and not placing any reliance upon the prisoner's statement, lent the prisoner ten shillings, the sum he asked, and took the chain as a pledge. It was held, that if the money had been obtained on the statement made by the prisoner, he might have been convicted of obtaining it by false pretences; but that, as the prosecutor relied entirely upon his own examination, and not upon the false statement, the prisoner was properly found guilty of only an attempt to commit that offence. Yet this result would not be reached if the parties be reversed: a jeweller making the false pretence as to material, and an ignorant purchaser resorting to some imperfect verification of his own. In the last case the inference would be that the vendor's false pretence would be operative; in the first case, the contrary. Pretence must have been direct cause, and property must have been transferred. § 1179. The pretence must operate as the direct cause of the transfer; and therefore, where it does not, the statute does not apply. This was the reasoning in an English case where the prisoner, by falsely pretending that he was a naval officer, induced the prosecutrix to enter into a contract to lodge and board him at a guinea a week, and under this contract he was lodged and supplied with various articles of food. It was held that a conviction for obtaining the articles of food by false pretences could not be sustained, as the obtaining of the food was too remotely the result of the false pretence. Hence, as we have seen, the prosecution fails when it is shown that the pretences were made after the goods were obtained.* When statements were made on different occasions, it is for the jury to say whether they were so connected as to form one transaction." The prosecutor must have intended to part with his right of property in the goods, and not merely with his possession." When a judgment by consent is obtained by false pretences, and 1 R. v. Roebuck, 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 631; D. & B. 24; 7 Cox C. C. 126. Infra, § 1182. 2 See R. v. Jones, 50 L. T. (N. S.) 725; 15 Cox C. C. 475; Therasson v. People, 82 N. Y. 238. R. v. Gardner, 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 640; 7 Cox C. C. 136; D. & B. 40; R. v. Hamilton, 9 Ad. & L. (N. S.) 271 ; and see infra, § 1202. • Supra, § 1177. 5 R. v. Welman, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 588; Dears. C. C. 188; 6 Cox C. C. 153; R. v. Greathead, 14 Ibid. 108; 38 L. T. (N. S.) 691; Beasley v. State, 59 Ala. 20. • Infra, § 1203; supra, § 888. the money collected under such judgment, this, it has been held by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, is not an obtaining of money by false pretences.1 No defence that the goods were obtained through mediately § 1180. As will be hereafter seen, the goods must have been obtained for defendant, and in accordance with his directions; if so, it is no defence that they were obtained mediately through a contract which the defendant's false pretence induced the prosecutor to make. At this point it is to be observed that the cases are plain to the effect a contract. that it matters not whether the goods were obtained immediately by the false pretence, or mediately by a contract to which the false pretence induced the prosecutor to consent, provided there be a causal relation between the contract and the false pretence. But it must appear that when a sale is averred, a sale on some sort of consideration must be proved." § 1181. Delivery by servant of false accounts of payments is a pretence. Where the foreman of a manufactory, who was in the I Com. v. Harkins, 128 Mass. 79; Gray, C. J., Ames and Soule, JJ., diss. • Infra, § 1202. R. v. C. & K. 630; R. v. Dark, 1 Den. C. C. 276; R. v. Kenrick, 1 D. & M. 208; 5 Q. B. 49; R. v. Greathead, 14 Cox C. C. 108; Com. v. Davidson, 1 Cush. 33; Com. v. Hooper, 104 Mass. 549; Com. v. Hutchison, 114 Ibid. 325; Com. v. Jeffries, 7 Allen, 549; State v. Newell, 1 Mo. 248. Infra, § 1229. Thus, to obtain a "trade" by a false pretence is indictable. State v. Stanley, 64 Me. 157. See State v. Hill, 72 Ibid. 238. It is otherwise when only credit on account was obtained, which was afterwards made operative by a distinct transaction. R. v. Wavell, 1 Mood. C. C. 224. Infra, § 1198. Abbott, 1 Den. C. C. 273; 2 Of this Sir J. F. Stephen gives the following illustrations, Dig. C. L. art. 331: "A. draws a bill upon B. in London, and gets it discounted by C. in Russia, by falsely pretending, by means of a forged authority, that he is authorized to draw upon B. for the amount of the bill. A. does not attempt to obtain money by false pretences from B., though he meant that C. should forward the draft to B., and should obtain payment of the amount, and though his act, if done in England, would have been an obtaining by false pretences from C. R. v. Kilham, L. R. 1 C. C. 261." Supra, § 878; infra § 1203. "A., by falsely pretending to be a naval officer, induces B. to enter into a contract to board and lodge him at a guinea a week, and under this contract is supplied with food for a week. This is not obtaining food by false pretences, as the supply of food in consequence of the contract is too remotely the result of the false pretence to become the subject of an indictment. R. v. Gardner, D. & B. 40." Supra, §§ 1175, 1179. Wagoner v. State, 90 Ind. 504; Baker v. State, 14 Tex. Ap. 332. False accounts of payments may be a pretence. habit of receiving from his master money to pay the workmen, obtained from him by means of false written accounts, more than he had really paid them, or they had earned, it was held within the statute; and all the judges, after much deliberation, agreed that if the false pretence created the credit, the case was within the statute; and they considered that, in this case, the defendant would not have obtained the credit but for the false account which he had delivered, and therefore that he was properly convicted.1 Prosecutor witness to prove preponderating influ ence. Necessary that pros ecutor should have believed the § 1182. The prosecutor in a trial for obtaining an indorsement by false pretences, may testify to the influence of the defendant's representations in inducing him to indorse. The causal relationship in such cases is a matter of inference.3 § 1183. It is an essential ingredient of the offence that the party alleged to have been defrauded should have believed the false representations to be true, for if representa- he knew them to be false, he cannot claim that he was influenced by them." tions. Intent to 8. Intent § 1184. While an intention to defraud is inferable from all the facts of the case, and need not be substantively proved," be inferred such an intention is necessary to the offence. Thus, a surveyor of highways, having authority to order gravel for the roads, in ordering gravel as usual, and applying it to his from facts. 1 R. v. Witchell, 2 East P. C. 830; Bonnell v. State, 64 Ind. 498. Supra, § 1141, but see infra, § 1215. 197. Herrick, 13 Wend. 87; People v. Baker, 96 N. Y. 340; Bowler v. State, 41 Miss. 570. As to proof of intent, see supra, People v. Miller, 2 Parker C. R. §§ 101-122; Whart. Crim. Ev. §§ 53, 734. That knowledge of falsity is not 3 Therasson v. People, 82 N. Y. 238. to be inferred from independent and Supra, § 1179. R. v. Dale, 7 C. & P. 352; R. v. Mills, 40 Eng. L. & Eq. 562; 7 Cox C. C. 263; D. & B. 205; Com. v. Hulbert, 12 Met. 446; People v. Stetson, 4 Barb. 151. Supra, §§ 1176–7. See infra, § 1226; R. v. Hamilton, 9 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 271. See, also, R. v. Bloomfield, C. & M. 537; People v. detached false statements to others, see People v. Spielman, 20 Alb. L. J. 96; S. C., under name of People v. Schulman, 14 Hun, 516; 76 N. Y. 624; referred to in 80 Ibid. 373 n; Whart. Cr. Ev. § 48. 6 State v. Norton, 76 Mo. 180; Fay v. Com., 28 Grat. 912. own use, is not liable to a charge of obtaining it by false pretences, nor of larceny, unless it appear that he did not mean to pay for it.' § 1184 a. That the pretence was used honestly to collect a just debt has been ruled to be a defence.2 To compel payment of debt. Proof of admissible. § 11846. As has been already fully seen, whenever a guilty act is deliberately performed, we may logically system infer a guilty intent, and it is always admissible to fortify this presumption by showing guilty preparations, or other acts from which the intent may be gathered, even though the latter acts constitute independent offences, provided they are part of a system with that on trial. Thus, upon an indictment for obtaining goods by falsely pretending that the buyer owed but little, and had ample means to pay all his debts, and that his note for $250 was good, it is competent for the State to prove, that within three days after, he mortgaged the greater part of his personal property to another, as bearing upon his intent in making such representations.5 But such proof is inadmissible if relating to a disconnected transaction. Thus when C. was indicted for obtaining a specific sum of money from P. by false pretences, and the evidence was that he was employed by his master to take orders, but not to receive moneys, and he was proved to have obtained the specific sum from P. by representing that he was authorized by his master to receive it; proof of his having, within a week afterwards, obtained another sum from another person by a similar false pretence, such obtaining not being in any way connected with the transaction under trial, was held inadmissible for the purpose of proving the intent when he committed the acts charged in the indictment." § 1184 c. It does not negative the intent to defraud, that the defendant intended to pay for the articles obtained when able, or that he paid in part, at the time, for the articles 1 R. v. Richardson, 1 F. & F. 488Wightman. Intent to indemnify no defence. 6 State v. Call, 48 N. H. 126; Trogden v. Com., 31 Grat. 862. See Whart. 2 Infra, § 1197; State v. Hurst, 11 Crim. Ev. § 53. W. Va. 54. * See supra, § 122; Whart. Crim. Ev. § 734; People v. Winslow, 39 Mich. 505. 4 See Whart. Crim. Ev. §§ 53 et seq., 734, 753; Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16; Com. v. Howe, 132 Mass. 250. 6 R. v. Holt, 8 Cox C. C. 411; Bell C. C. 280. 7 R. v. Bowen, 13 Q. B. 790; State v. Thatcher, 35 N. J. 445. In Com. v. Coe, 115 Mass. 481, Wells, J., said :— "The offence consists in obtaining obtained, or that a trap was laid for him by the prosecutor, or that the article obtained was not that which it was his principal motive to secure. Nor is it essential that the pretence should have been made lucri causa.1 Defendant must be shown to have 9. Scienter. § 1185. Falsity, in the sense of the statutes, must be subjective as well as objective; the statement must not only be false in fact, but false to the knowledge of its utterer." It should be remembered, however, that proof of knowledge of a negative is circumstantial and inferential. In what way this proof is constituted has been already partially considered. And proof that the defendant was ignorant of a fact that he stated, sustains a charge of false statement." known the falsity. Prosecutor not re 10. Prosecutor's Negligence or Misconduct. § 1186. We have seen that to a cheat at common law it is essential that the fraud should be latent. It was in part to meet this difficulty that the statute of false pretences was passed, and under this statute it has been repeatedly held that it matters not how patent the falsity of a pretence may be if it succeed in defrauding. Thus, in a leading case, Lord Denman, C. J., said, in answer to the quired to show prudence beyond his opportunities. property from another by false pretences. The intent to defraud is the intent, by the use of such false means, to induce another to part with his possession and confide it to the defendant, when he would not otherwise have done so. Neither the promise to repay, nor the intention to do so, will deprive the false and fraudulent act in obtaining it of its criminality. Com. v. Tenney, 97 Mass. 50; Com. v. Mason, 105 Mass. 163. The offence is complete when the property or money has been obtained by such means, and would not be purged by subsequent restoration or repayment. Evidence of ability to make the repayment is therefore immaterial and inadmissible. The possession of the means of payment is |