knowledge only are used, or orders given based apon them, it can at no time be considered more than pilotage service. It is also the duty of a pilot at any time, in order to prevent a vessel in his charge from grounding, to let go an anchor; nor could such an act be considered beyond what might be demanded of him as a pilot, or entitle him to extra reward." When Murray, therefore, went aboard of the Cachemire, he went as a pilot. He took charge of her as a pilot. If it be true, as he alleges, that he ordered the anchor out, he did so as a pilot. When the tugs came, and he remained on the Cachemire, his partner, Santos, went into the leading tug. They acted as pilots. When they took the ship over the bar they were still in the strict line of their duty, and could not be salvors. It would be contrary to public policy to encourage pilots in converting their duties into salvage services. The Grid, 21 Fed. Rep. 425. But they rendered extraordinary services, and displayed extraordinary skill. They took over the bar, in a difficult channel, the disabled steamship, 346 feet in length, steered in an unusual way, without accident or delay. They certainly are entitled to extra compensation. Hobart v. Drogan, 10 Pet. 108. A pilot who brings in a disabled vessel is entitled to additional compensation on account of the superadded responsibility, hazard, and risk. The Warren, 12 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 257; Dexter v. The Richmond, 4 Law Rep. 20; Love v. Hinckley, 1 Abb. Adm. 436; The Grid, supra. The doctrine is well laid down in Hope v. The Dido, 2 Paine, 243. Pilots may become salvors; but they must first strictly discharge their duty as pilots. The circumstances under which they may claim to be considered as salvors must be such as require efforts, peril to be encountered, labor or skill outside the line of their duty. When, however, there has been extraordinary personal merit or effort, or unforeseen exertion or hazard, in the performance of the service, even though it be in the line of their duty, a court of admiralty, in its discretion, may grant them an extra allowance." Under the circumstances of this case, I give to these pilots-the two of them engaged—an extra allowance of $150 each. The services having been given, neither the claimant nor his insurers made any offer of any compensation whatever to the tugs, nor of extra compensation to the pilots, and no acknowledgment of the services of the boats. The costs, therefore, will follow the decree, and fall on the claimant respondent. Let a decree be entered in accordance with this opinion.

SPRECKLES et al. v. THE BRUSSELS.

(District Court, N. D. California. February 28, 1889.)

SALVAGE-COMPENSATION.

On an alarm of distress being given by the bark B., which proved to be on fire, the tug A. proceeded immediately to the assistance of the bark, and during a period of about a half an hour, and until the city fire-boat came up, fought the flames; and, while not succeeding in subduing them, apparently prevented the fire from spreading to a quantity of oil constituting a part of the cargo. Afterwards, when it was found impossible to extinguish the fire without flooding the bark with such a quantity of water as would expose her to the danger of sinking, the A. towed the bark to certain flats, where it was hauled upon the mud and the fire was extinguished. The vessel was valued in her damaged condition at $15,000, the cargo at $55,312.56. Held, that the sum of $1,500 would be allowed the tug.

In Admiralty.

Milton Andros, for libelants.
Page & Eells, for claimant.

HOFFMAN, J. The evidence in this case, in some particulars, is conflicting, but it is not difficult, I think, to arrive at a clear view of the facts. About 11 o'clock of the night of the 9th of March, 1888, an alarm was given along the city front, indicating that some vessel in the harbor was either on fire or in need of assistance. The steam-tug Alert, which was then engaged in carrying mails to the steam-ship Alameda, instantly got under way, and went in search of the vessel in distress. She was directed to the bark Brussels, then lying in the stream, which proved to be on fire, kindled, as was afterwards ascertained, by incendiaries. Dense volumes of smoke were issuing from her after-hatch, indicating that the fire was raging with great violence. She instantly attached her hose, and commenced playing two streams into the hatch,-one of them through a hose known as the "Regulation Hose," and the other through a hose of smaller dimensions. She succeeded in so far subduing the fire as to prevent the flames from rising through the hatch. The smoke, however, still continued very dense, and the fumes, probably of burning mustard seed, were of a peculiarly acrid and suffocating character. The heat was also so intense that the men handling the hose had to be relieved at short intervals. After a time, variously estimated at from 20 to 40 minutes, the city fire-boat arrived. She at once passed on board four lines of hose, and commenced playing down the hatch. It soon became evident, however, that the water could not reach the seat of the fire, and that the latter could not be extinguished except by flooding the vessel with a quantity of water, which would expose her to the imminent danger of sinking at her moorings. It was then suggestedI think by Capt. Douglas-that she should be taken to the Mission flats, and hauled up on the mud. This was done, the Alert performing the effective part of the towage service. Capt. Douglas states that before the fire-boat came up he had the fire under control. In this,

I think, he is clearly mistaken. That he had succeeded in checking its progress, and preventing the flames extending to the mustard seed and oil with which she was stowed, may, I think, be fairly inferred. The condition of the mustard seed and the oil showed afterwards that a very short time would have been required to have involved those articles in the conflagration, and, had they become thoroughly ignited, it would probably have been impossible to save the ship; but that the fire was not under control is obvious from subsequent events. The ship had been on the mud for a considerable time before it appears to have occurred to any one to obtain access to the fire by cutting holes through her decks. The condition of the boiling pitch and the great heat of the planks clearly indicated where the seat of the fire was, and a couple of holes were cut in the deck, which exposed the fire, and enabled the hose to play directly upon it. After a comparatively short time the fire was totally extinguished, and sails and burning cables were hauled on deck. The Alert then returned to the wharf, and resumed her work of carrying mails to the Alameda. She came back later, however, but there was then no need of her service, there being no signs of fire about the ship. The service in which she was actually engaged lasted a few hours. She incurred no risk either to herself or to the members of her crew engaged in handling the hose, but her service was important. It was rendered with commendable alacrity and promptitude, and it may be that, had she not proceeded instantly to the scene of the conflagration, the fire might have reached the mustard seed and the oil, and rendered the destruction of the ship inevitable. Her towage service was undoubtedly a salvage service, and, I think, indispensable. Had the ship been obliged to wait for a tug to perform that service, it is possible that the fire might have obtained such headway as to render its extinguishment extremely difficult, or caused far greater damage to the cargo than it actually sustained. These I believe to be an outline of the facts. In estimating the imminence of the peril, I am naturally driven more or less to conjecture. How long the tug had been at work before the fire-boat came up cannot certainly be known. It was probably about a half hour. Whether during that interval the fire would have reached the mustard seed and the whale oil, and so far ignited them as to put it beyond the power of the fire-boat to extinguish, or even check, the flames, is also a matter of conjecture. It is certainly possible, and I think probable, that the services of the tug in this respect were valuable; and, though I cannot say that she certainly saved the ship from destruction, she contributed to it very possibly in an important degree. The value of the vessel in her damaged condition is agreed to be $15,000. The agreed value of the cargo is $55,312.56. shall allow the sum of $1,500.

I

THE ALGIERS.1

VANAMAN et al. v. THE ALGIERS.

VANAMAN v. SAME.

(District Court, E. D. New York. March 13, 1889.)

COLLISION-SIGNALS.

By article 2 of the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, a sailing vessel is forbidden to display a flare-up light to an approaching vessel, except when she is being overtaken by such vessel, as provided in article 11.

In Admiralty.

The first above named action was brought against the Algiers to recover for the loss of the schooner Nelly S. Jerrill and her cargo by collision. The second action was brought by a seaman on the schooner to recover for personal injuries to him arising out of the collision.

Biddle & Ward, Henry D. Edmunds, and Curtis Tilton, for libelants. Charles H. Tweed and R. D. Benedict, for the steam-ship.

BENEDICT, J. These actions, which have been tried together, arise out of a collision between the schooner Nelly S. Jerrill and the steamer Algiers, which occurred on December 8, 1887. The schooner, while proceeding up the coast of New Jersey, closehauled on her port tack, and heading N. E. by N., at about 10 o'clock at night off Barnegat, met the steamer Algiers coming down the coast, steering S. by W. W. The schooner held her course. The steamer did the same until near the schooner, when, seeing a flare-up light on her starboard bow, she starboarded hard, but by the time she had swung two and a half points she struck the schooner on the port quarter, about 10 feet from the taffrail, cutting off the stern, and with it the libelant John D. Vanaman, who was asleep in his bunk, and was awakened by finding himself in the water. The schooner claims that she was carrying proper side-lights, and besides was displaying a flare-up light, and that the collision was caused solely by the want of a proper lookout on the steamer. The steamer claims that the schooner, in violation of the law, displayed a flare-up light, by which she misled the steamer.

The question first to be considered is whether the exhibition of a flare-up light by the schooner was a violation of the rules for preventing collisions at sea, as revised by the statute of March 3, 1885. 23 St. at Large, 438. The contention on the part of the schooner is that the rules do not forbid the showing of a flare-up under such circumstances, and the decision in the case of The Merchant Prince, L. R. 10 Prob. Div. 139, is cited in support of this contention. By the decision referred to, the language of the British statute, which is identical with the language used

'Reported by Edward G. Benedict, Esq., of the New York bar.

in the second article of our act of March 3, 1885, was held not to forbid the exhibition of a flare-up light by a sailing vessel, although not being overtaken by but approaching a steamer upon a course crossing her own. With all my respect for the opinion of the learned justice who in the case of The Merchant Prince so construed the British statute, I am of the opinion that our act of March 3, 1885, cannot be so construed. The word "carry" seems to me to have the same meaning in all the rules. It means "carry and show." If the word "carry," in article 2, means "carry as a fixed light," it would follow that the light provided for in article 11 must be carried as a fixed light; for article 11 is specified in article 2, and the light mentioned in article 11 is just as much to be carried as the light mentioned in any other article. The necessary result of such a construction would be to make the statute declare that every vessel, when being overtaken, must be carrying as a fixed light a white light or a flare-up light, which she must show from her stern to the vessel overtaking her. I cannot put such a construction upon the act. As I understand our statute, a sailing vessel is forbidden by article 2 to display a flare-up light to an approaching vessel, except when she is being overtaken by such vessel, as provided for in article 11. Such being the law, the schooner on this occasion, when she displayed a flare-up light to the steamer approaching her from up the coast, was guilty of a violation of the law. Consequently, according to the doctrine laid down by the supreme court in the case of The Pennsylvania, 19 Wall. 125, the burden rests upon the schooner to prove not only that her display of a flare-up light was not one of the causes, or that it probably was not one of the causes, of the collision, but that it could not have been one of the causes of the collision. The evidence shows that the flare-up light was seen by those on board the steamer; that it was taken to indicate a vessel going down the coast, when in fact she was going up the coast; that shortly after it was seen, and by reason of it, the steamer's wheel was starboarded, and that she swung off two points and a half to three points before striking the schooner. Inasmuch as the steamer, although under a starboard helm, struck the schooner within 10 feet of her stern, it is clear that there could have been no collision if the steamer had held her course. And the testimony plainly shows that it was in consequence of seeing the flare-up light that the helm was starboarded and the steamer swung two and a half to three points off shore. It seems impossible, therefore, to hold that the flare-up light did not contribute to cause the collision, when, if the steamer had not seen the schooner at all, there would have been no collision, and when it was because the steamer saw the flare-up light that she swung to port and into the schooner. I see no way, therefore, to escape the conclusion that the schooner must be held in fault for having shown a flare-up light when forbidden so to do by the law. As to the steamer the evidence makes it plain that a careful lookout was not maintained. The weather was fine, and the schooner should have been seen sooner than she was. If she had been seen as soon as she might have been, collision could have been avoided. Both vessels are accordingly held in fault. Let such a decree be entered.