Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

Chase's amendment to the Nebraska bill, which gave the leave to exclude it.

In the third debate, which took place at Jonesboro, Mr. Lincoln showed that Douglas and his friends were trying to change the position of the country on the slavery question from what it was when the Constitution was adopted, and that the disturbance of the country had arisen from this pernicious effort. He then cited from Democratic speeches and platforms of former days to prove that they occupied then the very opposite ground on the question from that which was taken at the time he was speaking. He also brought out in strong relief the evasive character of Douglas's answers to the questions which he had proposed, especially the subterfuge of friendly legislation," which he had set forth as the means by which the people of a Territory could exclude slavery from its limits in spite of the Dred Scott decision.

It is a noteworthy fact that when Mr. Lincoln was preparing these questions for Douglas, he was urged by some of his friends not to corner him on this last point, because he would surely stand by his doctrine of Squatter Sovereignty in defiance of the Dred Scott decision, "and that," said they, "will make him Senator." "That may be," said Mr. Lincoln, with a twinkle in his eye, "but if he takes that shoot he never can be President."

Mr. Lincoln's sagacity did not fail him here. This position which Douglas took of "unfriendly legislation," was a stumbling-block which he was never able to get over; and if the contest between them had brought out no other good result, the compelling Douglas to take this ground was a most important point gained.

In the fourth joint debate at Charleston, Mr. Lincoln brought forward and spoke at length upon the evidence of a charge previously made by Judge Trumbull against Douglas, of being himself reponsible for a clause in the Kansas bill which would have deprived the people of Kansas of the right to vote upon their own Constitution. He stated this point as follows:

The bill that went into his (Mr. Douglas's) hands had the provision in it for a submission of the Constitution to the people; and I say its language amounts to an express provision for a submission, and that he took the provision out. He says it was known that the bill was silent in this particular; but I say, Judge Douglas, it was not silent when you got it. It was vocal with the declaration, when you got it, for a submission of the Constitution to the people. And now, my direct question to Judge Douglas is, to answer why, if he deemed the bill silent on this point, he found it necessary to strike out those particular harmless words. If he had found the bill silent and without this provision, he might say what he does now. If he supposes it was implied that the Constitution would be submitted to a vote of the people, how could these two lines so encumber the statute as to make it necessary to strike them out? How could he infer that a submission was still implied, after its express provision had been stricken from the bill? I find the bill vocal with the provision, while he silenced it. He took it out, and although he took out the other provision preventing a submission to a vote of the people, I ask, why did you first put it in? I ask him whether he took the original provision out, which Trumbull alleges was in the bill? If he admits that he did take it out, I ask him what he did it for? It looks to us as if he had altered the bill. If it looks differently to him-if he has a different reason for his action from the one we assign him-he can tell it. I insist upon knowing why he made the bill silent upon that point, when it was vocal before he put his hands upon it.

Mr. Douglas, it is needless to say, could not parry this home thrust. In his efforts to do so (for Mr. Lincoln gave him several opportunities subsequently to explain his position), he invariably lost his temper.

In view of the discussions now in progress in many parts of the country, the following passage from Mr. Lincoln's final rejoinder to Mr. Douglas, in this debate at Charleston, possesses peculiar interest.

Judge Douglas has said to you that he has not been able to get from me an answer to the question whether I am in favor of negro citizenship. So far as I know, the Judge never asked me the question before. He shall have no occasion to ever ask it again, for I tell him very frankly that I am not in favor of negro citizenship. This furnishes me an occasion for saying a few words upon the subject. I mentioned in a certain speech of mine which has been printed, that the Supreme Court had decided that a negro could not possibly be made a citizen; and without saying what was my gronnd of complaint in regard to that, or whether I had any ground of complaint, Judge Douglas has from that

thing manufactured nearly every thing that he ever says about my dispo sition to produce an equality between the negroes and the white people. If any one will read my speech, he will find I mentioned that as one of the points decided in the course of the Supreme Court opinions, but I did not state what objection I had to it. But Judge Douglas tells the people what my objection was, when I did not tell them myself. Now my opinion is that the different States have the power to make a negro a citizen under the Constitution of the United States, if they choose. The Dred Scott decision decides that they have not that power. If the State of Illinois had that power I should be opposed to the exercise of it. That is all I have to say about it.

In the fifth joint debate, that at Galesburg, Mr. Lincoln defended the Republican party from the charge of being sectional, and in the course of his speech he thus pointedly sketched the difference between the supporters of Mr. Douglas and their opponents, as regarded the manner in which they respectively looked upon the free and slave States:

The Judge tells, in proceeding, that he is opposed to making any odious distinctions between free and slave States. I am altogether unaware that the Republicans are in favor of making any odious distinctions between the free and slave States. But there still is a difference, I think, between Judge Douglas and the Republicans in this. I suppose that the real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends, and the Republicans on the contrary, is, that the Judge is not in favor of making any difference between slavery and liberty-that he is in favor of eradicating, of pressing out of view, the questions of preference in this country for free or slave institutions; and consequently every sentiment he utters discards the idea that there is any wrong in slavery. Every thing that emanates from him or his coadjutors in their course of policy, carefully excludes the thought that there is any thing wrong in slavery. All their arguments, if you will consider them, will be seen to exclude the thought that there is any thing whatever wrong in slavery. If you will take the Judge's speeches, and select the short and pointed sentences expressed by him—as his declaration that he "don't care whether slavery is voted up or down"you will see at once that this is perfectly logical, if you do not admit that slavery is wrong. If you do admit that it is wrong, Judge Douglas cannot logically say he don't care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down. Judge Douglas declares that if any community want slavery they have a right to have it. He can say that logically, if he says that there is no wrong in slavery; but if you admit that there is a wrong in it, he cannot logically say that anybody has a right to do wrong. He insists that, upon the score of equality, the owners of slaves and the owners of property

-of horses and every other sort of property-should be alike, and hold them alike in a new Territory. That is perfectly logical, if the two species of property are alike, and are equally founded in right. But if you admit that one of them is wrong, you cannot institute any equality between right and wrong. And from this difference of sentiment-the belief on the part of one that the institution is wrong, and a policy springing from that belief which looks to the arrest of the enlargement of that wrong; and this other sentiment, that it is no wrong, and a policy sprung from that sentiment which will tolerate no idea of preventing that wrong from growing larger, and looks to there never being an end of it through all the existence of things-arises the real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends on the one hand, and the Republicans on the other. Now, I confess myself as belonging to that class in the country who contemplate slavery as a moral, social, and political evil, having due regard for its actual existence amongst us, and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way, and to all the Constitutional obligations which have been thrown about it; but, nevertheless, desire a policy that looks to the prevention of it as a wrong, and looks hopefully to the time when, as a wrong, it may come to an end.

Mr. Lincoln also, after again calling attention to the fraudulent resolutions, and giving strong proof that Douglas himself was a party to the imposition, showed that he had failed to answer his question about the acceptance of the new Dred Scott decision, which, he said, was "just as sure to be made as to-morrow is to come, if the Democratic party shall be sustained" in the elections. He then discussed the policy of acquiring more territory, and the importance of deciding upon any such acquisition, by the effect which it would have upon the Slavery question among ourselves.

In the next debate, at Quincy, besides making some personal points as to the mode in which Douglas had conducted the previous discussions, he stated clearly and briefly what were the principles of the Republican party, what they proposed to do, and what they did not propose to do.

This exposition is at once so lucid and succinct that we give the passage at length. Mr. Lincoln alluded to the assertion made by Judge Douglas at Galesburg, that he (Mr. Lincoln) desired to avoid the responsibility attach

ing to the "enormity" of the principles he advocated, and said that he would heartily state those principles, as well as it was in his power to do, "in all their enormity," which he did as follows:

We have in this nation this element of domestic slavery. It is a matter of absolute certainty that it is a disturbing element. It is the opinion of all the great men who have expressed an opinion upon it, that it is a dangerous element. We keep up a controversy in regard to it. That controversy necessarily springs from difference of opinion, and if we can learn exactly-can reduce to the lowest elements-what that difference of opinion is, we perhaps shall be better prepared for discussing the different systems of policy that we would propose in regard to that disturbing element. I suggest that the difference of opinion, reduced to its lowest terms, is no other than the difference between the men who think slavery a wrong and those who do not think it wrong. The Republican party think it a wrong-we think it is a moral, a social, and a political wrong. We think it is a wrong not confining itself merely to the persons or the states where it exists, but that it is a wrong in its tendency, to say the least, that extends itself to the existence of the whole nation. Because we think it wrong, we propose a course of policy that shall deal with it as a wrong. We deal with it as with any other wrong, in so far as we can prevent its growing any larger, and so deal with it that in the run of time there may be some promise of an end to it. We have a due regard to the actual presence of it amongst us, and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way, and all the Constitutional obligations thrown about it. I suppose that in reference both to its actual existence in the nation, and to our Constitutional obligations, we have no right at all to disturb it in the States where it exists, and we profess that we have no more inclination to disturb it than we have the right to do it. We go further than that; we don't propose to disturb it where, in one instance, we think the Constitution would permit us. We think the Constitution would permit us to disturb it in the District of Columbia. Still we do not propose to do that, unless it should be in terms which I don't suppose the nation is very likely soon to agree to the terms of making the emancipation gradual, and compensating the unwilling owners. Where we suppose we have the Constitutional right, we restrain ourselves in reference to the actual existence of the institution and the difficulties thrown about it. We also oppose it as an evil, so far as it seeks to spread itself. We insist on the policy that shall restrict it to its present limits. We don't suppose that in doing this we violate any thing due to the actual presence of the institution, or any thing due to the Constitutional guaranties thrown around it.

We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I

« AnteriorContinuar »