Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal InterpretationHarvard University Press, 2006 - 333 páginas How should judges, in America and elsewhere, interpret statutes and the Constitution? Previous work on these fundamental questions has typically started from abstract views about the nature of democracy or constitutionalism, or the nature of legal language, or the essence of the rule of law. From these conceptual premises, theorists typically deduce an ambitious role for judges, particularly in striking down statutes on constitutional grounds. In this book, Adrian Vermeule breaks new ground by rejecting both the conceptual approach and the judge-centered conclusions of older theorists. Vermeule shows that any approach to legal interpretation rests on institutional and empirical premises about the capacities of judges and the systemic effects of their rulings. Drawing upon a range of social science tools from political science, economics, decision theory, and other disciplines, he argues that legal interpretation is above all an exercise in decisionmaking under severe empirical uncertainty. In view of their limited information and competence, judges should adopt a restrictive, unambitious set of tools for interpreting statutory and constitutional provisions, deferring to administrative agencies where statutes are unclear and deferring to legislatures where constitutional language is unclear or states general aspirations. |
Contenido
Introduction | 1 |
Critique | 13 |
Interpretation without Institutions | 15 |
Dynamism and Pragmatism A Tale of Two Nirvanas | 40 |
Reconstruction | 61 |
The Institutional Turn | 63 |
Judicial Capacities A Case Study | 86 |
Systemic Effects and Judicial Coordination | 118 |
Applications | 149 |
Judges Uncertainty and Bounded Rationality | 153 |
Statutory Interpretation | 183 |
Judicial Review and Constitutional Interpretation | 230 |
Interim Interpretive Theory | 289 |
Notes | 293 |
323 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation Adrian Vermeule Vista de fragmentos - 2006 |
Términos y frases comunes
adjudication ambiguous Antonin Scalia argument bill bounded rationality canons Chapter Chevron claim clear and specific common-law conceptual Congress consequentialist constitutional interpretation constitutional texts constitutionalism decision costs decision-procedures decisionmaking default rules deference to agencies democracy-forcing Dworkin dynamic emphasized empirical error Eskridge Eskridge's example federal formalism formalist H. L. A. Hart high-level Holy Trinity institutional blindness institutional capacities institutionalist intentionalist inter interpre interpretive approaches interpretive choice interpretive doctrine interpretive rules interpretive theory issue Jon Elster judges judicial capacities judicial coordination judicial review judiciary Justice legal interpretation legal system legislative history legislative intent legislatures meaning normative originalist outcomes particular political Posner possible pragmatic precedent premises pretive principle problems produce provisions purposivism question regime relevant Richard Posner satisficing Scalia Schauer second-best sources statutes statutory interpretation statutory text suggest supra note Supreme Court systemic effects textualism textualist Thayerian theorists tion tutional uncertainty updating value theory variables