two to three feet in depth, and from ten to twenty feet in width, from the river above the railroad to the river below. Following the inside line of the bayou the enemy had constructed rifle-pits, with the bayou to serve as a ditch on the outside and immediately in front of them. Carr's division occupied the right in investing this place, and Lawler's brigade the right of his division. After a few hours' skirmishing, Lawler discovered that by moving a portion of his brigade under cover of the river bank, he could get a position from which that place could be successfully assaulted, and ordered a charge accordingly. Notwithstanding the level ground over which a portion of his troops had to pass without cover, and the great obstacle of the ditch in front of the enemy's works, the charge was gallantly and successfully made, and in a few minutes the entire garrison with seventeen pieces of artillery were the trophies of this brilliant and daring movement. The enemy on the west bank of the river immediately set fire to the railroad bridge and retreated, thus cutting off all chance of escape for any portion of his forces remaining on the east bank. Sherman, by this time, had reached Bridgeport, on Black River above. The only pontoon train with the expedition was with him. By the morning of the eighteenth he had crossed the river, and was ready to march on Walnut Hills. McClernand and McPherson built floating bridges during the night, and had them ready for crossing their commands by eight A.M. of the eighteenth. The march was commenced by Sherman at an early hour by the Bridgeport and Vicksburgh road, turning to the right when within three and a half miles of Vicksburgh, to get possession of Walnut Hills and the Yazoo River. This was successfully accomplished before the night of the eighteenth. McPherson crossed Black River above the Jackson road, and came into the same road with Sherman, but to his rear. He arrived after nightfall with his advance to where Sherman turned to the right. McClernand moved by the Jackson and Vicksburgh road to Mount Albans, and there turned to the left to get into Baldwin's Ferry road. By this disposition the three army corps covered all the ground their strength would admit of, and by the morning of the nineteenth, the investment of Vicksburgh was made as complete as could be by the forces under my command. During the day there was continuous skirmishing, and I was not without hope of carrying the enemy's works. Relying upon the demoralization of the enemy in consequence of repeated defeats outside of Vicksburgh, I ordered a general assault at two P.M. on this day. The Fifteenth army corps, from having arrived in front of the enemy's works in time on the eighteenth to get a good position, were enabled to make a vigorous assault. The Thirteenth and Seventeenth corps succeeded no further than to gain advanced positions, covered from the fire of the enemy. The twentieth and twenty-first were spent in perfecting communications with our supplies. Most of the troops had been marching and fighting battles for twenty days, on an average of about five days' rations, drawn from the Commissary department. Though they had not suffered from short rations up to this time, the want of bread to accompany the other rations was beginning to be much felt. On the twenty-first my arrangements for drawing supplies of every description being complete, I determined to make another effort to carry Vicksburgh by assault. There were many reasons to determine me to adopt this course. I believed an assault from the position gained by this time could be made successfully. It was known that Johnston was at Canton with the force taken by him from Jackson, reënforced by other troops from the east, and that more were daily reaching him. With the force I had, a short time must have enabled him to attack me in the rear, and possibly succeeded in raising the siege. Possession of Vicksburgh at that time would have enabled me to have turned upon Johnston and driven him from the State, and possess myself of all the railroads and practical military highways, thus effectually securing to ourselves all territory west of the Tombigbee, and this before the season was too far advanced for campaigning in this latitude. I would have saved Government sending large reënforcements, much needed elsewhere; and, finally, the troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburgh, and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after their failure to carry the enemy's works. Accordingly on the twenty-first orders were issued for a general assault on the whole line, to commence at ten A.M. on the twenty-second. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, that there should be no difference between them in movement of assault. Promptly at the hour designated, the three army corps then in front of the enemy's works commenced the assault. I had taken a commanding position near McPherson's front, and from which I could see all the advancing columns from his corps, and a part of each of Sherman's and McClernand's. A portion of the commands of each succeeded in planting their flags on the outer slopes of the enemy's bastions, and maintained them there until night. Each corps had many more men than could possibly be used in the assault, over such ground as intervened between them and the enemy. More men could only avail in case of breaking through the enemy's line, or in repelling a sortie. The assault was gallant in the extreme on the part of all the troops, but the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken in that way. At every point assaulted, and at all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show all the force his works could cover. The assault failed, I regret to say, with much loss on our side in killed and wounded; but without weakening the confidence of the troops in their ability to ultimately succeed. No troops succeeded in entering any of the enemy's works, with the exception of Sergeant Griffith, of the Twenty-first regiment Iowa volunteers, and some eleven privates of the same regiment. Of these, none returned except the Sergeant and, possibly, one man. The work entered by him, from its position, could give us no practical advantage, unless others to the right and left of it were carried and held at the same time. About twelve м. I received a despatch from McClernand, that he was hard pressed at several points; in reply to which I directed him to reënforce the points hard pressed from such troops as he had that were not engaged. I then rode round to Sherman, and had just reached there, when I received a second despatch from McClernand, stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of and still held two of the enemy's forts; that the American flag then waved over them; and asking me to have Sherman and Mc Pherson make a diversion in his favor. This despatch I showed to Sherman, who immediately ordered a renewal of the assault on his front. I also sent an answer to McClernand, directing him to order up McArthur to his assistance, and started immediately to the position I had just left, on McPherson's line, to convey to him the information from McClernand by this last despatch, that he might make the diversion requested. Before reaching McPherson I met a messenger with a third despatch from McClernand, of which the following is a copy: HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, IN THE FIELD, NEAR VICKSBURGH, MISS., May 22, '63. GENERAL: We have gained the enemy's in trenchments at several points, but are brought to a stand. I have sent word to McArthur to reënforce me if he can. Would it not be best to concentrate the whole or a part of his command on this point? JOHN A. McCLERNAND, Major-General Commanding. Major-General U. S. GRANT. P.S.-I have received your despatch. My troops are all engaged, and I cannot withdraw any to reënforce others. McC. force in their fronts as possible. The diversion was promptly and vigorously made, and resulted in the increase of our mortality list full fifty per cent, without advancing our position or giving us other advantages. About half-past three P.M. I received McClernand's fourth despatch, as follows: HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, May 22, 1863. GENERAL: I have received your despatch in regard to General Quimby's division and General McArthur's division. As soon as they arrive I will press the enemy with all possible speed, and doubt not I will force my way through. I have lost no ground. My men are in two of the enemy's forts, but they are commanded by rifle-pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken, who intimate that the rear is strong. At this moment I am hard pressed. The assault of this day proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, nor other evidence of demoralization. After the failure of the twenty-second, I determined upon a regular siege. The troops now being fully awake to the necessity of this, worked diligently and cheerfully. The work progressed rapidly and satisfactorily until the third of July, when all was about ready for a final as sault. in the beginning, but under the skilful superinThere was a great scarcity of engineer officers tendence of Captain F. E. Prime, of the Engineer corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, and Captain C. B. Comstock, of the Engineer corps, who joined this command during the siege, enable any division of this army hereafter to consuch practical experience was gained as would duct a siege with considerable skill in the absence of regular engineer officers. The position occupied by me during most of On the afternoon of the third of July a letter the time of the assault gave me a better oppor- was received from Lieutenant-General Pembertunity of seeing what was going on in front of ton, commanding the confederate forces at Vicksthe Thirteenth army corps than I believed it pos-burgh, proposing an armistice, and the appointsible for the commander of it to have. I could ment of commissioners to arrange terms for the not see his possession of forts, nor necessity for capitulation of the place. The correspondence, reënforcements, as represented in his despatches, copies of which are herewith transmitted, resultup to the time I left it, which was between twelve ed in the surrender of the city and garrison of M. and one P.M., and I expressed doubts of their Vicksburgh at ten o'clock A.M., July fourth, 1863, correctness, which doubts the facts subsequently, on the following terms: The entire garrison, of but too late, confirmed. At the time I could not ficers and men, were to be paroled, not to take disregard his reïterated statements, for they might up arms against the United States until exchangpossibly be true; and that no possible opportun-ed by the proper authorities; officers and men ity of carrying the enemy's stronghold should be each to be furnished with a parole, signed by allowed to escape through fault of mine, I ordered himself; officers to be allowed their side-arms Quimby's division, which was all of McPherson's and private baggage, and the field, staff, and cavcorps then present, but four brigades, to report alry officers one horse each; the rank and file to to McClernand, and notified him of the order. I be allowed all their clothing, but no other proshowed his despatches to McPherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of the necessity of an active diversion on their part to hold as much perty; rations from their own stores sufficient to last them beyond our lines; the necessary cooking utensils for preparing their food; and thirty wagons to transport such articles as could not ready, and moved at once with a force increased well be carried. These terms I regarded more by the remainder of both the Thirteenth and favorable to the Government than an uncondi- Fifteenth army corps, and is at present investing tional surrender. It saved us the transportation Jackson, where Johnston has made a stand. of them North, which at that time would have been very difficult, owing to the limited amount of river transportation on hand, and the expense of subsisting them. It left our army free to operate against Johnston, who was threatening us from the direction of Jackson; and our river transportation to be used for the movement of troops to any point the exigency of the service might require. I deem it proper to state here, in order that the correspondence may be fully understood, that after my answer to General Pemberton's letter of the morning of the third, we had a personal interview on the subject of the capitulation. The particulars and incidents of the siege will be contained in the reports of division and corps commanders, which will be forwarded as soon as received. In the march from Bruinsburgh to Vicksburgh, covering a period of twenty days, before supplies could be obtained from government stores, only five days' rations were issued, and three days' of those were taken in haversacks at the start, and were soon exhausted. All other subsistence was obtained from the country through which we passed. The march was commenced without wagons, except such as could be picked up through the country. The country was abun dantly supplied with corn, bacon, beef and mutton. The troops enjoyed excellent health, and no army ever appeared in better spirit or felt more confident of success. In accordance with previous instructions, Major-General S. A. Hurlbut started Colonel (now Brigadier-General) B. II. Grierson, with a cavalry force, from La Grange, Tennessee, to make a raid through the central portion of the State of Mississippi, to destroy railroads and other public property, for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of the army moving to the attack on Vicksburgh. On the seventeenth of April this expedition started, and arrived at Baton Rouge on the second of May, having successfully traversed the whole State of Mississippi. This expedition was skilfully conducted, and reflects great credit on Colonel Grierson and all of his command. The notice given this raid by the Southern press confirms our estimate of its importance. It has been one of the most brilliant cavalry exploits of the war, and will be handed down in history as an example to be imitated. Colonel Grierson's report is herewith transmitted. I brought forward during the siege, in addition to Lauman's division and four regiments previously ordered from Memphis, Smith's and Kimball's divisions of the Sixteenth army corps, and assigned Major-General C. C. Washburne to command of the same. On the eleventh of June, Major-General F. J. Herron's division from the department of the Missouri arrived; and on the fourteenth two divisions of the Ninth army corps, Major-General J. G. Parke commanding, arrived. This increase in my force enabled me to make the investment most complete, and at the same time left me a large reserve to watch the movements of Johnston. Herron's division was put in position on the extreme left south of the city, and Lauman's division was placed between Herron and McClernand. Smith's and Kimball's I cannot close this report without an expresdivision and Parke's corps were sent to Haines's sion of thankfulness for my good fortune in being Bluff. This place I had fortified to the land side placed in cooperation with an officer of the navy and every preparation made to resist a heavy who accords to every move that seems for the force. Johnston crossed Big Black River with a interest and success of our arms his hearty and portion of his force, and every thing indicated energetic support. Admiral Porter and the very that he would make an attack about the twenty-efficient officers under him have ever shown the fifth of June. Our position in front of Vicks-greatest readiness in their coöperation, no matter burgh having been made as strong against a sor- what was to be done or what risk to be taken, tie from the enemy as his works were against an either by their men or their vessels. Without assault, I placed Major-General Sherman in com- this prompt and cordial support my movements mand of all the troops designated to look after would have been much embarrassed, if not wholly Johnston. The force intended to operate against defeated. Johnston, in addition to that at Haines's Bluff, was one division from each of the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth army corps, and Lauman's division. Johnston, however, not attacking, I determined to attack him the moment Vicksburgh was in our possession, and accordingly notified Sherman that I should again make an assault on Vicksburgh at daylight on the sixth, and for him to have up supplies of all descriptions ready to move upon receipt of orders, if the assault should prove a success. His preparations were immediately made, and when the place surrendered on the fourth, two days earlier than I had fixed for the attack, Sherman was found Captain J. U. Shirk, commanding the Tuscumbia, was especially active and deserving of the highest commendation for his personal attention to the repairing of the damage done our transports by the Vicksburgh batteries. The result of this campaign has been the defeat of the enemy in five battles outside of Vicksburgh; the occupation of Jackson, the capital of the State of Mississippi, and the capture of Vicksburgh and its garrison and munitions of war; a loss to the enemy of thirty-seven thousand (37,000) prisoners, among whom were fifteen general officers; at least ten thousand killed and wounded, and among the killed Generals Tracy, Tilghman, and Green, and hundreds and perhaps thousands of stragglers, who can never be collected and reörganized. Arms and munitions of war for an army of sixty thousand men have fallen into our hands, besides a large amount of other public property, consisting of railroads, locomotives, cars, steamboats, cotton, etc., and much was destroyed to prevent our capturing it. Our loss in the series of battles may be summed up as follows: Port Gibson,... Fourteen-Mile Creek, (skirmish,) Jackson,. Champion's Hill,.. Big Black Railroad Bridge,.. Killed. Wounded. Missing, .130 718 24 240 841 40 426 29 1,842 3,688 245 5 To this General Grant replied as follows: HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE, IN THE FIELD, NEAR VICKSBURGH, July 3, 1863. Lieut.-General J. C. Pemberton, Commanding "Confederate" Forces, etc. : GENERAL: Your note of this date, just received, proposes an armistice of several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, etc. The effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course, can be ended at any time you may choose, by an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. 32 Men who have shown so much endurance and 6 189 courage as those now in Vicksburgh, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you, will be treated with all the respect due them as prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange terms of capitulation, because I have no other terms than those indicated above. Of the wounded many were but slightly wounded, and continued on duty; many more required but a few days or weeks for their recovery. Not more than one half of the wounded were permanently disabled. My personal staffs and chiefs of departments have in all cases rendered prompt and efficient service. I am, General, very respectfully, In all former reports I have failed to make General Bowen, the bearer of General Pemmention of company A, Fourth regiment Illinois cavalry volunteers, Captain S. D. Osband com- berton's letter, was received by General A. J. manding. This company has been on duty with Smith. He expressed a strong desire to converse me as an escort company since November, 1861, eral Grant, declining this, requested General with General Grant, and accordingly, while Genand in every engagement I have been in since that time rendered valuable service, attracting Smith to say that if General Pemberton desired general attention for their exemplary conduct, to see him, an interview would be granted besoldierly bearing and promptness. It would not tween the lines in McPherson's front at any hour in the afternoon which General Pemberton might be overstating the merits of this company to say appoint. A message was soon sent back to Genthat many of them would fill with credit any po-eral Smith appointing three o'clock as the hour, sition in a cavalry regiment. General Grant was there with his staff, and with Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan, and A. J. Smith. General Pemberton came late, attended by General Bowen and Colonel Montgomery. He was much excited, and impertinent in his answers to General Grant. The conversation was I have the honor to be, Colonel, very respect-officers, and Generals Grant, McPherson, and A. held apart between General Pemberton and his fully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Col. J. C. KELTON, OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. Smith. The rebels insisted on being paroled and march beyond our lines, officers and men all with eight days' rations drawn from their own stores, the officers to retain their private property and body-servants. General Grant heard what they had to say, and left them at the end of an hour and a half, saying that he would send in his ton promised to reply before night, hostilities to ultimatum in writing, to which General Pembercease in the mean time. General Grant then conferred at his headquarters, with his corps and division commanders, and sent the following letter to General Pemberton, by the hands of General Logan and Lieu tenant-Colonel Wilson: NEAR VICKSBURGH, July 3, 1863. Lieut.-General J. C. Pemberton, Commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburgh, Miss.: GENERAL: In conformity with the agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following propositions for the surrender of the city of can make no stipulation with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do not propose to cause any of them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under restraint by stipulations. The property which officers can be allowed to take with them will be as stated in the proposition of last evening-that is, that officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack their arms at ten o'clock A.M., and then return to inside and remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objections to it. Should no modification be made of your accept Vicksburgh, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at eight A.M. to-morrow. As soon as paroles can be made out and signed by the officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their regimental clothing, and staff, field and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them, and thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one. You will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same con-ance of my terms by nine o'clock A.M., I shall ditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and privates, as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners. I am, General, very respectfully, The officers who received this letter stated that it would be impossible to answer it by night, and it was not till a little before peep o' day that the proposed reply was furnished: regard them as having been rejected, and act ac- I am, General, very respectfully, U. S. GRANT, Major-General U. S. A. To this the subjoined answer this moment has been received: Major-General U. S. Grant, Commanding U. S. HEADQUARTERS, VICKSBURGH, July 4, 1863. GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, and in reply to say that the terms proposed by you are accepted. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, REAR-ADMIRAL PORTER'S DESPATCH. Forces: I am, General, yours, very respectfully, follows: HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE, U.S. MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK, Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy: That she has not done so sooner has not been for want of ability on the part of our military commanders, but from the magnitude of the defences, which were intended to repulse any force the Government could possibly send there. What bearing this will have on the rebellion remains yet to be seen, but the magnitude of the success must go far toward crushing out this revolution, and establishing once more the commerce of the States bordering on this river. History has seldom had an opportunity of recording Lieut.-General Pemberton, Commanding Forces so desperate a defence on one side, with so much in Vicksburgh: courage, ability, perseverance, and endurance on GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the other; and if ever an army was entitled to your communication of the third of July. The the gratitude of the nation, it is the army of the amendments proposed by you cannot be acceded Tennessee and its gallant leaders. to in ful. It will be necessary to furnish every The navy has necessarily performed a less conofficer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the rolls of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again, I spicuous part in the capture of Vicksburgh than the army. Still, it has been employed in a manner highly creditable to all concerned. The gun |