CHAPTER IX.

OBJECTION THAT THERE IS NO LAW BECAUSE NO SUPERIOR.

LX. IT is sometimes said that there can be no Law between Nations because they acknowledge no common superior authority, no International Executive capable of enforcing the precepts of International Law. This objection admits of various answers: First, it is a matter of fact that States and Nations recognize the existence and independence of each other; and out of a recognized society of Nations, as out of a society of individuals, Law must necessarily spring. The common rules of right approved by Nations as regulating their intercourse are of themselves, as has been shown, such a Law. Secondly, the contrary position confounds two distinct things; namely, the physical sanction which Law derives from being enforced by superior power, and the moral sanction conferred on it by the fundamental principle of Right; the error is similar in kind to that which has led Jurists to divide moral obligations into Perfect and Imperfect. All moral obligations are equally perfect, though the means of compelling their performance is, humanly speaking, more or less perfect, as they more or less fall under the cognizance of human laws (a). In like manner, International Justice would not be the less deserving of that appellation, if the sanctions of it were wholly incapable of being enforced.

(a) Kant, Rechtslehre, s. 54, req.—Warnkönig says, with much force and truth, "Nonne ex mutua inter sese invicem agnitione inter eas quædam constituitur societas, et probantur communes justi regulæ quæ verum jus efficiunt? miscet vir summus (i. e. Kant) juris sanctionem cum justi notione, eaque in re parum sibi constans esse videtur."-Doctrina Juris Philosophica, s. 147.

Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. iv. pp. 396-7-8.

How far and by what means they are capable of being executed are questions which have been already alluded to, and which will be more fully discussed in a subsequent portion of this work, when the International Process of enforcing the execution of International Justice by Negotiation, Treaties, Reprisals, or War comes under consideration.

But, irrespectively of any such means of enforcement, the Law must remain (b). God has willed the society of States as He has willed the society of individuals. The dictates of the conscience of both may be violated on earth: but to the national, as to the individual conscience, the language of a profound philosopher is applicable: "Had it strength as it "had right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it "would absolutely govern the world " (c).

Thirdly, most, if not all, civilized countries have incorporated into their own Municipal Law a recognition of the principles of International Law.

The United States of North America, almost contemporaneously with the assertion of their independence (d), and the new Empire of Brazil in 1820, proclaimed their national adherence to International Law: in England it has always been considered as a part of the law of the land (e).

(b) Kaltenborn, Kritik des Völkerrechts, has a very good chapter on this head, entitled, Die Läugner des Völkerrechts, kap. vi. p. 306: "Mit Recht nennt Stein es einen kahlen und trostlosen Satz, das es kein Völkerrecht geben solle."-" Stahl (Rechtsphilosophie) erklärt, nicht alles Recht sei erzwingbar, unter Anderen nicht das Völkerrecht. Wenn man aber nur richtiger und allgemeiner Weise die Erzwingbarkeit als äussere Realisirbarkeit auffasst, so ist auch das Völkerrecht erzwingbar zu nennen," pp. 307, 309, n.

(c) Bishop Butler (Sermon III.), On Human Nature.

"Si les loix naturelles ont assez de force pour régner sur les Rois mêmes par la crainte de l'Auteur de ces loix, elles ne règnent pas moins entre les Rois qu' entre les différentes nations comparées les unes avec les autres. Elles sont le seul appui ordinaire de ce droit qui mérite proprement le nom de Droit des Gens; c'est-à-dire, de celui qui a lieu de Royaume à Royaume ou d'Etat à État."—Institution du Droit public, xii. t. i. 498; Euvres d'Aguesseau.

(d) "According to the general usages of Europe."-Kent, Comm. i. p. 1.

(e) Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, book iv. c. v.

Lastly, it may be observed on this head, that the History of the World, and especially of modern times, has been but incuriously and unprofitably read by him, who has not perceived the certain nemesis which overtakes the transgressors of International Justice; for, to take but one instance, what an "Iliad of woes" (f) did the precedent of the first partition of Poland open to the kingdoms who participated in that grievous infraction of International Law! The Roman Law nobly expresses a great moral truth in the maxim-" Jurisjurandi contempta religio satis Deum habet ❝ultorem" (g). The commentary of a wise and learned French jurist upon these words is remarkable, and may not inaptly close this first part of the work: "Paroles (he says) "qu'on peut appliquer également à toute infraction des loix "naturelles. La justice de l'Auteur de ces loix n'est pas "moins armée contre ceux qui les transgressent, que contre "les violateurs du serment, qui n'ajoute rien à l'obligation "de les observer, ni à la force de nos engagements, et qui ne "sert qu'à nous rappeler le souvenir de cette justice in"exorable” (h).

(f) Burke, Letters on a Regicide Peace.

(g) Cod. lib. iv. t. i. 2, De Reb. Cred. et de Jurejurando (Alexander Severus).

(h) D'Aguesseau, Ib. xiv. t. i. p. 500. See, too, p. 482.

"Auch ist die Erzwingbarkeit nicht der einzige Charakter des Rechts, auch nicht sein wesentlichster-Dieser besteht vielmehr darin, das es Norm und Ordnung für alle menschlichen Gemeinverhältnisse in allen Sphären und Dimensionen des privaten und des öffentlichen Lebens, mithin auch des socialen Verhältnisses der Völker und Staaten untereinander also Völkerrecht ist-Der Zwang geht nun aber von Gemeinschaft als solcher aus-Dies ist die Ordnung die aufrecht erhalten werden soll-Das Rechtsleben ist das Gemeinleben u. s. w."—Kaltenborn, 310, ib.

PART THE SECOND.

CHAPTER I.

SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-STATES.

LXI. STATES are the proper, primary, and immediate subjects of International Law. It will be seen, indeed, that questions of this jurisprudence may be raised in matters affecting the persons and property both of Private Individuals and of Sovereigns and Ambassadors-the Representatives of States-and of public officers like Consuls, but mediately and indirectly, and in so far only, as they are members, or representatives, or public officers of States. Under the appellation of State are included all the possessions of a Nation; so that if a Nation establish a Colony, however distant, that is looked upon by the eye of the Law as a part of the State, in the same manner as a province or city belonging to her ancient territory; and therefore, unless by the policy of the Mother State, or by the provisions of Treaty, a different character has been impressed upon the Colony, the Law applicable generally to the territory of the State is applicable to the Colony or Colonies belonging to her: all together make up one State, and are to be treated as one by International Law (a).

LXII. The question as to the origin of States belongs rather to the province of Political Philosophy than of International Jurisprudence. The idea that any descendant of

(a) Vattel, lib. i. c. xviii. s. 210: "Tout ce qui est dit du territoire d'une nation, doit s'entendre aussi de ses colonies."