CHAPTER XXIV.

KEEPING STATIONS AND MANEUVRING IN SQUADRON.1 § I.

It is proposed here to discuss in rather general terms some of the difficulties connected with work in squadron from the point of view of seamanship—not at all from that of tactics. We may regard tactics as prescribing, in a very definite way, certain things which must be done; while seamanship deals, in a much less definite way, with the manner of doing them. The two subjects necessarily overlap each other throughout a considerable field. and within this field it is impossible to discuss one of them without touching upon the other. This is the excuse for such comment as is here included upon tactical formations and manœuvers. All work of ships in squadron is designed as a preparation for battle, but it may be questioned whether sufficient consideration is always given to the difficulties which, in time of battle, will be added to those which are connected with station-keeping and manœuvring at other times. The smoke from the guns and the funnels of ships ahead-all of these ships being under forced draft-will obscure the view from the conning tower in all directions, but especially ahead. The ship next ahead will be seen only a part of the time; the leader of the column probably not at all. And the use of instruments for keeping position will be altogether impracticable.

In ordinary cruising and manoeuvring the conditions are much better; the next ahead can be seen at all times, the leader occasionally; and sextants, stadimeters and range-finders are always available for measuring distances. It is questionable, however, to what extent advantage should be taken of these conditions. Certainly a constant effort should be made to train the eye in judging distance both by day and by night-the last without the aid of lights. And it would seem desirable to recognize the fact that only under very exceptional circumstances, such as will rarely exist in battle, can a column of vessels keep their distances from the leader.

1 See Notes B, Handling Ships," at end of this chapter.

Whatever method is used for estimating distance, it will usually be found easier to keep position than to regain it after it has been lost. The moment a tendency is recognized to close up or drop back, the speed should be changed enough, and only enough, to check the tendency. This is better than to wait until the error is so great as to call for a more radical change, which, if prolonged even a very little more than necessary, throws the position out in the other direction.

A caution is called for here. It has already been remarked that a column of ships cannot keep distance from the leader. It seems probable that, in battle, each ship will be reduced to the necessity of keeping distance from the next ahead; and that there will often be a good deal of uncertainty even about this. There will be many times, however, when it is practicable to judge whether the next ahead is or is not approximately in position with reference to her own next ahead. Thus by watching as many ships ahead as can be seen, whether one or two or more, it will often be possible to discriminate between a real and an apparent fault in position and to avoid the vexation of closing up on the next ahead only to find her a moment later dropping back because she has herself been ahead of position.

In spite of all that can be done, a ship will at times get quite badly out of distance. It may be that her revolutions are not quite true to standard, or that she has been badly steered, or that the vessels ahead have changed their speed. When distance has been lost from this last cause, caution must be used in closing, as the other ships may at any time resume standard speed.

Here it may be remarked that more than half the troubles in station-keeping come from irregularity in the speed and steering of the guide, and that no amount of trouble should be thought too great to keep these uniform. Good steering can be insured by careful training of the helmsmen, and the electric revolutiontelegraph which is now installed in battleships gives the officer of the deck information at all times of the number of revolutions actually being made. The officer-of-the-deck sets on this telegraph, by means of three dials, the number of revolutions he desires to make. This is indicated in the engine room and repeated back over the instrument so that a duplicate set of dials on the bridge record the number of turns that the engine room understands it is to make. The officer-of-the-deck can always tell how many revo

lutions he has ordered by looking at his instrument, which also shows that the engine room understands correctly.

While a perfectly uniform speed is more important on the part of the guide than on that of other ships, it is of immense importance to every vessel of the fleet, both for her own comfort and for that of all the vessels associated with her. It is rather surprising how little attention is usually given to acquiring this habit. As a rule, if ships keep their positions reasonably well, very little thought is given to the methods by which they accomplish this result, and a ship which is incessantly ranging up and dropping back a little-without getting seriously out of position-suffers nothing by comparison with one which steams steadily hour after hour. Yet the difference between the two is very great, especially in the consumption of coal and in the demand upon the fire-room and engine-room force. It is worth while to give great attention to this point and to require the closest possible approach to perfect steadiness on the part of the officer of the deck and the engineer's force. An excellent way to develop this is by steaming in line. Here errors in speed manifest themselves at once and yet they inconvenience no one but the offender. But for good results here, as in other cases, the steadiness of the guide must be beyond suspicion.

Under conditions as they exist at present, some variation in speed must be anticipated, and it is very important for every ship of the column to have timely notice of a change made by the ships ahead. The speed-cones as at present used give information of changes in units of one knot. The rules for their use could easily be modified to admit of showing smaller changes. But any system of signalling by shapes hoisted at a yard-arm is crude and unreliable and in battle would probably break down altogether. It would not be difficult to devise an electrically controlled system for showing in a sheltered position at the stern the number of revolutions which the ship is making, or, perhaps more simply, the deviation on one side or the other from the number which is for the moment prescribed, whether this be standard," "half" or "slow." Whatever system is used, the signal for a change should, when practicable, be shown coincidently with the change.

66

Attention has been called to the without the use of instruments.

importance of judging distance

The clearness with which de

** Macmon error for beginners n make no frequent and Not talleuj élanges of seed as a result of the failure I allow for the intersal which necessary elapses between the signal for mecham of peducing the revolutions and the actual change of speed and proton to be produced by the change in revolutions.

resized that a large ship holda her way for a long time after the Austines are stopped, and that she does not gather way. if at ret, until an appreciable time after the engines are started;

but it is not always realized that exactly the same delay must be allowed for in the response to a change of a few turns when the ship is already making way. Thus the beginner, impatient to regain position, and seeing no effect from his signal to add or subtract one or two revolutions, is tempted to call for two or three more; and when, finally, the ship begins to forge ahead or to drop back, his inclination is to let this go on until he is nearly or quite in position, forgetting that the effect of the change in revolutions of his engines will continue to affect the speed of his ship long after the engines have resumed their standard speed. This leads, of course, to almost endless changes in the revolutions and keeps the ship perpetually ranging ahead of position and dropping back astern of it.

Assuming that a ship has dropped astern of position, say a hundred yards, and wishes to regain her place.1 Having steadied her, it remains to regain position and to avoid overrunning. Suppose that five revolutions correspond to one knot. This means that five revolutions per minute will give 2000 yards in an hour. One revolution will thus give 400 yards an hour, or 100 yards in 15 minutes. If, therefore, we add one to the revolutions which hold her steady, we may expect to regain position in 15 minutes, which is much too long an interval. To reduce the time to five minutes, we must add not one turn, but three. We shall not be actually in position at the end of the five minutes, for it will take a perceptible time to pick up the extra speed; but the interval for continuing the extra revolutions will be five minutes, since it will take approximately the same time to run off the extra momentum that it took to pick it up, and the ship should, theoretically, settle into place with the speed which will just keep her there.

Similar considerations govern the reverse operation of dropping back when we find ourselves ahead of position.

In all changes of speed, and indeed at all, times when working in squadron, it is not only good "comradeship" but good seamanship, to give all possible consideration to the next astern. may be difficult for him to run into you, as is often said, but this is no reason for trying to make it easy for him to do so. If the

1 It is the "doctrine" of the Fleet to do this smartly (See Notes B at end of this chapter) but the danger of overrunning, as above described, must not be forgotten.