gency. But his personal movement was checked by a request from Hooker for further help, he having come upon the enemy in strong force at the mountain pass beyond Ringgold and having had a hard battle. Sherman's dispo sition of Howard's corps, had already turned the position of the enemy in Hooker's front, and by the time Sherman reached Hooker, the enemy had fled to Tunnel Hill, a point outside of the Chattanooga Valley and entirely off the soil of Tennessee.

At Ringgold Sherman again met Grant, and it was agreed that all that could be accomplished in the way of pursuit and destruction in that direction had been achieved. Sherman was therefore ordered to confine his further operations to the direction of Charleston and the line of the Hiawasse. This would be to aid Granger's corps which Grant had already started to Burnside's aid at Knoxville, and, as it turned out, to place Sherman also in the direct line of march thither.

In the battles which are grouped under that of Chattanooga, Grant's losses were 757 killed, 4,529 wounded, and 330 missing, a total of 5,616. The enemy's losses in killed and wounded were lighter owing to their more advantageous positions, but to them must be added the loss of 6,142 prisoners, 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery wagons, and 7,000 small arms. Hooker fought with about 10,000 men, Sherman with 20,000, including Howard's corps, and Thomas with 30,000. Bragg had 45,000; equal to thrice that number considering the advantages of his positions. In many respects Chattanooga was one of the most magnificent battles ever fought. The plans were well studied and deep. They embraced the most delicate manœuvres under the very eye of the enemy. Only the most skillful generals, and those in thorough accord, could have held to

the original plans. Only the most undaunted soldiers could have turned the toil which preceded action and the heroism which was required for it into victory. Chattanooga was the crowning result of a myriad of causes, a culmination of grandly conceived and concentered ideas, all betokening military genius of the highest order and military execution as definite as machine work. Tenacious fighting did the work at Shiloh. Magnificent strategy conquered Vicksburg. Complicated manoeuvre bewildered Bragg at Chattanooga, and prompt action drove him like a whirlwind from his proud pinnacle. The importance of the victory to the country could not be magnified. It laid bare the very heart of the Confederacy. Its powerful border stronghold was gone, as well as its base for further Northern operations in the West. There was a way to Atlanta and the fields and magazines of the South. And it was a victory as important to Sherman as to Grant, in showing that the Government had made no mistake by giving to the one the control of the Division of the Mississippi and to the other the command of the Army of the Tennessee. Sherman received the direct compliments of Grant for his steadfast and heroic part in the battle. The Government thanked him through its officials, and after his return from Knoxville the Senate and House of Representatives resolved, "That the thanks of Congress and of the people of the United States are due and are hereby tendered, to Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commander of the Department and Army of the Tennes see, and officers and soldiers under him, for their gallant and arduous services in marching to the relief of the Army of the Cumberland, and for their gallantry and heroism in the battle of Chattanooga, which contributed in a great degree to the success of our arms in that glorious victory."

CHAPTER X.

KNOXVILLE AND MERIDIAN.

After the magnificent battle and splendid victory at Chattanooga, or rather Missionary Ridge, Nov. 25th, 1863, Sherman's forces pursued the fleeing Confederate columns as far as Ringgold, where they met those of Hooker, who had also been engaged in a vigorous pursuit. Here Grant came up, who, on learning that Bragg was in full retreat toward Dalton, ordered the pursuit off, in order that he might relieve Knoxville, where Burnside was known to be in great danger. Even before the battle of Missionary Ridge, Bragg had detached Longstreet's corps to augment the Confederate forces which were closing in on Knoxville and threatening its capture, together with entire East Tennessee. Grant and Sherman spent the night of Nov. 27th together at Graysville, and the whole matter of the relief of Burnside was talked over. Grant would go back to Chattanooga at once, and start Granger's Fourth Corps toward Knoxville. Sherman was to march his corps in the same direction, keeping out well into the country and picking up all the forage he could find, so as to relieve the slack stores at Chattanooga.

By Nov. 29th all his columns converged at Cleveland, and the next day he was at the railroad crossing on the Hiawassee, near Charleston. Here he had word from Grant, to the effect that Burnside was completely invested by Longstreet, and in need of instant relief, and that he

(Grant) had lost faith in Granger's ability to reach the scene in time. He therefore asked Sherman to assume command of all the forces moving up the Tennessee, including Granger's Corps, and out of them to organize such a force as he deemed adequate for the situation. The necessity for promptitude was great, and this new tax on Sherman's tired troops was felt keenly by them.

But Sherman was equal to the task. He outlined his march with great dispatch, and by the night of December 3d his cavalry advance, under Long, reached Knoxville to convey to Burnside the welcome news that Sherman was rapidly approaching with force sufficient to raise the siege. On December 5th the head of Sherman's infantry column reached Marysville, fifteen miles distant from Knoxville. This approach was too much for Longstreet, and he hurriedly raised the siege, after having tried in a desperate assault to break through Burnside's fortification. Longstreet retreated up the valley toward Virginia. Sherman halted his entire army, except two divisions. With these and his entire staff, he pushed on and entered Knoxville on December 6th to consult with Burnside as to measures of pursuit. Burnside said he had already taken steps to pursue, and thought he would be successful with the aid of two of Granger's divisions. Sherman tendered him the help of his own jaded and half frozen forces. Having spent a few days in and about Knoxville and supplied Burnside with all he needed to conduct a vigorous pursuit of Longstreet, he began an easy return march to Chattanooga, which was reached on December 16th. Here, Sherman was ordered to restore the two divisions of Howard and Davis, borrowed for the occasion of the Knoxville campaign, to their original place in Thomas' army, and to take his own

Fifteenth corps into Northern Alabama for the balance of the winter.

Sherman's report furnishes the details of this Knoxville operation, so promptly executed and so pregnant with results. Its gist is to the following effect:-Grant's fears that Granger could not reach Knoxville in time, induced him to order Sherman to take command of all the troops moving to Burnside's relief, and to hasten to his rescue. Seven days before, he had left camp on the Tennessee with with two days' rations, without a change of clothing and with but a single coat and blanket per man. He was illy sppulied for such a march, having no provisions except what had been gathered on the way to Charleston. But the thought that 12,000 fellow-soldiers were beleagured in a mountain town, 84 miles distant and that relief must be had in three days, was a stimulus to further sacrifices. That night Howard repaired and planked the railroad bridge at Charleston, and at daylight the army crossed the Hiawasse, and marched to Athens a distance of fifteen miles. In the night his cavalry overtook him in Athens. Here he sent word to Granger, who was skirting the Tennessee, to push out and meet him at Philadelphia.

On December 2d, he moved rapidly toward Loudon, twenty six miles distant, sending his cavalry ahead to save, if possible, the bridge across the Tennessee, which was held by a Confederate Brigade under Vaughn. The cavalry moved rapidly and captured every Confederate picket, but Vaughn's artillery proved too strong for a successful cavalry dash and darkness set in before Howard got his infantry up. The enemy decamped in the night destroying pontoons, running locomotives and cars into the Tennessee and aband oning four guns and many provisions, which fell into Howard's hands in the morning. The destruction of the bridge