Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

and finally complete. A few light attacks on tion lasted but a few minutes, the enemy rethis front were made up to one o'clock P.M., af- tiring. ter which every thing was comparatively quiet. There was no more fighting. At dusk I reThe value of this simple breastwork will be un-ceived orders from General Thomas to retire on derstood, since my loss behind it this day was Rossville, which I did quietly and in perfect oronly about thirteen men, during a period of more der, the pickets of the enemy following mine stubborn fighting than at Shiloh or Stone River, closely as they were withdrawn, and confronting when the same brigade at each place lost over an officer, sent to see that it was thoroughly four hundred men. Our left flank was twice done. turned and partially driven this day, but the ene my was easily checked and our lines speedily restored.

At about ten o'clock A.M. our couriers for ammunition, previously prompt to return, did not come back, and it soon came to be believed that our trains had been captured. I at once cautioned my colonels, who fired only by volleys, not to waste a single round of ammunition, and my battery was similarly cautioned.

During the quiet that afterward settled upon us, several officers were struck by sharp-shooters from distant trees. Ascertaining the proper direction, I caused volleys to be fired into the tops of the trees, and thus brought several of them from their hiding-places, checking for a time this species of warfare. Skirmishers sent out along this front reported the execution of our arms during the engagement to have been terrible, beyond any thing before seen in this war, as I believe the fight from eight to eleven o'clock to

have been.

The stillness that now hung over the battle- field was ominous. We had four divisions in line that, although they had withstood one of the most terrific assaults on record, had hardly felt the breath of the battle. There were four more upon our right with General Thomas, as fresh as we were. But the feeling that our ammunition was gone, was like a leaden weight in the breast of many. The men, however, were confident of success. It afterward appeared that the breaking up of the troops on our right had swept away our ammunition and much else along with their fragments to Chattanooga.

There are several lessons to be learned from this fight, and to me, none more plainly than that the iron hand that strikes justly yet firmly, can alone make the soldier that can be relied upon in the hour of trial. The effect of firing by volleys upon the enemy has invariably been to check and break him. It further gives a careful colonel complete control of his fire. The effect of sending in fractions to battle with an entire army is to waste our own strength without perceptibly weakening the enemy.

My entire brigade has my warmest thanks for its services. Colonel O. H. Payne, One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio volunteers, and Colonel George F. Shackelford, Sixth Kentucky volunteers, both of whom fell early in the fight of Saturday, carried in their commands bravely and at the opportune moment. The One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio volunteers, although in its maiden engagement, bore itself gallantly and efficiently. Major Hampson, who commanded this regiment after the fall of its Colonel, bore his part with ability and success. Colonels Wiley, Forty-first Ohio volunteers, and Suman, Ninth Indiana volunteers, with their regiments, are veterans of so frequent trial that it would be mockery to praise them with words. The country cannot too highly cherish these men. Colonel Wiley had his horse shot from under him. The services of Lieutenant-Colonels Kimberly, Forty-first Ohio volunteers, and Lasselle, Ninth Indiana volunteers, were conspicuous and valuable. Lieutenant-Colonel Kimberly had two horses killed under him.

My staff were efficient, performing every duty assigned them with promptness and accuracy.

Of the noble dead there are Lieutenant-ColoNo new dispositions of troops on our part of nel Rockingham, Captains McGraw, Johnson, the line were made, except that General Rey-Marker, Lieutenants Lockman and Ewbanks, all nolds's right was somewhat withdrawn, to cover of the Sixth Kentucky; Lieutenants Crisswell, that flank. General Wood, General Brannan, Nickeson, and Parks of the Ninth Indiana, with and two divisions of the reserve corps were found a long list of others, as brave and true, but bearin a line at right angles with, and directly in rear ing no title. Many tears are shed for them. of the position before described, the left of this line being about one half mile from, and opposite Reynolds's right. At about three o'clock P.M. a fearful onslaught was made upon this line. The battle raged for an hour with apparently varying fortunes, when several general officers at our position expressed a sense of the necessity for a brigade to move over and strike the deciding blow. No one appeared to have any ammunition. I found upon examination that I still had forty rounds per man, and immediately moved my men over at double-quick with a front of two regiments. Arriving near the scene of action, I caused a partial change of direction to the left, and was quickly pouring in volleys, my second line alternating with my first. The ac

Captain H. W. Johnson, Forty-first Ohio, Acting Quartermaster, was with me the entire day on Saturday, and at night brought upon the battle-field such portions of his train as were needed for the comfort of the command, taking them away before daylight the next morning. Captain John Crowell, Jr., Assistant Adjutant-General, and my Aids, Lieutenants Wm. M. Beebe and E. B. Atwood, Forty-first Ohio; my InspectorGeneral, Captain James McCleery, Forty-first Ohio; my Provost-Marshal, Captain L. A. Cole, Ninth Indiana; my Commissary of Subsistence, Lieutenant F. D. Cobb, Forty-first Ohio; and my Topographical officer, Lieutenant A. G. Bierce,

Ninth Indiana, were with me at all times doing Kimberly, drove them easily, and without loss, valuable service. My Surgeon, M. G. Sherman, a distance of two and a half miles, when we were Ninth Indiana, was, as he always is, in his place. ordered to return to camp.. Remained in bivouac Of my orderlies, Waffee, Brise, Morrison, and on the thirteenth at Gordon's Mills, marched Sweeney deserve special mention. Shepard Scott thence to Chattanooga Valley on the fourteenth, was particularly distinguished for bravery and thence on the fifteenth to a position on the good service. He on two occasions brought bri- Chickamauga River, about five miles from Gorgades to my assistance when greatly needed. don's Mills, and miles from Lafayette; reHis horse was shot, and he killed or captured. mained in bivouac here, receiving supplies of Should he be restored, I recommend that he be clothing, etc., until the evening of the sevenappointed a Second Lieutenant. Quite a num-teenth, when we went into position in line of ber of horses were killed and disabled in the service of my staff.

The entire casualties of the brigade were as follows:

[blocks in formation]

Wounded. Miss- Aggre-
Officers. Men. Officers. Men. ing. gate.

18

15

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]
[ocr errors]

22

[blocks in formation]

11

8

Bat'ry F, 1st O. V. A., 1

Total,........

9

[blocks in formation]

2

74

141

115

12

494 The commander of the brigade was twice struck, but not injured. Two or three members of my staff were also struck, but without effect. Attention is called to accompanying reports of regimental commanders,

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,
W. B. HAZEN,

Brigadier-General.

COLONEL WILEY'S REPORT.

CAMP OF FORTY-FIRST REGIMENT O. V. I., CHATTANOOGA, TENN., September 25, 1863. ( Captain John Crowell, Jr., A. A. G.:

battle about three miles further north on the same road. In the night of the eighteenth took up a new position about four miles further north on the same road; bivouacked here in line of battle, covering the front of the regiment with skirmishers. On the nineteenth the engagement began still further on the left. As the firing of 108 musketry became brisk, the regiment, with the 118 rest of the brigade, was again moved to the left. About one P.M. we advanced in line of battle to the attack, being on the right of the first line of the brigade, with two companies deployed as skirmishers. Passing through an open wood, our skirmishers soon became engaged with those of the enemy, and drove them. On emerging from the wood, we came to an open field about four hundred yards in width with another skirt of woods beyond. Through this wood the enemy started in line across the field to meet us. Near the middle of this field, and a little to our left, was a narrow strip of timber. The enemy had advanced but a short distance when he delivered his fire, and then sought to gain the cover of this strip of timber. We were too quick for them, gaining it first, and delivering our fire by battalion at short-range, sent them back to the woods from which they started. As soon as they began to retreat, a battery planted in the edge of the wood opened fire, inflicting considerable loss. As soon as the retreating forces gained the cover of the woods a heavy infantry. fire was also opened on us. This position the regiment maintained till about four P.M., replying to the enemy's fire and repelling their attempt to dislodge us. In repelling their last assault we were supported and assisted by two companies of the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth O. V. I. The regiment was then relieved by the Sixth Kentucky and ordered to retire to procure ammunition and clean their arms. While replenishing our boxes, we were again ordered forward to the right to the support of a portion of Van Cleve's division. We had barely got into position in rear of the line when it began to fall back. The regiment remained in position until the troops to whose support we had gone had retired. Those on the left retiring toward the left created an interval through which the enemy advanced. We fired our volley by battalion and then retired slowly, halting, facing about, and firing by battalion as soon as the regiment had loaded, and effectually holding the enemy in check in our front. Finally the advance of the enemy on the left having been checked, and the troops to whose support we had been sent hav

In compliance with your order I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this regiment in the operations terminating in the general engagement on the Chickamauga River on the nineteenth and twentieth instant.

On the morning of September tenth, the regiment forded the Tennessee River at Friar's Island, at which place it had been on outpost duty for two days previous, and marched the same day to Tiner's Station, on the Knoxville and Chattanooga Railroad. On the eleventh it marched thence to Ringgold, via Graysville, at which place we joined the rest of the division. On the twelfth it marched from Ringgold to Gordon's Mills, acting as advance-guard of the division. During the day's march, a body of rebel cavalry attempted to cut off a portion of the ad vance-guard by charging on its flank, but the vigilance of Lieutenant-Colonel Kimberly, commanding it, frustrated their object, a volley from the skirmishers-killing one horse and wounding one man, who, with two others, fell into our hands caused them to retreat precipitately. After going into bivouac the same day at Gordon's Mills, the enemy's cavalry exhibiting great audacity in approaching our position, the brigade was ordered on a reconnoissance, the regiment again forming the advance. Four companies de ployed, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel

of skirmishers that was vigorously attacked by the enemy. Corporal Strock, of company E, also deserves notice for pursuing and bringing in two prisoners who took refuge in a house when the regiment repelled the last attack on their position on Saturday afternoon. They belonged to the Twelfth Tennessee, Colonel Watkins, Smith's brigade, Cheatham's division. Corporal Strock's name had previously been placed upon the roll of honor, and his conduct in this engagement shows that the confidence of his comrades has not been misplaced.

ing been reënforced, on a ridge in our rear, the regiment again moved off to the left and joined the rest of the brigade. It was now sundown, and our part in the engagement for the day was ended. The regiment bivouacked for the night in the first line, on a ridge on the east side of the road, and maintained the same position on the twentieth till about three P.M. A small parapet of logs, hastily constructed on the morning of the twentieth, enabled us to repel two assaults on the position during the day, without loss to ourselves. About three P.M. it was moved to the right to the support of a portion of Harker's Of the nine men "missing," should any prove brigade, Wood's division, which was in position skulkers or cowards, I shall take the same interon the crest of a hill which the enemy was en-est in having them punished that I shall always deavoring to carry. The possession of the hill take in securing to good soldiers the reward due was maintained, the regiment losing about a gallant and noble conduct. dozen wounded in this part of the action. As soon as it became dark we withdrew from this position, marched to Rossville, where the regiment bivouacked, and on Monday morning again went into position in the first line on Missionary Ridge, throwing up a parapet of rails and covering our front with skirmishers. The enemy soon afterward engaged our skirmishers, and later in the day opened with artillery, evidently for the purpose of feeling our position; the main line, however, did not become engaged, and at night we were again withdrawn, and the next day took up the position in the present line, which we now occupy.

The following is the list of casualties: Killed-Men, six. Wounded-Officers, five; men, ninety-five. Missing-Men, nine. Aggregate-Killed, six; wounded, one hundred; missing, nine. Number engaged-Officers, twentythree; men, three hundred and thirty-seven; aggregate, three hundred and sixty.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kimberly had two horses and Major J. H. Williston one horse wounded and disabled in the engagement. My own horse was killed.

I cannot speak too highly of the gallantry and fortitude of both officers and men, nor of the enthusiasm, that two days' hard fighting and their thinned ranks failed to depress. My thanks are especially due Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Kimberly and Major J. H. Williston, as well for their untiring vigilance and zeal as for their gallantry in action. Lieutenant Fisher, Acting Adjutant, deserves and has my thanks for promptness in communicating orders under severe fire. Late on the nineteenth he was severely and it is supposed mortally wounded while going to the rear to bring up ammunition. He is supposed to be in the hands of the enemy. Lieutenant J. N. Clark performed the duties of Adjutant during the remainder of the engagement and deserves mention for zeal and gallantry. Among company officers, while I can commend all for their cheerful and steady courage throughout the engagement, Lieutenant C. W. Hills deserves special mention for deliberation and coolness which attracted my attention in the heat of the engagement on Saturday, and for the obstinacy with which he held his ground on Monday while commanding a line

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
AQUILA WILEY,

Colonel Commanding Forty-first Ó, V. L

A NATIONAL ACCOUNT.

On the ninth of September, it became definitely known that the movement of General Rosecrans against Chattanooga had been successful in compelling the enemy to evacuate the place without fighting, and orders were given for the advance of all forces not designed for garrison duty at the several points on the Tennessee River. The position of the army at the time was: the right corps, under McCook, at Winston's Springs, in Lookout Valley, forty-five miles south of Chattanooga, separated from the enemy's line of retreat by the Lookout Mountains; the centre corps, under Thomas, thirteen miles nearer Chattanooga, in the same valley; and the left corps, under Crittenden, in the lower part of the valley, the left resting upon the Tennessee River, not more than eight miles from Chattanooga. Two brigades of Crittenden's corps were yet west of the Tennessee; Wagner's at the crossing of Waldron's Ridge, on the Thurman Road, and Hazen's at Poe's Tavern, the former five miles from Chattanooga, the latter ten miles from there up the river. These brigades, with Wilder's mounted brigade, and Minty's brigade of cavalry, watched the various fords for thirty miles above Chattanooga, and made constant demonstrations at various points. Van Cleve's division (two brigades) had been at Piketon, thirty-two miles above Poe's, but was withdrawn a few days previous to the ninth. These forces crossed the Tennessee on the ninth and tenth, and on the eleventh, having met the enemy's cavalry in considerable force, Crittenden's corps reached Ringgold, Georgia, fifteen miles south-east from Chattanooga. The corps, except the brigades that had been watching the fords above Chattanooga, had marched southward on the Rossville road. At Rossville, Wood's division, leaving the main column to proceed to Ringgold, marched southward to Gordon's Mills, ten and a half miles south of Chattanooga. Arriving at Gordon's Mills on the evening of the eleventh, Wood came unexpectedly upon the ground where, the night before, the rebel General Polk's corps had bivouacked, and at once apprised General Critten

den of the close proximity of the formidable rebel force. The enemy had evacuated Chattanooga and its vicinity without destroying bridges or track on the railroads, and left large quantities of supplies in the country about. He had had abundant time and opportunity to remove these supplies, and if he was to transfer his line of defence to Dalton, it would certainly have been worth his while to render the railroads immediately unserviceable.

On the morning of the twelfth, Crittenden's divisions, at Ringgold, were put in march for Gordon's Mills, to join Wood, and diminish the distance isolating him from the rest of the army. Near Gordon's the enemy's cavalry was again encountered, and, although they gave ground readily before the infantry advance on the march and in a subsequent reconnoissance from Gordon's toward La Fayette, still their spirit of enterprise, while hovering constantly about, and boldly venturing between the infantry columns, indicated a confidence in substantial supports close at hand. Their cavalry was evidently performing its duty in a way little like its ordinary manner of covering a retreat. On the morning of the thirteenth, the corps crossed to the west side of the creek and took position.

A reconnoissance toward La Fayette met a stubborn resistance, at a distance of two miles from the Mills, the enemy using artillery. On the fourteenth, two divisions marched westward to the Chattanooga Valley, and in the afternoon found Thomas's corps some miles further up the valley; the left and centre were now together, but the right corps was far up the valley, and without supporting distance.

General Thomas had pushed Negley's division across Lookout Mountain, at Stephens's Gap, about sixteen miles from Gordon's. On the eighth and ninth, his whole corps crossed. On the tenth, Negley was sent forward to the passes of Pigeon Mountain, which closes Chattanooga Valley, a few miles south of Stephens's Gap.

have left the road to Chattanooga, and the rear of the entire army with its lines of communication, unobstructed. Leaving Wood's division in position at Gordon's Mills, General Crittenden on the fifteenth, moved his corps to the left and front, taking position on Chickamauga River, to the left of Thomas, seven miles north of Gordon's. During the sixteenth and seventeenth, the position was not materially changed. On the night of the seventeenth, the line moved to Crawfish Springs. Developments since the battle are to the effect that the isolation of McCook was as dangerous as that of Crittenden. When ordered to join the army at Crawfish Springs, McCook recrossed the Lookout Mountains and came down Lookout Valley, crossing again into Chattanooga Valley at Stephens's Gap. Had he attempted to join by moving down the east side of Lookout, as was expected, he would, say prisoners whose rank entitles them to credit, have encountered a force sufficient to overpower him. During the eighteenth, heavy clouds of dust east of Chickamauga River, and demonstrations upon General Wood at Gordon's, indicated that the enemy was moving toward our left. Toward evening the movement of General Rosecrans's army to its left commenced, and early on the morning of September nineteenth, the disposition and the ground were as follows:

From Gordon's Mills to Chattanooga (ten miles) the road runs nearly north, for six miles nearly parallel to, and one to two miles from Missionary Ridge, which it crosses by a pass at Rossville.

At Gordon's Mills the Chickamauga River is close upon the road, and runs parallel to it for half a mile northward, where it makes a sudden bend to the right and gradually increases the distance between it and the road. The ridge is high, and in many places very steep and impracticable.

The river at Gordon's runs in a bed with rocky, precipitous banks, impassable for artillery, except at the established fords, north of the Mills; though not always impracticable, it is a good obstacle, and crossing is difficult if contested.

The country between the ridge and river is generally level but rolling, thickly wooded, with comparatively little cleared land. Too much wooded for artillery, the ground is yet open for manoeuvre.

Here Negley found the enemy strong and active, and was obliged to fall back upon the corps, the enemy manifesting much enterprise in attacking his trains during the movement. Development since the battle shows the isolation of Crittenden's corps during the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth to have been hazardous in the extreme; while it was at Gordon's Mills it was reported that the rebel General Polk, with a strong corps, was near Crittenden's corps, its left in the strong posiRock Spring, three miles from the Mills, medi- tion at Gordon's, was in line parallel with the tating an offensive movement. Rebel officers, now road and east of it. Thomas was on his left, at prisoners, confirm this, and state that Hindman's Owen's Ford, two miles south of the Mills. The division was ordered to seize Stephens's Gap; in line followed the road, not the river, though the Lookout Mountains, to prevent the junction of left was considerably beyond the road, while the Crittenden with Thomas. Hindman failed to exe-right was upon it. Two of McCook's divisions cute this order in proper time; the junction was made, General Polk's forces were withdrawn, and the concentration of Bragg's army, and the reënforcements sent him from Virginia and elsewhere, were made at La Fayette. For his failure here Hindman is said to be now in arrest. An attack by Polk at daylight on the thirteenth would have been disastrous to Crittenden, and without doubt VOL. VII.-Doc. 16

were yet on the march from Crawfish Springs. There was a ford at the river in front of the left, but it was unguarded, and there were other practicable points on the stream toward the Mills.

A division of the reserve corps, under General Granger, was at Rossville, four miles from the left of the line, and on Saturday morning a brigade from this force advanced on the Ringgold road,

and burned the bridge at the Chickamauga River.

but almost upon the ground where they went into line, they were nearly enveloped on the instant From Crawfish Springs it had been a race, both by the swarming enemy, and could of course armies marching by the flank. The movement accomplish nothing. It was even necessary to of Rosecrans's whole line on the night of the send to this point, as they came up, McCook's eighteenth, until the right rested where the left two divisions, Davis's and Sheridan's. This force had been, was supposed to have put him again in sufficed to hold the ground only, and the atfront of the enemy, and for the present saved his tempt to strike the enemy's left flank was of line of operations. Of the several enterprises the course at an end-the whole Federal force being enemy might undertake, the most probable was now engaged with his front. The enemy had that he would concentrate as far to his right as made his battle, suffering nothing from the disadpossible, if he fought; for the Federal left was vantage of having to cross the river almost within a much weaker position than the right, and in rifle-shot of the Federal lines, had maintained an attack here afforded the tempting prospect a superiority in force, and fought upon equal of securing Rosecrans's line. To allow the ene- ground. Late in the afternoon, coming heavily my to bring across the river a portion of his upon Reynolds and Van Cleve, he drove them force to attack, and then, with the obstruction in furiously back, and penetrated the line. Palmtheir rear, preventing alike a good retreat and aer's brigades, attempting to assist Reynolds, were prompt reënforcement, to fall violently upon and sent back with him. Nearly the whole force was overwhelm them by striking on front and flank, in confusion, and the enemy bearing strongly was an operation of rich promise, but requiring down upop the broken flank to his right, had great vigilance and correct judgment in determin-like to have swept in reverse the entire Federal ing the moment for assuming the offensive.

Of course it is not pretended that this plan was in view during the confused night march of the eighteenth, and the still more confused movements of the nineteenth.

Until late in the morning of the nineteenth, every thing was quiet on the rebel side. At length the brigade from General Thomas's left was sent forward to the ford mentioned as being in front of that point. This force encountered a rebel brigade, drove it from its position, and reached the river. Almost immediately, however, it was in turn attacked and driven back.

Whatever force the enemy may have crossed previous to this time, he now maintained the fight much in advance of the river, and brought his forces into action so rapidly that all attempts to drive him back upon the river were futile, and no advantage of ground lay with either side. Thomas's left divisions (Brannan's, Baird's, and Johnson's) were found insufficient to force the enemy, and Crittenden's left division (Palmer's) was ordered to the ground to strike the enemy's left flank. Palmer went to the left of Thomas's right division, (Reynolds's-not then engaged,) but came full in the face of the enemy, not on his flank. Soon after Reynolds became engaged, but still the Federal right did not outflank the abundant foe. Van Cleve, commanding Crittenden's next division, was sent in, and his leading brigade (Beatty's) formed within half musketshot of a rebel force preparing to flank the Federal right, ran over and captured, almost without fighting, a rebel battery, but was immediately hurled violently back. The last division at hand (Wood's, of Crittenden's corps, which formed the right of the line) was then thrown in to find the flank of that rebel line which had grown so alarmingly that it now covered the whole front of the Federal army. The fine position at the Mills, the cover of the right flank, was abandoned by this movement, but subsequently temporarily reöccupied by one of McCook's brigades, (Lytle's.) Wood sent in his brigades as ordered,

line left of the break, when twenty pieces of artillery, hastily posted by General Hazen, and rapidly served with canister, brought him to a stand, and he withdrew from the interval. After dusk an energetic attack, maintained with some promise of persistency, upon Johnson's division, but successfully resisted, closed the battle for the day. Had the enemy, after penetrating Reynolds's line, followed with proper force the movement stopped by the artillery, he would have had probably little to do on the twentieth, to make his victory decisive.

There had been gallant fighting on both sides, and both had suffered severely. Little artillery had been lost, but the Federals had made the gain, three guns. What advantage generally had been gained, however, was with the rebels. They had successfully overcome the obstacle of the river in their front on Sunday morning forcing the Federal line from it at every point, until it lay in a country almost destitute of water. Not enough could be had for the men's coffee, and what was obtained was from springs several miles distant. During the day Negley's division had been withdrawn from Owen's Ford, and in the afternoon Lytle's brigade, which had reöccupied Gordon's Mills after Wood was withdrawn, was recalled, so that the whole army was in the line. There was, indeed, little need of detachments now, for there was left nothing south of Rossville to hold, except the plain country, which the enemy shared. The force and position of both armies had, it was safe to assume, been well developed, and with this knowledge the night was before the hostile commanders for tactical dispositions, if it was decided to fight on the morrow. On the Federal side there was less reason for retreat than in the morning; all uncertainty as to the rebel position had vanished, and it only remained to look to his movements during the night. Gordon's Mills having been abandoned, there was but one great strategic point to claim attention- the pass at Rossville, on the Chattanooga road. With this in posses

« AnteriorContinuar »