threat as a man of ordinary firmness cannot be expected to resist, and therefore falls within the word menaces used in the statute.1 And so, under another statute, has been held to be a letter to the effect that if money be deposited in a particular place an attack would be averted. A false statement that a warrant has issued to arrest A. on a criminal charge is "threatening" to accuse A. of crime. And so is threatening to enter a complaint; and threatening to imprison on a fictitious charge." Though it would seem not essential that the prosecutor should be actually frightened, the threat must be such as would ordinarily create alarm. It is immaterial, in such cases, so far as concerns the defendant's penal responsibility, whether the prosecutor was guilty or innocent; but this issue may be material in considering the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, the intention of the prisoner was to extort money or merely to compound a felony.

A threatening letter in the defendant's own name, sent to enforce the payment of a debt, is not within the statute;10 and it has been further held that a threatening letter, referring in its terms to such circumstances as were plainly intended to denote who the writer was, and making a demand of a sum of money in controversy between him and the prosecutor, which the latter had received, and which the former had before insisted should be accounted for to him, was not a threatening letter within 9 Geo. I. c. 22, or 27 Geo. II. c. 15, although the writer did not subscribe his name. A letter is not regarded as anonymous when it indicates on its face the sender."1

§ 1665. A letter, when ambiguous, may be explained by parol proof of extraneous facts as well as by declarations of the writer.13

1 R. v. Miard, 1 Cox C. C. 22. See sites of indictment, see Com. v. MoulKistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400.

2 R. v. Pickford, 4 C. & P. 227; R. v. Smith, T. & M. 214; 1 Den. C. C. 510; 2 C. & K. 882.

Com. v. Murphy, 12 Allen, 449. Supra, § 1151.

Com. v. Carpenter, 108 Mass. 15. 5 R. v. Robertson, L. & C. 483; 10 Cox C. C. 9.

6 State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71.

7 R. v. Walton, 9 Cox C. C. 268; L. & C. 483. Compare R. v. Smith, T. & M. 214; 1 Den. C. C. 510. For requi

ton, 108 Mass. 309; Com. v. Dorus, Ibid. 307; State v. Young, 26 Iowa, 122; People v. Brannan, 30 Mich. 460; State v. Morgan, 3 Heisk. 262.

8 R. v. Cracknell, 10 Cox C. C. 408; R. v. Richards, 11 Ibid. 43.

9 Ibid.

10 People v. Griffin, 2 Barb. 427; State v. Hammond, 80 Ind. 80.

1 R. v. Heming, 2 East P. C. 1116; 1 Leach C. C. 445, n.

12 Supra, § 1660; R. v. Tucket, 1 Mood. C. C. 134; R. v. Cooper, 3 Cox

Letters

plained by parol.

The prosecutor may be asked as to what appeared to him to be the meaning of the letter. The meaning is for the jury if may be ex- the terms be ambiguous, and is to be inferred from all the circumstances of the case ;3 though whether a certain charge, not ambiguous, is threatening, is for the court." § 1666. The person threatened must be averred and proved, and so must the fact of sending, but as will be seen in the next section sending may be inferentially shown. The letter must be set out if obtainable. The venue may be laid in the place of reception. If inspection be desired, the court will, on motion of the prisoner's counsel, as soon as the bill is found, order that the letter be deposited with the officer of the court, that the prisoner's witnesses may inspect it."

Material facts must be averred

and proved.

§ 1666 a. To prove intent, prior threats of the same kind are admissible. The sending is to be inferred from facts. It has

10

C. C. 547; R. v. Hendy, 4 Ibid. 243; State v. Linthicum, 68 Me. 66. Under the Massachusetts statute only the substance of the letter need be set forth. Com. v. Philpott, 130 Mass.

59.

v. Dorus, Ibid. 488; Shifflet v. Com., 14 Grat. 652.

6 R. v. Dunkley, 1 Mood. C. C. 90.

R. v. Jones, 2 Cox C. C. 434; 2 C. & K. 398; R. v. Paddle, R. & R. 484. A letter signed by two initials, as R.

1 R. v. Tucket, 1 Mood. C. C. 134; R., was held a letter without a name R. v. Hendy, 4 Cox C. C. 243.

2 Ibid.; R. v. Carruthers, 1 Cox C. C. 138; R. v. Cooper, 3 Ibid. 547.

R. v. Menage, 3 F. & F. 310; R. v. Coghlan, 4 Ibid. 316; R. v. Braynell, 4 Cox C. C. 402; State v. Hollyway, 41 Iowa, 200; Longley v. State, 43 Tex. 490. That proof of reception of spoils is admissible to prove intent, see State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 17.

4 Brabham v. State, 18 Ohio St. 485; Com. v. Carpenter, 108 Mass. 15; State v. Morgan, 3 Heisk. 262. As to what constitutes "infamous crime" under the statutes, see R. v. Hickman, 1 Mood. C. C. 34; R. v. Redman, 10 Cox C. C. 159; L. R. 1 C. C. 12; Kistler v State, 54 Ind. 400. And see State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71; State v. Vaughan, 1 Bay (S. C.), 282; Robinson v. Com., 101 Mass. 27; Com. v. Moulton, 108 Ibid. 307; Com.

subscribed thereto within 9 Geo. I. c. 22. R. v. Robinson, 2 Leach C. C. 749; 2 East P. C. 1110.

7 R. v. Hunter, 2 Leach C. C. 624; R. v. Lloyd, 2 East P. C. 1122.

8 Supra, §§ 288, 1206; R. v. Girdwood, 2 East P. C. 1120; 1 Leach C. C. 142; R. v. Essex, 2 East P. C. 1125; People v. Griffin, 2 Barb. 427.

9 R. v. Harrie, 6 C. & P. 105. On an indictment with three counts for three separate letters, it was proposed to prove the sending of all three. It was held, that evidence of one only was admissible. R. v. Ward, 10 Cox C. C. 42.

10 Whart. Crim. Ev. § 46; R. v. Cooper, 3 Cox C. C. 547; R. v. McDonnell, 5 Ibid. 153.

In the latter case it was proved that the prisoner had gone up to the prose

been held that the dropping a letter in a man's way, in order that he might pick it up, was a sending of it; and it was said that there was a "sending," although the party saw the question of prisoner drop the letter, if the prisoner did not suppose

the party knew him, and intended he should not.

Sending a

fact.

As will presently

be seen, a letter threatening A., but directed to B., which is left at a place accessible to A., with the intention that it should reach as well A. as B., is "sent" to A.; and fastening a threatening letter on a gate in a public highway is some evidence to go to the jury of a sending thereof. A conviction, however, cannot be sustained where the only evidence against the defendant was his own statement that he should never have written it but for W. G. And when there is no person in existence of the precise name which the letter bears as its address, it is a question for the jury whether the party into whose hands it falls was really the one for whom it was intended. The bare delivery of a letter containing threats, though sealed, is held to be evidence of a knowledge of its contents."

§ 1666 b. Letters threatening to "burn or destroy" are also made specifically indictable by statute in England. Under this

cutor and said to him, "If you do not give me a sovereign I will charge you with an indecent assault." It was held that inasmuch as, if the jury believed that such language had been used by the prisoner, the intent was manifest, evidence for the prosecution tending to show that the prisoner had made a similar charge two years before ought not to be admitted. But this is no adequate reason for rejecting the evidence.

1 R. v. Wagstaff, R. & R. 398. 2 Ibid.

be received, knowing the contents thereof, any letter or writing threatening to burn or destroy any house, barn, or other building, or any rick or stack of grain, hay, or straw, or other agricultural produce, or any grain, hay, or straw, or other agricultural produce, in or under any building, or any ship or vessel, or to kill, maim, or wound any cattle, shall be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding ten years

3 R. v. Grimwade, 1 Cox C. C. 67; 1 and not less than five years (27 & 28 Den. C. C. 30; 1 C. & K. 592.

R. v. Williams, 1 Cox C. C. 16. 6 R. v. Howe, 7 C. & P. 268.

6 R. v. Carruthers, 1 Cox C. C. 138. 7 R. v. Girdwood, 1 Leach C. C. 142;

2 East P. C. 1120.

By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 50, "whosoever shall send, deliver, or utter, or directly or indirectly cause to

Vict. c. 47), or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor, and with or without solitary confinement, and, if a male under the age of sixteen years, with or without whipping." (Former provisions, 4 Geo. IV. c. 54, s. 3, and 10 & 11 Vict. c. 66, s. 1.)

Threats to destroy and kill

statute, where a count charged T. with sending to V. and threatening to burn certain houses, laying them as the property of O., V.'s tenant, it was proved that T. dropped the letter in a public road near V.'s house; that A. found it and gave it to H., who opened and read it, and gave it to E., who showed it to both O. and V. It was ruled that this was a sending under the statute.1

indictable.

A threat of a false and malicious prosecution in order to extort money is indictable at common law.2

§ 1666 c. By another statute, sending a letter threatening murder is made a felony. The letter, under this statute, must be construed in its natural sense, as explained by circumstances; though when necessary the indictment may explain by innuendoes and prefatory matter. To put a letter in a place where it would be likely to be seen by the person to whom it is directed is "uttering" it."

1 R. v. Grimwade, 1 Den. C. C. 30; 1 C. & K. 592; 1 Cox C. C. 67. See, as to sending, supra, § 1666 a.

a letter to T. L., threatening to burn the house of J. R., as the threat must be to the owner of the property; and if

Under prior statutes we have the the letter was sent to T. L., with intent following rulings :

Under 27 Geo. II. c. 15, a conviction for sending a letter to P., threatening "to set fire to his mill, and likewise to do all the public injury they were able to do him, in all his farms and seteres," was set aside, it appearing that P. had not then any mill to which the threat of burning would apply (having parted with it three years before); and the threat as to the farm, etc., not necessarily implying a burning. R. v. Jepson, 2 East P. C. 1115.

A conviction under 4 Geo. IV. c. 54, 8. 3, was also set aside on an indictment charging that the prisoner sent 478

that it should reach J. R., and did reach him, it should have been charged in the indictment as sent to J. R. R. v. Jones, 2 C. & K. 398; 1 Den. C. C. 218; 2 Cox C. C. 434; R. v. Grimwade, 1 Ibid. 67.

2 See supra, § 851; Embry v. Com., 79 Ky. 439; Williams v. State, 13 Tex. Ap. 723.

24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 16.

R. v. Boucher, 4 C. & P. 562. Under similar statute, see State v. Young, 26 Iowa, 122; Longley v. State, 43 Tex. 490; Buie v. State, 1 Tex. Ap. 58.

R. v. Jones, 5 Cox C. C. 226.

Escape is

§ 1667. "EVERY one who knowingly, and with intent to save the person escaping from trial or execution, permits any person in his lawful custody to regain his liberty, otherwise than in due course of law, commits the offence of voluntary escape; and

"Is guilty of high treason if the escaped prisoner was in his custody for, and was guilty of, high treason;

permitting prisoner to depart from custody.

"Becomes an accessary after the fact to the felony of which the escaped prisoner was guilty if he was in his custody for, and was guilty of, felony; and

"Is guilty of a misdemeanor if the escaped prisoner was in his custody for, and was guilty of, a misdemeanor."2

The law as to voluntary escapes is thus stated by Mr. Sergeant

1 See Whart. Prec. 633 et seq. for Penn. St. 445. forms of indictment.

2 Steph. Dig. C. L. art. 144, citing Hawk. P. C. 192, 196, 197; 1 Russ. Cr. 583. See, also, Weaver v. Com., 29

It does not appear

what is the effect of voluntarily permitting the escape of a man lawfully charged, but innocent in fact. Steph. Dig. ut supra.