4. The Grounds of Probability are two; Conformity with our own Experience, or the Testimony of others Experience. 5. In this all the Agreements, pro and con, ought to be examined, before we come to a Judgment. 6. They being capable of great Variety. SECT. CHAP. XVI. Of the Degrees of Affent. 1. Our Affent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability. 2. These cannot always be all actually in view, and then we must content ourselves with the remembrance that we once faw ground for fuch a Degree of Afsent. 3. The ill Confequence of this, if our former Judgment were not rightly made. 4. The right ufe of it is mutual Charity and Forbear ance. 5. Probability is either of Matter of Fact or Speculation. 6. The concurrent Experience of all other Men with ours, produces Affurance approaching to Knowledge. 7. Unquestionable Teftimony and Experience for the most part produce Confidence. 8. Fair Testimony, and the Nature of the thing indiffer ent, produces alfo confident Belief. 9. Experience and Teftimonies clashing, infinitely vary the Degrees of Probability. 10. Traditional Teftimonies, the farther removed, the lefs their Proof. 11. Yet History is of great use. 12. In things which Senfe cannot difcover, Analogy is the great Rule of Probability. 13. One Cafe where contrary Experience leffens not the Testimony. 14. The bare Teftimony of Revelation is the highest Cer tainty.. 4. Syllogifm not the great Inftrument of Reafon. 5. Helps little in Demonstration, lefs in Probability. 6. Serves not to increase our Knowledge, but fence with 7. Other Helps fhould be fought. 8. We reafon about Particulars. 9. First, Reason fails us for want of Ideas. 10. Secondly, Because of obfcure and imperfect Ideas. 11. Thirdly, For want of intermediate Ideas. 12. Fourthly, Because of wrong Principles. 13. Fifthly, Because of doubtful Terms. 14. Our highest Degree of Knowledge is intuitive without 15. The next is Demonftration by reafoning. 16. To fupply the Narrownefs of this, we have nothing but Judgment upon probable Reasoning. 17. Intuition, Demonftration, Judgment. 18. Confequences of Words, and Confequences of Ideas. 1. Neceffary to know their Boundaries. 2. Faith and Reafon what, as contradiftinguished. 3. No new fimple Idea can be conveyed by traditional Re 4. Traditional Revelation may make us know Propofi 5. Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear Evi dence of Reafon. 6. Traditional Revelation much less. 7. Things above Reason. 8. Or not contrary to Reafon, if revealed, are Matter of Faith. 9. Revelation, in Matters where Reafon cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearkened to. 10. In Matters where Reafon can afford certain Knowledge, that is to be hearkened to.. 11. If the Boundaries be not fet between Faith and Reason, no Enthufiafm, or Extravagancy in Religion, can be contradicted. 1. Love of Truth neceffary. 2. A Forwardness to dictate, whence. 3. Force of Enthusiasm. 4. Reafon and Revelation. 5. Rife of Enthusiasm. 6, 7. Enthusiasm. 8, 9. Enthufiafm miftaken for feeing and feeling. 10. Enthusiasm, how to be discovered. 11. Enthusiasm fails of Evidence, that the Propofition is from God. 12. Firmness of Perfuafion, no Proof that any Propofition is from God. 13. Light in the Mind, what. 14. Revelation must be judged by Reason. 15. Belief no Proof of Revelation. SECT. CHAP. XX. Of wrong Affent, or Error. 1. Caufes of Error. 2. First, Want of Proofs. 3. Obj. What fhall become of those who want them, an fwered. 4. People hindered from Inquiry. 5. Secondly, Want of Skill to use them. 6. Thirdly, Want of Will to use them. 7. Fourthly, Wrong Meafures of Probability, whereof. 8-10. First, Doubtful Propofitions taken for Principles. 11. Secondly, Received Hypothefes 12. Thirdly, Predominant Paffions.. 13. The Means of evading Probabilities, ft, Supposed 14. zdly, Suppofed Arguments for the contrary. 15. What Probabilities determine the Affent. 5. This is the firft Divifion of the Objects of Knowledge. OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. BOOK IV.-CHAP. I. OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. S $1. Our Knowledge converfant about our Ideas. INCE the mind, in all its thoughts and reafonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident, that our knowledge is only converfant about them. § 2. Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of two Ideas. KNOWLEDGE then feems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas. In this alone it confifts. Where this perception is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guefs, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. For when we know that white is not black, what do we elfe but perceive that these two ideas do not agree? when we poffefs ourselves with the utmost security of the demonftration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive, that equality to two right ones, does neceffarily agree to, and is infeparable from the three angles of a triangle? §3. This Agreement fourfold. BUT to understand a little more diftinctly, wherein this agreement or difagreement confifts, I think we may reduce it all to these four forts: |