assumption,-takes the character of means totally indispensable for the attainment of the imaginary end. Now, under such circumstances, it will always happen that whenever the root of the evil is touched,—whenever its legitimacy is questioned,—no arguments are more popularly conclusive against the objectors than those which go to prove that the system which long custom has consecrated cannot stand without the ground now assailed. There cannot be a doubt that such arguments were the strongest barrier which checked the Reformation. 'You would make the Church fallible in matters of faith' (people would say with alarm and indignation), 'you would question her power to bind and to loose. How then can we be sure that our belief is not heretical; or how can we enjoy a comfortable assurance of the remission of our sins? Observe besides' (they would continue to object) 'the innumerable cases in which the Pope's dispensing power is required: what shall we do without it, in the multitude of complicated events which no law can provide for?' I cannot conceive any thing more powerful than this reasoning, to excite a general feeling of abhorrence to the Reformation. Whence, I ask, does the fallacy derive its strong power of delusion? From a mere winking the principle, the recognition of which I contend for : the fallacy derives its power from the circumstance that the growth, or the consequences of the assailed assumption are regarded as important final ends, and the false assumption itself is defended upon the score of its being indispensable for the attainment of those ends. It is perfectly true, whatever the orthodox Protestants may say, that without an infallible Church, salvation by means of an orthodox creed hangs upon a desperate chance; but, if the notion of a salvation which depends on orthodoxy is the growth of hierarchical pretensions ignorantly admitted at first, and subsequently confirmed by superstition, habit, and violence, the objection that if we reject the infallibility of the Church, we cannot rest our orthodoxy upon the infallibility of the Church, is quite ludicrous. Let us then beware of a similar reasoning respect

ing the oracular character of the Scriptures. To object that, if the Scriptures are not infallible we cannot have an infalliable foundation for our religious creed, is just such an argument as I have stated in favour of Church infallibility. The necessity of infallibility in religion, must first be proved to exist; if this cannot be done, we must not be surprised by the discovery that God has not given us the means of attaining what he has not demanded.

"(25). Exactly of the same logical character is the objection, that such rationalism, as I contend for, renders useless all God's revelations to man. If the Bible' (it will be said) is to be treated like any other collection of writings, we must at once make up our minds to the melancholy state of being without a direct means of knowing the will of God,- -we must acknowledge that we have no advantage over the heathen world.' Here again the failure of results which were expected upon a false assumption is charged upon those who show that the assumption is groundless. It has been assumed that if the Bible is inspired, mankind are brought by means of it nearer to the Deity than they have been, and must remain, in case such inspiration cannot be proved; but any one who shall show the fallacies upon which the supposition was made, will be sure to be accused of the cruelty and impiety of destroying the only means of direct communication with God. I do not mention this as a peculiar hardship, to which I myself must submit. At all times and in all places he who ventures to disturb a flattering delusion will be described as a wanton aggressor, as an enemy to the happiness of his fellow men. Thank Heaven the frequent and melancholy disappointments which the more civilized part of the world have experienced on such subjects, have opened the eyes of a sufficient number to diminish the danger of those whose unwelcome vocation is to contend with popular delusions.

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(24.) In the present case I might content myself with an appeal to the long and varied experience which shows that the theory of inspiration (especially among Protestants), totally

fails of the results for the sake of which it has been set forth. But I wish to attack the root itself of the delusion. In my view of the subject, even the most direct and personal communication with God of any writer, could not give to his books the power of conveying a supernatural, or rather superrational conviction to the readers. In establishing this important point, deep prejudice and trembling superstition present the only difficulties with which intellect has to contend. As, for the present, I totally despair of gaining any ground; I shall only point to principles on which men, accustomed to follow reason in spite of imagination, will, I trust, readily agree with me.

"The notion of a certainty above reason,- -a superrational certainty I wish to call it,-is so self-contradictory, that it cannot be well conceived by the mind. Yet such a notion is the only foundation of the established supernaturalism. With a truly infantine ignorance of man's mental constitution, people continue to imagine, that no belief can exceed in certainty that which would arise from hearing God himself make a verbal statement of what he wished mankind to hold as unquestionably true. But there is a monstrous misconception at the bottom of this notion; for does it not suppose that God may make himself an object of which our senses may judge? God, I doubt not, can do all things, except what is in contradiction with himself: it is He who has made our senses in such a manner that they can receive only certain kind of impressions,-impressions essentially distinct from every thing mental or spiritual. The supposition then that he would resort to such a medium for a more immediate and more secure communication with man, implies a charge of ignorance of his own works in the great Creator. 'God is a spirit,' is the sublime fundamental principle of Christ's religion. Man too, is in part a spirit; and the communication between the spiritual Creator, and that visible creature of His, who bears the spiritual stamp of his likeness, would naturally be expected to be between the two spirits,-the spirit of God, and the spirit in

man. But no this could not take place except through man's reason; and that supreme power within us, is said to be too weak, too much exposed to error and delusion. How shall this difficulty be obviated? How shall God remove uncertainty from his most particular and important communications with man? Let God be seen and heard,' answers the supernaturalist. In vain it is declared (though it scarcely needed a declaration) that no man has seen God at any time.' The divine will confidently explain away this assertion, and tell us that God was frequently seen in the time of the Patriarchs, and was distinctly heard by the whole people of Israel. Reason, he tells us, is a deceitful guide: but here, it seems there was no room for mistake,-a mountain was seen in flames, there was an earthquake,-a trumpet sounded,-and a voice was heard speaking distinctly. Such, we are told, is one of the most remarkable instances of direct communication between God and man, intended to obviate the danger of our being misled by reason, and to establish a certainty in religious matters for all ages and nations to come. This is to be considered a source of certainty above all assurance which could be obtained spiritually, or what is the same, rationally. But let us see God spoke are we sure that God has a voice, or that when a sound like that of the human voice cannot be traced to any man, it must, beyond all doubt, originate in God? The world has been full of delusions, bearing internal marks very like the communication in question. I will not say that this is a delusion of the same kind as those which are recorded in prophane history; but the senses are subject to delusions and how can we be certain that the witnesses of such manifestations of God through the senses, took every reasonable precaution against mistake?-But I will not tire you with a minute enumeration of the doubts which inevitably surround a transaction of this kind, as soon as it is consigned to history, in order (it is supposed) to produce a superrational conviction, at the distance of an indefinite number of years. It seems quite incredible that such an ignorance of ourselves,

of our faculties, of the grounds of our conviction, as is betrayed in the above supposition, should exist among us! God, in the first place, is asserted to have addressed himself to the external senses of man, distrusting the powers which he had imparted to man's mind. Such, we are told, was the Deity's preeminent means of giving us certainty upon things on which our eternal well-being depended. But, it is clear, that all this contrivance of ocular and auricular certainty could reach only those whose eyes and ears were affected at a certain time. The benefit of that supposed certainty was confined to a small number of men, upon a very limited spot. What then is to be the ground of certainty for the millions of millions equally concerned in the subject, who were not present? • Historical evidence, we are told, is enough for them.' But historical evidence, however complete and strong, does not address itself to the senses, which the supernaturalist makes the vehicles of the highest certainty,―certainty above that of which reason is capable. What we and all the rest of mankind except the witnesses of a miracle can examine by means of our senses, are writings which can prove nothing, except by the help and under the approbation of reason. The credibility of the witnesses, the authenticity of the documents, their perfect agreement with the original manuscripts,-are these things objects of sense? Unquestionably not: the blindest enthusiast must confess that reason is here to be the judge; and since its approbation must be at the bottom of the whole process, even the blindest enthusiast, if he still preserves common sense undisturbed in the slightest degree, must confess that the supposed divine contrivance to avoid the fallibility of human reason, has totally failed; and that the originally discarded reason must be the foundation of belief in those miracles which were intended to supersede it in matters, as they are called, of revelation.

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(25.) Verbal revelation and miracles have for ages been treated under the false notion which I have just laid before you. Both have been, most unphilosophically, imagined to