4. The cleareft Idea of active Power had from Spirit. 5. Will and Understanding, two Powers. 6. Faculties. 7. Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Neceffity. 8. Liberty, what. 9. Suppofes Understanding and Will. 10. Belongs not to Volition. 11. Voluntary oppofed to involuntary, not to neceffary. 12. Liberty, what. 13. Neceffity, what. 14-20. Liberty belongs not to the Will. 21. But to the Agent or Man. 22-24. In refpect of willing, a Man is not free. 25, 26, 27. The Will determined by fomething without it. 28. Volition, what. 29. What determines the Will. 30. Will and Defire must not be confounded. 31. Uneafinefs determines the Will. 32. Defire is Uneasiness. 33. The Uneafinefs of Defire determines the Will. 34. This the fpring of Action. 35. The greateft pofitive Good determines not the Will, but Uneafinefs. 36. Because the removal of Uneafiness is the first step to Happiness. 37. Becaufe Uneafinefs alone is prefent. 38. Becaufe all who allow the Joys of Heaven poffible, pursue them not; but a great Uneafinefs is never neglected. 39. Defire accompanies all Uneafinefs. 40. The moft preffing Uneafinefs naturally determines the Will. 41. All defire Happiness. 42. Happiness, what. 43. What Good is defired, what not. 44. Why the greatest Good is not always defired. 45. Why, not being defired, it moves not the Will. 46. Due confideration raifes Delire. 47. The Power to fufpend the Profecution of any Defire makes way for Confideration. 48. To be determined by our own Judgment is no Restraint to Liberty. 49. The freeit Agents are fo determined. 50. A conftant Determination to a Pursuit of Happiness no Abridgment of Liberty. 51. The Necality of purfuing true Happinefs, the Foundation of all Liberty. 52. The Reafon of it. 53. Government of our Paffions the right Improvement of Liberty. 54, 55 How Men come to purfue different Courses. 56. How Men come to choose ill. 57. Firft, From bodily Pains. Secondly, From wrong Defires, arifing from wrong Judgment. 58, 59. Our Judgment of prefent Good or Evil always right. 60. From a wrong Judgment of what makes a neceffary part of their Happinefs. 61, 62. A more particular Account of wrong Judgments. 63. In comparing prefent and future. 64, 65. Caufes of this. 66. In confidering Confequences of Actions. 67. Caufes of this. 68. Wrong Judgment of what is neceffary to our Happinefs. 69. We can change the Agreeableness or Difagreeableness in things 70, 71, 72, 73. Preference of Vice to Virtue, a manifeft wrong Judgment. TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THO MA A S, EARL OF PEMBROKE AND MONTGOMERY, Baron HERBERT of Cardiff, Lord Ross of Kendal, Pár, Fitzhugh, Marmion, St. Quintin, and Shurland; Lord Prefident of his Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, and Lord Lieutenant of the County of Wilts and of South Wales. MY LORD, HIS treatise, which is grown up under your Lord your order, does now, by a natural kind of right, come to your Lordship for that protection which you feveral years fince promised it. It is not that I think any name, how great foever, fet at the beginning of a book, will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in it; things in print must stand and fall by their own worth, or the reader's fancy; but there being nothing more to be defired for truth than a fair unprejudifed hearing, nobody is more likely to procure me that than your Lordship, who are allowed to have got so intimate an acquaintance with her in her more retired receffes. Your Lordship is known to have fo far advanced your fpeculations in the most abstract and general knowledge of things beyond the ordinary reach or common methods, that your allowance and approbation of the defign of this treatise will at least preserve it from being condemned without reading, and will prevail to have those parts a little weighed, which might otherwife, perhaps, be thought to deserve no confideration, for being fomewhat out of the common road. The imputation of novelty is a terrible charge amongst those who judge of mens heads, as they do of their perukes, by the fashion, and can allow none to be right but the received doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote anywhere at its first appearance: New opinions are always fufpected, and usually opposed, without any other reafon, but because they are not already common: But truth, like gold, is not the lefs fo for being newly brought out of the mine; it is trial and examination must give it price, and not any antique fashion; and though it be not yet current by the public ftamp, yet it may for all that be as old as nature, and is certainly not the lefs genuine. Your Lordship can give great and convincing inftances of this, whenever you please to oblige the public with fome of those large and comprehenfive difcoveries you have made of truths hitherto unknown, unless to some few, to whom your Lordship has been pleased not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a fufficient reason, were there no other, why I fhould dedicate this Effay to your Lordship; and its having fome little correfpondence with fome parts of that nobler and vast system of the fciences your Lordship has made fo new, exact, and inftructive a draught of, I think it glory enough, if your Lordship permit me to boast, that here and there I have fallen into fome thoughts not wholly different from yours. If your Lordship think fit, that, by your encouragement, this fhould appear in the world, I hope it may be a reafon, fome time or other, to lead your Lordship farther; and you will allow me to fay, that you here give the world an earnest of fomething that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their expectation. This, my Lord, fhows what a prefent I here make to your Lordship, just such as the poor man does to his rich and great neighbour, by whom the basket of flowers or fruit is not ill taken, though he has more plenty of his own growth, and in much greater perfection. Worthlefs things receive a value when they are made the offerings of refpect, efteem, and gratitude. Thefe you have given me fo mighty and peculiar reafons to have in the highest degree for your Lordship, that |