thefs, and were fit to fupport the doctrines of their particular schools or churches; a plain evidence that there are no fuch innate truths: Nay, a great part of

en are fo far from finding any fuch innate moral principles in themselves, that by denying freedom to mankind, and thereby making men no other than bare machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral rules whatfoever, and leave not a poffibility to believe any fuch, to thofe who cannot conceive how any thing can be capable of a law that is not a free agent; and upon that ground they must neceffarily reject all principles of virtue, who cannot put morality and mechanifm tgether, which are not very eafy to be reconciled or made confiftent.

15. Lord Herbert's Innate Trinciples examined. WHEN I had writ this, being informed that my Lord Herbert had, in his books De Veritate, aligned thefe innate principles, I prefently confulted him, hoping to find in a man of fo great parts fomething that might fatisfy me in this point, and put an end to my inquiry. In his chapter De Inftin&u Naturali, p. 76. edit. 1656, I met with these fix marks of his Notitie Communes. 1. Prioritas. 2. Independentia. 3. Univerfalitas. 4. Certitudo. 5. Neceffitas, i. e. as he explains it, faciunt ad hominis confervationem. 6. Medus conformationis, i. c. Affenfus nulla interpofita mora. And at the latter end of his little treatife De Religione Laici, he fays this of thefe innate principles, "Adeo ut non uniufcujufvis religionis confinio artentur quæ ubique vigent veri"tates. Sunt enim in ipfa mente cœlitus defcriptæ nullifque traditionibus, five fcriptis, five non fcriptis, "obnoxiæ," p. 3. And, "Veritates noftræ Catholicæ, 66 que tanquam indubia Dei effata in foro interiori de"fcripta." Thus having given the marks of the innate principles or common notions, and afierted their being imprinted on the minds of men by the hand of God, he proceeds to fet them down, and they are thefe: 1. Efe aliquod fupremum Numen. 2. Numen illud coli debere. 3. Virtutem eum pietate conjunctam optimam effe rationem cultus divini. 4. Refipifcendum effe a peccatis,

5. Dari præmium vel pœnam poft hanc vitam tranfa&tam. Though I allow thefe to be clear truths, and fuch as, if rightly explained, a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his affent to, yet I think he is far from proving them innate impreffions, in foro interiori dejcripta. For I muft take leave to obferve,

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First, THAT thefe five propofitions are either not at all, or more than all thofe common notions writ on our minds by the finger of God, if it were reasonable to believe any at all to be fo written, fince there are other propofitions which, even by his own rules, have as juft a pretence to fuch an original, and may be as well admitted for innate principles, as at leaft fome of these five he enumerates, viz. Do as thou wouldst be done unto, and perhaps fome hundreds of others, when well confidered.

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Secondly, THAT all his marks are not to be found in each of his five propofitions, viz. his firft, fecond, and third marks, agree perfectly to neither of them; and the first, fecond, third, fourth, and fiath marks, but ill agree to his third, fourth, and fifth propofitions: For, befides that we are affured from hiftory of many men, nay, whole nations, who doubt or difbelieve fome or all of them, I cannot fee how the third, viz. That virtue joined with piety is the best worship of God, can be an innate principle, when the name or found virtue is fo hard to be understood, liable to fo much uncertainty in its fignification, and the thing it ftands for fo much contended about, and difficult to be known; and therefore this can be but a very uncertain rule of hunan practice, and ferve but very little to the conduct of our lives, and is therefore very unfit to be affigned as an innate practical principle.

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FOR let us confider this propofition as to its meaning (for it is the fense and not found that is and must be the principle or common notion), viz. Virtue is the best worship of God, i. e. is noft acceptable to him; which if virtue be taken, as moft commonly it is, for thofe

actions which, according to the different opinions of feveral countries, are accounted laudable, will be a propofition fo far from being certain, that it will not be true. If virtue be taken for actions conformable to God's will, or to the rule prefcribed by God, which is the true and only measure of virtue, when virtue is used to fignify what is in its own nature right and good, then this propofition, That virtue is the best worship of God, will be moft true and certain, but of very little ufe in human life, fince it will amount to no more but this, viz. That God is pleafed with the doing of what he commands, which a man may certainly know to be true, without knowing what it is that God doth command, and fo be as far from any rule or principles of his actions as he was before; and I think very few will take a proposition which amounts to no more than this, viz. that God is pleased with the doing of what he himfelf commands, for an innate moral principle writ on the minds of all men (however true and certain it may be), fince it teaches fo little. Whofoever does fo will have reason to think hundreds of propofitions innate principles, fince there are many which have as good a title to this to be received for fuch, which nobody yet ever put into that rank of innate principles. $19.

NOR is the fourth propofition, viz. Men mußt repent of their fins, much more inftructive, till what thofe actions are that are meant by fins be fet down; for the word peccata, or fins, being put, as it ufually is, to fignify in general ill actions, that will draw punishment upon the doers, what great principle of morality can that be to tell us we fhould be forry, and cease to do that which will bring mischief upon us, without knowing what thofe particular actions are that will do fo? Indeed this is a very true propofition, and fit to be inculcated on and received by thofe who are fuppofed to have been taught what actions in all kinds are fins; but neither this nor the former can be imagined to be innate principles, nor to be of any use if they were innate, unless the particular meafures and bounds of all

virtues and vices were engraven in mens minds, and were innate principles alfo, which I think is very much to be doubted; and therefore I imagine it will scarce feem poflible that God fhould engrave principles in mens minds in words of uncertain fignification, fuch as virtues and fins, which amongst different men stand for different things; nay, it cannot be fuppofed to be in words at all, which, being in moft of thefe principles very general names, cannot be understood but by knowing the particulars comprehended under them: And in the practical inftances, the measures must be taken from the knowledge of the actions themselves, and the rules of them, abstracted from words, and antecedent to the knowledge of names; which rules a man must know, what language foever he chance to learn, whether English or Japan, or if he should learn no language at all, or never fhould understand the use of words, as happens in the cafe of dumb and deaf

When it shall be made out, that men ignorant of words, or untaught by the laws and customs of their country, know that it is part of the worship of God not to kill another man, not to know more women than one, not to procure abortion, not to expose their children, not to take from another what is his, though we want it ourfelves, but, on the contrary, relieve and fupply his wants, and whenever we have done the contrary, we ought to repent, be forry, and refolve to do fo no more; when, I fay, all men fhall be proved actually to know and allow all these, and a thousand other fuch rules, all which come under these two general words made ufe of above, viz. Virtutes et peccata, Virtues and fins, there will be more reafon for admitting these and the like for common notions and practical principles. Yet after all, univerfal consent (were there any in moral principles) to truths, the knowledge whereof may be attained otherwife, would fcarce prove them to be innate, which is all I contend for.

20. Object. Innate Principles may be corrupted, anfwered.

NOR will it be of much moment here to offer that very ready, but not very material anfwer, viz. That the innate principles of morality may, by education and cuftom, and the general opinion of thofe amongst whom we converfe, be darkened, and at laft quite vorn out of the minds of men; which affertion of theirs, if true, quite takes away the argument of univerfal confent, by which this opinion of innate principles is endeavoured to be proved, unless those men will think it reasonable that their private perfuafions, or that of their party, should pafs for univerfal confent, a thing not unfrequently done, when men, prefuming themselves to be the only mafters of right reafon, caft by the votes and opinions of the rest of mankind, as not worthy the reckoning; and then their argument ftands thus: The principles which all mankind allow for true are innate; those that men of right reafon admit, are the principles allowed by all mankind; we, and thofe of our mind, are men of reason, therefore we agreeing, our princi ples are innate; which is a very pretty way of arguing, and a fhort cut to infallibility; for otherwife it will be very hard to understand how there be fome principles which all men do acknowledge and agree in, and yet there are none of thofe principles which are not by depraved cuftom and ill education blotted out of the minds of many men; which is to fay, that all men admit, but yet many men do deny and diffent from them: And indeed the fuppofition of fuch first principles will ferve us to very little purpofe, and we ihall be as much at a lofs with as without them, if they may by any human power, fuch as is the will of our teachers, or opinions of our companions, be altered or loft in us; and notwithstanding all this boat of first principles and innate light, we fhall be as much in the dark and uncertainty as if there were no fuch thing at all, it being all one to have no rule, and one that will warp any way, or, amongst various and contrary rules, not to know which is the right. But concerning in