtained money from the plaintiff by false representations. No doubt if a man obtains money by false pretences he may be criminally prosecuted, but that does not prevent the plaintiff from having his remedy in this court The bill therefore rests upon the ordinary and firmlyestablished jurisdiction of this Court; where money is obtained by false representation, that is fraud, a ground upon which the jurisdiction of this Court and the Courts of law are concurrent. The demurrer must be overruled with costs, the defendant to have a month to answer. Solicitors-Messrs. Fitch & Fitch, for plaintiff; Messrs. G. S. & H. Brandon, for defendant. (4) 1 De Gex & Sm. 459; s. c. 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 190. (5) Law Rep. 5 Eq. 183; 3 Ch. 646. (6) 1 De Gex, F. & J. 518; s. c. 29 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 273. The testator, Richard Bowers, who died in 1856, by his will devised and bequeathed all his residuary real and personal estate to William Bowers, Henry Bowers and John Haigh, on trust to get in his personal estate and then to divide the whole amongst his four children, William, Henry and Richard Bowers and Elizabeth Haigh, share and share alike, as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants, with benefit of survivorship in case any of them should die without issue, and in case any of his said children should die leaving any child or children, then he directed that the share, whether original or accruing, of him, her or them so dying should go, belong and be divided between such children in equal shares, if more than one, and if only one then the whole to such one and only child; and he appointed his trustees executors of his will. All the testator's four children survived him and were living at the filing of this bill. Three of them, Richard, William and Elizabeth, had issue living; Henry was married, but had never had a child. This bill was filed for the administration of the testator's estate, the question being whether the four children of the testator having survived him took absolute interests in their shares, or life estates only, with remainder to their children, if any, and in default of children, to the survivors or survivor of themselves. Mr. Shapter and Mr. Vincent, for the plaintiff, supported the first view. Mr. J. Pearson, for grandchildren, referred to Farthing v. Allen, 2 Madd. 310, 2 Jarman on Wills, 730, in favour of the second construction. Mr. Whitworth, in the same interest, cited Woodburne v. Woodburne, 3 De Gex, Gosling v. Townshend, 17 Beav. 245. Mr. Hardy and Mr. Humphrey, for the trustees. MALINS, V.C. said, if the gift in the will had stopped before the mention of survivorship, the gift would have been unquestionably absolute: did the succeeding words divest it of that character? That would be their effect if the expression "die without issue" meant "die at any time without issue." But this could not be the intention of the testator; his only object in using those words was to prevent a lapse in the case of a child dying in his own lifetime without issue. If therefore the words were read in that sense, the will would be clear and consistent. The contrary decision in Farthing v. Allen was irrational, and opposed to the current of modern decisions. He should follow Gee v. the Mayor of Manchester (1), Woodburne v. Woodburne, Home v. Pillans (2) and Ware v. Watson (3), which was the leading case on the subject, and hold that where there was an absolute gift to a class, followed by "benefit of survivorship in case any of them should die without issue," that survivorship was to be understood to refer to surviving the testator, and was a mere provision against lapse, which would cease to operate at the death of the testator. In the present case, therefore, all the four children, having survived the testator, had become indefeasibly and absolutely entitled to their shares. Solicitors Mr. R. Metcalfe, agent for Mr. C. C. Becke, Northampton, for plaintiff; Messrs. Bell, Brodrick & Gray, for the trustees; Messrs. Stuart & Massey, for defendants Mr. and Mrs. Haigh and their infant children. (1) 17 Q. B. Rep. 737; s. c. 21 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 242. (2) 2 Myl. & K. 15; s. c. 4 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 2. (3) 7 De Gex, M. & G. 248. Partition Suit-Plaintiffs' Title (a legal one) disputed by the Defendants-Jurisdiction- Evidence-Tithe Commutation Acts -Decree. A bill in equity for a partition ought not to be made the means of trying a title, which should properly be tried at law. But, although a plaintiff on such a bill must prove his title to that part of the property which he seeks to have divided, there is no rule that a bill for a partition cannot be maintained, if the defendant denies the title of the plaintiff, and that title is purely a legal one. If, in such a case, the partition of the property is the primary object of the bill, and the establishment of the plaintiffs' title is incidental only to that relief, the Court will make a decree for a partition, and with costs where the right to a decree is resisted. Principles on which the written statements of third parties (since deceased) are admissible as evidence, discussed. The proceedings (properly authenticated) of the Commissioners acting under the Tithe Commutation Acts, are public evidence of the matters therein stated, and to be received as such. Slade v. Barlow, ante, 369; s. c. Law Rep. 7 Eq. Ca. 296, and Bolton v. Bolton, Ibid. 298, observed upon. The plaintiffs in this suit were Walter Peter Giffard, Walter Thomas Courtenay Giffard, William Reginald Herbert and Charlotte Josephine, his wife, and James Wyley and George Holyoake. The defendants were Richard Williams and Catherine Margaret, his wife, Robert Davies and John Craddock. The bill in the suit stated that the estate known as Plas Ucha, situate in the township of Nerquis, in the parish of Mold, in the county of Flint, was about the beginning of the last century owned by a Mr. Roberts, whose daughter Helena married Peter Giffard, of Chillington, in the county of Stafford, the ancestor in title of the plaintiffs. Through that marriage the estate passed to Peter Giffard, and from him by divers acts in the law to Elizabeth Giffard, and on her decease to Thomas William Giffard, late of Chillington aforesaid, as tenant in fee simple. dated the 18th of July, 1855, devised all Thomas William Giffard, by his will, his freeholds of inheritance to the plaintiffs James Wyley and George Holyoake for the term of 1,000 years from his death, upon the trusts therein declared concerning the same, and subject thereto to the use of his first and other sons successively in tail male, with remainder to the use of his first and other sons successively in tail general, with remainder to the use of his brother the plaintiff Walter Peter Giffard for his life, with remainder to the use of the plaintiff Walter Thomas Courtenay Giffard (then the only son of the plaintiff Walter Peter Giffard) for his life, with divers remainders over (which failed), with remainder to the plaintiff Charlotte Josephine Herbert, the eldest daughter of the testator, and the wife of the plaintiff William Reginald Herbert, as tenant in tail. Thomas William Giffard died on the 21st of January, 1861. He left no son. Walter Peter Giffard was the tenant for life under the will of the estates therein comprised, including the Plas Ucha estate, and Charlotte Josephine Herbert was entitled to the first vested estate of inheritance under the will. The Plas Ucha estate had always since it had been in the family of the Giffards included one undivided moiety of a field, called Gwergloed Vadock, or Wereglodd Fudog. The plaintiffs, by their bill, shewed, in support of their claim to the moiety of the field, that the tenant of the field had always (at least since 1738) paid rent for one moiety of it to the owner for the time being of the Plas Ucha estate, and that the tenants, or some person representing them, had always attended the rent-days of those owners; that in 1771 the Plas Ucha estate was parcelled out into farms, and that upon that parcelling out one moiety of Wereglodd Fudog was assigned as a separate holding to Edward Williams, at the rent of 17. 10s. a year; that the owners of the Plas Ucha estate had from time to time repaired the fences of the field, and done other acts of ownership in relation thereto, and that a commutation and apportionment of the tithes took place in 1838, in which apportionment and the plan annexed thereto, |