had, at 4 P.M., checked the enemy, and were preparing the next day to assume the offensive. I remember the fact the better from General Grant's anecdote of his at Donelson battle, which he told me then for the first time-that, at a certain period of the battle he saw that either side was ready to give way, if the other showed a bold front, and he determined to do that very thing, to advance on the enemy, when, as he prognosticated, the enemy surrendered. At 4 P. M. of April 6th, he thought the appearance the same, and ne judged, with Lewis Wallace's fresh division and such of our startled troops as had recovered their equilibrium, he would be justified in dropping the defensive and assuming the offensive in the morning. And, I repeat, I received such orders before I knew General Buell's troops were at the river. I admit that I was glad Buell was there because I knew his troops were older than ours, and better systematized and drilled, and his arrival made that certain, which before was uncertain. I have heard this question much discussed, and must say, that the officers of Buell's army dwelt too much on the stampede of some of our raw troops, and gave to us too little credit for the fact that for one whole day, weakened as we were by the absence of Buell's army, long expected, of Lewis Wallace's Division, only four miles off, and of the fugitives from our ranks, we had beaten off our assailants for the time. At the same time, our army of the Tennessee have indulged in severe criticisms at the slow approach of that army which knew the danger that threatened us from the concentrated armies of Johnston, Beaure gard and Bragg, that lay at Corinth. In a war like this, where opportunities for personal prowess are as plenty as blackberries, to those who seek them at the front, all such criminations should be frowned down; and were it not for the military character of your journal, I would not venture

to offer a correction to a very popular error.

I will also avail myself of this occasion to correct a another very common mistake, in attributing to General Grant the selection of that battle-field. It was chosen by that veteran soldier, Major-General Charles F. Smith, who ordered my division to disembark there, and strike for the Charleston Railroad. This order was subsequently modified, by his ordering Hurlbut's Division to disembark there, and mine higher up the Tennessee, at the mouth of Yellow Creek, to strike the railroad at Burnsville. But floods prevented our reaching the railroad, when General Smith ordered me in person also to disembark at Pittsburg Landing, and take post well out, so as to make plenty of room, with Snake and Lick Creeks the flanks of a camp for the grand army of in

vasion.

It was General Smith who selected that field of battle, and it was well chosen. On any other we surely would have been overwhelmed, as both Lick and Snake Creeks forced the enemy to confine his movement to a direct front attack, which new troops are better qualified to resist than where the flanks are exposed to a real or chimerical danger. Even the divisions of that army were arranged in that camp by General Smith's order, my division forming, as it were, the outlying picket, whilst McClernand's and Prentiss' were the real line of battle, with W. H. L. Wallace in support of the right wing, and Hurlbut of the left; Lewis Wallace Division being detached. All these subordinate dispositions were made by the order of General Smith, before General Grant, succeeded him to the command of all the forces up the Tennessee, headquarters at Savannah. If there were any error in putting that army on the west side of the Tennessee, exposed to the superior force of the enemy also assembling at Corinth, the mistake was not General Grant's; but there was

no mistake. It was necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, to test the manhood of the two armies, should come off, and that was as good a place as any. It was not then a question of military skill and strategy, but of courage and pluck, and I am convinced that every life lost that day to us was necessary, for otherwise at Corinth, at Memphis, at Vicksburg, we would have found harder resistance, had we not shown our enemies that, rude and untutored as we were, we could fight as well as they.

Excuse so long a letter, which is very unusual for me; but of course my life is liable to cease at any moment, and I happen to be a witness to certain truths which are now beginning to pass out of memory, and form what is called history.

I also take great pleasure in adding, that nearly all of the new troops that at Shiloh drew from me official censure, have more than redeemed their good name; among them, that very regiment which first broke, the 53d Ohio, Colonel Appen. Under another leader, Colonel Jones, it has shared every campaign and expedition of mine since, is with me now, and can march, and bivouac, and fight as well as the the best regiment in this or any army. Its reputation now is equal to that of any from the State of Ohio.

I am, with respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

CHAPTER VII.

MEMPHIS AND BEYOND.

While Grant and Smith were making sure ground for the "Army of the Tennessee" on the line of the Tennessee River, Pope was moving down the Mississippi against Island No. 10 and New Madrid. Pope's army was power, fully supported by the gunboat fleet under Admiral Foote. On the date of the battle of Shiloh, Pope and Foote were bombarding Island No. 10 and the batteries on the Kentucky shore opposite; Pope, having run his steamers to the Easts hore, captured a large part of the Confederate forces near Tiptonville.

Halleck still remained at St. Louis, and seemed dazed with the successes of his Generals. Instead of following up the triumphs on the line of the Mississippi, he ordered Pope around and up the Tennessee, and following him, took command of the Tennessee operations in person. Foote's gunboat fleet descended the Mississippi till brought to a stand at Fort Pillow, 50 miles above Memphis. It was at this juncture that Farragut entered the mouth of the Mississippi and prepared to co-operate with Butler for the reduction of Forts Jackson and Philip, and the capture of New Orleans,

Shiloh had been fought on April 6 and 7. On the 8th the enemy cleared the front of the Union army, leaving behind killed, wounded and much property. The close of the battle had left the Army of the Tennessee on the right of the line and the Army of the Ohio on the left, but neither

Grant nor Buell seemed to exercise command, both being busy in repairing damages. All the subordinate officers were wholly engrossed with collecting stragglers, burying dead and caring for the wounded. After this came the re-organization of existing forces. Sherman consolidated his four brigades into three, the First under General M. L. Smith, the Second under Colonel John A. McDowell, the Third under General J. W. Denver. While thus re. organized and ready for an advance, he was promoted to the rank of Major General of Volunteers, a merited compliment, after the hard fought field of Shiloh.

In a few days Halleck arrived by boat and assumed personal command. He came full of the prejudices which had been inspired by worthless newspaper correspondents against Grant, and in a few days issued an order re-organizing the entire army. Buell's army was given the centre; Pope's army, then arriving, was given the left; the right was composed of Sherman's division, Hurlbut's division, and two others made up of fragments of Prentiss' and Smith's coinmands. General Thomas was taken from Buell's command and placed in command of this newly formed right. The two divisions of Wallace and McClernand were placed in reserve under McClernand. Grant was practically ignored, though he still retained his staff and an escort of one small company of Illinois cavalry. For a month he remained thus ostracised, during which time he visited Sherman often, not to complain, yet unable to conceal his indignation at the insult heaped upon him.

Sherman was now immediately under Thomas, a classmate of his at West Point, and a chum of the old army. The enemy had stopped at and fortified Cornith, 30 miles distant from Shiloh. They had received large re-inforce