2. Land-Adverse Possession.-A party cannot, as against a superior title holder, acquire title by adverse possession to lands lying outside of his deeded boundary by merely claiming the land. He must actually enter on the land and hold it adversely for the statutory period.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Land-Adverse Possession.-Where a grantor conveys land to a part of which he has no title, the grantee does not acquire possession or title of such part as against a superior title holder by merely claiming the land under his deed. He must actually enter on the land and hold it adversely for the statutory period in order to acquire title.

Champerty-Possession-Enclosure. To maintain the plea of
champerty, possession by actual enclosure is not required. All
that is necessary is an actual adverse possession, manifested by
some act or fact sufficient to indicate to others that the person
claiming to have been possessed had, in fact, the possession.
Champerty-Sale by Trustee in Bankruptcy.-A sale of land by a
trustee in bankruptcy is a judicial sale, and the sale is valid
though the land be adversely held at the time.

Courts-Bankruptcy-Jurisdiction. A United States court having
jurisdiction of a bankrupt has jurisdiction to order and approve
the sale of his real estate, though lying in a district other than
the district in which the proceedings are instituted.
Ejectment-Deeds-Trustee in Bankruptcy-Evidence.-A certi-
fied copy of a deed executed by trustees in bankruptcy, and
acknowldged as required by law, is admissible in evidence.
Ejectment-Title-Deed-Evidence.—In the absence of a statute,
the recitals in a deed made by trustees in bankruptcy are not evi-
dence of title in them, or of authority to make the sale. The
hiatus may be supplied by properly certified copies of the orders
in the bankruptcy proceeding showing the adjudication of bank.
ruptcy, the appointment and qualification of the trustees named in
the deed, and the approval of the sale.

ROBBINS & ROBBINS, GUS THOMAS and JOE W. BENNETT for appellants.

R. L. SMITH, L. L. HINDMAN and D. O. MYATT for appellees.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY WILLIAM ROGERS CLAY, COMMISSIONER-Reversing.

Plaintiffs, J. D. White, S. U. Haworth and W. J. White, brought this action of ejectment against defendants, Luther Brown and Ethel Brown, to recover about ten acres of ground lying in three tracts in Hickman County, Kentucky. The defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs and pleaded title in themselves, both by record and adverse possession. They also pleaded that certain deeds constituting plaintiffs' chain of title were

champertous. A trial before a jury resulted in a verdict in favor of plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.

The facts developed by the record are as follows:

In the spring of 1890, C. C. Mengel, Jr., and Bro. Company (hereinafter called the Mengel Company), a corporation organized under the laws of this State, owned a tract of land situated in Hickman County, Kentucky, containing about 500 acres. The whole tract at that time was in the shape of a rectangular parallelogram, with the Mobile & Ohio Railroad beginning at the southeast corner and running diagonally across the east end of the tract.

On May 1st, 1890, the Mengel Company conveyed to Joseph Crossland, a colored man, about 1411% acres of the west end of the 500-acre tract. The land so conveyed is described in the deed as follows:

"All of that certain tract of land in the County of Hickman and State of Kentucky, bounded and described as follows, to-wit: Beginning at a large white oak in Dobson's line, thence south 613 degrees east 109 poles and 3 links to a stake in McLane's Branch, with elm and sweet gum pointers, thence S. 2814 degrees W. 210 poles to a hickory, dogwood and elm, thence North 6134 degrees W. 102 poles to a sweet gum, thence N. 2814 degrees E. 3814 poles to a sweet gum, thence N. 6134 degrees W. 7 poles to Joseph Crossland's southeast corner, thence N. 2814 degrees E. 1714 poles to the beginning, the said tract being the northwesterly portion of the tract of land conveyed by deed to Joseph Huffaker, &c., to said first party therein called C. C. Mengel, Jr., & Brother Company, instead of its correct name of C. C. Mengel, Jr., & Bro. Co."

On May 26, 1891, the Mengel Company conveyed to Joseph Crossland about 80 acres of land lying in the north central part of the 500-acre tract, and just west of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad. The description in the deed is as follows:

"Beginning at a stake on the M. & O. Railroad, 50 feet from the center of the right of way and running thence north 634 degrees west 166 poles and 16 links to a stake with gum and elm pointers, thence south 28 degrees west 75 poles to a stake with red oak, elm and hickory pointers, thence south 634 degrees east 166 poles and 16 links, thence north 28 degrees 75 poles to the beginning."

On May 21, 1894, Joe Crossland conveyed the 80acre tract of land to his son, Samuel Crossland, by the same description contained in the deed from the Mengel Company to Joe Crossland and above set out. Sam Crossland died intestate and without issue, and his father, Joe Crossland, inherited the 80-acre 'tract from him. On December 23, 1908, Joe Crossland conveyed the land to defendants, Luther Brown and Ethel Brown, his wife. In the latter deed the land is described as follows:

"Beginning at a stake fifty feet west of the center of the M. & O. R. R. in the line of the R. R. Land, thence N. 6114 degrees west 170 poles to a stake in the branch, thence south 281%degrees west 76 poles to a stake with pointers, thence S. 611⁄2 degrees E. 205 poles to a stake 50 feet west of the center of said railroad with elm pointers, thence northward with said railroad to the beginning, containing 89 acres.'

After selling the two tracts, one consisting of 14112 and the other consisting of about 80 acres, the Mengel Company continued to own the balance of the land until June 10, 1905. On that day it sold the balance to Isaac Bodkin. The deed describes the land conveyed as the whole tract of 500 acres, giving its metes and bounds, and then excepts therefrom the tract of 141 acres, sold to Joe Crossland on May 1, 1890, and also the tract of about 80 acres sold to Joe Crossland on May 26, 1891. Subsequently Bodkin sold the land conveyed to him to W. L. Salmon by deed dated October 15, 1908. Salmon sold and conveyed to the Hardy Grain Company, a corporation, by deed dated March 16, 1909. Thereafter the Hardy Grain Company went into bankruptcy, and S. Waddell and others, trustees in bankruptcy of the Hardy Grain Company, conveyed the land to plaintiffs on July 11, 1910.

It will be observed that both plaintiffs and defendants claim through a common grantor, the Mengel Company. The following plat shows the land in controversy:

The land in controversy is divided into three tracts. The first tract is a narrow strip of land about 3 poles and 9 links wide and 75 poles long and lying between the lines E-F and B-C, on the west side of the 80-acre tract conveyed by the second deed to Joe Crossland. The second tract lies between the line C-D and the line F-G up to the point of that line opposite to D. The third tract lies between the railroad on the east and the lines A-D and D-G.

The evidence shows that if the courses and distances mentioned in the second deed to Joe Crossland be followed, the land so conveyed will be represented by the figure B, C, D, A. The conveyance, however, does not show any established corners at the points B, C and D. The evidence does show, however, that there are established corners at E and F, and that these corners correspond to the corners called for in the second deed to Joe Crossland. There is also evidence to the effect that there is a marked line from E to F and from F to D and for a short distance beyond D. If the courses and distances in the second deed to Joe Crossland be followed, the survey stops at the point D; but there is no established corner either at D or at G. There is some evidence tending to show that Joe Crossland claimed to the line E-F on the west, the line F-G on the south and to the railroad right of way on the east. There is also evidence to the effect that he claimed no further than the lines B-C on the west, C-D on the south and A-D on the east. The evidence further shows that none of the strips of land in controversy were enclosed until a short time prior to the institution of this action, although there is evidence to the effect that a field of about 60 acres on the 80-acre tract was cleared and in cultivation, and this field extended in places west of the line B-C and south of the line C-D. The evidence, however, fails to show for what period of time the field was cleared or cultivated. There is practically no evidence of possession of the tract A, D, G, A, except the occasional cutting of timber. About a year or more before the bringing of the action defendants extended their fence so as to follow the lines A, E, F, G, A.

The trial court evidently construed the second deed to Joe Crossland as including only the land embraced within the lines of A-B, B-C, C-D and D-A, as he authorized a recovery on behalf of defendants only in the event that they and those through whom they claimed had been in adverse possession of the land in dispute for the statu