were native and original impreffions, fhould appear faireft and clearest in thofe perfons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them: And it is, in my opinion, a ftrong prefumption that they are not innate, fince they are least known to thofe, in whom, if they were innate, they muft needs exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, favages, and illiterate people, being of all others the leaft corrupted by custom or borrowed opinions, learning and education having not caft their native thoughts into new moulds, nor by fuperinducing foreign and studied doctrines, confounded thofe fair characters nature had written there; one might reafonably imagine, that in their minds thefe innate notions fhould lie open fairly to every one's view, as it is certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected, that these principles fhould be perfectly known to naturals; which being ftamped immediately on the foul (as thefe men fuppofe), can have no dependence on the conftitutions, or organs of the body, the only confeffed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these mens principles, that all thefe native beams of light (were there any fuch) fhould in thofe who have no referves, no arts of concealment, fhine out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleasure, and abhorrence of pain. But alas! amongst children, idiots, favages, and the grofsly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? What univerfal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from thofe objects they have had moft to do with, and which have made upon their fenfes the frequenteft and ftrongeft impreffions. A child knows his nurfe and his cradle, and by degrees the playthings of a little more advanced age; and a young favage has, perhaps, his head filled with love and hunting, according to the fashion of his tribe: But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect thefe abstract maxims and reputed principles of fciences, will, I fear, find himself mistaken. Such kind of ge

neral propofitions are feldom mentioned in the huts of Indians, much lefs are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impreffions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and bufinefs of the fchools and academies of learned nations, accustomed to that fort of converfation or learning, where difputes are frequent; thefe maxims being fuited to artificial argumentation, and ufeful for conviction, but not much conducing to the difcovery of truth, or advancement of knowledge. But of their fmall ufe for the improvement of knowledge, I fhall have occafion to speak more at large, l. 4. c. 7.

28. Recapitulation.

I KNOW not how abfurd this may feem to the masters of demonftration; and probably it will hardly down with any body at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of cenfure, till I have been heard out in the sequel of this difcourfe, being very willing to fubmit to better judgments. And fince I impartially fearch after truth, I fhall not be forry to be convinced that I have been too fond of my own notions; which I confefs we are all apt to be, when application and ftudy have warmed. our heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot fee any ground to think these two famed fpeculative maxims innate, fince they are not univerfally aflented to; and the affent they fo generally find, is no other than what feveral propofitions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them; and fince the affent that is given them is produced another way, and comes not from natural infcription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following difcourfe. And if thefe first principles of knowledge and fcience are found not to be innate, no other Speculative maxims can (I suppose) with better right pretend to be fo.

IF

CHAP. III.

NO INNATE PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES.

1. No moral Principles fo clear and fo generally received, as the forementioned fpeculative Maxims.

F thofe fpeculative maxims, whereof we difcourfed in the foregoing chapter, have not an actual univerfal affent from all mankind, as we there proved, it is much more visible concerning practical principles, that they come fort of an univerfal reception: And I think it will be hard to instance any one moral rule, which can pretend to fo general and ready an affent, as, What is, is; or to be fo manifest a truth as this, That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be. Whereby it is evident, that they are farther removed from a title. to be innate; id the doubt of their being native impreffions on the mind, is ftronger against these moral principles than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in queftion; they are equally true, though not equally evident. Those speculative maxims carry their own evidence with them: But moral principles require reafoning and difcourfe, and fome exercife of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth. They lie not open as natural characters engraven on the mind; which, if any fuch were, they must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to every body. But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty, no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones; because it is not fo evident, as, The whole is bigger than a part, nor fo apt to be affented to at first hearing. It may fuffice, that these moral rules are capable of demonftration; and therefore it is our own fault, if we come not to a certain knowledge of them. But the ignorance wherein many men are of them, and the flownefs of affent wherewith others receive them, are manifeft proofs that they are not innate, and fuch as offer themselves to their view without fearching.

§ 2. Faith and Justice not owned as Principles by all

Men.

WHETHER there be any fuch moral principles, where-
in all men do agree, I appeal to any who have been
but moderately converfant in the hiftory of mankind,
and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chim-
neys. Where is that practical truth, that is univerfally
received without doubt or queftion, as it must be if in-
nate? Sufice, and keeping of contracts, is that which
most men fem to agree in. This is a principle which is
thought to extend itself to the dens of thieves, and the
confederacies of the greateft villains; and they who have
gone fartheft towards the putting off of humanity itfelf,
keep faith and rules of juftice one with another. I
grant that outlaws themfelves do this one amongft an-
other, but it is without receiving thefe as the innate
laws of nature; they practife them as rules of conve-
nience within their own communities; but it is impof-
fible to conceive, that he embraces juftice as a practical
principle, who acts fairly with his fellow-highwaymen,
and at the fame time plunders or kills the next honest
man he meets with. Juftice and truth are the common
ties of fociety; and therefore even outlaws and rob-
bers, who break with all the world befides, must keep
faith and rules of equity amongst themselves, or else
they cannot hold together. But will any one fay, that
thofe that live by fraud and rapine, have innate prin-
ciples of truth and juftice, which they allow and af-
fent to?

3. Object. Though Men deny them in their Prac-
tice, yet they admit them in their Thoughts, an-
fwered.

PERHAPS it will be urged, That the tacit affent of their
minds agrees to what their practice contradicts. I an-
fwer, firft, I have always thought the actions of men.
the beit interpreters of their thoughts. But fince it is
certain that most mens practice, and fome mens open
profeffions, have either queftioned or denied thefe prin-
ciples, it is impoffible to eftablifh an univerfal confent
(though we fhould look for it only amongst grown men),

المدية

without which it is impoffible to conclude them innate. Secondly, It is very ftrange and unreasonable, to fuppofe innate practical principles, that terminate only in contemplation. Practical principles derived from nature, are there for operation, and muft produce conformity of action, not barely fpeculative affent to their truth, or elfe they are in vain diftinguished from fpeculative maxims. Nature, I confefs, has put into man a defire of happiness, and an averfion to mifery: These indeed are innate practical principles, which (as practical principles ought) do continue conftantly to operate, and influence all our actions, without ceafing. Thefe may be obferved, in all perfons and all ages, fteady and univerfal; but thefe are inclinations of the appetite to good, not impreffions of truth on the underftanding. I deny not, that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; and that, from the very firft inftances of fenfe and perception, there are fome things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; fome things that they incline to, and others that they fly: But this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge, regulating our practice. Such natural impreffions on the understanding are fo far from being confirmed hereby, that this is an argument against them; fince, if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the underftanding, as the principles of knowledge, we could not but perceive them conftantly operate in us, and influence our knowledge, as we do those others on the will and appetite, which never ceafe to be the conftant fprings and motives of all our actions, to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us.

§4. Moral Rules need a Proof, ergo not Innate. ANOTHER reafon that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles is, That I think there cannot any one. moral rule be propofed, whereof a man may not justly demand a reafon: Which would be perfectly ridiculous and abfurd, if they were innate, or fo much as felf-evident, which every innate principle muft needs be, and not need any proof to afcertain its truth, nor want any rea