Mr. RUSSELL. That is domestic?

Mr. SEGERSTRUM. That is domestic. Now foreign tungsten of quite a better grade is selling for $31. Foreign tungsten of 1 percent molybdenum is selling around $25 to $29 a unit.

Mr. RUSSELL. In other words there should be quite a sufficiency of tungsten placed in the stock pile under Public Law 520 and an ade quate supply should be obtained at the prices now prevailing?

Mr. SEGERSTRUM. That is correct. The only thing there I would do is to suggest that a certain amount should be allotted to the toolsteel industry all of the time because they don't have the low molyb denum domestic concentrates and they can't use foreign material.

The way I feel about it, any oversupply of domestic material should go into the stock pile or be allocated to the tool-steel operators.

Mr. LEMKE. May I ask if these nations from whom we are importing have the same standard of living for their laboring people we have, and if we can compete with them?

Mr. SEGERSTRUM. We cannot.

Mr. LEMKE. It is a case of cheap labor and slave labor?

Mr. SEGERSTRUM. That is right. We are operating at $10 a day against 25 and 50 cents a day in foreign countries.

INTERIOR DEPARTMENT'S TUNGSTEN ORE RESERVE ESTIMATE CRITICIZED; UNREASONABLY LOW

Mr. LEMKE. How about the visible supply we have on hand! Would that last for a number of years?

Mr. SEGERSTRUM. You mean in the stock pile or in the ground? Mr. LEMKE. In the stock pile or in the ground.

Mr. SEGERSTRUM. We have a considerable visible supply. I don't agree with the Bureau of Mines that it is so short. They list tungsten at the bottom of the list.

Mr. LEMKE. I think they have suggested or perhaps admitted they were not up to date as much as they would like to be?

Mr. SEGERSTRUM. That is correct.

Mr. LEMKE. And I think the Bureau of Mines is quite willing to cooperate with this committee in seeing if something cannot be done to make this Nation safe in case of emergency.

I am quite sure we have educated them to that point.

Mr. SEGERSTRUM. I know in the case of our mines they have no idea of what the potential ore supply is. They list some ore supplies and our national ore resources that to me is out of all reason. That again is part of this "have not" theory.

Mr. LEMKE. They gave us some very important testimony the other day on the possibilities of chromium.

Mr. MARTIN. What is your estimate of the supply?

Mr. SEGERSTRUM. It gets back to that question of whether we can continue to operate and do exploratory work.

I cannot agree with anything as low as a 2-year estimate of tungsten reserves. I would say it is more like 10 years.

The potential of the country is really great if we want to go out and get it.

ONE OPERATOR'S ESTIMATE OF TUNGSTEN PRICE NEEDED TODAY BY
MARGINAL PRODUCERS

Mr. RUSSELL. May I ask one question?

Mr. SEGERSTRUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Segerstrum, could you tell us for the information of the committee what the Metal Reserves Company paid for tungsten during the war?

Mr. SEGERSTRUM. $30 a unit.

Mr. RUSSELL. And that is comparable to the domestic price today? Mr. SEGERSTRUM. Yes. Many of the products if taken from those producers at that time would not sell for $30 today because of their impurities and the low grade. They had penalty schedules but it still would not compensate.

Mr. RUSSELL. What, in your opinion, should the price be for a less efficient operation than you have, to bring it back into production? Mr. SEGERSTRUM. What do I estimate the price to be?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. SEGERSTRUM. I should say a price of $35 or $40 would pick up a whole lot.

Mr. LEMKE. Mr. Hedrick, are there any questions?

Mr. HEDRICK. No questions.

Mr. LEMKE. Mr. Segerstrum, we wish to thank you for the information you have given, and if you wish to file further information we shall be glad to have it. Finally we will get out a report to inform the Nation about the scarcity of metals.

PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE TUNGSTEN AND MERCURY MINING INDUSTRIES

THURSDAY, MAY 20, 1948

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MINES AND MINING,

Washington, D. C.

Mr. LEMKE. Our next witness will be Mr. S. H. Williston, vice president of Cordero Mining Co., principal Nevada quicksilver producer.

He is a member of the Department of the Interior's National Minerals Advisory Council, and chairman of the Premium Price Subcommittee; a member of the Munition Board's Nonferrous Metals Advisory Committee; a member of the Lead and Antimony Subcommittee, and chairman of the Quicksilver Subcommittee.

He is also vice president of the Oregon Mining Association, a member of the mining committee of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce; acting chairman of the Strategic Metals Producers Council; chairman of the Mining and Metallurgical Society's tax committee; a member of the American Mining Congress tax committee, and a member of the board of governors of the Western Division of the American Mining Congress.

STATEMENT OF S. H. WILLISTON, VICE PRESIDENT, CORDERO MINING CO., SAN FRANCISCO CALIF.

Mr. WILLISTON. My name is S. H. Williston. I am vice president and general manager of the Cordero Mining Co. We have offices in Nevada and in San Francisco, and only temporarily in Philadelphia. Mr. LEMKE. We have a very thriving city in North Dakota by the name of Williston. That was named, if I remember right, after some railroad president in times past.

I wonder if you are related to that family, Mr. Williston.

Mr. WILLISTON. I am. It is a long way back and it is a very remote cousin. I believe practically all of the Willistons are related.

Mr. LEMKE. I invite you to come and visit the city of Williston in North Dakota sometime at your leisure.

Mr. WILLISTON. I certainly appreciate the invitation.

Mr. LEMKE. You may proceed in your own way.

Mr. WILLISTON. I did not know quite how much time you want me to take up so I have prepared a comparatively short statement. I can amplify it to any extent you may wish, and I hope that I am able to answer any questions you might ask.

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The Cordero Mining Co. is the largest producer of quicksilver in the State of Nevada, the second largest producer of quicksilver in the United States. However, I might say that that is almost a thing of the past.

BRIEF HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF THE MERCURY INDUSTRY IN THE

UNITED STATES

So that you will be familiar with the rather tragic situation now facing the hundred-year-old mercury industry of the United States, I will endeavor to give you a very brief outline of its prewar history, its accomplishments during the war years, and the situation that it now finds itself in as a result of having done too thorough a job in providing the armed services during the war period with their full requirements of mercury.

For the last 100 years, the quicksilver industry in the United States has supplied a very large proportion of domestic requirements. Throughout the last 100 years, the number of quicksilver mines operating in the States of California, Nevada, Idaho, Oregon, Washington, Texas, and Arkansas, have ranged from 40 to 100 operations. The industry, while a small one, with a gross value of its product in the neighborhood of 2 to 3 million dollars annually, has been able to continue on a somewhat erratic but nevertheless continuous basis throughout the First World War, the depression of the thirties, and the Second World War. It will not continue any longer.

In 1938 and 1939, prior to the outbreak of war in Europe, the governmental departments in studying the industry, held out little hope for any conceivable production in excess of 25,000 flasks a year.

When the war started, there was a small but healthy industry and although it received almost no governmental help, it was able to expand production to fulfill the total requirements of the United States and her allies during the four war years. The estimated consumption figures for the early years of the war were set by the War Production Board and the armed services at a figure almost twice as high as actual requirements proved to be and as a result foreign metal was purchased from Mexico, Canada, and Spain in many cases at a price considerably above that given to the domestic producer.

In January of 1944, in spite of the fact that an important new use had been developed for war purposes-the mercury battery-all mercury contracts with domestic producers were canceled, although they were continued for a considerable period of time with some foreign producers. By the end of 1944, the authorities found that they had seriously erred in their estimates and that the new requirements would be in amounts greatly exceeding previous estimates.

In the early months of 1945, contracts were made with Franco Spain for tremendous quantities of metal at the identical times that the War Production Board was notifying domestic producers that no additional amounts of quicksilver would be required.

As a result of these combined overestimates and requirements in the early years of the war and purchases from abroad in the last year of the war, when VE-day arrived, governmental mercury stocks of foreign metal were far in excess of any requirements. All of this material, or almost all of it, was placed in Government stock piles. This took national security stock piles above their minimum requirements