and hoped his success would fully equal his expectations. The destruction of everything in Sherman's rear had now fully begun, and his reply of "All right" to Thomas was the last dispatch that passed over the wires between Atlanta and Chattanooga. As Sherman rode into Atlanta that night, his reflections on the situation took this turn :-"It was surely a strange event-two hostile armies marching in opposite directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final and conclusive result in a great war; and I was strongly inspired with the feeling that the movement on our part was a direct attack upon the rebel capital at Richmond, though a full thousand miles of hostile country intervened, and that, for better or worse, it would end the war."

Sherman had not as yet decided upon an absolute route. It was indispensible that he should have alternatives. At the beginning, it was no "march to the sea," but a grand campaign on a general plan. If the Atlantic could not be reached, he must make the Gulf of Mexico. In his last dispatch to Grant he said :-"If I start before I hear further from you, or before further developments turn my course, you may take it for granted that I have moved by way of Griffin to Barnesville; that I break up the road between Columbus and Macon good, and that if I feign on Columbus, I will move by way of Macon and Millen to Savannah; or if I feign on Macon, you may take it for granted I have shot off toward Opelika, Montgomery and Mobile Bay, I will not attempt to send couriers back, but trust to the Richmond papers to keep you well advised, I will see that the road is completely broken between the Etowah and Chattahoochee, and that Atlanta itself is utterly destroyed."

For weeks before Sherman's start, the country had been passing through a period of gloomy agitation. The prosecution of the war had been made a political issue. It was the

last opportunity the Democrats would have for four years of regaining power, and if they succeeded, the Confederates would gain their end. The enemy, therefore, North and South made frantic efforts to inflame and prejudice the public mind. Grant's campaign against Richmond was declared hopeless. Hood was certain to march to the Ohio. Sherman was courting annihilation. The North was proclaimed as in favor of acquiescing in Confederate demands. Northern cities were full of Confederate refugees and spies, plots were laid to release the prisoners at Chicago and burn the city. A great conspiracy against the government was detected in the Western States. Riots broke out in New York City which according to General Dix, contained "more disaffection and disloyalty, independent of the elements of disturbance always here, than any other city in the Union."

The election relieved the gloom, in so far as it was attributable to politics. Lincoln was elected by a popular majority of over 400,000 votes. It occurred on November 8th. The result was the signal for hurrying re-inforcements to the front. Grant asked for his quota, saying: "Sherman's movement may compel Lee to send troops from Richmond, and if he does I want to be prepared to annoy him." McClellan resigned his commission in the army on November 8th. The entire military situation changed with Sherman's start. Grant said, "I would not, if I could, just now do anything to force the enemy out of Richmond or Petersburg. It would liberate too much of a force to oppose Sherman with." The whole effort now and for some time would be clear a path for Sherman and to augment Thomas' force, on which the brunt of the next heavy fighting was sure to fall. Supplies were already on their way to the neighborhood of Savannah. Rations for thirty days, clothing for 60,000 men, and forage for 15,000 horses, were ordered to Mobile bay to await the

possibility of Sherman's appearance there. Canby was ordered to operate on Beauregard's and Hood's communications. Foster was directed to destroy railroads between Savannah and Charleston. Rosecrans was ordered to assist Thomas directly.

As already known, the departure of Sherman, threw the command of all the Tennessee forces on Thomas. His operations depended on the course Hood might take after the designs of Sherman were revealed to the enemy. Thomas, therefore, in the midst of his preparations to meet Hood should he cross the Tennessee, kept strict watch on him, lest he might turn in pursuit of Sherman. He was prepared to follow if Hood took a backward step. On November 16th, Sherman marched out of Atlanta. On the same day Beauregard telegraphed word to Richmond: "Sherman is about to move with three corps from Atlanta to Augusta or Macon, thence probably to Charleston or Savannah." This information was sent too Hood, who was left his choice of dividing his forces and going to the rescue of General Cobb in Georgia; or of at once assuming a bold offensive and thus relieving him. Hood immediately chose the latter, and put his columns in motion, intending to strike between Thomas' forces at Palaski, and those at Nashville. Thomas divined his intentions and fell back before Hood's superior numbers. He fully adopted the policy of slow retreat back to Nashville, for the double reason that it gave him time to concentrate his scattered forces, while it encouraged Hood to pursue, thus committing him more and more to his northern movements, and, of course, drawing him further from Sherman's rear. All possibility of Hood's forces following Sherman came to an end in this way, and Thomas had to prepare for the great battle of Nashville, which was begun on December 15th, 1864, and resulted in the total defeat of Hood and

his retreat from Tennessee with the loss of more than half of his army. The prophecy of Jefferson Davis had come true. The snows of winter had indeed witnessed a "Moscow retreat." It was not Sherman, however, but Hood who had played the part of the discomfited Napoleon. Thomas had not only rolled back a daring invasion whose success would have undone all of Sherman's work since he left Chattanooga, thrown both Kentucky and Tennessee irretrievably into the Confederacy, and prolonged the war for years, but he annihilated the Western Confederate army, the very object Sherman had set out to achieve eight months before. Since Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi had been drained of material to fill the ranks of Hood, the fully appointed and hopeful legions which Sherman led out of Atlanta could not only march unmolested to the sea, but could go whither they would in the face of the disheartened officers and broken squads of the enemy.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE MARCH TO THE SEA.

On November 12, 1864, Sherman cut off all communications to his rear, and threw his army into that campaign whose destination he did not know, whose direction was to be controlled by circumstances, whose support was to be the resources which the country provided. He would have to make all the time possible, meet emergencies as they arose, conform as nearly as possible to his ideal plan, co-operate as effectively as he could with his chief. It was a bold undertaking, and if executed successfully would prove as useful in results as it was brilliant in conception.

By November 14th all his troops were in or near Atlanta, and he had arranged them into four corps. The Fifteenth Corps under General P. J. Osterhaus, and the Seventeenth Corps under General Frank P. Blair, composed the right wing of his army, to whose command General Howard was assigned. The Fourteenth Corps under General Jeff. C. Davis, and the Twentieth Corps, under General A. S. Williams, composed the left wing of his army, to whose command General Slocum was assigned.

Osterhaus' Fifteenth Corps embraced the four divisions of Wood, Hazen, J. E. Smith and Corse.

Blair's Seventeenth Corps embraced the three divisions of Mower, Leggett and G. A. Smith,

Davis' Fourteenth Corps embraced the three divisions of Carlin, Morgan and Baird.