controversy, should be received with great defendant, at the time he procured the writ, are A 248. Declaration must be taken entire. 249. of confederate. The declarations Iowa, 194. 252. of grantor. In proceedings under a not admissible for himself, to show his motives. 254. And such declarations are inad- 255. Prior declarations of witness. The dec- b. Of party in interest. 256. Objections to work. A party cannot 257. Payment on account without objection. 258. Answer of garnishee. An affidavit exe- Of Party in Interest Of Person in Possession — Of Deceased Persons. tion, are not admissible for the purpose of showing the loss of the notes secured by the mortgage. Jones v. Jones et al., 20 Iowa, 388. 260. by one suffering from injury. In an action for damages for injuries received by plaintiff's intestate, her declarations as to the nature and character of her sufferings, made while in that condition, were held admissible. Gray v. McLaughlin, 26 Iowa, 279. 261. of directors in a corporation. Where, in an action on railroad bonds, the bonds purported to have been assigned to the plaintiff by the vice-president and secretary of the company by order of the board of directors, it was held, that parol evidence of a statement of directors of the company, while in session and transacting business in regard to the bonds, was not admissible for the purpose of showing that they were not assigned at the time they purported to have been. Whittaker v. The County of John son, 10 Iowa, 161. 262. of administrator: statute construed. Section 2393 of the Revision, which provides that an administrator shall not admit claims until the claimants have sworn to their correctness, and that the same rule shall apply to payments and set-offs, was not intended to abrogate the general rule admitting in evidence the declarations and admissions of parties to the record. It is accordingly held, that the admissions of an administrator as to the amount of payments that had been made on a note held by the estate were admissible in an action wherein he was a party. McKenzie, adm'x, v. Kitler, 27 Iowa, 254 263. The admissions of an administrator are admissible in an action against him. Schmid, adm'r, v. Kreismer, adm'x, 31 Iowa, 479. 264. by party in his own favor. In an action against an administrator for boarding and nursing the decedent, it was held, that the declarations of the plaintiff, while having the care of the decedent, and rendering the services sued for, as to what he thought the same were worth, and what he intended to charge therefor, were admissible in evidence against the plaintiff. Shafer v. Dean, 29 Iowa, 144. 265. Admission of account. A party is not called upon to dispute an account on every occasion on which it may be presented; and when evidence of any act or declaration of a party is given, as tending to prove the account, care should be exercised in determining whether the circumstances required the defendant to dispute the account, so as to cause his omission to do so to have weight against him. Churchill et al. v. Fulliam, 8 Iowa, 45. 266. Adultery: proof of marriage. In a prosecution for adultery the prior admissions of the defendant are admissible for the purpose of proving the mortgage. The State v. Sanders, 30 Iowa, 582. See, also, sub-title Res Gesta in this title, ante, and CRIMINAL LAW, sub-title EVIDENCE. c. Of person in possession. 267. The declarations of a party in possession of property, explanatory of such possession, are admissible in evidence against a party claiming under him. Taylor v. Lusk, 9 Iowa, 444; Ross v. Wayne, 3 G. Gr. 211. 268. Declarations of a third person while in possession of personal property, explanatory of such possession, as that he held in his own right, or as agent, etc., is competent evidence in an action concerning the same, between the owner and an attaching creditor, of the person in possession. Blake v. Graves et al., 18 Iowa, 312. 269. of plaintiff in replevin. In an action of replevin by one claiming to have purchased the property from one, under execution against whom, the property was taken, the declarations of the plaintiff, made soon after the purchase, and while he was in possession of the property, as to the fact of his purchase, and the consideration upon which it is based, are not admissible in his favor as a part of the res gestæ. (Citing Taylor v. Lusk, 9 Iowa, 443; Ross V. Wayne, 3 G. Gr. 211; West v. Price's Heirs, 2 J. J. Marsh. 380; Blake v. Graves, 18 Iowa, 312; Miners v. Sturdevant, 23 Ala. 664; Thompson v. Marchinney, 17 Ibid. 362; 3 Phil. Ev. (3d ed.) 337; n. 213.) Murray v. Cone et al., 26 Iowa, 276. 270. This case does not fall within that class in which the declarations of the person in possession of personal property, simply explanatory of the possession, have been held admissi ble. Ibid. d. Of deceased persons. 271. Written entries. Written entries or statements of a deceased person, where he was in a position to know the facts, and where the entries were undeniably adverse to his interest, are receivable in evidence in an action between third parties. (Citing, Gross v. Watlington, 3 Brod. & Bing. 132; Middleton v. Miton, 10 Barn Of Deceased Persons - Of Partner. & Cress. 317; Higham v. Ridgway, 10 East, 103; S. C., 2 Smith's Lead. Cas. 193, with Eng. & Am. notes; 1 Ibid. 333, and notes; Townsend v. Everett, 4 Ala. 607; 5 How. U. S. 29; 9 W. & S. 109: Doe v. Turford, 3 B. & Ad. 898; Dow v. Sawyer, 29 Me. 118; Augusta v. Windsor, 19 Ibid. 317; Nichols v. Webb, 8 Wheat. 337; 1 Greenl. Ev. 147, et seq.; 1 Phill. Ev. 293, et seq.: Roe v. Rawlings, 7 East, 279; Chase v. Smith, 5 Vt. 551; Burton v. Scott, 3 Rand. 399; Holliday v. Littlepage, 2 Munf. 316; Thompson v. Stevens, 2 Nott & McC. 493; Parker v. The State, 8 Black f. 26; The Governor v. Shelby, 2 Ibid. 26; Evans v. The State, 13 Ala. 787; Bondurant v. Bank, etc., | 7 Ibid. 830; 4 Ibid. 607; Townsend v. Kerns, 2 Watts, 180; Harriman v. Brown, 8 Leigh. 697; Churchill v. Smith, 16 Vt. 560.) The County of Mahaska v. Ingalis, ex'rs, 16 Iowa, 81. 272. Verbal declarations. So also verbal declarations are receivable in evidence, in an action between third parties, when accompanied by the following pre-requisites: 1. The declarant must be dead; 2. The declaration must have been against the pecuniary interest of the declarant at the time it was made; 3. The declaration must be of a fact in relation to a matter concerning which the declarant was immediately and personally cognizable; and, 4. The court should be satisfied that the declarant had no probable motive to falsify the fact declared. (Citing 1 Greenl. Ev., SS 147, 148; 1 Phill. Ev. 310 and note; Starkie Ev. 44, 355, 365, and Am. ed., note, p. 7; Best on Ev. 577, 483-485; 10 B. & C. 317; Ivat v. Finch, 1 Taunt. 141; Stode v. Winchester, 1 Dick. 397; Doe v. Williams, 1 Cowp. 621; Doe v. Pettett, 5 B. & A. 223; Davis v. Pearce, 2 D. & E. 53; Doe v. Jones, 1 Camp. 367; Barker v. Bay, 2 Russ. 63; Peaceable v. Watson, 4 Taunt. 16; Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Cl. & Fin. 85, 111, 113; White v. Choteau, 10 Barb. 202; S. C., 1 E. D. Smith, 493; People v. Blakely, 4 Park. Cr. 176; Holliday v. Littlepage, 2 Munf. 316; Prather v. Johnson. 3 Harr. & J. 487; Trego v. Hazzard, 19 Penn. St. 440; S. C., 35 Ibid. 9; 25 Ibid. 334; Resp. v. Davis, 3 Yeates, 128; Coleman v. Frazier, 4 Rich. 147; Hinckley v. Davis, 6 N. H. 210; Gilchrist v. Martin, 1 Bailey Eq. 492; Contra, see 3 Phill. Ev. C. & H. Notes, 260; Lawrence v. Kimball, 1 Metc. 524.) Ibid. be in the case of confirmed insanity. Mere absence from the jurisdiction will not answer. Ibid. 274. Declarations of deceased trustee. Evidence of the declarations of a deceased person, in whose name the title to certain real estate was taken in trust for his children, and pur chased with money belonging to them, made at the time of the investment, which were against his interest, in disparagement of his title, and explanatory of the character thereof, is admissible in a proceeding to establish the trust in favor of the children. Robinson v. Robinson, 22 Iowa, 427. 275. Dying declarations of ancestor: advancement. Dying declarations of the ancestor are not admissible against the heir for the purpose of showing an advancement. Such declarations are admissible only in cases of homicide where the death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death are the subject of the declaration. Middleton v. Middleton et al., 31 Iowa, 151. 276. of ancestor in favor of heirs. But, where it is claimed that an advancement was made to an heir by the sale of a farm to him by the ancestor, the declarations of the ancestor made at about the time of the sale, to the effect that the heir had fully paid him for the farm, are admissible on the part of the heir. Ibid. 278. against interest. In an action against a county treasurer, for failing to account for certain moneys collected as taxes, the declarations, to a third person, of an assistant in the office, employed by the board of supervisors, and who had since deceased, to the effect that he had converted money received for taxes to his own use, and falsified the books to con ceal his defalcation, were held admissible on the part of the defendant. The case of The Scott County v. Fluke et al., 34 Iowa,317. County of Mahaska v. Ingalls, supra, followed. e. Of partner. 273. Mere absence not sufficient. It is probable that the courts will not relax the rule 279. Declarations by partner in his own making death a pre-requisite, unless it might favor. The declarations of a party, sought to Of Partner - Of Agent-Of Husband and Wife. be charged as a partner, are not admissible to prove that he was not a member of such copartnership. Danforth, Davis & Co. v. Carter and May, 4 Iowa, 230. 200. as to who constitute firm. In an action against a co-partnership by a creditor, the declarations of the partners, made while the firm was in existence, and before any difficulty arose, are admissible in evidence to show that one of the persons sought to be charged was not a member of such partnership. Such declarations, to be admissible in evidence, must have been made before any difficulty arose, while the business was going on, and as imparting information to persons with whom the firm dealt, and the world. Danforth, Davis & Co. v. Carter and May, 4 Iowa, 230; Williams v. Soutter, 7 Ibid. 435. 281. Grounds of their admissibility. The admission of the declaratious of a partner, showing who are members of the firm, does not depend upon the fact that such partner has deceased, but are receivable upon the ground, that as the plaintiff must recover against all the defendants, or none, and as such partner, if called to testify in person, would be testifying in presenti, he would be interested to defeat the suit. Danforth, Davis & Co. v. Carter and May, 4 Iowa, 230. 282. In an action against a partnership, as guarantor of a bill of exchange, evidence that one of the partners admitted the liability of the firm is admissible, as tending to prove either the fact of notice of non-payment to it, or of its waiver thereof. First Nat. Bank of Dubuque v. Carpenter, Stibbs & Co., 34 Iowa, 433. f. Of Agent. 283. When admissible. The acts and declarations of an agent, made and done in connection with the transaction of business for his principal, which is the subject-matter of controversy, are admissible in evidence to bind the principal. Wiggins v. Leonard, 9 Iowa, 194. 284. Continuing agency. The authority to buy a mortgage is not a continuing agency, and acts and declarations done and made by the agent after such a purchase for his principal, are not admissible in evidence to bind the principal. Ibid. 285. Declarations by an agent with limited powers, not made at the time, nor respecting the subject-matter in controversy, cannot bind the principal, especially where those declarations were of a vague, indefinite character, and in conflict with testimony of a higher and more direct character. Lucas v. Barrett, 1 G. Gr. 510. 286. Subsequent declarations: general rules. To render the declarations of an agent admissible in evidence to bind his principal, they must have been within the scope of the agency, and made during the continuance of it, in respect to the transaction then depending. Subsequent declarations are not part of the res gesta and are not admissible. Sweatland v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., 27 Iowa, 433; Farner v. Turner, 1 Ibid. 53; Wiggins v. Leonard, 9 Ibid. 194. 287. To render the declarations of an agent admissible in evidence, they must be shown to have been made in respect to a matter within the scope of his employment, and when engaged in the business of his principal. An authority to make an admission is not necessarily to be implied from an authority previously given in respect to the thing to which the admission relates. Osgood v. Bringolf, 32 Iowa, 265. 288. The declarations of an agent, made while executing the purpose of his agency, are admissible against his principal. Howe Machine Co. v. Snow et al., Ibid. 433. g. Of husband and wife. 289. Where a woman holds the title to real estate in trust for her infant children and subsequently marries, in an action against the husband to obtain possession of the land, the declarations of the wife, at the time of paying the money and receiving the title, although made before her second marriage, are admissible in evidence against the husband, to prove that the inoney belonged to her first husband. Claussen, guardian, v. La Franz, 1 Iowa, 226. 290. As to authority of husband to act for wife. The authority of the husband to act as agent of the wife, in relation to her separate property, cannot be proved by the declarations of the husband alone. Whitescarver et ux. v. Bonney, 9 Iowa, 480. 291. In an action of replevin, instituted by a wife to obtain possession of property taken under execution against the husband, evidence of the declarations and acts of the husband tending to show that he had the possession and control of the property, is admissible. Presnall v. Herbert, sheriff, 34 Iowa, 539. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, ante; and sub-title WITNESS, herein. Documentary Evidence X. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. a. Handwriting. Handwriting-Laws and Public Documents. 292. Sufficiency of knowledge of. Where a witness has received letters purporting to be from A B, and has answered one of them, but has received no reply, he cannot, without other evidence or knowledge of the handwriting of A B, be a competent witness to prove A B's signature to a power of attorney. Webb & Thurston v. Mauro, Mor. 329 293. Standard writing. Under section 2404 of the Code of 1851, which provides that "evidence respecting handwriting, may be given by comparison made by experts, or by the jury, with writings of the same person, which are proved to be genuine," the certificate of acknowledgement to a mortgage, purporting to be executed by the person whose handwriting is to be compared, does not prove the genuineness of the mortgage deed, or the genuineness of the signature, for the purpose of admitting such signature as a standard by which the writing in controversy is to be proved or disproved. Hyde v. Woolfolk and Bacon, 1 Iowa, 159. 294. Methods of proving. Two obvious methods of proving the standard writing are: first, by the testimony of a witness or witnesses who saw the party write the instrument, or writing offered as the standard; and, secondly, the admission of the party, when not offered by himself; but the proof of the standard, however made, must be positive. Ibid. 297. General rule. The competency of a witness called as an expert to prove handwriting, does not depend upon any particular calling, but upon his intelligence, and means of knowledge as a business man. Ibid.; and The State v. Hinkle, 6 Ibid. 380. 298. While the evidence of experts respecting the genuineness of a person's signa ture, by comparison of handwriting, is entitled to consideration, it is not regarded as evidence of a high order or satisfactory character. Borland v. Walrath et al., 33 Iowa, 130; and see McGregor et al. v. Armill, 2 Ibid. 30. 299. Modes of comparison. Handwriting may be proved by comparison made by experts, or by the jury, with the writing of some person which is proved to be genuine. Citing Revision of 1860, section 3997 (§ 3655, Code of 1873). Baker v. Mygatt, 14 Iowa, I31. 300. by supreme court. On the trial of a chancery cause de novo in the supreme court, the court may compare the signature affixed to an instrument in controversy with writing of the same person, which is proved to be genuine, as evidence of handwriting. Morris v. Sargent, et al., 18 Iowa, 90. b. Laws and public documents. 301. Ultimate proof of legislative will. The enrolled bill signed by the presiding officers of the senate and house of representatives, and 295. Qualifications of an expert: illustration. A witness offered as an expert to prove handwriting, who testified that " he was not an expert in the business of comparing handwriting; he had never made it a business to compare or detect feigned or forged handwritings; that in early life he had been a clerk in a store, afterward an editor of a newspaper, and for the last fifteen years a lawyer, but not all the time engaged in practice; that he pre-approved by the governor, is the ultimate and sumed he had some skill in comparing hand- conclusive proof of the legislative will. Dunwritings; he had had during his life occasion to combe v. Prindle, 12 Iowa, 1. examine a good deal of writing, but did not pretend to any extra skill over business men, but thought he was as good a judge as business men generally; and that he had been in the habit of examining bank bills for the purpose of testing their genuineness," was properly admitted to testify as an expert. lbid. 296. Further illustration. A witness offered as an expert to prove handwriting, who testi 302. Recitals in a statute. The recitals in the preamble to an act of the legislature, embracing statements of facts affecting the rights of third persons, do not impart absolute verity, or conclusive proof of the truthfulness of such statements. Ibid. 303. Laws of another State. The method prescribed by the act of congress of May 26, 1790, in relation to the authentication of the |